01
First of all, I would like to thank these four scholars, who belong to two generations, but are scholars whom I admire, for taking my lectures seriously. They provided in-depth professional comments on the content of the lecture from different perspectives, and this short article is some of my responses to those comments. Before I respond, however, let me summarize the basic points discussed in this report:
Mankind's theoretical discovery and systematic demonstration of freedom means that such a "conceptual nuclear bomb" has been invented: it is enough to break all the hierarchies of mankind and all the monopolies of all powers, thus bringing mankind to an era of equal power and equal power for everyone. Through this conceptual nuclear bomb, human beings established their own individuals as an independent separatus capable of truly autonomous-autonomous, thus establishing the status of an autonomous individual, subverting the priority of the principle of community (city-state, collective) and responsibility in ancient societies. The free individual has thus become the basic unit and starting point for understanding and examining the truth and legitimacy of all value principles.
In fact, the conceptual nuclear bomb of freedom puts all of the cultural world, and indeed the entire history of the world, in a state of reevaluation.
Therefore, it can be said that the argumentation and establishment of freedom is one of the greatest intellectual undertakings of modern times. The English philosophers represented by Locke played a pioneering role in this cause of thought, and the German philosophers represented by Kant and Hegel made irreplaceable and unique contributions to this, because it was they who really overcame the difficulties of the "thin theory of freedom" represented by Locke in arguing on the problem of freedom. By introducing the transcendental dimension, the other dimension, the historical dimension, and the holistic dimension, they not only theoretically completed the argument between external freedom (rights) and internal freedom (free will), but also provided a possible way out to solve the new dilemma brought about by the previous theory of freedom in practice.
By introducing a priori dimensions, the transcendental relationship between freedom and moral law is revealed, thus establishing freedom itself with irrefutable arguments; By introducing the dimension of the other, the freedom established is no longer the freedom of the atomistic individual, but always the freedom in relation to others; The introduction of the historical dimension makes the realization of freedom a process, and some fundamental differences in the world are presented as differences in historical eras. The introduction of the holistic dimension has started the effort to elevate the problem of freedom from a problem in the field of practical philosophy to an existential problem, which not only puts people in a free ethical relationship with each other, but also puts people in a free value relationship with the world as a whole.
In the thin theory of freedom, all conflicts are reduced to cultural clashes due to the lack of a historical dimension; Due to the lack of a priori dimension, the space of power has become a secular space where people can live without virtue; And by closing the holistic dimension and closing the vision of the absolute other, humanity slides into the danger of being "too human". These indicate that it is time to say goodbye to the "thin theory of freedom" and return to German philosophy in order to open up a new theory of freedom.
02
Professor Yu Xilin's comments were brief and subtle. An important question he raised was that although the lecture revealed that the question of freedom had entered the ontological realm from the realm of practical philosophy through Schelling and Heidegger, it did not really pick out the breakthrough of Schelling's conception of freedom, that is, it broke through Kant's diametrical separation between freedom and nature, and nature gained the status of spirit and was incorporated into freedom.
This is a precise question. This question is not only a question of my lecture, but also a question of Kant's conception of freedom and the whole thin theory of freedom. For up to Kant, the question of freedom was almost always discussed in the distinction or opposition between freedom and nature. Nature is often seen as an inevitable realm that has been completed or is being completed. This is a contextual or corresponding view of nature that constitutes the theory of freedom. This view of nature, with the help of science and technology, has been popular to this day and will continue to be popular for the foreseeable future. This view of nature, in opposition to freedom, is both a product of and a drive to the expansion of scientific thinking, which threatens freedom while exacerbating the denaturalization of nature. The consequences of this epoch show that the opposition between freedom and nature itself needs to be rethought and revised. This is a subtle but strong expression of Professor Yu Xilin.
