The Kuomintang and the Communist Party finally reached a consensus on the issue of the reorganization of the New Fourth Army. The Red Army guerrillas in various parts of the south also stepped out of the dense mountains and forests and began negotiations with the local Kuomintang authorities to further realize the transformation of strategic tasks in accordance with the spirit of the instructions of the CPC Central Committee.
There were indeed those in the Kuomintang who were deeply aware of the great righteousness and sincerely negotiated with the southern Red Army guerrillas, supported the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and went to the country together. However, some Kuomintang military and political officials always tried to negotiate with the Red Army partisans in a vain attempt to achieve the goal of military "liquidation" through political negotiations. This made it difficult for the Red Army partisans to cooperate with the local Kuomintang local authorities in the negotiations against Japan, and the struggle was very fierce.
These Kuomintang officials "suppressed" while talking. Some took advantage of the lack of communication between the Red Army partisans and the outside world to spread rumors that the Communist Party and the Red Army had surrendered to the Kuomintang, in an attempt to disintegrate the Red Army partisans; Some wrote letters, published newspapers, or sent Communist Party traitors to guerrilla areas to carry out "appeasement" and "persuasion" activities, allowing high-ranking officials to divide and disintegrate the guerrillas; Some used negotiations as a cover to carry out armed encirclement and attacks in an attempt to force the Red Army partisans to submit, or used deception to induce the Red Army partisans to go down the mountain and concentrate, and then confiscate the guns of the Red Army partisans.
The negotiation process of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the various guerrilla areas in the south to jointly resist Japan was a tortuous, complex, and sharp process of struggle.
On August 1, 1937, in view of this situation, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Instructions of the Central Committee on the Work of the Guerrilla Areas in the South", which included the contents of negotiations with the Kuomintang:
Under the principle of preserving and consolidating the revolutionary armed forces and guaranteeing the absolute leadership of the Party: (1) The larger red units may negotiate with the nearby garrisons of the Kuomintang or local authorities to change their numbers and establishment in order to obtain legal status, but they must strictly prevent the other side from disintegrating and eliminating our conspiracies and encirclement attacks. (2) After changing the number and establishment, a three-member secret party committee may be established in the unit consisting of a captain or deputy captain, the director of the political department and the secretary of the general branch to lead all work in the unit. Party work and political work must be changed to suit the new situation. (3) In principle, small local guerrilla detachments and guerrilla groups that have separated from production shall become vigilante groups in order to obtain legal status, and may still exist illegally when this is not possible. (4) The Red Young Brigade was abolished, and the local Zhuangding team and vigilante group were changed or mixed in a planned and organized manner to play a role. (5) Until there are real negotiations with the Kuomintang government and the local garrisons, all our armed forces can automatically change their numbers, carry out independent activities in accordance with the new policy of the Party in the name of the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army, the Anti-Japanese Guerrillas, etc., and continue to carry out united front work. With flexible guerrilla action, it is necessary to mobilize and organize the people, establish the party's secret organization, catch and kill traitors, and expand the influence of the party's new policy. However, after obtaining the opportunity to negotiate an armistice with the Kuomintang garrison, it was necessary to use great strength and use the opportunity to carry out rectification and training, and cover the work of the local masses. We should use all means to raise the political level and firm awareness of every commander and fighter of the troops, and prevent all conspiracies to buy, induce, and divide. (6) With regard to the provision of troops, we may raise money and food by collecting donations from the rich until negotiations are reached with the other side. Only if it is indeed the property of a traitor, the method of confiscation is resorted to.
