Decision-making and operational planning prior to transfer
At the end of April 1934, after the defeat in the Battle of Guangchang, the Field Command of the Red Army returned to Ruijin from the front under the leadership of Bogu, Li De, Zhu De, and Liu Bocheng. The field command was abolished, and the personnel of each unit were returned to their original structure.
Gu Zuolin, member of the Politburo and director of the Field Political Department (acting director of the General Political Department of the Red Army), suffered a recurrence of lung disease at the front line due to intense work, and there was no good medicine to treat it, and his condition worsened.
After the Battle of Guangchang, Bogu, Li De, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and others held a small-scale discussion on the subsequent military operations of the Central Red Army in the "independent house" of Li De's residence.
After Chiang Kai-shek's army had acquired new weapons and equipment from Germany, Italy, and other countries, the five "encirclement and suppression" campaigns could not be smashed, and it was difficult to preserve the revolutionary base areas in the central Soviet region, and it was necessary to seek a new way out in order to develop the revolutionary situation. At that time, it was planned that the main force of the Central Red Army would be led by the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Revolution to withdraw from the Central Soviet Region and move to the Lingling area in western Hunan, creating a new revolutionary base area, and waiting for an opportunity to join up with He Long's Second Red Army.
In order to stabilize the position internally and confuse Chiang Kai-shek externally, two advance armies were prepared to be dispatched: one was to the west to fight the front station and try to get in touch with the Helong Army; One moved east to northern Fujian and then inserted itself into the Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangxi borders behind enemy lines in order to mobilize the enemy and relieve pressure on the main forces of the Central Red Army.
The Party Central Committee reported this idea to the Comintern, and then the triumvirate of Bogu, Li De, and Zhou Enlai was responsible for handling everything. On 25 June, the Comintern replied: "The mobilization of new armed forces has not been exhausted in the Central Soviet District, nor has the resistance of the Red Army units and the environment in the rear been sufficient to alarm us. And even about the withdrawal of the main Red Army in the Soviet zone, the only thing was to preserve the forces of the movement from a possible blow from the enemy. ”
This means that we agree with the plan put forward by the CPC Central Committee.
After receiving the reply telegram from the Comintern, the Party Central Committee conveyed to a small number of responsible persons of the party, government, and military organs, demanding strict secrecy.
What I remember vividly is that around this time, my parents wrote to me to go back to my hometown in Xingguo to find a partner, and later asked my brother to visit me in the army, and I knew that I would have to be separated from my family.
Still silent, happily saying goodbye to his loved ones. At that time, it was less than two months before the Long March, and under the instructions of the central authorities, the headquarters was already in full swing to make preparations for the transfer.
First of all, on July 5, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution issued an operational instruction for the establishment of an anti-Japanese advance team in the north, with the 19th and 20th divisions forming an advance team of more than 6,000 people of the Red Seventh Army Corps, under the leadership of corps commander Xun Huaizhou, political commissar Le Shaohua, chief of staff Su Yu, and director of the Political Department Liu Ying, set out from Ruijin on the 7th to march eastward.
Then, on 12 August, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution ordered the 17th and 18th Divisions to form the organs and military and political committees of the Sixth Army Corps of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, with Ren Bi as the chairman of the Military and Political Committee, Xiao Ke as the commander of the corps, Wang Zhen as the political commissar, Li Da as the chief of staff, and Zhang Ziyi as the director of the Political Department.
The First Bureau of the Central Military Commission was entrusted with the task of keeping track of the movements of the two advance teams.
It has been learned that although the Eastward Advance Corps mobilized and dispersed part of the enemy's forces in the process of advancing into northern Fujian and penetrating behind enemy lines, and relieved a little of the pressure on the Central Red Army, it was unable to do so because of the small number of troops of our army and the difficulty of penetrating deep into the enemy's hinterland.
After skillfully maneuvering with the enemy, the Western Expeditionary Corps successfully rendezvoused with the Red Third Army led by He Long, communicated radio contact with the Party Central Committee, and initially built the Sichuan-Hubei-Hunan-Guizhou-Guizhou Soviet Region, achieving the expected goal.
