In orthodox judgment, Qi Shan always appeared as a traitorous "traitor", but in the 1930s, there were also historians with different views who put forward different ideas, the most representative of which was Jiang Tingdi. (Jiang Tingdi (1895-1965), a native of Shaoyang, Hunan, was an important historian of the modern Republic of China period and a pioneer in China's modern diplomatic history.) He was a professor at Nankai University and the Department of History of Tsinghua University. Jiang Tingdian was also the most successful scholar in participating in politics during the Republic of China period, and served as the chief of the administrative affairs department of the Executive Yuan of the National Government, the ambassador of the National Government to the Soviet Union, and so on.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="21" > Jiang Tingdi first talked about Qishan</h1>
In 1931, Jiang Tingdian published an article in the Journal of Tsinghua Entitled "Qishan and the Opium War" to re-evaluate Qishan from the perspective of diplomacy. In his opinion, "although the Opium War, as an international history, is so deformed and chaotic, it can be clearly divided into three phases for the study of China alone." "The first period was when Lin Zexu was the minister of Chincha in Guangdong," strictly speaking, there is no diplomacy to speak of. "The third period was the reign of the Daoguang Emperor," and there was no diplomacy to speak of. Both sides acknowledged that the negotiations were hopeless and insisted on a decisive battle. Only the second phase of Qi Shan's administration" had a diplomatic situation. "On the one hand in China, QiShan's attitude is the attitude of diplomats. When he interacted with British military documents, he would generally use words such as "your country" and "your commander-in-chief" to address British representatives. And when he interviewed the British army, he also treated the British representatives with an equal attitude. Not to mention that Qi Shan's purpose was to resolve the British invasion through diplomatic negotiations. At the same time, Jiang Tingdian further praised Qi Shan as "the first foreign minister in The Great Changes in China in the past ninety years." It can be seen from this that Jiang Tingdian's evaluation of Qi Shan is already higher than that of Lin Zexu.
Not only that, but Jiang also criticized the view of attacking Qishan's military performance in the Opium War, mainly around whether Qishan withdrew in Guangdong. Regarding the issues of Qi Shan's order to withdraw from defense, disarm, and disband Shui Yong after he arrived in Guangzhou, Jiang Tingdian believed that there was something to be done with the withdrawal of defense, but the responsibility could not be borne by Qi Shan. Because the Daoguang Emperor was an emperor who highly admired frugality, in order to "save money", in early September 1840, he had already ordered the seven coastal provinces to abolish their troops, and Qi Shan was still under the governorship of Zhili. "To sum up, the four provinces associated with the Opium War, with the exception of Fujian, the remaining three provinces—Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong—all withdrew their troops in accordance with the emperor's decree before Qishan arrived in Guangdong." The withdrawal was true, but it was the will of the Daoguang Emperor to withdraw. After Qi Shan arrived in Guangdong, he also did not take the initiative to withdraw, and the blame for the failure of the war due to the withdrawal could not be attributed to Qi Shan alone. Therefore, Jiang Tingdian believes that although Qi Shan has no praise for military affairs, there is no deficiency that can be blamed.
