Ukraine, Russia's highest priority country 丨 Book excerpt

Wen 丨 Bobo Luo

(This article is excerpted from The Lonely Empire: Russia and the Disorder of the New World (published in January 2019). The author, Bobo Royce, is an internationally renowned expert on Russian foreign and security policy, with a long-term focus on Russian relations. Interface News is authorized by the publisher to publish. ）

The most important relationship between the two countries for Russia is its intimate but often tricky relationship with Ukraine. Ukraine is not only a foreign policy imperative, it is also at the heart of Russian identity, culture and historical notions. For Putin, and undoubtedly for most Russians, the concept of an independent Ukraine is meaningless, since kievan rus' founding in the 10th century, especially since the union in 1654, the two countries have enjoyed a common history. As Putin put it, Ukraine "is a Great Russia, or part of the Russian-Ukrainian world." While Putin denies any attempt to create a new unified state, it is clear that he sees Ukraine's emergence as an independent sovereign state as a regrettable historical accident.

However, in the Russian elite and public consciousness, Ukraine's importance does not stem solely from history. Equally critical is its pivotal strategic location. From Moscow's point of view, whoever controls Ukraine will dominate Eastern Europe and exert greater influence in Europe and Eurasia. The competition of power here is not only a static concept of geopolitical space, but also control over the important pipelines and transport routes connecting Europe and Asia. With the same mindset, controlling Ukraine's national security as Russia understands it is indispensable. "Losing" Ukraine would put Russia's own security in jeopardy. Ukraine is also very important economically, as it is Russia's third largest trading partner after the European Union and China. Despite the sharp decline in the magnitude of direct gas imports from Russia, it remains an important customer of Gazprom. Since the Soviet era, the military-industrial complex of Russia and Ukraine has been inseparable. In addition, until now, Russia has been the largest importer of Ukrainian agricultural products.

Developments in Russia and Ukraine make these considerations even more important. Back in 2004, Putin took steps to strengthen his power out of concern about the broader impact of the Orange Revolution, although his political fortunes were on the rise thanks to rising oil prices and annual economic growth of 6 to 7 percent. After 10 years, Putin's anxiety has increased significantly. The anti-Putin protests of 2011-2012 struck a blow to the complacency of the Putin government. Moreover, russia's economy has stagnated since 2013, threatening Putin's exchange of material welfare for the foundations of a solid political social contract. In this case, the Ukrainian revolution brought a deeper sense of crisis.

Putin himself has invested so much capital in Ukraine that any victory or defeat is personally at stake. The fall of Mr. Yanukovych in February 2014 was not only one of the most serious setbacks in Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet era, but also a serious personal disgrace that Putin absolutely could not tolerate. On the contrary, for Putin, the significance of the subsequent "annexation" of Crimea was not that it represented the moral behavior of oppressed minorities to correct historical errors, nor was it the victory over ukrainian "fascists" and Western powers. Most importantly, it was Putin's personal victory – as evidenced by the unprecedented rise in support.

It is difficult to find out Russia's consistent strategy toward Ukraine. Its strategy is a strange mixture of mysterious expectations, historical and geopolitical anxieties, a sense of strategic entitlement, intuition, and tactical flexibility. Putin's approach reflects the paradoxical influence of the two worlds that more generally shape his foreign policy. On the one hand, the Kremlin envisions Ukraine and its relations with Russia in terms of historical necessity; On the other hand, the development of the real world constantly warns it that such fantasies are divorced from the real situation.

Contrary to the views of some Western commentators, there is no indication that Russia has grand plans to include Ukraine in the Russian Federation. To illustrate this, just after Yanukovych's fall, Putin's repeated refusal to reintegrate Crimea has diverged from the position of most political factions in Russia since the early 1990s. This relative restraint stems in part from Putin's notion of respect for the law, which is important to respect the law on the surface, if not in spirit. Just as he used the election of Medvedev as president as a stopgap measure to ban three consecutive presidents, so he has tried to cloak Russia's policy toward Ukraine in due process. Therefore, the "annexation" of Crimea was carried out in the form of a referendum, showing that its people have the right to make their own choices. (As for the referendum as little more than a cover, it doesn't matter to the Kremlin, what matters is that there was such a procedure.) )

But the main thing that stops Putin's attempt to reintegrate Ukraine into the territory is not the law, but the impracticality of the path. It is not the impact of Western sanctions that plays a deterrent role in this regard, but only a secondary consideration. The real problem is that the inclusion of Ukraine as part of the Russian Federation would place a heavy burden on Moscow, especially when it faced increasing economic pressure (already evident before the sanctions). As Clifford Gady and Barry Ickes observed, Russia "can't afford to ... To win Ukraine, that is, to include Ukraine in its territory, Russia will not only spend $10 billion a year to burden the eastern part of Ukraine, but if it wants to cut off the rest of Ukraine from the Western market, Russia will need to invest more money to support it." Another obvious consequence is that the more directly Russia gets into Ukraine, the greater the resistance it will encounter. Currently, pro-European and pro-NATO sentiment is spreading sharply due to Moscow's actions in Crimea and southeastern Ukraine.