It was on the basis of the situation of the Sixth Army Corps of the Red Army that we drew up a preliminary road map for the westward transfer of the main Red Army, which provided a basis for the command of the main force of the Central Red Army in the future transfer operations.
Secondly, it began to expand the Red Army and urged the intensification of the production of ammunition and other materials.
In order to meet the needs of the war and to prepare for the strategic shift, in accordance with the regulations of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission that the strength of each regiment should not be less than 1,500 and that the strength of each division should not be less than 5,000, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and the central government transferred a large number of cadres from party, government, and military organs to various counties, districts, and townships to do the work of mobilizing young and middle-aged people to join the Red Army.
Under the slogan "Expand the Iron Red Army by one million," the Central Soviet District set off an unprecedented upsurge of expanding the Red Army. The people of the Soviet area responded to the party's call and enthusiastically joined the army. From June to October, about 30,000 people were mobilized to replenish the losses of the main Red Army due to combat casualties, providing for the formation of new regiments.
The Central Revolutionary Military Commission instructed the Xingguo Guantian Arsenal to redouble its efforts to produce bullets and grenades, so as to reach the target of no less than 50 rounds of ammunition for each rifle and no less than two grenades for each combatant in the field army by September. The Ministry of General Supply, for its part, should vigorously raise military supplies.
By September, it is necessary to prepare a set of cotton military uniforms and two pairs of shoes for each person in the army. Each commander and fighter of the Red Army also made two pairs of straw sandals, a hat (an umbrella), and a bag of dry rations. The Ministry of Health must purchase as many medicines as possible for the treatment of the wounded in case they are needed.
Finally, and most crucially, it is necessary to reorganize the organs and schools and deploy cadres.
This work is a core secret, which is completely in the hands of the Central Three-Man Group and is carried out step by step.
The list of cadres of the Party Central Committee and the Central Government is in charge of Li Weihan and Zhang Wentian, and the military cadres are in charge of Zhou Enlai.
(Editor's note: It has always been difficult to understand why Xiang Ying's high status was left behind?) I couldn't find any information about his bad relationship with the trio.
Chen Yi was seriously injured and had to be carried on a stretcher before he could go, and his relationship with Zhou Enlai was also very good, could it be related to his low status at that time. Wang Jiaxiang was seriously injured by the plane bombing, and he was also carried on a stretcher to complete the Long March, but his status was much higher than Chen Yi's when he set off.
He Shuheng was one of the deputies of the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China, ostensibly because he was too old to go on an expedition, but the "five elders" of the Long March were not much different in age from him, and they also completed the Long March with proper care.
Qiu Qiubai has stepped down because of the wrong route, and he is sick, so it is clear that he does not take the Long March)
At that time, Ye Jianying, in accordance with the instructions of the Central Three-member Regiment, organized two columns of the organs and departments under the Party Central Committee, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviets, the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution, and all the organs, units, and cadres that the Party Central Committee had determined (in fact, the decisions of the Three-Man Regiment of Bogu, Zhou Enlai, and Li De) to be evacuated.
Namely:
The first column of the Military Commission (also known as the Military Commission column, codenamed the "Red Star Column"), Ye Jianying served as the commander and political commissar,
The first, second, third, and fourth echelons are composed of cadre regiments jointly established by the functional bureaus and schools of the General Headquarters. party
The leading comrades of the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution acted with the first echelon (combat bureau) in order to facilitate the leadership and command of the operations and transfers of the whole army.
The Second Column of the Central Military Commission (also known as the Central Column, codenamed the "Red Medal Column"), Luo Mai is Li Weihan as the commander and political commissar, and Deng Fa is the deputy commander and deputy political commissar.
The first, second, third and fourth echelons are composed of the Party Central Committee, the central government organs, the General Supply Department, the General Health Department, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Central Organs of the Communist Youth League, the State Political Security Bureau, and teachers.
