Author: Knife cutting surface
Since the founding of the people's army, there have been a few failures in the reorganization system.
The Red Army of more than 20,000 people crossed the Yellow River in the west to fight the enemy and almost perished; in the Southern Anhui Incident, more than 9,000 people of the New Fourth Army were surrounded by more than 80,000 people from 7 divisions of Chiang Kai-shek's army in Maolin, Anhui Province, and fought fiercely for 7 days and nights, and finally more than 2,000 people broke through; when they attacked Kinmen, more than 9,000 people of the three infantry regiments of the 28th and 29th Armies of the Tenth Corps were strongly shelled and bombed by the enemy at sea and on the beaches, and suffered heavy losses; in the Fifth Campaign to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the 180th Division of the Volunteer Army was deeply encircled and lost more than 3,000 people, which was a rare loss since the founding of the Volunteer Army.
Opinions differ on the defeat of the 180th Division, and more than 70 years later, people still hold their own views. Lu Xun said that tragedy is to tear apart the valuable things in life to others. For the defeat of the 180th Division, people should have an objective understanding and understanding, just as Mr. Peng said at the fifth campaign summary meeting: "The 180th Division suffered losses, I am also responsible, we are not mainly responsible for the responsibility, more importantly, find a lesson, let us be smarter." ”
In order to find out the reasons for the defeat of the 180th Division, the great man successively summoned Wang Jinshan, Wei Jie, and the commanders of the other two corps of the three corps to return to China. After Wang Jinshan reported to the great man, Liu Bocheng, Nie Rongzhen, Xu Xiangqian, and others, as Wang Jinshan's old superiors, comforted him and said: You Wang Jinshan is a tiger general, and the defeat on the battlefield of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea has nothing to do with other issues, mainly improper command and paralysis of the enemy. Mr. Peng took the initiative to take responsibility for you... Now that the target of the battle has changed, it is not enough to rely solely on fighting hard and fighting hard, and we must pay attention to summing up experience and improving tactics...
This time in Beijing, Wang Jinshan was arranged to stay at the Beijing Hotel. After Wei Jie received a telegram from the great man summoning him to return to China, he immediately rushed back to Beijing. When he arrived in Beijing, the first thing he saw was Nie Rongzhen, the acting general manager, and after reporting to Nie Shuai, the general staff sent someone to send him to the Beijing Hotel.
Arriving at the Beijing Hotel, Wei Jie went straight to Room 7 of Building 4, which was Wang Jinshan's room. Wang Jinshan was very happy to see Wei Jie, but it seemed that Wei Jie had some opinions about him, asking: "Wang Cripple, the chairman summoned you, what noble work?" ”
"What's the point. I have come this time to review and endorse. Wang Jinshan said, "Someone hit my report and said that I was leaning to the right, which caused the losses of the 180th Division." If the Chairman knows me, you may want to 'be merciful under your mouth'! ”
"Our opinions are based on opinions, and we are not satisfied with our dissatisfaction, but I Wei Jie is a dignified person, but I have never beaten you with any 'small reports'."
When reporting to the great man, Wei Jie showed dissatisfaction with the superior command organ, saying that in the second phase of the fifth campaign, the 60th Army was initially put on standby by the reserve of the positioning corps, but at the beginning of the battle, Shiji transferred the 12th Army to the command of the Ninth Corps with one order. Until May 16, Shiji readjusted its deployment in response to changes in the enemy situation. The Third Corps ordered the 179th Division of the 60th Army to be transferred to the command of the 15th Army, the 181st Division to be transferred to the command of the 12th Army, and the 180th Division to be under the direct command of the Corps, and I became an empty commander with no troops to command.
Wang Jinshan (1915-1978), deputy commander of the 3rd Corps, actually commanded the 3rd Corps in combat because commander Chen Geng returned to China
Commander of the 60th Army of the Volunteer Army, Wei Jie
Zheng Qigui, commander of the 180th Division of the 60th Army of the Volunteer Army
Standing in front of the map and listening to Wei Jie's report, the chairman fell into contemplation, and after a while, he asked: "Zheng Qigui, the commander of the 180th Division of your army, what is the command ability?" Which unit was it? What positions have you held? ”
Wei Jie replied one by one, and his evaluation of Zheng Qigui was that he was resolute in carrying out orders, but as a military commander, his adaptability was somewhat worse. After listening, the chairman nodded and said, It seems that Zheng Qigui, a man, is not suitable or can no longer serve as a military commander, and it is better to let him do some other work.
