Tashi is best known in China for "August Gunfire", which depicts the vivid portraits of pre-war social beings. I just don't understand why the Chinese edition doesn't have a citation source.
A quote from the article, quite a lesson: the ancient spirit of fighting is actually floating on the surface of all of us, and a small event can awaken it. Once awakened, it is impossible to bury it any longer. Being aware of this is telling.
American cultural advocate and authority, art professor Charles Elot Norton, also protested the spirit of war during a meeting at shepherds memorial church in Cambridge, Massachusetts. "Cruel applause echoes through every corner of the country," causing rational patriots to have "extreme fear" of the future, he said.
In August of the book, in August 1914, the first of the First World War, 750,000 German troops marched into Belgium and pounced on the Belgian border, preparing to attack Paris; on the other side of the English Channel, Britain, which had declared war on Germany, was mobilizing a large army to prepare for an expedition to Europe; in the east, Russian Cossack cavalry entered Germany's East Prussia, which made the Germans panic; in the Balkan Peninsula on the southern front, Austria-Hungary and Serbia were also fighting fiercely...
Writing a history book about war is not necessarily a history of war. The "professional" histories of warfare that go out of their way to tell how every unit was moved and how every battle was killed or injured are no different from a computer book in Pascal or an architectural code.
Tuchman's book not only provokes people to think, but also gives a euphemistic answer in those vivid, flowing scenes that repeat itself.
Is the outbreak of a world war inevitable or accidental? What is the root cause of the outbreak? What led to a clear strategic miscalculation among the decision-makers of the empires? What was the impact of this world war on future generations? These profound questions, author Tuchman answered during her August gunfire.
In her writing, the politicians of various empires fought in a fierce battle for the sake of national interests; the military commanders strategized and made decisions thousands of miles, trying to formulate detailed plans to defeat the enemy; the military commanders were brave and fearless in battle; and the cruelty of war and the devastation it caused were frightening.
From the place where Tuchman wrote, the fate has long been determined, since the fiasco of France in the Franco-Prussian War, the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, the feud has been concluded. But what led to the evolution of a local war into a world war in 1870 and a large-scale all-out war in 1914? Tuchman doesn't offer her insights, and her brilliance lies in the multi-angle narrative, where contrasts naturally arise:
From the French point of view, let the reader feel the surging trend of thought within France, and feel why the offensive ideas represented by the "Seventeenth Plan" (in fact, they are seriously divorced from reality) came into being:
From the perspective of the German Empire, expounding the need for expansion in Germany as a latecomer, they shouted slogans for the right to land under the sun, wielded the stick of Clausewitz's theory of war, and preached the racial superiority of the German nation — what struck me was that this was not formed in World War II;
When Tuchman described the British Empire, which was accustomed to playing the offshore balancer, its arrogance and arrogance, disdainful of being with Ottoman Turkey, but at both ends, in order to prevent Germany from becoming bigger, it early served as a protectorate of the neutral Belgium, and secretly made a military alliance with France;
As for Russia, it is already the afterglow of the empire, dying, from a decadent system to an incompetent official, the Tsarist Russian system is strong outside and has been half-cut into the ground. It may seem like the conflict of interests between countries is irreconcilable, but what is the real answer? The author also did not answer.
We, who are familiar with history, know the end of the empire, and from God's point of view, the collapse of the empire seems logical. If we look at it from another angle, in the 1900s, in the chaotic world, will we, as bystanders, lose our way in the tide of history and come to completely different conclusions?
In the countless complex clues, can we see the interaction of various factors, grasp the context that drives the main line of history forward, and finally predict the direction of historical development? Drawing on Arthur Clarke's elevator effect, when key factors are missing, reasoning, even if correct, will lead to strange conclusions, so prejudgment is not an easy task.
I'm attracted to decisions, and decisions are prejudicial, so how do I make reasonable predictions? Let's conduct a preliminary analysis from two perspectives: tactical and strategic, first look at the tactical perspective:
(i) The commander of the French Fifth Army, Langlezac, retreated after the Belgian decision
German deployment on the Western Front
At that time, the Fifth Army was ordered by the French commander-in-chief Xia Feizhi to defend Charlerois, Belgium, and the strength of the First, Second and Third German Armies was far superior to that of the French Army. Xia Fei was reluctant to change his advance attack plan. For the Fifth Army Command, first of all, faced with the contradiction between the planned arrangement of the French Command (arranging for the Fifth Army to contain the German army, believing that the German army was small in number) and the enemy it actually faced (through a series of information obtained through intelligence reconnaissance, showing that the Fifth Army faced an unimaginable number of German troops), from the perspective of the Fifth Army, the support of the command was reasonable.