In his capacity as director of the bureau and commander and political commissar of the Central Military Commission's column, Ye Jianying protected a group of cadres who were attacked and ostracized by the "leftist" line and made them accompany the army on the Long March. When he was ordered to organize the column of the Central Military Commission, he put forward two plans for retaining the cadres of the Red Army:
First, some of the cadres and instructors of the six abolished schools were assigned to five regiments to fill the vacancies, and the remaining instructors and cadres and trainees were organized into a cadre regiment directly under the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, which had the nature of a battalion school, and under normal circumstances, it should not be used by combat units in order to retain the backbone;
Second, some of the so-called "erroneous" cadres who have been rejected by the "leftist" line will be assigned to work in government organs, and the other part will be assigned to cadre regiments to act with the army.
The above-mentioned plan was approved and implemented by the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution, and as a result, a number of outstanding cadres of the Party and the Red Army accompanied the army to northern Shaanxi, where they became the precious wealth of the Party and made major contributions to the later revolutionary struggle. For example, Bian Zhangwu, Guo Huaruo, Wei Gongzhi and others were on the Long March with the army under Ye Jianying's protection arrangement.
At the same time that the organs of the Red Army General Headquarters were stepping up preparations for the strategic transfer in accordance with the instructions of the Central Three-Man Regiment, news came from the front line that Jianning and Yinlongxia, north of Gulonggang, had been lost one after another.
In early July 1934, in order to intensify the "encirclement and suppression" of the Central Soviet Region and the Red Army, the enemy advanced from six directions to the areas of Xingguo, Gulonggang, Toupi, Yiqian, Pengkou, and Yunmenling, and launched an all-out attack on the central area of the Central Soviet Region.
In the face of the enemy's powerful offensive, Li De, Bogu, and others failed to make a decisive decision on the spot, did not hesitate to change their strategic policy, and quickly carried out a strategic shift in order to preserve our army's strength and wait for an opportunity to annihilate the enemy; instead, they continued to demand that the main force of the Red Army "use all forces to continue to defend the Soviet area in order to achieve a great victory in the campaign." Militarily, they adopted the operational policy of dividing troops into six routes and resisting on all fronts, in an attempt to save the tide of the war through the military defense of the main force of the Red Army and the activities of strengthening auxiliary directions.
Unexpectedly, the military deployment of Li De and Bogu of "dividing troops on six routes" and "resisting on all fronts" happened to be broken by Chiang Kai-shek's tactics of using superior forces to break through. Although the combat team of the headquarters worked day and night for the above-mentioned defensive campaigns, racked their brains, and meticulously organized and implemented them, they were unable to save the situation of losing the whole situation due to the mistakes of Li De, Bogu, and others in their decision-making.
By August 28, in the positional defensive battle, although our army repelled the enemy's repeated group charges with the support of multiple defensive positions, it was finally forced to abandon all positions at the cost of more than 2,300 casualties.
At the beginning of September, our 1st Army Corps and the 9th Army Corps and other units used the tactics of ambush movement to annihilate more than one brigade of the enemy's Jiang Dingwen Eastern Route Army and deal a blow to the enemy's Eastern Route Army, but they could not change the passive situation of our army.
By the end of September, only the narrow areas of Ruijin, Huichang, Xingguo, Yandu, Ningdu, Shicheng, and Changting counties remained in the Central Soviet Region.
In mid-July, when Li De, Bogu, and others were arranging for the main forces of the Red Army to divide their troops into six routes for positional defensive operations, an unexpected incident occurred, and Li De, Bogu, and others were forced to speed up preparations for strategic transfer. After graduating, Kong Hezhong, former commander-in-chief of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Military Region and commander of the 16th Red Army, who studied at the Red Army University, took the opportunity to inspect his work and carried the marked map of the central organs in Ruijin that he had drawn in advance.
After Chiang Kai-shek obtained the map of the location of our party, government, and military organs, he received Kong Hezhong in Nanchang and decided to send a large number of planes to Ruijin to bomb the addresses of the main leaders of our Central Committee.