However, it seems to me that Kant's thinking about freedom, although it began with the opposition between freedom and nature (the necessary realm), when he established human freedom, found himself faced with the task of bridging the gap between the two. Thus, in the third critique, nature is examined in the context of freedom, so that nature is not only necessary, but at the same time (for the existence of freedom) purposeless and purposeful. In fact, in the Second Critique and in Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason, nature has been understood in the context of a higher freedom: when our free reason necessarily demands the highest good, which contains the highest virtue and the highest happiness in itself, it cannot but place nature under the domination of the highest freeman, and nature returns to freedom and is reunited with freedom. Of course, this unification is indeed accomplished through religion, as Professor Yusilin has seen. However, the rationale from the purposiveness of nature to the final unequivocal unity with freedom has undoubtedly provided the direction for Schelling and Hegel's theory of free ontology, and we can even say that Kant's theory of practical freedom has moved towards a theory of free ontology. This is what I am trying to show in my book Freedom and Hope (which continues my attempt to make an ontological interpretation of Kant's philosophy in my previous book).
When nature is placed in freedom and unified in freedom, it means that nature acquires or restores its spirituality, so that nature not only has a mechanical necessity that can be spied on and measured, but also its secretiveness. But how can we understand and settle this secrecy of nature? This is an urgent issue of the times posed by Professor Yu Xilin in his commentary. However, no matter how one understands the secrecy of nature, all intellectual efforts to appeal to the legitimacy of nature today can no longer simply return to nature in ancient thought, but only to free nature. For the theory of free existence, freedom is higher than nature, there is only nature within freedom, and there is no nature outside freedom. Any recourse to natural justification in disregard of freedom, especially of human freedom, is not only a regression of thought, but also a laziness of thought. For simply returning to nature means that the mind can be allowed to create all sorts of mystical thoughts through exaltation and self-sanctification, or to pretend to be a ghost to capture people.
03
In his commentary, Professor Yan Mengwei particularly reminded that freedom is not only a matter of concept, but also a question of history and reality, because the deepening and advancement of philosophers' theoretical discussion of the issue of freedom has historical and practical conditions. This comment is very much in line with the criticism of me by some friends who have criticized my work for focusing only on the theoretical and theoretical aspects of freedom, and ignoring the practical conditions for the realization of freedom.
Indeed, the intellectual enterprise of philosophy, like work in other fields, cannot develop in isolation from other fields of society. Imagine that if an era does not even allow the question of freedom to be discussed, then it is certainly unlikely that a philosophy of freedom will emerge. Thus, the conditions of the times that allow the discussion of freedom and related issues are a necessary condition for the emergence of a philosophy of freedom. Therefore, it is undoubtedly necessary and insightful to emphasize the historical conditions under which the German liberal theory arose.
However, in my thinking, I will also ask the question: Why, given the historical conditions that gave rise to the German theory of freedom, did not necessarily give rise to a corresponding philosophy of freedom? In many parts of the world, although there are historical conditions for the emergence of the German theory of freedom, which are pointed out by Professor Yan Mengwei, there is no corresponding philosophy of freedom. At the very least, this suggests that for the birth of the philosophy of freedom, philosophers stood up and meditated on freedom, which was crucial. In fact, just as the emergence of modern science requires a certain cultural background, the freedom of thinking and inquiry also requires a certain ideological tradition to prepare the necessary ideological height. And this tradition of thought requires the accumulation of generations of philosophers to form. Therefore, if too much emphasis is placed on the dependence of ideas on social conditions, and the independent efforts of practitioners in the spiritual world are neglected, then this may hinder philosophy from being at the forefront of the times, so that some emerging ideas will be rejected as detached from reality, from the times, and from history.
Since the birth of Hegel's philosophy of history, historical experience has been included as an indispensable dimension for understanding all philosophical problems, so all philosophical theories should have historical consciousness, that is, theories need to think about their own historical links and the practical conditions for their implementation, including the obstacles that need to be overcome or removed. Since then, not only history has entered philosophy, but also many modern disciplines such as economics, sociology, and anthropology. This has undoubtedly enriched the content of philosophy to an unprecedented extent, not only promoted the deepening and expansion of philosophy itself, but also greatly enhanced the realism and epochality of philosophical thinking and expression. It can be said that this is a turning point made by Hegel and Marx to philosophy.
