The "New Economic Policy" had a strong stroke in the history of the Soviet Union, and from a certain point of view, this set of reforms saved the young Soviet power from the tragic fate of premature death. As one of the most frequently mentioned terms in that period of history, its content is presumably not to be repeated here. What is less well known is that the Nemopolitan Economic Policy was not a calm and spontaneous change at the top of the Soviets; on the contrary, when it was created, a considerable number of senior leaders even shouted that "Russia is doomed"; in addition, Lenin always regarded it as a "concession" under all helplessness, and even once hoped to launch a "counter-offensive".
With the development of social productive forces, the material materials produced by people will often exceed daily needs, and the extra things will be exchanged to communicate with each other; to buy three pounds of rice, you must carry two watermelons, such "equivalent exchange" is too troublesome, so people created the concept of "general equivalents", and later formed money, and the market was formed step by step on this basis. Of course, the market is very complex, so three or two sentences can not be accurately summarized, but the market development to today, we seem to have been unable to imagine the world without money will be like. Yet in the eyes of the early leaders of Soviet power, both the market and the banknotes were evil, because they were tools of "exploitation" by the capitalists.
Lenin firmly believed that when human society reached its final stage, the market would disappear and the currency would disappear; and at the very end of the October Revolution, when the Wealth of Russian Society was poor, the people were poor, and only most of the wealth was piled up in the Tsar's palace. The main purpose of the Soviet hierarchy, which was initially implemented as a grain expropriation system, was to collect from the peasants enough materials to sustain the civil war, but Lenin apparently placed higher expectations on it. In September 1920, he replied to the deputies' questions: "Let every peasant family have no surplus grain left." ”
Lenin wanted to see the government concentrate all its materials and use them to restore state industry and establish a complete and powerful industrial system; when the country is strong, the people will naturally get the means of subsistence they deserve. The view that many articles have therefore accused Lenin of "oppression" is too out of context, but it is undeniable that the soviet leadership is too naïve at this time. Imagine first letting the people take out the money in their pockets, and then making promises to them such as "When the country becomes rich in a few years, it will never fail you", who will listen to this set of normal people? Moreover, the Soviet regime was much stranger to it than the tsarist regime, and secondly, the latter's attitude in harvesting grain was no better than that of its predecessors, and the peasants even privately called the workers in charge of grain collection "bandits on horseback".
In the first few years, the authorities perceived great resistance to the expropriation of grain, but Lenin believed that these were only minor setbacks on the road to nation-building, until the outbreak of increasingly frequent peasant uprisings. It is worth mentioning that the grain expropriation system does not seem to be a temporary intention of soviet power, because as early as September 1917, Lenin mentioned in his article "Whether the Bolsheviks Can Protect the Regime": "The monopoly of grain, the rationing of bread and the universal compulsory labor system are the most powerful means at present." Therefore, when farmers are reluctant to give grain to others, the countermeasures at the top are also resolute and decisive, which inevitably does not cause public indignation. According to official records, from the middle of 1918, a small number of "bandits" ganged up; by the end of 1920, the phenomenon of "bandits" had spread to Siberia, Tambov, Voronezh and the middle volga. The following year, banditry had infiltrated Ukraine and even Central Asia, and it was clear that it had become a serious threat that could not be ignored.
The so-called "bandits" were peasants who were dissatisfied with the forcible deprivation of grain, and at first Lenin and his comrades did not think much of the bandits, believing that they were merely provoked by the old Russian forces and that they were enemies of the proletarian regime and should be resolutely suppressed; until two events occurred in succession, Lenin was deeply shocked and had to reflect on his decision-making.
In 1920, a group of forces in Tambov Province, known as the "Antonov Gang", appeared in Tambov Province, and unlike other peasant uprisings, this group was organized and disciplined, and even promulgated their own program, playing "Down with the grain expropriation system!" Long live free trade! " slogan. Antonov responded, and his troops swelled wildly. Ironically, Antonov's army also had a political commissar, almost carved out of a mold with the Soviet army. According to official records, the "Antonov gang" once reached 50,000 people, and in fact, almost all adult men in Tambov Province participated.
In March 1921, kronstadt sailors, who were called "the glory of the October Revolution" by the Soviet high command, revolted. Officers and soldiers gathered in the Square of Jacor and openly professed their support for Soviet power and opposition to bureaucracy, hoping to give dissidents a fair chance. Among the many participants, a significant number were Soviet soldiers and Bolsheviks. However, the precarious situation did not allow Lenin and the others to hold their patience, and Tukhachevsky was ordered to personally suppress the Antonov gang and the Kronstadt Uprising, and although the situation was stabilized to a certain extent, Lenin was deeply shocked.