After the Second Bureau of the General Headquarters discovered Chiang Kai-shek's above-mentioned scheme, the First and Fourth Bureaus, under the leadership of the head of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, organized the party, government, and military central organs to urgently evacuate their original stations overnight and move to the Meikeng area of Yunshi Mountain, 15 kilometers west of Ruijin, in camouflage and concealment, thus avoiding the losses caused by the bombing of enemy planes in early August and ensuring the safety of the Party Central Committee, the Central Government, the Central Military Commission, and the General Headquarters.
Fortunately, Kong Hezhong did not know about the battlefield deployment of our army, let alone the core secrets of the central government's preparation for the strategic transfer, but he was very shocked by Li De and Bogu.
At the beginning of August, the Central Three-Man Regiment made a decision to ask the Operations Section of our headquarters to begin drawing up a plan for a breakout at the end of October or early November, so as to prepare for the timely withdrawal of the main forces of the Central Committee and the Red Army from Ruijin.
After that, due to the successive defeats in the defensive battles of our army's positions, it was discovered from the end of September to the beginning of October that the enemy's northern, eastern, and southern route armies were taking advantage of a large-scale encirclement posture to intensify their attacks on the central area of our Soviet region, in an attempt to achieve the goal of encircling and annihilating our army.
Li De, Bogu and others then hastily decided that the Red Army should immediately abandon the central Soviet area and move to Xiangxi. At the beginning of October, the Party Central Committee decided to demote Liu Bocheng from chief of the General Staff to chief of staff of the Fifth Army Corps on the "ground" of Liu Bocheng's disrespect for Li De, and at the same time ordered the First Bureau of the General Headquarters to redraft the plan for the breakout of the encirclement.
On October 5, He Changgong and Pan Hannian were dispatched to carry a letter from Commander-in-Chief Zhu De to secretly negotiate with Yang Huanmin, a major general and staff officer of Chen Jitang, to discuss the issue of excuses. At the same time, a reconnaissance detachment was dispatched to the Taojiang River valley to secretly ascertain the situation and select the crossing point.
On 7 October, the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution ordered the local corps to take over the defensive tasks of the main Red Army on all fronts, and the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 8th, and 9th Red Army Corps withdrew from their positions and concentrated their reorganization in the Ruijin, Yandu, and Huichang areas, and stood by for departure.
At the same time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution set about setting up the Central Sub-Bureau of the Soviet District, the Central Soviet District Office of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the Central Military Region, and the provincial military districts. Xiang Ying was appointed secretary of the Central Bureau of the CPC Soviet District, commander and political commissar of the Central Military Region, Chen Yi was appointed director of the Central Government Office, Liang Baitai was appointed deputy director, Gong Chu was appointed chief of staff, and He Chang was appointed director of the Political Department.
Tissue sequence and timing of transfer
In order to carry out this major strategic shift in an organized manner, the First Bureau of our General Headquarters has, in accordance with the instructions of the Central Three-Man Regiment and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, urgently drawn up the sequence of the establishment of the field army and local troops before the start of the Long March.
When withdrawing from the Soviet zone, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided,
Politburo member Chen Yun served as the representative of the Central Committee of the Fifth Army Corps, Politburo alternate member Liu Shaoqi served as the representative of the Central Committee of the Eighth Army Corps, and Politburo alternate member Kaifeng (He Kequan) served as the representative of the Central Committee of the Ninth Army Corps.
The two tables attached to the next page are the results of the summary statistics of the strength of the main Red Army and local troops on October 8 by the First Bureau of our General Headquarters in accordance with the instructions of the Central Three-member Regiment and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. In order to have a complete picture of the equipment and material readiness of the main forces of the Red Army before the transfer, we also presented to the head of the General Headquarters at the same time the specific figures of the armament and subsistence supplies of each corps.
There were a total of 338 horses, 33,244 guns of various kinds, 1,732,130 rounds of ammunition,
38 mortars, 2,473 shells,
83,000 pieces of winter clothes, 34,862 catties of salt,
2.024 million yuan of silver dollars, 177 quintals of medicines, and communication materials can be supplied until November 24.