At present, our general policy for the work of the National Revolutionary Army is not to dismantle it, but to adopt the policy of winning over its officers and men to jointly resist Japan. (1) From the standpoint of the anti-Japanese national united front, propagate and explain to the officers and men our Party's proposition, first of all, with the idea of peaceful reunification, unity and insults, to strive to stop the civil war and non-aggression, and even to conduct peace negotiations and establish an agreement. (2) Make use of every opportunity to get close to the officers and soldiers at lower levels, raise the national consciousness and anti-Japanese sentiment of the officers and soldiers politically, establish a secret party organization, and proceed from the daily life of the troops to gradually improve the lives of the soldiers and improve the discipline organization and education of the troops. (3) But as they continue to attack us, we should still persist in guerrilla warfare in self-defense. For vigilante groups, the above policy should generally be adopted. But the persistence of the stubborn reactionary vigilantes and bandits against us, when it is impossible, can be eliminated by political disintegration and military attack. When we negotiate with the local garrison and the regime, we can work with them to resolve it. [Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, vol. 11 (1936-1938), Central Party School Press, 1991 edition, p. 301.] 】
This is a programmatic document guiding the transformation of the work of the guerrilla areas in the south, and it has a strong pertinence and practical guidance for the guerrilla areas in the south that are negotiating with the local military and political authorities of the Kuomintang. At the same time, the CPC Central Committee also sent liaison personnel to the guerrilla areas in the south to convey the instructions of the central authorities and assist the guerrilla areas in negotiating with the local Kuomintang authorities.
At this time, while opposing the "clean-up and suppression," some Red Army guerrillas were directly or indirectly informed of the changes in the domestic situation after the Xi'an Incident and the content of the CPC Central Committee's policy on the anti-Japanese national united front, and also made some adaptable adjustments ideologically, militarily, and in policy, and some guerrilla areas began negotiations with the Kuomintang before they got in touch with the Party Central Committee. However, because they did not receive direct instructions from the Party Central Committee, some deviations were inevitable in some areas when negotiating with the Kuomintang authorities.
On March 5, 1937, the Fujian-Guangdong Border Region Special Committee received a letter of instruction from the Central Southern Provisional Working Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Southern Provisional Working Committee") in Hong Kong, which mentioned that the CPC Central Committee had changed the slogan of "resisting Japan and opposing Chiang" to "uniting with Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan" and instructed the Fujian-Guangdong Border Region Special Committee to negotiate with the local Kuomintang troops to reach a joint anti-Japanese agreement. In April, the Fujian-Guangdong Border Region Special Committee began negotiations with the 157th Division of the Kuomintang Guangdong Army stationed in Zhangzhou.
The negotiations did not go well. First of all, Huang Tao, commander of the 157th Division, tried to use the negotiation opportunity to "absorb" the guerrillas, which was recognized by the CCP negotiators. Second, the 157th Division fought and talked, not only launching military attacks on the guerrillas, but also arresting and imprisoning negotiators and commander of the 3rd Red Regiment, He Ming, and others. Under the active rescue of the special committee of the Fujian-Guangdong Border Region of the Communist Party of China, the Kuomintang side quickly released He Ming and others. However, this arrest and easy release, coupled with the reduction of clashes between the two sides after that, gave He Ming a false impression, and he gradually relaxed his vigilance against the Kuomintang, laying the groundwork for his future disarming.
In late June, He Ming and others signed a cooperation agreement with the 157th Division, in which the 157th Division accepted the Red Army guerrillas' idea of cooperation in resisting Japan, recognized the legal status of the Southern Fujian Communist Party and the Red Army guerrillas, but proposed that the Red Army guerrillas must leave their original base areas and concentrate in Zhangpu County. The special committee of the Fujian-Guangdong Border Region held a discussion on whether to go down the mountain and enter Zhangpu City. He Ming was worried about affecting the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and insisted that he should go to Zhangpu City to concentrate.
In early July, the "Southern Linning Committee" learned of the news that the Red Army partisans were reorganized and preparing to leave the base areas, and sent people to convey instructions: The number of the army can be changed, political independence must be maintained, the troops must be vigilant, they must be stationed in the base areas, and they must not drive to the plains. However, He Ming did not carry out the instructions of the "Southern Linling Committee" that the guerrillas should be stationed in the base areas, saying: "It has already been opened, and I am sorry to drive it back again." "
On July 13, He Ming brought 607 troops to the Confucius Temple outside Zhangpu. As for the future, He Ming is not sure. And the deputy regiment commander Lu Sheng, who came with him, had an even more serious expression, he had not agreed to go down the mountain, and now there was a sense of foreboding lingering in his heart. When the soldiers saw the faces of the regiment commander and deputy regiment commander, they were also worried.
The liaison officer of the Kuomintang 157th Division came to ask for warmth, and explained this and that to everyone, it was really a cooperative look, which gradually calmed down the mood of the soldiers. Everyone began to imagine using new equipment to fight the Japanese devils on the anti-Japanese front.
