Author: I look at history
On October 28, 1948, after the Changchun Uprising of the 60th Army, a strange thing happened in Jiutai, Jilin Province: Regarding the number of people in the 60th Army, which should be said to be very simple, whether it is the commander Zeng Zesheng, or the division commanders Long Yao and Bai Zhaoxue, they can't even say it clearly. Our side immediately sent someone to investigate the real number of troops, the results did not know, a check was startled, the total number of reported 28,000 people in the 60th Army's Changchun Uprising, but only 23,000 people in Jiutai.
When the reorganization began, our army conducted another thorough survey of the number of people, and was surprised to find that the real number of the 60th Army was only 19,000 people. What's going on here?
Zeng Zesheng led the 60th Army to revolt in Changchun
According to Li Kaiguo, a senior soldier in the 60th Army, the main reason was that "there are more people who eat empty pay and fewer people who fight."
Originally, the 60th Army of the Anti-Japanese Iron Army, although it was strictly disciplined, did not disturb the people, and established meritorious achievements in the anti-Japanese battlefield, like other old armies, often "ate empty pay."
Li Kaiguo recalled that when he went to Wulian to work for a desertion clerk, he had personally seen 150 people on the company's roster, and the total number of people in the company at that time was less than 100. Later, the document of desertion came back and secretly told Li Kaiguo, "There are at least 40 people on the roster of personnel, and they are the names of people who are casually made up according to the meaning of the chief, which is called 'eating empty pay.'" ”
Beginning in December 1947, the Northeast Field Army launched a winter offensive of unprecedented scale. In January 1948, the New Fifth Army, known as the "Iron Horse Division", was completely destroyed under the command of Chen Cheng, and Jiang shi was forced to remove Chen Cheng under pressure and appoint Wei Lihuang as the commander-in-chief of the Northeast Suppression Campaign.
Wei Lihuang
As soon as Wei Lihuang took office, he put forward a battle plan for trapped points, connecting lines, and folding surfaces, and ordered the 60th Army to retreat to Changchun. When Zeng Zesheng retreated, he did not carry out the order to blow up the Fengman Hydropower Station and kept the hydropower station, but on the way to Changchun in three ways, he was ambushed by the local armed forces of our army, with 899 casualties, 3240 captured, 30 artillery pieces, 8401 rifles and machine guns, and all the cars and heavy materials lost.
In this regard, the officers of the 60th Army have a "way" to turn tragedy into comedy. I believe that many friends have already guessed, that is, to cover up the real number of casualties, to under-report, conceal, so as to exchange for weapons, money and food supplemented by superiors.
According to records, as early as the autumn of 1947, after the 60th Army guarded Jilin and fought a "defensive battle" with the People's Liberation Army, it concealed at least a few hundred dead and wounded.
So, is There really nothing Chiang Kai-shek can do about the phenomenon of the troops trying to "eat empty pay"?
The answer, of course, was no; after the 60th Army was ordered to withdraw to Changchun, Chiang Kai-shek sent a special commissioner to check how many people were in Li Kaiguo's regiment. According to the requirements of the regulations, it is not only necessary to check the roster of personnel in the regiment, but also to verify the correct body one by one, but this is not difficult for the regimental commander of Li Kaiguo's regiment.
To put it bluntly, it's simple.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="5" > first, dismantling the east to make up for the imposter. </h1>
A few companies were temporarily dispersed to make up for the inspected detachment, and these imposters had been numbered in advance to correspond to their false names, and when the commissioner named them, they could pass the test with a single promise. And the scattered troops, as long as they use the excuse of "going out of the city to carry out their tasks", they will perfunctory.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="7" > second, eat and play and send money. </h1>
It is reasonable to say that the first method of dealing with it is okay to play once, and if there are more times, it is inevitable that the horse's feet will leak out; not to mention the "long history" of Jiang Jun's "eating empty pay," and it is not strange for the upper and lower levels to see this kind of behavior of seeking personal gains, and even if the commissioners sent by Chiang Kai-shek are stupid, they cannot see the problem at all. However, for the commissioner in charge of the inspection, as long as someone eats, plays and sends money, any responsibility, obligation, or military order is not worth mentioning. Since everyone is their own person, then take advantage of the wine as a song to seek a happy life, life is originally a drama.
General Zeng Zesheng
So, how much did the 60th Army spend on the activities of the pay-off commissioners? It remains a mystery to this day. In any case, they handled the inspection quite satisfactorily, and Chen Cheng, the director of the Northeast Xingyuan, who is known as the "small committee chairman," did not notice it, and even Jiang Shi, who has always been shrewd at calculations, was also in the dark.
In addition to the two divisions of the 60th Army, Li Song, the commander of the provisional 52nd Division of the unit, was even more advanced in "eating empty pay", and it is said that he ate at least 142 empty salaries alone!
If Li Song's empty salary is slightly different from that of other generals of Jiang Jun's troops, it is that Li Song did not monopolize this income, but took out a part of the money from it and used it for official expenses, subsidies, and rewards for his officers. It's just that the proportion of this money taken out is very small, and most of it still goes into Li Song's own pocket.
Looking at those commanders who "ate empty pay" and made a fortune, as the platoon commanders and squad leaders of the provisional 52nd Division, they were very hungry: Since everyone is not at the same income level, then they will shed wool from their soldiers. Therefore, the "little fish" of Jiang Jun naturally extended their black hands to the bitter soldiers like shrimp and rice.
At that time, many soldiers of Chiang Kai-shek's army were accustomed to the rule of "eating for 5 minutes", saying that soldiers are fast, they are on the battlefield, and wasting 1 second may change the situation of the war. If we understand this "eating rule" of Chiang Kai-shek in this way, it would be a big mistake; the officers and men at the bottom of the provisional 52nd Division did not have such a high pursuit of quality, and this was just a means for officers to withhold grain from the soldiers' mouths, and then sneakily take it to the black market at a high price and sell it, and make a small fortune in a muffled voice.
In the communication platoon of the provisional 52nd Division, Qi Yunge, a soldier who participated in the Changchun uprising, witnessed before the uprising how the commander of the communication platoon used this routine to make a small fortune, and then smeared oil under his feet.
What is even more infuriating is how much money can you receive in a month as a soldier in the provisional 52nd Division? This is also an inexplicable mystery. Why is that?
I'm sure that everyone understands this, so I don't need to say anything more.
Jiang Jun's information photo
Of course, after the Changchun Uprising, some officers who were not dead-hearted thieves and were accustomed to "eating empty pay" also had the audacity to extend their hands to the logistics supplies of our army. As a result, in the early stage of the rectification training, they were reported and exposed by the soldiers one by one, and none of these black sheep slipped through the net, and they were all punished as they deserved.
Bai Xiude, a well-known American journalist who won the Pulitzer Prize, angrily rebuked in the book: "Chiang's officers treat soldiers like animals." But where does this American journalist know that "soldiers are noble and foolish, and generals are wise" is the eternal way of leading soldiers in the old army. Chiang is just concocting it. Only the people's army can truly be a dignified soldier, and the army that has truly been liberated for the toiling masses can truly be loved by the people. This is difficult for American journalists to understand.
【Deeply cultivate the history of war, carry forward positive energy, welcome to submit, private messages will be restored】