On 9 October, the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution issued to all field regiments the draft prepared by the First Bureau of the General Headquarters
The "Map of the Gathering Position of the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army before the Breakthrough Siege" and the "Schedule of Operations of the Field Army from October 10 to 20" specifically stipulate the daily action routes, tasks, requirements, demarcation lines, and communication and liaison methods for the first and second columns (1) of the Central Military Commission and the various army corps to carry out the strategic transfer.
On the same day, the action arrangements for the principal leaders of the CPC Central Committee, the Central Government, and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission were decided.
It is clear that Zhu De, chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang, vice chairmen, Bogu, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Party Central Committee, Zhang Wentian, member of the Politburo and chairman of the People's Committee of the Central Government, Mao Zedong, member of the Politburo and chairman of the Executive Committee of the Central Government (who accompanied the army in Lingdu on October 16), and the Central Military Advisers all acted with the first echelon of the first column.
The above heads of the Party Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission are each equipped with two guards, one horse, one pair of stretchers, and four to six stretchers. Zhu Deyin did not want a stretcher, but two horses.
Chen Yun, Liu Shaoqi, and Kaifeng acted with the corps headquarters of the 5th, 8th, and 9th Red Army Corps respectively because they served as the central representatives of each corps.
At the same time, it is stipulated that the first and second echelons of the first column from the date of transfer shall be the specific administrative organs of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, the Party Central Committee, and the Central Government. All telegrams, instructions, and other documents issued in the name of the Party Central Committee and the Central Government of the Soviet Union in the course of the transfer were undertaken by the First Bureau of the General Headquarters. The staff of the above two central organs were assigned to the second column, led by Romai, who followed behind the first column.
(1) At that time, it was also known as the Military Commission Column and the Central Column.
In the absence of a chief of general staff at the General Headquarters, Ye Jianying, commander of the column of the Central Military Commission, assisted Zhu De and Zhou Enlai in presiding over the daily work of the General Headquarters, and actually acted as chief of the General Staff until the Liping Conference reinstated Liu Bocheng from his original post.
Later, Zhang Yunyi, who accompanied the army on the way to Youshan in southern Jiangnan, served as deputy chief of the general staff, and as the advance commander of the column of the Central Military Commission, he led some personnel of relevant departments and bureaus to be responsible for attacking the front station first, reconnoitering the terrain and the enemy's situation, and arranging food and lodging for the follow-up troops.
On October 10, the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution issued an order officially announcing the composition and action plan of the First Field Column. At 5 p.m. on the same day, all the commanders and fighters of our Central Military Commission column, under the leadership of the party Central Committee and the head of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, set out from Meikeng in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province, and began the world-famous 25,000-mile Long March.
Order of the Central Revolutionary Military Council
19 34-Oct-10
1. The General Headquarters of the General Military Commission and its directly subordinate units hereby organize the First Field Column to act together with the field army composed of the main force of the Red Army, that is, Comrade Ye Jianying will be the commander of the column.
2. The composition and concentration plan of the first column are shown in the attached table.
3. In order for the column to carry out its tasks smoothly, it is necessary to thoroughly understand and carry out the following matters to all personnel.
1. To maintain military secrets, it is necessary to strengthen vigilance and block information, all military organs should use code characters, try their best to conceal the original number and name, absolutely keep confidential the direction of action, inspect the garrison before setting off on the 5th, and not leave any words about military secrets.
2. To avoid aircraft reconnaissance for covert operations, apply night marches, assemble before dusk, move after dusk, and stop at dawn.
3. Each catering unit shall have one camper, who shall be led by the personnel of each echelon to set up the camp (the first and second echelons shall be distributed by the second echelon).
4. When the echelons are advancing on parallel roads, they should send road reconnaissance teams two hours before departure to reconnoiter and repair the roads, but the first echelon should send a company of engineers to go ahead on the evening of the 9th as a road reconnaissance team.
5. The assembly and departure times and the marching order should be strictly observed, and there should be no delay or disorder.
6. The assembly site for troops and baggage should be selected separately in the open space next to the road, and the road should not be blocked to obstruct the passage.
7. The echelons should look for guides, but absolutely conceal their intentions.
8. Keep a distance when traveling, and do not stretch or stretch arbitrarily.
9. In the night march in the Soviet area, the march may be carried out with a specified number of torches (three for each food unit and one for six loads).