In the years of war between you and me, carelessness and lack of vigilance had serious consequences. On the morning of July 16, the 157th Division of the Guangdong Army surrounded and disarmed the 3rd Red Regiment in the name of paying salaries and training by name, detaining all personnel, and creating the "Zhangpu Incident."
When the black muzzles of the Kuomintang troops were aimed at the partisan fighters of the Red Army, they showed an unyielding integrity that preferred to die.
The soldiers of the short gun company all pulled out the barge guns with a whoosh, and the machine gunners also set up the machine guns, and one by one they looked angrily, only hearing a "clicking" sound of bullets being loaded and the angry sound of "spelling out" and "fighting".
He Ming hurriedly came forward to stop everyone and said: "Comrades, don't move, training does not have to take weapons, everyone must believe me, this is a national problem, do not conflict!" "
The Kuomintang troops in ambush around them also gradually approached. The company commander of Fu Yishan removed the striker and large spring of the barge gun, threw the gun and said: "Give him the shell, but the heart can't give it!" "Some soldiers fainted on the spot, some soldiers tore to shreds the clothes and hats issued by the Kuomintang troops, and threw guns and copper trumpets everywhere. When the troops returned to the Temple of Confucius, many wept bitterly ...
This Red Army guerrilla detachment, which had been unable to be "annihilated" after 10 years of "encirclement and suppression" by the Kuomintang army, was disarmed without bloodshed due to the ideological errors of their leaders.
That night, Lu Sheng, with a small number of soldiers, risked death to cross the blockade of the Kuomintang army and sneak back into the mountains. And reorganize the partisan fighters of the Red Army who escaped one after another, and re-raise the banner of the Red 3rd Regiment. By the end of 1937, when they went down again to adapt, they had grown to more than 300 people.
During the "Zhangpu Incident," the Red 3rd Regiment was seized with a total of 2 heavy machine guns, 5 light machine guns, more than 200 barge guns, more than 500 rifles, and more than 100,000 rounds of ammunition. This incident exposed the conspiracy of the anti-communist diehards in the Kuomintang to take advantage of negotiations and reorganization to annex the southern Red Army guerrillas.
After the incident, it attracted great attention from the CPC Central Committee and made serious representations with the Kuomintang authorities, demanding that the Kuomintang properly resolve the "Zhangpu Incident" and make it a precondition for the reorganization and concentration of the guerrillas of the Southern Red Army.
At the end of August, Mao Zedong called Zhang Yunyi, instructing him to lodge a serious protest with Yu Hanmou and to promptly return all the original people and guns. On September 14, Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Bogu, Ye Jianying, and others who were negotiating with the Kuomintang, asking the Nanjing government to order Yu Hanmou to return He Mingbu's guns, without missing one shot per person. [New Fourth Army Literature (1), PLA Press, 1988, p. 26.] 】
On October 1, the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee sent a telegram to Zhang Yunyi and others, stressing once again: "The Kuomintang first returns the guns of He Mingbu, and only after it is confirmed that the report is correct can it negotiate the issue of the guerrilla zones." [New Fourth Army Literature (1), PLA Press, 1988, p. 36.] On October 15, Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Pan Hannian and others: "After the Kuomintang returns He Mingbu's guns and publicly admits their mistakes," [New Fourth Army Documents (1), PLA Press, 1988, p. 51. The other guerrilla zones will then discuss adaptation. On October 18, Mao Zedong still stressed in his telegram: "First of all, the Kuomintang must return He Mingbu's guns. [New Fourth Army Documents (1), PLA Press, 1988, p. 52.] On October 30, Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Bogu, Ye Jianying, and others, pointing out: "Until He Mingbu's guns are returned in full, they cannot be concentrated." [New Fourth Army Literature (1), PLA Press, 1988, p. 56.] On November 12, Mao Zedong, in the outline of the report of the Yan'an Communist Party Activist Conference, stressed the need to guard against the "danger of He Ming."
After solemn negotiations by the CPC Central Committee and under the strong pressure of public opinion, the Kuomintang Fujian provincial authorities had no choice but to return the guns of the Red 3rd Regiment on March 2, 1938.