When commander-in-chief Xiafei received a request for reinforcements, Xiafei did not provide support. If Xia fei could really understand the Deployment of the German Army, rational decision-making would inevitably reinforce. In fact, the news of the General Headquarters was chaotic, and Xia fei could not make a clear and unambiguous judgment in the many messages provided by many parties, and the quality of the reports of these messages varied from person to person, so from the perspective of the headquarters, it was not possible to clearly judge the direction of the attack of the main force of the German army. Then Xiafei's decision not to reinforce is also reasonable. Arbitrary changes in deployment will not only cause gaps between the various armies, but also cause confusion in command. Although the Fifth Army could not understand Xia fei's decision.
Then when the isolated Fifth Army faced a strong German army, the retreat of the Fifth Army was also reasonable, if it was completely defeated in battle, then the left flank of the French army would be completely crushed, the Middle Route Army might be encircled, and the entire front would collapse, so it was very natural for the French army to retreat to preserve its strength.
Most decisions cannot be analyzed with an hindsight attitude and God's perspective, and the information collected when many decisions are made is not complete, so to judge whether the decision is reasonable, it is necessary to go back to the background of the time of the judgment.
(ii) The defeat of the combined attack of the Russian First Army Leninkamp and the Russian Second Army Samsonov
The Russian army planned to arrange for the First Army and the Second Army to attack the German army in East Prussia, the German army had only one army group in East Prussia, the strength was weak, and soon the commander of the German First Army, General François, after taking the initiative, had greatly depleted the strength of the Russian First Army that had entered the country first.
At this moment, what was determined in front of the German commander was that the Russian First Army was delayed, the two German corps were scattered, and the Russian Second Army was still outside the national border and would soon enter the national border. The risk to the Germans was that they might be caught in the offensive by the Russians, and the opportunity was to take advantage of the time difference between the two Russian legions entering the country to mobilize their troops to catch them off guard. There is a possibility of maneuvering with rail lines.
If a conservative plan is adopted, the German army abandons Königsberg and retreats to the Vistula River is relatively risky, but it will make the two legions of the Russian army rest together, and under the frontal attack, the strength disadvantage of the German army will be more obvious, the loss of East Prussia means the loss of the granary, not only that, the capital Berlin will be put in danger, then in order to defend Berlin, it is likely to disrupt the offensive plan of the Western Front, and the right hook plan to attack France may be destroyed. The rational decision against the Germans was to adopt an offensive plan.
Second Battle of Tannenberg
The German commander-in-chief, Prittwitz, went awry and chose to retreat. This was also the reason why he was replaced by a substitute, with Hindenburg and Ludendorff succeeding him. In fact, the idea of using a railway line to mobilize the German army to meet the Russian Second Army was very effective, but only if the German army was not caught by the Russian First Army.
Staff Officer Hoffman believed that there was a gap between the First Army's Leninkamp and the Second Army's Samsonov, so it would not attack, which was very subjective and illogical. The fundamental reason for the lack of coordinated operations is the backwardness of the Command, Support, and Information Transmission System of the Russian Army, and the First and Second Armies have not conducted training in coordinated operations at all, nor have they carried out close information communication channels, isolating each other from each other.
This situation even occurred in the Russian General Command, the lack of information led to the command is also ignorant of the front line, fundamentally speaking, the organization of the Russian army has a big problem. After analysis, it can be found that Ludendorff's decision was correct, but the logic was problematic.
The above view comes from the perspective of God, if you come to the battle front, you will find that Ludendorff has always been unable to determine the movement of the First Army, weighing the pros and cons, although it may be wrapped up, but conservative will destroy the overall situation, can only adopt this strategy. Decisions made when all information is not available, analyzing the long-term pros and cons, is also a way to increase the weight of decision options.
(iii) Von Kluk, the German First Army attacking France, decided to abandon the attack on Paris and turn around to encircle the Fifth Army
The German First Army, as the strongest force, had the primary task of defeating the French army. The retreat of the French Fifth Army actually left a hole in the defensive line, and Kluk made the decision to intersperse the Fifth Army.
When Kluke made his decision, the scene was that the French Fifth Army, the British Expeditionary Force were retreating all the way back, and the French Sixth Army had just been formed and was expected to be undermanned. According to this, Kluke believed that the French army was insufficient to influence the German flank.
The Germans seized the opportunity to encircle, the risk was that the flanks were exposed and attacked, and the benefit was that the French Fifth Army was defeated in one fell swoop, and it was logical to look at Kluk's encirclement from this point of view.
When he realized that the French Sixth Army and the Paris garrison were not weak and were likely to pose a significant threat to the Germans, it was clear that the risks (being flanked) were greater than the benefits of crushing the French, and it was reasonable for the Germans to retreat immediately.
Kluke's problem is not with the above decisions, but with the collection of information that assists decision-making. He did not collect enough enemy information, and the decisions he made were more subjective to personal judgment, compared to Moltke Jr.,D.,Who judged that the French army had not collapsed by judging that there were fewer French prisoners of war, etc. Kluke was in the authorities' obsession, only believing that the French army's retreat was due to the collapse of french morale, and in this cognition, it was inevitable to ignore Moltke's request that he cooperate with the Instructions of the German Second and Third Armies.