After Wang Jinshan, Wei Jie, and others returned to the front, the three corps immediately formed a working group to rectify the 180th Division, and formed a conclusion on the entire process of the 180th Division's defeat. However, this conclusion did not convince all parties, and many years later, the former chiefs of staff of the corps, the army, and the division expressed different views on this.
In 1984, Wang Yunrui, chief of staff of the Third Corps, wrote in the military newspaper that in the later stage of the fifth campaign, the 180th Division of the 60th Army was assembled in a place where it was surrounded by water on one side and surrounded by mountains on both sides, and the two wings were not protected, which was extremely dangerous.
Deng Shijun, chief of staff of the 60th Army, believed that the defeat of the 180th Division was caused by a series of delusional mistakes from top to bottom. The 180th Division was resolute in carrying out the orders of its superiors, and after the lone army hall, it fought against the enemy several times its own, and played an active role in covering the transfer of the corps headquarters of the army. However, after the 27th, the measures were improper, the breakout organization was not good, the casualties increased, and the number of people who fell behind and was captured increased, which is a lesson that we can never forget.
In his recollection, Deng Shijun also had a good opinion on the deployment and deployment of troops by his superiors in the second phase of the Fifth Campaign. The three corps assigned the 181st Division to the 12th Army, the 179th Division to the 15th Army, and the 180th Division as the 60th Army to fight the US 10th Army head-on. At that time, the 180th Division had less than 10,000 troops, counting 60 guns as less than 100 artillery, while the US 10th Army had nearly 50,000 troops, more than 700 artillery pieces, more than 300 tanks, and aircraft cover. The disparity between the two was too great, and subsequently, the 3rd Corps ordered the 180th Division to actively contain the US 1st Marine Division and the US 7th Division, at which point the 60th Army Headquarters became the "Air Force" command.
Wang Zhenbang, chief of staff of the 180th Division, believes that the repeated mistakes of the superior command and the mechanical execution of the orders of the 180th Division are the root causes of this serious setback. After receiving the task at the division level, whether to adopt mobile defense or stick to defense is an important factor in whether the operation is active or passive. In view of the enemy situation at that time, the 180th Division should take the action of fighting and walking, and the main force should quickly retreat north, rather than fortifying everywhere and holding on. At the corps and military level, the 180th Division should not continue to be ordered to stand still for help at the critical juncture when it is under siege; on the other hand, when Hu Jingyi, chief of staff of the 538th Regiment, broke through to report to the army, the army should immediately send troops to respond.
[Zheng Qigui (1913-1990), commander of the 180th Division, a native of Jinzhai, Anhui, joined the Red Army in 1929. After the defeat of the 180th Division, the division commander Zheng Qigui was dismissed from his post and reviewed, and later served as the director of the management department of the three corps (main regiment), and after the war, he served as the deputy commander and commander of the military sub-district. In 1955, he was awarded the rank of colonel and later promoted to colonel. He retired in 1970 and died in 1990 at the age of 77 and was buried in the Hefei Martyrs' Cemetery.
Wu Chengde (1912-1996), acting political commissar and director of the Political Department of the 180th Division, led some officers and men to fight guerrilla warfare for 14 months and was captured, and was the highest officer captured by the Volunteer Army. In 1953, when he exchanged prisoners of war, he returned to China, was dismissed from all duties, sent to the farm for "transformation", and after 27 years, he restored his identity and returned to his hometown in Yuncheng, Shanxi.
The five levels of the dust in this dynasty are said by people after the non-meritorious service. Although the 180th Division had a record of serious defeats in its combat history, it did not affect people's admiration for the predecessors of the Volunteer Army. Just like what people say about the 180th Division:
In the long-term armed struggle, the 180th Division has made a great contribution, worthy of an old unit with a glorious tradition!
【Deeply cultivate the history of war, carry forward positive energy, welcome to submit, private messages will be restored】