In late July 1937, Xiang Ying was a little confused in the dense forests of the Gan and Guangdong border areas: In the six months after the "Xi'an Incident," the Kuomintang troops were more frantically "clearing and suppressing" the southern guerrilla areas than ever before, which Xiang Ying had long anticipated. However, during this time, the Kuomintang troops stopped attacking.
Why is that? Is there a new situation?
While thinking, Xiang Ying casually flipped through a batch of books that he had just found. Suddenly, Xiang Ying was caught by an article published in a magazine called "New Knowledge," entitled "The Tasks of the Communist Party of China in the Anti-Japanese Period," which was a summary of Mao Zedong's report at the National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in Yan'an on May 3, 1937.
It had been nearly three years since he lost contact with the Party Central Committee, and suddenly received instructions from the Party, although indirect, but still made Xiang Ying feel extremely happy. Xiang Ying often mentioned later: "That happy mood is really indescribable." Because with it, we will have a basis for talking about KMT-CPC cooperation. "
Xiang Ying hurriedly sent people down the mountain to find more newspapers and magazines, only then did he know that the reason why the enemy did not attack was the Lugou Bridge Incident.
On August 8, Xiang Ying and Chen Yi, in the name of the CPC's special committee of the Gan and Guangdong Border Region and the Red Army guerrillas, issued a declaration entitled "Stop the Civil War, Unite to Resist Japan," calling on the Kuomintang troops to immediately stop attacking the Red Army guerrillas.
Should negotiations be made with the local Kuomintang authorities? Xiang Ying was also hesitant in his heart, and he discussed with Chen Yi: "The matter is very important, I should have asked the Party Central Committee for approval, but now there is no way to directly ask for instructions." If action is not taken, I am afraid that the favorable opportunity will be lost. The partisans of the Southern Red Army, these three years have been too bitter, and they also need to take a break. Therefore, Xiang Ying decided to negotiate a truce with the Kuomintang. He also drafted the conditions for negotiations with the Kuomintang authorities, the main contents of which were: demanding that the Kuomintang recognize the legal status of the Communist Party and freedom of speech and action, and release political prisoners; disbanded the "Shovel Communist Group", reorganized the anti-Japanese armed forces, and formed the Red Army partisans into independent anti-Japanese forces; Ensure the supply of the partisans of the Red Army and protect the interests of the masses in the partisan areas.
At such a complex and sensitive critical moment, Xiang Ying was able to keenly perceive changes in the policies of the CPC Central Committee and make strategic changes in a timely manner without direct instructions from the CPC Central Committee.
On August 20, Xiang Ying, in the name of the special committee of the Ganxi Border Region of the Communist Party of China, wrote to Xiong Shihui, chairman of the Jiangxi Provincial Government of the Kuomintang; Ma Baoheng, commissioner of the Office of the Fourth Administrative Inspector and commander of the Security of the Fourth Administrative Region; and Dai Sixia, commander of the 46th Division of the Kuomintang Army, to publicize the political stand of the Communist Party of China on the establishment of an anti-Japanese national united front and urge them to consult and cooperate with the Communist Party on anti-Japanese matters.
On August 27, Peng Yuying, the magistrate of Dayu County in Jiangxi Province, sent a "secret telegram" to Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. He said: "Unless the CCP participates in the anti-Japanese forces, it will never be able to defeat the Japanese invaders," and "now is the time for people with lofty ideals to resist Japan and save the country, and welcome to go down the mountain to negotiate and discuss the matter of going north to resist Japan." On September 3, Chen Yi wrote to Peng Yuying, pointing out: "The Japanese invaders are raging, and the United Front of Anti-Japanese Aggression will be completed without the unity of the whole country, and the unity of the whole country will not be realized without the first alliance of all factions." After that, Chen Yi went down the mountain to Dayu and Ganzhou to negotiate with the Kuomintang authorities.
