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His contribution to the three-year guerrilla war in the south ranked ahead of Chen Yi, and his role was underestimated in the past

author:Micro Talk Inn

Objectively speaking, Chen Yi's contribution to the three-year guerrilla war in the eight southern provinces is huge, but compared with Xiang Ying, it is a little inferior, and there is a very important reason that Chen Yi later became the head of the New Fourth Army and Huaye, and participated in the 55-year awarding of titles, so many friends will have this misunderstanding, and today I will talk about Xiang Ying's contribution to the three-year guerrilla war in the eight southern provinces!

His contribution to the three-year guerrilla war in the south ranked ahead of Chen Yi, and his role was underestimated in the past

In October 1934, tens of thousands of the main forces of the Red Army began the Long March, but some of them had to be left to cover the withdrawal of the main forces, and at the same time continue to fight after the withdrawal of the main forces. In the end, it was decided that Xiang Ying would stay and be fully responsible for the withdrawal of the main force, and Chen Yi was also left to assist Xiang Ying in carrying out his work, Xiang Ying was the general person in charge at that time, and Chen Yi was the director of the office.

After the main force withdrew, Xiang Ying's first task was to pretend to be the main force to cover the main force, and when the main force withdrew, the main force left the 24th Division and some local armed forces of more than 16,000 people, but in the face of 200,000 troops, you can imagine how difficult it is. At first, Xiang Ying still fought positional warfare with the main force, but it didn't take long for most of the positions to be lost, and later adopted Chen Yi's suggestion to adopt guerrilla warfare to disperse the remaining forces. Later, many people thought that Xiang Ying should not have fought positional warfare at the beginning, and should have used guerrilla warfare at the beginning. I don't think this is appropriate, because the most important task left at the beginning is to feign the main force, so there is no problem for Xiang Ying to adopt a countermeasure at the beginning.

His contribution to the three-year guerrilla war in the south ranked ahead of Chen Yi, and his role was underestimated in the past

In the face of the encirclement and suppression of hundreds of thousands of people, Xiang Ying scattered the remaining more than 10,000 people into multiple guerrilla units to carry out guerrilla warfare, ranging from hundreds to few. After the main force withdrew, it didn't take long for Xiang Ying to lose contact with the main force, but Xiang Ying still led everyone to adjust their strategies in time, carried out guerrilla warfare in Jiangxi, Guangdong and other places, and compiled guerrilla tactics into songs and ballads, and skillfully maneuvered. Xiang Ying vividly described it like this: "As long as there is money to be made, we will come, and we will not do the business of losing money." What should I do if I can't beat it? In a word - slip out, hide ... found that there was no way to go, drilled into the old forest, took the time to release the cold gun, and beat them without a head or tail. ”

Xiang Ying, Chen Yi, and others persisted in guerrilla warfare in the eight southern provinces for three years, containing hundreds of thousands of people as the main force and retaining the backbone of tens of thousands of people, who were organized into the New Fourth Army three years later. How hard these three years are, just look at the poems Chen Yi wrote in the past three years! Xiang Ying later said: "I haven't taken off my clothes to sleep for two years, and my clothes are in tatters from tree branches, and they are all patched. ”

His contribution to the three-year guerrilla war in the south ranked ahead of Chen Yi, and his role was underestimated in the past

Under such difficult conditions, there will be some people who are shaken, how did Xiang Ying solve this situation? On the one hand, Xiang Ying reasoned with everyone, and on the other hand, for those who wanted to leave, Xiang Ying would give them the travel expenses and come and go voluntarily. In this way, although there are fewer people, those who remain are determined. At that time, many people didn't understand why Xiang Ying did it? Xiang Ying explained to everyone: "The more difficult the environment, the more it can test a person's will, if they want to leave at this time, it means that they do not have a firm will to reform, sooner or later something will happen, it is better to let them go early, the rest of the people are firm, and the combat effectiveness will be stronger." ”

His contribution to the three-year guerrilla war in the south ranked ahead of Chen Yi, and his role was underestimated in the past

After the outbreak of the full-scale War of Resistance Against Japan, Xiang Ying, Chen Yi and others went down the mountain to negotiate, and gathered the guerrillas scattered all over the country together to form the New Fourth Army. Together with the army commander, he led several detachments of the New Fourth Army to the anti-Japanese front.