From the Kremlin's perspective, the best-case scenario is for Ukraine to become a dysfunctional, but relatively stable, with close political, strategic, and economic ties with Russia. In this situation, Moscow only needs to take the middle way, neither to support its crisis-ridden, long-dependent, and sometimes turbulent neighbors, nor to compete with a confident Ukraine committed to pursuing an independent, European-oriented foreign policy. Such a bad, messy Ukraine would be more willing to abide by Russia's priorities and would not give the West an interest in meddling in its affairs.

Perfect plan... However, Former Chancellor Viktor Chernomyrdin of Yeltsin famously said, "We want the best, but the result is usually the same as always." For years, Putin found Kiev a frustrating partner. He suffered two major setbacks — the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the anti-government demonstrations in Ukraine in 2014 — and even if a friendlier leader emerges in Ukraine, it will be difficult to get people to obey his leadership. Putin, for example, had hoped that Yanukovych's victory in the 2010 presidential election would improve the severely deteriorating relations between the two countries under his predecessor, Victor Yushchenko. There has indeed been some progress to some extent. The bilateral atmosphere improved markedly, relations in political, security and military institutions strengthened, and Kiev quickly agreed to extend the lease on the port of Sevastopol, the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, for another 25 years until 2042. Yanukovych also downplayed sensitive historical issues, such as the famine of 1932-1933 that killed at least 3 million Ukrainians.

But the subsequent direction of the relationship disappointed the Kremlin. While relations within the polity remain close, the Yanukovych regime has sought to give itself some backsliding by seeking military support, technology, and trade through other channels. Ukraine is regularly involved in the activities of NATO's Partnership for Peace program, and although requests to join NATO have been shelved, cooperation in areas such as military exercises has increased. Ukraine's vision is not limited to Europe. It has also expanded military-technical cooperation with China. In December 2013, as anti-government demonstrations in Ukraine intensified, Mr. Yanukovych took the time to travel to Beijing to sign a contract worth about $30 billion.

Ukraine's resistance to Russian pressure and "sweet talk" is most evident in the economic sphere. Local oligarchs Rinat Akhmetov, Dmytro Firtash, Viktor Pinchuk and others resisted Russian plunder of their business empire. Yanukovych took a staunch opposition to Gazprom taking over Ukraine's state-owned oil and gas company (Naftohaz) and Ukraine's pipeline system. He also demanded renegotiation of the gas deal signed between Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Putin in 2009, under which Ukraine pays much more than European customers such as Germany and Italy. Gas imports from Russia fell by nearly half directly, and the gap was filled by cheaper Russian gas bought from Germany. Ukraine has also signed $10 billion each of shale gas exploration and extraction contracts with Royal Dutch Shell and Chevron. (Suspended due to the current conflict, falling global oil prices and the collapse of the Ukrainian economy.) )

Most typically, Yanukovych refused to join the Customs Union under pressure from Russia. He has been juggling Brussels and Moscow, abruptly changing his mind at the last minute in November 2013 without signing a Joint Agreement with the EU. Not only is Yanukovych trying to secure $20 billion in subsidies from the Eu, but he also wants to secure (non-existent) associate membership of the Customs Union – to benefit from membership but not to be bound by any promises. The Kremlin was dissatisfied with Kiev's tactics, but as long as Yanukovych ruled Ukrainian politics, it had to deal with him.

As a result of the outbreak of the Ukrainian Revolution, it is easy to forget that Putin and Yanukovych's views on bilateral relations and Ukraine's place in the international system are so divergent. Faced with a direct threat to his personal business interests, Yanukovych was forced to accept a $15 billion aid package from the Kremlin and a one-third reduction in the price of Russian gas in exchange for Ukraine abandoning negotiations for a joint agreement with the European Union. But he still wants to keep Europe's way back. In his efforts to maintain strategic flexibility, Ukraine's independence, and economic integration with Europe, Yanukovych had much more in common with his political opponents than was widely accepted.