Looking at the figure of the guerrilla who sent him back to the mountain, Chen Yi felt that he had a heavy responsibility on his shoulders. The lessons of the first Kuomintang-Communist cooperation are still vividly remembered, so he had mixed feelings and feelings, and made "Shengchazi. The term "After ten years of war, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party cooperated again." Thinking back to the old people, tears stained my sleeves. Anti-Japanese resistance is the center, and democracy can save itself. Firmly reluctant, do not do Chen Duxiu. "
Peng Yuying was a person in the Kuomintang who deeply understood the great righteousness of the nation. With his assistance, the negotiation process was smoother than Chen Yi imagined. After Chen Yi reached a preliminary agreement with the local Kuomintang authorities, Xiang Ying went to Ganzhou in late September to negotiate with the Kuomintang on the withdrawal of the Kuomintang troops from the guerrilla areas, the release of political prisoners, and the reorganization of the Red Army guerrillas into the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army, and prepared to reach a final agreement.
Until this time, Xiang Ying and Chen Yi still did not have direct contact with the Party Central Committee. Because he did not understand the guidelines, principles, and specific methods of the Party Central Committee for the negotiation and reorganization of the Southern Red Army guerrillas with the Kuomintang, Xiang Ying also had some deviations in the negotiations. For example, in his letter to Liu Ying, secretary of the Fujian and Zhejiang Provisional Provincial Party Committee of the Communist Party of China, he demanded in the "Implementation Measures for Adoption": "All integrated units must absolutely obey all government orders after the reorganization"; In the "12 Articles of Adoption" agreement reached with the Jiangxi provincial authorities of the Kuomintang, it was agreed that the Red Army guerrillas should be transferred out of the guerrilla areas, and in the "Open Letter to the Southern Guerrillas" published on September 29, he demanded that the guerrillas in various localities "immediately gather to listen to the waiting points after receiving the letter, unify under the National Government, and serve and kill the enemy." In the specific circumstances of the time, many of these errors of judgment could not be avoided.
At the end of September, Xiang Ying heard that Bogu and others were working in Nanjing, and immediately sent a telegram.
For three years, the CPC Central Committee also tried its best to find the Red Army guerrillas who remained in the south. When it was learned from the newspapers that Xiang Ying and Chen Yi had not sacrificed and were still negotiating with the Kuomintang authorities, the central leadership was very happy and relieved.
However, the CPC Central Committee was very disturbed when he found that Xiang Ying had agreed to the concentrated reorganization of the Red Army partisans during the negotiations.
On October 1, the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee sent a telegram to Zhang Yunyi and others, pointing out: "Comrade Xiang Ying does not seem to understand the principle of maintaining independence in the united front, and it seems that he still less understands the principle that the strategic fulcrum of the south should not be unconditionally concentrated, and his approach in Nanchang is dangerous, and he hopes to inform him to come to Yan'an for discussion." [Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, vol. 11 (1936-1938), Central Party School Press, 1991 edition, p. 363.] On October 2, Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong mentioned again in a telegram to Bogu and Ye Jianying: "Xiang Ying went to Nanjing to inform him of the policy, and after arriving in Nanjing, he asked him to come to the central government to discuss." The southern guerrillas should not be concentrated, and Xiang's practice in Jiangxi fell under the influence of the Kuomintang. ["New Fourth Army. Literature (1), PLA Press, 1988, p. 41. At the same time, the CPC Central Committee sent urgent telegrams to CPC delegates in Xi'an, Nanjing, Wuhan, and Hong Kong, asking them to quickly try to convey the correct policies of the CCP to Xiang Ying.
According to the requirements of the CPC Central Committee, Bogu and Ye Jianying learned about the negotiation process between Xiang Ying and the Kuomintang, and wrote back to the CPC Central Committee: "Due to unclear circumstances, Xiang and Chen had some improprieties in the negotiations, but the general direction was correct. ["New Fourth Army. Literature (1), PLA Press, 1988, p. 55. In mid-October 1937, Bogu sent Gu Yuliang with letters from Nanjing to the Ganyue border guerrilla zone.
Gu Yuliang's arrival brought great joy to Xiang Ying and Chen Yi, for three years, they had been looking forward day and night to get in touch with the Party Central Committee, and now the people sent by the Party Central Committee were in front of them!
Their hands were clasped together.
Gu Yuliang conveyed the spirit of the relevant instructions of the CPC Central Committee to Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. After that, Xiang Ying hurriedly went to Nanjing with Gu Yuliang. But Xiang Ying did not expect that this was his final parting with the Ganyue border guerrilla zone.