However, there is also a danger to be wary of, that is, as philosophical problems are gradually decomposed into practical problems from the perspective of various disciplines, philosophy also gradually closes the metaphysical dimension of thought, abandons the transcendental way of thinking, and thus disintegrates itself into empirical science or applied science. However, if philosophy loses its metaphysical dimension of thought and its transcendental way of thinking, then it is inevitable that the entire cultural world of mankind will slide into the abyss of relativism and nihilism. Because if there is no absolute, which can only be understood in the metaphysical dimension of thought, and there is no whole, which can only be recognized and accepted in a priori way, we cannot determine the irreplaceable value (position) and irremovable direction of what is presented in history and experience.
Everything that people emphasize and pursue in the name of reality will become illusory as a result. In my lectures and in a series of research work, the reason why I emphasize sticking to metaphysical thinking and preserving the transcendental way of thinking is out of vigilance against the self-disintegration of philosophy and the requirement to defend philosophy as philosophy. The primary task of the philosophy of freedom is to make a systematic a priori argument for freedom itself, to demonstrate the theoretical systemic truth of freedom, that is, the intrinsic relationship between freedom and other fundamental issues, and the centrality and irreplaceability of freedom in relation to these fundamental issues. As to the question of the actual conditions or obstacles to the reality of freedom, it is not unimportant, but it is a second-order question. For, in fact, it is only when freedom is established theoretically, and therefore on the level of rational consciousness, that human beings can truly recognize the conditions for the realization of freedom and strive to create them, and can they clearly recognize the obstacles to freedom and have the courage to overcome them.
04
In the comments of two young scholars, Yang Yunfei and Shang Wenhua, they went further than my lectures in many respects and led to a series of topics that deserve more in-depth discussion.
The discussion of the holistic dimension of freedom is the most difficult part of the lecture, and it is also the most neglected part of the study of freedom, and Professor Yang Yunfei has gained insight into the importance of this part, but also put forward a number of well-founded doubts: "[In the lecture] the overall world freedom as the prototype and source, so that human freedom acquires absoluteness and divinity; Holistic freedom places man in a relationship with the Absolute Other, opening up the direction of super-secular values; Holistic freedom ensures the openness of the world and fundamentally upholds human freedom. The responses were wonderful. But one can also question further, for example, whether the fact that human freedom has acquired divinity through this means that human beings are given too high a position. Does it mean that man has thus broken through his finitude? Another example is that this super-mundane value relationship seems to have a lot of room for interpretation. Will this relationship be defined by some traditional religious doctrine? Or is it dependent on a future 'God' of salvation, as Heidegger puts it? With regard to the second question, if the answer is yes, is man again included in the God-man relationship and the heaven-man relationship? (Although the 'gods' or 'heavens' here as the free whole of the world are different from the gods and heavens in traditional culture, there should be similarities in this framing relationship.) This impression seems to be reinforced by Heidegger's 'vintage' tendency to a certain color throughout the process. Does this mean that the holistic view of freedom may re-characterize people? This may further imply a tension within the German philosophy of freedom: is it possible that the holistic dimension of freedom has questioned or hollowed out other dimensions, such as the transcendental dimension, the otherness dimension, etc.? ”
These doubts can be summarized into two questions: 1. Does understanding and defining human freedom from the dimension of overall freedom lead to the attainment of divinity at the same time as it leads to transcending its finitude and becoming too divine? 2. In the overall dimension, the relationship between God-man or Heaven-Man must be introduced, and in this framework of this relationship, will the transcendental, historical, and other dimensions of human freedom be eroded or even denied?