10. Road Reconnaissance Teams shall sign the Lime direction at the road divergence.
11. In the event of a break or road breakdown, the rear troops should be notified to avoid fatigue caused by prolonged stops.
12. Each echelon should send a shelter team to shelter the outdated and sick, and the last echelon should be responsible for eliminating road signs and sending a blocking team to prevent escape.
13. Bring the April rice grain. (sic)
14. All seriously ill patients who cannot be cured in one month shall be sent to the Fourth Rear Hospital (under the Song of Jiubao) to be transported by 10 o'clock before noon on the 10th.
15. The head of each echelon shall strictly check the number of baggage documents, and shall not exceed the prescribed number without approval.
16. After arriving at the centralized area, the contact will be made by wire. A long-distance telephone line was connected between Manta and Mantian Madi, and a telephone and switchboard were set up.
Right Order
Captain Pengti
Chairman: Zhu De
Vice-Chair: Zhou Enlai
Xiang Ying
At the end of this section, I would like to point out that there is a certain degree of inaccuracy and inappropriate evaluation in the current commentary on the process of the strategic transfer of the Central Red Army from the Soviet areas in the current party history, military history, and war history.
Needless to say, throughout the entire period of the Fifth Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" Campaign, Bogu and Li De vigorously rejected the correct propositions of Zhu De and Mao Zedong, and politically and strategically made the mistake of moving from military adventurism to military conservatism and even "escapism in retreat" in the later period, with the result that the Red Army had completely lost the central revolutionary base areas that had been established by the Red Army after many years of bloody struggle.
However, this does not mean that, as some historical works have said, the CPC Central Committee at that time did not make prior preparations for the withdrawal from the Central Soviet Region, and the withdrawal of the Central Red Army from the Central Soviet Region was an unorganized and unplanned escape of our army after the failure of the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign.
In fact, as mentioned earlier, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China not only made a certain degree of preparation for the withdrawal of the Central Red Army from the Soviet area, but also determined its overall plan and plan as early as May 1934 after the fall of Guangchang.
As for the reason for the hasty transfer to October, the main reason was that Bogu and Li De lacked a clear understanding of the evil consequences of the positional defensive operational policy they had implemented under the guidance of the military conservatism line, and they still took a wait-and-see attitude. This has affected in part the progress of preparations at Headquarters.
What I still remember vividly is that in order to carry out the instructions and requirements of the Central Three-Man Regiment, the personnel of our General Headquarters also specially formed two teams, one of which was responsible for organizing and coordinating the front-line operations of the main force of the Red Army, and the other was responsible for the preparations before the transfer. During those months, I and Huang Huxian, Kong Shiquan, Deng Shiqian, Luo Shunchu, Wang Hui, Zeng Zhaotai, Huang Gongfa, and other operational staff officers rushed back and forth between the front and rear, busy with everything else, and the work was extremely intense and busy, and we could not afford to prepare our own bags until we left.
To this end, on October 8, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, and Ye Jianying also conducted a centralized inspection of the material and equipment preparations of our staff officers of the General Headquarters. (See next page for action plan form)
Of course, because the central authorities considered that the strategic transfer from the central Soviet area was a major military act, in order to strictly maintain secrecy, the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution did not announce the transfer plan to the troops until the transfer was carried out, nor did they carry out the necessary political mobilization to the vast number of commanders and fighters.
However, in the author's opinion, under the situation in which Chiang Kai-shek was desperately pursuing evil killings and trying to annihilate our Central Red Army in one fell swoop, it was very necessary for the Party Central Committee to mobilize 100,000 troops within the narrow Soviet area to achieve an unprecedented change of guard and transfer, take necessary preventive measures, and ensure the secrecy of the operation.
Facts have proved that due to the attention paid to secrecy at that time, the large-scale transfer of our troops was not discovered by the enemy at the beginning stage, and it was not until late October that the Red Army broke through the first blockade line that Chiang Kai-shek did not know that our main Red Army was retreating westward.