In the moral concept of Chinese, "traitor" is an unforgivable crime, and to justify the name of "traitor" is subject to criticism and great pressure. Then, why did Jiang Tingdian "justify" Qi Shan? This can be seen in a will written by Jiang Tingdian on October 31, 1938, "I have a great regret in my life, that is, I did not prevent the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. Before the September 18 Incident, I knew that we should avoid conflict with Japan in tohoku, but I did not try to tell the people of my countrymen. After September 18, I knew we should compromise, but I did not try my best to explain it to the Chinese people. After joining the government, I knew that we should be passive to Japan, actively reform internal affairs, and build a new country, but I did not fully fulfill my responsibilities. ”
It can also be seen from this that the reason why Jiang Tingdian portrayed QiShan as a "diplomat" was, first, in 1931, Japan brazenly launched the September 18 Incident and forcibly invaded and occupied the northeast region of Our country, while the Nanjing Nationalist Government led by Chiang Kai-shek pursued a policy of non-resistance and abandoned the northeast, which caused great controversy in society at that time, and the voices of condemnation at home and abroad continued unceasingly, and Jiang Tingdian, as a senior official of the National Government in Nanjing, defended the policy of non-resistance in order to appease social sentiment and stabilize the rule of the Nationalist Government; secondly, Jiang Tingdian defended Qi Shan with the aim of studying what kind of way modern China should take to get rid of imperialist aggression. The purpose of affirming Qishan is to express a point in his heart: if he wants to truly get rid of imperialist aggression, the way is not only stubborn resistance, but also to support the government's use of diplomatic activities to win a relatively peaceful and stable social environment to comprehensively build the country's internal affairs; finally, Jiang Tingdian himself is a diplomat, which has something to do with his experience, and in historical research, he also attaches importance to China's diplomacy in modern times, and fills the gap in modern Chinese diplomatic history through the study of Qishan's diplomatic actions.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="11" > Jiang Tingdi again on Qishan</h1>
However, as soon as Jiang Tingdian's view of "justifying QiShan's name" was put forward, it was criticized and criticized by all sides. In 1935, Tao Yuanzhen published an article entitled "Reading Qishan and the Opium War", which refuted it from both military and diplomatic aspects. First, Qi Shan had four problems in military terms, such as withdrawing defense and contempting national defense, and "although Qi Shan had increased his defense in the first half of his reign in Guangdong, his intention to increase defense was nothing more than bluffing," such an increase in defense did not benefit anything, and he did not reinforce the fighting army in time; second, in diplomacy, first of all, "Qi Shan still lacked the conditions that a diplomat should have at least -- to be honest with the government," he repeatedly deceived the Daoguang Emperor. Secondly, he did not treat outsiders with a completely equal attitude, and even "sometimes treated outsiders with humility," and knew nothing about Britain except that they knew the superiority of ships and cannons, and the subordinates appointed, such as Bao Peng and the like, had no real materials, and there was no real diplomatic plan that could be implemented, which summed up that "QiShan seems to have more places to blame in diplomacy than there are praiseworthy places." So there is no such thing as a "far over timer." In addition to military and diplomatic affairs, Tao Yuanzhen believes that Jiang Tingdi's evaluation of Qishan is even more undesirable than Lin Zexu's, and comprehensively negates Jiang Tingdian's evaluation of Qishan. He believes that Qishan's failure to adhere to the anti-smoking campaign is the failure of Qishan's diplomacy. Tao Yuanzhen clearly refuted one by one and again gave Qi Shan's image of a "traitorous courtier" another conclusion.
In his book "Modern Chinese History" six years later, Jiang Tingdian once again expressed his views on Qishan, believing that Qishan was at least wise, "Although the Qishan and Qiying people who advocated Fuyi clearly saw clearly the disparity between The strengths and weaknesses of China and foreign countries and openly publicized it, the scholar class did not believe them, and they had no self-confidence and no confidence in the nation,...... We don't blame them because they are not responsible. From this, we can see that Jiang Tingdian's evaluation of QiShan has changed from "a diplomat who is far ahead of the time" to "not being responsible", although Jiang Tingdian's evaluation of Qishan has changed the tone, indicating that he has a new view on compromise and surrender, but on the whole, he does not think that Qishan is a "traitor" or even a "traitor" who needs to bear the charge of treason.
Jiang Tingdi's views have also received attention in the later development of historiography, and there are also historians who support it, but there are more people who refute and criticize this, and they generally believe that Jiang Tingdian's evaluation of Qi Shan is too high and lacks true and reliable historical support. Although there are famous scholars such as Jiang Tingdian who overturned the case for Qishan, Qishan's image has not been improved.
bibliography:
[1] Jiang Tingdian, "Qishan and the Opium War", Tsinghua Journal, No. 6, 1931.
[2] Jiang Tingdian, Modern Chinese History, Wuhan Publishing House, 2012.
Note: This article is the original content of the public account, and it is forbidden to reprint it at will without the authorization of the account