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The Soviet counter-offensive in the Battle of Moscow was not enough to eliminate the Germans, so why such a large-scale counter-offensive?

The Soviet counter-offensive in the Battle of Moscow was not enough to eliminate the Germans, so why such a large-scale counter-offensive?

On December 5, 1941, the Soviets launched a counterattack, which came very suddenly, and the Germans, who had been frozen into ice sculptures around Moscow, were unable to resist and had to withdraw in a hurry, which was quickly turned into a rout by the Germans. But it should be pointed out that the Soviet army itself lacked the ability to annihilate a million German troops, so why did the Soviet army insist on launching a large-scale counterattack? What is the purpose of this?

I. Soviet counteroffensive

On 29 November, Zhukov proposed a strong counter-offensive against the Germans, estimating that the Germans were already short of attack capabilities and only needed to resist once, then he could launch a powerful counter-assault against the Germans.

He proposed that the Assault 1st and 10th Armies be allocated from the reserve of the High Command to the Western Front so that the Western Front under his command could launch a strong counteroffensive. The next day, Stalin called Zhukov, and Stalin asked Zhukov:

"Are you sure that the enemy is close to a state of crisis and that it is not possible to throw in a new heavy army group?"

The Soviet counter-offensive in the Battle of Moscow was not enough to eliminate the Germans, so why such a large-scale counter-offensive?

On the phone, Zhukov gave Stalin a clear answer

"The Germans are already extremely weak. However, without the addition of new troops, the Western Front could not have eliminated the danger of the enemy wedging into its defensive lines, and the situation would certainly deteriorate once the Germans were able to redeploy from Army Groups North and Army Groups South. ”

That night, Zhukov not only got the two army groups he needed, but also the newly formed 20th Army. Overjoyed, Zhukov immediately began to plan a counterattack, which of course had to be carried out on the premise of ensuring that they had completely resisted the German attack.

After 1 December, the German offensive forces came to a complete halt on the 320-kilometer-long arc of defense around Moscow, which was an excellent opportunity for Zhukov to counterattack.

After several days of planning, on 5 December, the Kalinin front led by Konev took the lead in launching a counterattack, and although the offensive was blocked, the Kalinin front cut into the German defenses.

On 6 December, the Soviet Western Front, under zhukov's command, launched a full-scale counteroffensive against the Germans after strong artillery preparations.

The right flank of the Western Front exerted strong pressure on the Germans, dividing and encircling the German blocs from Kling to Solnienogorsk.

The Soviet counter-offensive in the Battle of Moscow was not enough to eliminate the Germans, so why such a large-scale counter-offensive?

As of January 1, 1942,

The Soviet assaults on the 1st, 16th and 20th Armies were pushing the Germans backwards to the line of the Rama and Ruza rivers. In the centre, the 5th, 33rd, 43rd and 49th Armies operated on the lines of the Ruza, Nara and Oka rivers in the direction of Mzenszynk, Borovsk, Malojaroslavitz and Kondrovo.

On the left flank, the 10th and 50th Armies, as well as Belov's clusters, were victoriously pursuing the Germans, advancing towards Yukhnov, Mzensk and Kirov (southwest of Moscow).

At the same time, the Kalinin Front was attacking in the general direction of Stalica and Erzhev, while the forces of the rebuilt Bryansk Front were fighting on the front line of the Oka River later on the left flank of the Western Front.

Second, continue to attack? Or stop?

However, at this time, it should be noted that the Strength of the Soviet Army was only about 1.1 million at the beginning of the counter-offensive, and it was obviously more difficult to launch such a huge offensive.

For this reason, Zhukov believed that it was necessary to increase the strength of a total of 4 armies for the Bryansk Front, the Western Front, and the Kalinin Front, otherwise the offensive would be greatly frustrated.

Conversely, if he could, he could have repelled the Germans to the point where they launched the German offensive against Moscow in October 1941.

Unfortunately, Zhukov did not get these troops. Moscow, on January 5, 1942, recalled him to Moscow to discuss the next course of action of the Soviets.

The Soviet counter-offensive in the Battle of Moscow was not enough to eliminate the Germans, so why such a large-scale counter-offensive?

Almost all the people present at that time, including the Soviet Military Command and the General Staff,

The content of the meeting was to expand the offensive to the entire area, that is, the Soviet army had to launch a counterattack not only in the direction of Moscow, but also in the direction of Leningrad, etc., with the ultimate goal of eliminating the German forces in the direction of Leningrad, Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula.