His contribution to the three-year guerrilla war in the south ranked ahead of Chen Yi, and his role was underestimated in the past

Many people believe that if Xiang Ying had not died prematurely, when he was awarded the rank in 55 years, Xiang Ying, as a representative figure of the three-year guerrilla war in the eight southern provinces and the New Fourth Army, would definitely be awarded the title of marshal if he had not been transferred to a local position, and even if he was transferred to a local area, he would not be lower than the vice president. However, there are also many people who believe that Xiang Ying is not outstanding militarily, for example, the implementation of the New Fourth Army's major policy decision to develop behind enemy lines is not in place, the preparation for recalcitrant is insufficient, and the hesitation to move northward is so that the development of the New Fourth Army is not as good as that of the Eighth Route Army in North China 41 years ago, so they think that it will probably be transferred to the local area in the future.

However, I believe that the development of the New Fourth Army in the first three or four years was not as good as that of the Eighth Route Army in North China, mainly due to objective constraints. The first objective condition is that there is a huge disparity between the strength of the enemy and us in the areas to which the New Fourth Army went after its reorganization, and at that time the southern Anhui, central Anhui, and southern Jiangsu regions were already heavily defended by the Japanese army, and the New Fourth Army only went to these areas in 38 years, and at this time the Japanese army had already stabilized, and it was very difficult to open up the situation. In 37 years, the Eighth Route Army carried out more than 10 key ambush warfare in Shanxi in a row, and made a reputation, which played a very important role in the subsequent development and growth, and in just one or two years, the total number of people exceeded hundreds of thousands, especially the guerrillas in Hebei and Shandong were subsequently reorganized, and the Lu Zhengcao Department and the Shandong Column contributed more than 100,000 troops, and the 120th Division also went to Jizhong to expand it once.

The second objective condition: the geographical conditions are not as good as North China, and the Eighth Route Army can rely on the mountainous areas in Shanxi, and the three regions of Shanxi, Chahar, Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Northwest Shanxi are all mountainous areas in Shanxi! In the most difficult time, when Jizhong could not hold on, most of them withdrew to the northwest of Shanxi. Shandong can also rely on the mountainous area of Luzhong. However, the region of central Anhui and southern Jiangsu where the New Fourth Army was located a few years ago was a great plain, which was not easy to develop and grow. The Eighth Route Army also has the rear of northern Shaanxi as support, and the rear of the New Fourth Army is the Third War Zone, and the orders of the Third War Zone must also be considered, and it cannot be completely let go of development, which will lead to conflicts with the Third War Zone, so there is nothing wrong with Xiang Ying's consideration in this regard. With the Japanese army in front and the third theater in the back, it is not easy to let go and develop.

Third, objective conditions: When the New Fourth Army was formed, the total number of troops was far less than that of the Eighth Route Army, and the number of troops was an order of magnitude worse. When the Eighth Route Army was formed, there were 45,000 people in the three divisions alone, and if there were no establishment restrictions, it could be almost 60,000 or 70,000 people, and at that time, counting the logistics schools and other institutions, there were 70,000 or 80,000 people, and the thousands of people who were scattered and captured by the West Route Army also returned one after another, and these thousands of people were at least directly served as company platoon commanders, and they were subsequently enriched into the troops, especially after fighting several battles during the Battle of Xinkou, a large number of young people in Shanxi signed up, and the number of several divisions doubled, and at the end of 37, the Eighth Route Army almost had more than 100,000 people. The New Fourth Army was only established on December 25, 37, when the total number was only more than 10,000 people, and they were all scattered guerrillas, and the difference in numbers was an order of magnitude!