These are two deep questions. Examining human freedom in the context of the whole reveals that there must be a source for man, a being who has been thrown into freedom, and that this source must be another absolutely free being that transcends our freedom, otherwise it cannot be the source of the free man. The source that cannot autonomously and automatically unfold other things from itself still requires a higher source until there is a source that can unfold out all things autonomously and autonomously. This source, which opens up all things autonomously and autonomously, is at the same time a whole, insofar as it contains all possibilities within itself. When we understand ourselves in relation to such a whole, on the one hand, we show that we have a similarity with this transcendent whole—both can be the beginning of a series of events, and therefore we are as absolute as the whole, that is, "divinity": as a free being, each of us has a place in place, that is, each of us is irreplaceable as the end of his existence. But, on the other hand, our freedom is only similar to the freedom of the whole, not the same, for although we can be the beginning of our own series of actions, we cannot be the beginning of the series of all events, which is one of them. Second, our freedom is given, because we have the freedom of the absolute, or because we are inhabited by the freedom of the whole, so that although "we are free" is absolute, "we are free" is not up to us, which is what is commonly referred to as an existential situation: we are thrown into freedom. This situation is neither of our own nor can we change it. This means that our freedom is limited. In this sense, the examination of human freedom under the absolute wholeness not only reveals the divinity of man, but also reminds of the finitude that man himself cannot break through: man is in the midst of possibilities and constantly opens up possibilities because he is thrown into freedom, but he can never realize and control all possibilities.
Professor Yang Yunfei is keenly and vigilantly aware that once the holistic dimension is introduced, it also means that the framework of the God-man relationship will be introduced. This is an ancient and traditional framework of human self-understanding, which has been severely challenged and questioned in recent times. However, if we acknowledge our own limitations, and guard against and prevent human beings from becoming "too human" due to self-centered transgression, then we will have to refocus on this relational framework and reset it.
As long as we are assumed to be free beings, we must exist in an autonomous relationship and a relational being. In fact, we are truly in a relationship if and only if we are free. Because only a free being can open up all kinds of possibilities to construct all kinds of relationships, or dissolve all kinds of relationships. Although instinctive beings or necessary things also exist in relations, these relations are completely irrelevant to the instinctive being: these relations are neither opened nor planned or constructed by it, nor can it be changed or escaped. Among all the relationships we have opened, there are three basic relationships: the human-man relationship, the human-thing relationship, and the God-Heaven-Man relationship. The first two relationships are easy to understand and accept, while the last relationship, although it has occupied an important and even dominant position in human history for a long time, with the centralization of humanism and the uniqueness of scientific thinking in modern times, the relationship between God and man or the relationship between heaven and man has been repeatedly questioned, so that it has almost become a superfluous thing. It seems that human beings can live without heaven, earth, and gods, and even gods and gods can live better and freer. However, this is dangerous. The fact that human beings are freer in their political life (which is of course very important and a great progress) does not necessarily mean that human beings are freer in their overall existence (this freedom of overall existence is the freedom of existence that Professor Shang Wenhua is concerned with in his commentary). Because in the world of life where the God-man relationship is closed, the world is not more open, but more cramped.
In fact, by acknowledging that we are free beings, we are not only compelled to admit that we must exist in a relationship, but also to open a special relationship, that which cannot be opened by instinctive beings or necessary beings, which is the God-man relationship or the heaven-man relationship. For as a free being, whether proceeding from his own moral practice or from his inescapable inquiry into the source of the absolute, he inevitably leads himself to a relationship with the totality of absolute freedom, that is, with an absolute Other who transcends himself. The God-man relationship or the heaven-man relationship is actually an expression of this relationship. However, this is an asymmetrical relationship, because it contains a threefold asymmetry: 1. The wholesome is the source of all possible things and is the absolute prior being, and we are only the derivative of the later being. 2. The whole not only contains all possibilities, but can realize and control all possibilities, while we can only open up possibilities, but cannot realize and control all possibilities. Therefore, at most, we can only move towards those who are close to the whole, and we can never reach or become the whole. 3. The whole is absolutely free, because nothing does not come from Him, and therefore He is the Absolute Beginning, while our freedom is given and therefore limited. Therefore, we are only the like, not the same, with the whole. This triple asymmetry creates a fractured chasm between God and man. To open up and establish a relationship with the whole is to open up a dimension of absolute goodness that contains all our goodness but surpasses all these goodnesses, and provides a value direction that can be infinitely approached for our living world. Professor Yang Yunfei is worried that the right to interpret this value direction will be monopolized, which is a pertinent concern. However, as long as we make it clear that our freedom is the starting point for opening the God-man relationship, then from this point of departure we can establish a principle that prevents the monopoly of this right of interpretation: any interpretation of this value direction must be based on the free reason of man and follow the free reason of man and its laws. In other words, the power of interpretation is not in the hands of any person or organization, but only in free reason. This is also a basic principle of our reset of the God-man relationship.
