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Memories of the Battle of Shanghai on August 1 (Bai Chongxi)

author:Drag racing in modern history

1. Battle of Songhu

On August 4, the 26th year of the Republic of China, I flew to Nanjing by telegram from the chairman of the National People's Congress and appointed me to the post of deputy chief of staff. At that time, the situation was becoming more and more urgent, and Japan was constantly provoking in the Hebei, Suiyuan, and Pingjin areas. Knowing that Japan would not stop its invasion of China in order to implement its mainland policy, our supreme authorities convened a meeting of the generals of the whole country in Nanjing to express their determination to resist the war.

After the generals returned, they mobilized and dispatched to stand by to resist the enemy. On 9 August, the enemy's armed officers and men invaded the cordon of Shanghai's Hongqiao Airport to cause an incident and clashed with our security forces.

On 13 August, the enemy concentrated about 10,000 troops of the army and marines stationed in Shanghai to attack our security forces, and the battle of Songhu broke out. In order to cope with the incident, I ordered three divisions in the central part of Zhang Zhi to reinforce Shanghai, and at the beginning I advanced to Huishan Wharf with superior troops. On the evening of 22 August, the enemy's 3rd Division, 11th Division, 4th Brigade of 8th Division, and 1st Brigade of 1st Division landed at Chuansha, Shishilin, and Baoshan 5 at the same time, and attacked south on the line of Baoshan, Luodian, and Liuhe. Shanghai is narrow and close to the sea, and the enemy's land, sea, and air force joint operations are very easy to exert their might, and our army's counteroffensive has failed to work.

Later, the enemy's reinforcements increased one after another, and the main force attacked Luodian. On the 19th, 6 Luodian fell, and our army retreated to the first line of Zhabei, Jiangwan, Miaoxing, and Shuangcaodun. General Gu Zhutong, deputy commander of the Third Theater (the commander was originally Feng Yuxiang, and after Feng was transferred to the post of commander of the Sixth Theater, Chiang Kai-shek concurrently served as the commander) commanded the group armies of Zhang Fakui, Zhu Shaoliang, Xue Yue, Luo Zhuoying, Liu Xiang (who had not yet reached the front line), and Liao Lei (who arrived in Shanghai more than a month after the Songhu War) confronted the enemy on the line of Beizhan, Liuhang, and Liuhe. At that time, if each group army was counted as three armies, there were 18 corps, and if each army was counted as three divisions, there were 54 divisions. By the end of September, the enemy's forces had gathered a total of 200,000 men, and in coordination with the powerful naval and air forces, they had broken through the defense lines of our Miaohang and Jiangwan with superior momentum, and our troops were moving to the south bank of Yunzaobang, Chenhang, Guangfu, Shixianggongmiao, and Liuhe.

Our troops moved to a new defensive area and continued to hold on to the enemy, and the fighting was fierce. Our army suffered heavy casualties due to the lack of modern weapons and the fact that they relied on flesh and blood to fight against it. Later, due to the enemy's heavy firepower, our army was forced to retreat to the south bank of Suzhou Creek, Jiangqiao Town, and Xiaonanxiang. Due to the enemy's air supremacy, enemy planes invaded day and night, so they and the left wing corps continued to retreat to Qingpu and Baihe Port. At that time, due to the difficulty of communication, the order was issued late, the various departments were not well prepared, and the retreat order was very chaotic.

At that time, due to the threat of being tracked by enemy planes day and night, the retreat order of the troops became even more disorderly, so that the Wufu line was not defended again, and continued to retreat to the Xicheng line. On 9 November, the enemy approached Xicheng, and the central government saw that the troops suffered heavy casualties and could not fight under the threat of the enemy's powerful air force, so they ordered a retreat to the Songhu battlefield, and the main force of the troops retreated to the Zhejiang-Anhui-Jiangxi border, and the first part retreated along the Beijing-Shanghai Avenue to Nanjing, and participated in the defense of the city.

The Shanghai War of Resistance came to an end, lasting February and 26 days. The original plan of the Shanghai War of Resistance was originally to resist step by step, so there were existing positions and the Wufu line and the Xicheng line, but because the enemy had air supremacy, it was not easy to march and could not be implemented according to the original plan.

2. Review of the Battle of Songhu

(1) Review of the Japanese Army

1. Taking advantage of the situation along the coast of Songhu and Shanghai, the enemy brought into play the might of the joint operations of the army, navy, and air force, and brought into play the combat strength of all arms on the battlefield with excellent equipment and skillful training, thus inflicting heavy wounds on our army.

2. The Japanese officers and men were able to exert their struggle and sacrifice on the battlefield, and they had the spirit of bushido and the spirit of Yamato, and although they were our enemies, they should also learn from their strengths and imitate them.

3. The discipline of the enemy is too poor, and he does everything to commit adultery and plunder against the people. Although our army was not as well equipped as the enemy, and the Japanese army's behavior aroused the psychology of hatred and hatred for the enemy, it was a sharp weapon to stimulate the spirit in the war of resistance against Japan.