Same goals, different situations. Yanukovych's downfall drew Moscow's attention to Ukraine and took action. Against the backdrop of constant hostilities with Europe and, especially, the United States, the Kremlin's zero-sum mentality has been exposed. However, its underlying assumptions and goals remain unchanged. As before, its primary goal is control, not conquest—in other words, the projection of power under limited responsibility. Putin's actions continue to be based on Russia's primary interest in governing Ukraine, especially in the region of foreign and security policy (but not only that). This resembles Brezhnev's so-called concept of "limited sovereignty" that applies to relations between the Soviet Union and members of the Warsaw Pact. Ukraine can be formally independent, but not fully sovereign. Russia can not meddle in its day-to-day decisions, but retain its de facto veto.

Of course, the situation facing Moscow in pursuing its goals has changed. Most obviously, the main instrument of Russia's influence no longer exists — a less than satisfactory, but once the most convenient — without Yanukovych (or its replacement), Moscow is looking for other ways to advance Russia's interests.

This is why Russia advocates the "federalization" of eastern Ukraine. Russia's ability to force President Petro Poroshenko to submit to its will is much less than before, so it has been working on those regions that are closest to Russia geographically, ethnically and culturally, such as Luhansk and Donetsk. But even if most of the local population opposes the new government in Kiev, they are not in favor of secession from Ukraine or integration into Russia. As a result, Russian policies have become increasingly temporary and contradictory. Russia would rather Ukraine be fragmented and dysfunctional because it is more vulnerable to stress. However, it also fears that a prolonged conflict will continue to deplete Russia's resources, destabilize its own western region, and lead to a freeze in relations with Europe.

The Kremlin is seeking Western help to solve this conundrum. While Russia generally does not welcome the involvement of Western governments and organizations, it knows that it will be difficult to stop them with its current capabilities. The potential benefit of engaging the West is that European leaders may pressure Poroshenko to make concessions to Russia, especially on "federalization," in order to evade onerous obligations. The decentralization of important constitutional powers to ukraine's eastern region would cement Russia's influence on the ground, so that Moscow could threaten it with division in later dealings with Kiev, while Ukraine would be excluded from NATO or the European Union for decades. From the Kremlin's point of view, it would be a huge positive if these plans were endorsed by the Minsk Accords or, more formally, the OSCE in which Angela Merkel and François Hollande participated.

It is unclear what Russia's policy toward Ukraine will look like in the coming years. In the near term, Moscow is bringing the West and Kiev into compromise with new fait accomplis. Russia took over Donetsk Airport in January 2015 and a month later, the strategically important town of Debatchev, all to achieve this. How far Putin will go will depend on many factors: the strength and weakness of the West, especially In Europe, the policy response; Poroshenko was able to restore normal governance in Ukraine, including the extent to which relations with the east were established and a severe economic recession was halted; And the Kremlin's own level of confidence, which is correspondingly affected by Russia's political and economic conditions.

As for the spring of 2015, Russia will not fully invade eastern Ukraine. However, this outcome (or no outcome) is subject to a number of unstable factors. Putin is likely to oppose a large Russian military deployment and has no intention of realizing the historical vision of a "new Russia" (Novorossiya). However, there is a big risk that if Putin is not able to obtain favorable political capital, the conflict will escalate and Russia may occupy most of Ukraine. Moscow has laid some basic groundwork for such a possible situation, such as describing the so-called "anti-terrorism" campaign in Kiev against civilian armed forces in eastern Ukraine in the summer of 2014 as "developing into genocide." In an atmosphere of fanaticism in which short-term behavior prevails over reason, it is impossible for us to safely rule out any situation.

Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in The Grand Chessboard (1996), "Ukraine's existence as an independent state helps to change Russia." Without Ukraine, Russia would no longer be a Eurasian empire." This sentence still applies. Ukraine remains the most important touchstone. If Russia can accept Ukraine's decision to move closer to the Eu or expand cooperation with NATO, it will show that Russia wants to break away from its imperial history. But if Moscow continues to see this outcome as an extraordinary event that requires vigorous "defensive measures," then a departure from imperial history is a distant aspiration. Developments since 2013 have confirmed that Putin – more generally, the political elite – cannot reimagine that Russia is just another influential neighbor and power. The ancient ties of historical civilization and, more recently, the relations between the suzeraintys have become truly insurmountable obstacles to achieving the change of attitude that Brzezinski had hoped for.