On March 15, 1921, Lenin delivered a speech: "We must first clarify the question of how the working class should treat the peasantry. Lenin realized that the working class is not the "absolute main force" of Russia today, but the peasants, who constitute the majority of the population. However, the attitude of the top to the peasants has always been very unfriendly, and the peasants will not oppose your regime and policy because of its name, but what kind of loss it has suffered. The grain expropriation system was implemented in Tsarist Russia during World War I, and the Provisional Government after the February Revolution was also implemented, and they were all overthrown; now the desperate situation is before the Soviets. Lenin said: "The dissatisfaction of the peasantry is justified, and this situation can no longer be continued. ”
When lenin made a decision to make changes and find a way out, the first thought that popped into Lenin's mind was "freedom of turnover", that is, to end the grain monopoly. Interestingly, when the decision was announced, some people in the venue even burst into tears and whispered, "Russia is finished." Because many of the participants were representatives from other countries, they regarded the big men at the top of the Soviet Power as idols and monuments of revolution; today, these idols want to engage in "free turnover", which is undoubtedly a regression in their cognition, this is the collapse of ideals, how can they bear it?
In fact, Lenin was very reluctant about this: once the peasants had surplus grain in their hands, the demand for the exchange of goods was bound to arise, which was likely to breed capitalism. However, the current policy has undoubtedly already broken through the bottom line that farmers can afford, and the introduction of new policies is imperative.
In fact, before the formation of the "New Economic Policy", the Soviet and Russian high-level officials had already carried out a pilot project and achieved good success. In 1920, when the Soviet-Polish War was in full swing, in order to stabilize the rear, the top brass implemented a policy of encouraging peasant labor in the Smolensk region, the core of which was to inform the peasants early in the morning what they needed to hand over, and the government guaranteed that not a single grain of rice would be overcharged, and the rest could be exchanged or even traded within a certain degree of freedom. This was called the "Small New Economic Policy" by the Soviet high command, and it was so successful in Smolensk that the authorities were able to harvest enough food in just one month, which increased its efficiency by tenfold. However, Lenin at that time only regarded it as a stopgap measure, and now had to make changes, and the "Small New Economic Policy" became the first choice.
Under Lenin's care, the economic expert Bukharin gave careful consideration to the new policy. According to the expectations of the Soviet and Russian high-level, the surplus grain in the hands of the peasants should first be used to exchange the means of subsistence with the state department, and if it is really impossible to avoid trade, then it is best to form a "small market" of limited scale in a small area, and try not to break this barrier. At the same time, the government must ensure that the process of collecting grain is fast, avoiding excessive entanglement, and making farmers feel that the pressure on them is indeed reduced. However, to the surprise of the top brass, in the face of the olive branches handed by the government, the farmers did not eat this set at all from the beginning.
It turned out that the grass-roots people had long since become birds of fright, and the sudden change in policy made them mistakenly believe that the authorities were changing their methods to engage in oppression. One of the most prominent aspects of the "New Economic Policy" is to encourage farmers to reclaim arable land. Although the more arable land there is, the more grain to hand over, the farmers who open up more land will enjoy preferential tax treatment. Even so, when government officials came to collect grain, the peasants tried to underreport by all means, which caused an interesting phenomenon: the peasants tried to cultivate grain, and by 1922, the total area of arable land in Soviet Russia was 13.6 million Russian mu less than last year. However, this suspicion of the peasants did not last long: in 1923, the government collected 361 million puts of grain, up 128 million puts from the previous year, the famine that broke out in 1921 was quickly quelled, and in 1924, the Soviet Union exported grain.
The "New Economic Policy" was undoubtedly a bout of tonic for the young Soviet regime, but the doubts about it at the top have not disappeared. When the decision was made to end the grain monopoly, the Soviet leadership split into two factions; Lenin claimed that "the new policy was adopted unanimously", but in fact the dissenting opinion was only not made public.
Soon after the implementation of the new policy, the representatives of the workers' opposition accused that the abbreviation of the New Economic Policy was "Nepp", which was consistent with the abbreviation of "new oppression of the proletariat", and its essence was a new exploitation! The peasants had plenty of money, and in the process of the "free turnover" of goods, there were many "speculators" in the market. Although Lenin did not think that these people could be regarded entirely as capitalists, in the face of a situation in which the circulation of goods in the country in 1923 had increased by more than a dozen times compared with the previous year, and fearing the resurgence of the "market of capital", he also tried to launch a "counter-offensive" against some of the "negative effects" brought about by the new policy. But in the face of a series of achievements in the development of the agricultural economy, Lenin's attitude has always been relatively tolerant. Although Lenin was able to hold the situation for a short time, this undoubtedly cast a shadow over the New Economic Policy.
It is worth noting that when the big guys were arguing about the merits and wrongs of the new policy, Stalin never expressed an attitude toward it. The only remarks associated with it were only a bitter sentence in the article "The Future" at the end of 1921, in which he added a "so-called" to the mention of the New Economic Policy; Stalin later admitted that he believed that the direction of the Soviet economy was predestined as early as 1918. Even more frightening than the outbreak of the problem is the forcible burial of dangerous problems and the hasty dismissal of the impact of the new policy before it has reached its peak, and the result seems to have been predestined.