(2) Review of the National Army

1. The officers and men of the national army have a deep sense of nationality and national concept, and although the air and sea supremacy in the Songhu battlefield are in the hands of the enemy, and our equipment and training are far inferior to the enemy, our army is able to resist the Japanese army with flesh and blood, and its spirit of seeing death as if it were home can sing and cry.

2. Our army relied on the patriotic spirit to resist the enemy's superiority in joint operations by land, sea and air with inferior army equipment. From 13 August to 9 November, although our troops suffered heavy casualties, the enemy also suffered heavy losses. Break the dream of the Japanese warlords to conquer China in three months.

3. Due to the lack of air force cover and the lack of artillery, it is very difficult for our army to attack the fortifications. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, there were many examples of battles in which our army captured the enemy's fortified positions, such as the two battles of Kunlun Pass and Myitkyina, but they were ultimately a minority, and the reason for this was that the armament was inferior to that of the enemy.

4. The Japanese artillery fire was fierce, and there was air force cover, and the offensive effect of our army was very small.

5. Our army's training is far inferior to that of the enemy, and the hit rate of using the same weapon is far inferior to that of the enemy. Didn't exert great power.

(3) International comments on the Shanghai War

Although our army fought in Songhu and was absolutely inferior in equipment, it won unanimous praise from the international community for its heroic resistance, and a few of them are listed below:

1. On November 28, 26, the newspapers here unanimously expressed their admiration for the ability of the Chinese troops on the Shanghai front to retreat in the most orderly manner to the properly arranged line of defense according to the predetermined plan after fierce resistance. The British newspaper The Times published an editorial, in particular, about the heroic resistance of the Chinese army, and said that the Japanese army had not yet achieved its main purpose of destroying the Chinese army. That is, in this battle between the two armies, both sides suffered heavy casualties, but ten weeks of heroic resistance have caused China to be called a military state, which has never been heard of before. It should be noted that some of the equipment of the Chinese army was not sufficient, but it was generally believed that it could not be maintained for a day, and they were held for ten weeks. This kind of miracle is very valuable. The resistance in a corner of Shanghai had a great impact on the whole of China.

2. 28 November, London Reuters (Reuters) -- The Times published an editorial on the same day, commenting on the latest episode of the Songhu War, first of all, the newspaper's greatest respect for the heroic and resourceful Chinese troops in the Shanghai operation, and then saying that the Japanese army wanted to turn the planned retreat of the Chinese army into a general rout, and the generals felt exhausted and exhausted. The greatest and only purpose of the Japanese army is to destroy the Chinese army so that it will no longer have a strong and effective fighting capacity. Even though the Japanese army claimed to have killed a large number of Chinese soldiers, and even though the battle in Shanghai did not need to be extended any longer, this was not necessarily the case, and the 10-week bloody battle in Shanghai would one day prove that China had laid the foundation for the deployment of troops that had never been in place. Hua Jun has now emerged from the fog of comical stories. ...... At present, although most of the Chinese army is still under-trained, not fully armed, and because they do not have the strength to purchase raincoats, they still carry umbrellas (referring to the Sichuan army), but they are still able to resist modern weapons and retreat in an orderly manner, and this spirit will affect everywhere.

3. November 28, Reuters LONDON: The Chronicle of the News said in an editorial on the same day that the Chinese army's record in resisting the Japanese attack in Shanghai is actually the most heroic and glorious page in history. The loyalty and valority of the Chinese army in Shanghai and the war of resistance should move the delegates participating in the Nine-Power Pact to uphold international law and to take a firm stand of the balance of power, and that all countries have stronger weapons than China and are capable of initiating an international boycott of Japan, which will make Japan bend its knees at an early date and force them to abandon their violent acts of aggression.

The above is the criticism and admiration of the British newspapers for the Shanghai War. This kind of international sympathy, and the comfort of the people at home, are all the tragic results of the sacrifice of 300,000 troops in the Battle of Songhu in March.

After the retreat from the Shanghai battlefield, Chiang Kai-shek had the following instructions on the transfer of the battlefield:

(1) The Songhu War has dealt a great blow to the Japanese, which fully expresses the spirit of our soldiers to resist the enemy to the death for the sake of the country and the doctrine;

(2) To commemorate the officers and soldiers who died in glorious battles, it is necessary to continue their spirit of sacrifice and fulfill their legacy;

(3) Senior generals should redouble their diligence, conscientiously study and improve the shortcomings of their troops, and stress effective tactics in order to reduce casualties among officers and men and increase their fighting strength;

(4) Key points that should be paid attention to in future operations: In the current transfer of the Shanghai position, we have moved to the last front line of the Shanghai battle, and everyone should be determined to make sacrifices, swear to defend to the death, and live and die together with Shanghai.

During the Battle of Songhu, the army highly demonstrated the spirit of fearlessness, and the people also showed generosity. All the food needed by the troops, as well as defense supplies such as sacks, sandbags, and wires, were unconditionally contributed, and this patriotic fervor invisibly boosted morale, and I am still deeply moved to this day.