So, does the reintroduction of this reconstructed God-man relationship undermine or dissolve the transcendental, historical, and other-dimension of freedom? Since the God-man relationship we have reintroduced is based on our freedom, without our freedom it is impossible for us to understand and establish the true God-man relationship. In this sense, our freedom itself is a priori condition for understanding and establishing the God-man relationship, or rather, our freedom is a prior condition for us to understand and affirm that God as a whole. Thus, the introduction of the God-man relationship based on our free reason not only does not dissolve the transcendental nature of our freedom, but rather suggests the a priori (prior) nature of our freedom.
The historical dimension of the existence of our freedom fundamentally means that our freedom unfolds in history, and history is only the unfolding process of freedom. Because of this, history is also the argument for freedom. However, as the unfolding process of our free existence, this kind of history must have a direction and a goal, otherwise it is just a simple movement or change, not a historical process. And that direction or goal must be more free. For a history based on freedom cannot be in the opposite direction, that is, less free. In the sense that more freedom means more openness and more possibilities, more freedom means more completeness; And to be more free as the individual also means to be more conscious, more respectful of moral law and more virtuous, more free is the same as being more perfect. We call this fullness and perfection together the better. Therefore, as the direction of history, more freedom is also better. And the openness of this historical process towards a better future can only be safeguarded in the reset of the asymmetrical God-man relationship. That is, within the framework of the God-man relationship, our history can remain a history of openness and freedom. Any end is closed and anti-liberal.
In fact, the God-man relationship places each person first in a relationship with the Absolute Other, so that this relationship with the Absolute forms the basis of the relationship between people, which means that the Absolute mediates the relationship between people, and therefore, there are unbridgeable boundaries between people. What does this mean? This means that each person becomes an irreplaceable other. Here we can see that the God-man relationship is what really defends others as others.
The above discussion also partly responds to the questions raised by Professor Shang Wenhua in his comments. In fact, he raised a question that is still outside the ideological horizon of the Chinese philosophical circles: the question of the relationship between freedom and the basis of freedom. This question can also be replaced by a question of the relationship between freedom and faith. Because of his concern for the question of the basis of freedom, he believes that he cannot be satisfied with the theoretical inquiry of freedom, and even this theoretical inquiry is not the most urgent, but the real urgency is to realize the mystery of the basis of freedom in "survival". By realizing the mystery of the basis of freedom and affirming this abyssal basis, we can be truly free. This is a very challenging thing to think about for the world of Chinese thought. In my lectures, I put this dimension of thinking in the context of the holistic dimension of freedom.
Finally, I would like to thank the four scholars again for their comments, which provoked me to think more.
—Related Reading—
Review of the Lectures of the Stars (2)|Huang Yusheng: The Inquiry and Argumentation of Freedom: German Philosophy as a Theory of Freedom
Review of the Lectures of the Stars (2)|Huang Yusheng: The Inquiry and Argumentation of Freedom: German Philosophy as a Theory of Freedom (2)
Huang Yusheng is a professor of philosophy, and his main research areas are First Philosophy, German Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Political Philosophy-Philosophy of Law, and Comparative Philosophy. He is the author of "Truth and Freedom: An Existential Interpretation of Kant's Philosophy", "Time and Eternity: On the Problem of Time in Heidegger's Philosophy", "The Philosophy of Ferrying Between Being and Nothing: A Study of the First Philosophical Problem", "The Metaphysics of Rights", "The Encounter between Philosophy and Religion", etc.