In this case, it is not only necessary for the Soviet army in the direction of Moscow to launch a counterattack, but also for the Soviet army to launch a large counterattack in an all-round way, and strive to complete its contribution to one battle and eliminate the main force of the German army in one go.

This counterattack plan is unprecedentedly large, and according to the requirements,

The forces of the Western Front and the Kalinin Front, the left wing of the Northwestern Front and the Bryansk Front carried out the main assault on the German Army Group Center. The tasks of Leningrad's forces, the right wing of the North-West Front, and the Baltic Fleet were to crush the German Army Group North and remove the blockade of Leningrad. The task of the South-West front and the Southern Front was to crush the German Army Group South and liberate the Donbass region. The Caucasus Front and the Black Sea Fleet were responsible for the liberation of Crimea, and the start of this offensive should be as early as possible.

The Soviet counter-offensive in the Battle of Moscow was not enough to eliminate the Germans, so why such a large-scale counter-offensive?

This plan was opposed by Zhukov,

After all, the troops now lacked manpower and supplies, and it was impossible to achieve further attacks. The Soviets had to take advantage of this period to increase their strength and technical weapons, especially tanks, or it would be impossible to launch an attack.

Although Zhukov's proposal was correct, Stalin rejected it and demanded that the offensive continue. Afterwards, Shaposhnikov, chief of the General Staff, said that Zhukov was saying that the order had long been sent to the headquarters of the various armies, and that the troops would launch an offensive in the next few days.

Why was Stalin in a hurry to launch an offensive?

In fact, Stalin's rush to launch an offensive was not unreasonable.

Because from the overall situation of the battlefield, the Soviet army is now very unopposed, not only is there a shortage of troops, but also a shortage of weapons.

In fact, at the height of the war, the Germans were only about thirty kilometers away from Moscow.

Although the Germans had now been repulsed, the Germans still controlled multiple transportation hubs throughout the battlefield and were largely connected.

If these points could not be removed, it was clear that even if the Battle of Moscow had been won, the strategic initiative in 1942 would have been in the hands of the Germans, not the Soviets.

The Soviet counter-offensive in the Battle of Moscow was not enough to eliminate the Germans, so why such a large-scale counter-offensive?

This situation is very troublesome, because whoever has the strategic initiative will be in better control of the situation in 1942.

If the Soviets were to grasp the situation, they would have to push the front as far forward as possible in early 1942, at least to drive the Germans out of multiple transportation hubs. Otherwise, the two sides would have to continue fighting in the direction of Moscow in 1942.

And this is a fatal question for the Soviets - that is, if there is another battle in Moscow, will the Soviets be able to resist the Germans? The answer is obviously no, and in another battle of Moscow, it is obvious that the Soviets will find it difficult to hold Moscow.

If, according to Zhukov, the troops first reserve troops and equipment, and then launch an attack.

Zhukov's judgment was accurate, then, that before the end of the offensive, he could at most push his troops to the Position of the German Army in October, that is, in the Smolensk area.

However, there was a problem with this, and at this time the German army was also actively sending reserve troops to the Soviet battlefield.

The Germans of the nine divisions will arrive soon, and more reinforcement battalions will be transported to the front. The Luftwaffe also added four bomber wings, a fighter wing, and six transport winges to strengthen the Eighth Air Force.

The result would then be that after two to three months of accumulating strength, the battle would continue to revolve around Moscow.

The Soviet counter-offensive in the Battle of Moscow was not enough to eliminate the Germans, so why such a large-scale counter-offensive?

The consequence of this was very serious, that is, the Soviet army was forced to continue to concentrate its forces in the direction of Moscow to fight another strategic decisive battle with the German army, and the focus of the decisive battle would undoubtedly be Moscow.

If this happened, the Soviets would be forced to concentrate their forces here, not only the existing forces, but also the reserve forces that the Soviets needed to train in the rear.

However, the area around Moscow is almost a horse, and the Soviet army is doomed to become a nightmare because of insufficient industry and technical weapons.

It can be said that if the attack was stopped after January 5, the result would be nothing more than the second Battle of Moscow in the summer of 1942. This time, the Soviets would have no advantage at all.

epilogue

The fact that another counterattack in January 1942 had little effect is a fact. But at least it forced the Germans to withdraw from many strategic points across the line and changed their axis of attack. The Germans no longer made Moscow their primary target, but took the south as their main direction, planning to wipe out the Soviet forces west of the Don and seize the oil fields and passages of the Caucasus. Arguably, it was precisely the expanded counterattack that influenced the judgment of the German high command and ensured that the moscow direction was no longer attacked.

Reference: Sweeping Through a Thousand Armies

History of the Second World War

Memories and Reflections

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