When we make decisions, we must not only know ourselves and know each other, but also rely on the information that is objective, not distorted by personal subjective attitudes, and ensure the accuracy of information.
From a strategic perspective, let's continue to analyze the decision:
(i) The effects of the Schlieffen Plan, the consequences of Germany's passage through Belgium
Implementation of the Schlieffen Plan
In order to defeat the French army, by way of Belgium, the advantage is that it can quickly reach the heart of France. Passing through Belgium would seriously undermine Belgium's neutral status.
In fact, Belgium was determined by the five powers in 1839, and Britain had an obligation to protect Belgium, but Britain held a wall-to-sideline attitude towards the Franco-German dispute. If Belgium's neutrality had not been undermined, there would have been little reason for Britain to intervene in the war.
Then the passage through Belgium only has tactical value, the strategic risk is very large, this plan is problematic. Facts have also proved that when Germany began to attack Belgium, it was also the most critical straw that overwhelmed British domestic public opinion, and the German invasion not only lowered its moral status, but also laid the foundation for the intensification of the war. This is a very illogical decision.
(ii) Britain's foreign policy mistakes toward Turkey
The Ottoman Turks were actually wavering at the beginning of World War I and wanted to ally with britain, but the British not only refused Turkey's request, but also seized the dreadnought ships ordered by Turkey in Britain. Germany took the opportunity to send the Goeben to win over Turkey as a gift. From a strategic point of view, Turkey's geographical location is critical.
Britain's former refusal was not merely out of arrogance, but unwillingness to follow the Ottomans as enemies of Russia and the Balkan and Eastern European states, and even to be drawn into a war with Austria-Hungary.
But britain just stood by and did not win over the Turks, and when the Turks were forced into a world war, when the Black Sea was blockaded and Russia could not get supplies, when Churchill and his naval forces were in the Dardanelles Strait, the British decision-makers understood the importance of Turkey.
I don't quite agree with the author that the UK rejects alliances out of arrogance, but the specifics have yet to be mined at a deeper level.
(iii) The German concept of war and the roots of the massacre of civilians
The influence of the theory of war on German military philosophy was enormous, and in order to establish order in the occupied areas, violence was used directly against the population. When this barbarism occurred in the cities and villages of Belgium, and even when the German army set fire to the University of Leuven, then Germany lost its moral legitimacy and became an aggressor.
In my preliminary opinion, the root cause of the mistake is the short-sightedness of strategy formulation, the neglect of public opinion propaganda and the maintenance of moral status, and the pursuit of victory in battle, and the international strategy is in a mess.
As a late-developing industrial country, Germany needs to improve its centripetal force and cohesion by promoting the national spirit. Propaganda mouthpieces defend their acts of aggression by propagating the superiority of the German nation, declaring that the German nation is a strong nation and that Germany has an obligation to rule over the weak and small nations. By morally dwarfing other countries and peoples, Germans gained self-confidence.
There is much help for the way, and little help for the wrong way. The truth that has been circulating in China for a thousand years ago is still not understood by industrialized Germany. The theory of war is a famous book, but dead reading, accepting wrong thinking, leading to wrong strategic decisions, it has to be said that metaphysical forces determine the fate of the country.
From the writing method, I feel that Tuchman's work is not so much a serious historical analysis as more like a historical novel, from the perspective of writing techniques, the author takes time as the main axis, multiple main lines advance at the same time, supplemented by a large number of portrait descriptions and psychological portrayals, as a history book it is interesting to read, but it is also doubtful, how did the author understand the inner activities of the participants who were at the center of the whirlpool at that time? This is difficult to determine.
But it is worth learning from Tuchman's Spring and Autumn brushwork, many roles appear in turn, complex but not complex, each has their own unique role, plays a variety of roles in history, threading needles, weaving the music of history, such as the driver of the racing driver who pulled Xia Fei in the war zones, the Paris taxi drivers who volunteered to support the front line, the Paris taxi drivers who rushed forward enthusiastically, and lieutenant general Marx Hoffmann who was full of confidence and made predictions by mistake...
The history of the August artillery fire is rich and colorful for people. The vivid writing method of the author sandwiching between narratives and discussions and multi-line parallel progress is very worthy of reference.
Finally, the August artillery fire helped me straighten out my understanding of the history that took place before the trench battles of World War I. Of course, my understanding of decision theory is still relatively shallow, and in order to dig deeper, more historical materials and existing analysis are needed, which is only the beginning of future exploration.
As for the history of the historical events described in the author's book, it is not entirely believed, I can feel in the reading that the author has indeed collected a large amount of material and fulfilled the obligation to be faithful to the facts, but the way the material is presented also secretly expresses her understanding of history, and also expresses the author's understanding of the causal relationship of historical events, which needs to be supplemented by reading other materials through the theme.
In short, the August Cannon Fire book is wonderful, and there is no problem with using it as a novel for entertainment and after-dinner talk, but as a profound historical analysis, it can only be less than satisfactory.