Cheng Zihua, formerly known as Cheng Shijie, was born in June 1905 in a poor family in Xie County, Shanxi Province. After graduating from high school, Cheng Zihua was admitted to the government-funded Taiyuan National Normal School. During his time at the Taiyuan National Normal School, he actively participated in the student movement and joined the Communist Party of China in June 1925. With the successive victories of the Northern Expedition, in December 1926, Cheng Zihua and three others were sent by the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee to apply for the Wuhan branch of the Huangpu Military Academy.
At the beginning of 1927, Cheng Zihua was admitted to the Wuhan branch of the Huangpu Military Academy (belonging to the sixth phase of the Huangpu Military Academy), although he only studied in the Wuhan branch for more than half a year, but under the education and training of the Communist Party of China, he actively exchanged revolutionary information with Xu Xiangqian, the captain of the engineering brigade of the military academy at that time, and other teachers and students from Shanxi, and greatly improved politically, militaryly, and ideologically. He was assigned to the Central Independent Division of the National Revolutionary Army with the school, and participated in the counterattack against the rebel Xia Douyin Division together with Ye Tingbu of the 24th Division of the 11th Army, and experienced the baptism of war. After the defeat of the Great Revolution, the massacre of the reactionaries did not make Cheng Zihua bow his head, and he left the teaching regiment of Zhang Fakui of the Second Front Army and went to Shanghai via Hankou to find the party organization. After Cheng Zihua arrived in Shanghai, the Party Central Committee sent someone to talk to him: "After the 'August 1' riots, the He and Ye troops went to Guangdong, and you went to Guangdong to join the He Ye army. After Cheng Zihua arrived in Guangdong, he first served as a soldier in the special service battalion of the General Headquarters of Li Jishen's Eighth Route Army, and then returned to the Zhang Fakui Teaching Regiment in Guangdong, and connected with the party.
At that time in Guangdong, Zhang Fakui was fighting for territory with the Xingui faction, and the rear was empty, so Zhang Fakui sent his main force to Xijiang to meet the Xingui army, leaving the teaching regiment in the rear to maintain order. The enemy forces in Canton were empty, and it was a good time for an armed uprising. According to the instructions of the Party Central Committee, on December 11, under the leadership of Zhang Tailei, Ye Ting, Ye Jianying, etc., the Guangzhou Uprising was held and the Guangzhou Soviet Government was established. After the failure of the Guangzhou Uprising, Cheng Zihua traveled thousands of miles with the remnants of the uprising troops to the Hailufeng area where the Soviet power was established under the leadership of Peng Pai, the leader of the peasant movement. Because Cheng Zihua was a native of the north, it was difficult to hide on the spot, and he was later asked by the local party organization to leave Haifeng County to find the party organization.
The first sound of exemplary soldiers
After Cheng Zihua left Guangdong, under the atmosphere of white terror, he went to Shanghai and Xie County's hometown to find the party organization in vain, and finally went to Nanyang, Henan, and finally found the party organization in the warlord Yue Weijun's department. In the summer of 1929, the underground party of the Communist Party of China had established party branches in 15 companies of Yuebu, with more than 70 Communist Party members, forming a strong fighting fortress and directly accepting the leadership of Zhou Enlai, secretary of the Central Military Commission. Cheng Zihua first served as an adjutant in Yue Weijun's department, and then served as the platoon commander of the fifth company of the second battalion of the sixth regiment of the first division of Yue Weijun's department. With the downsizing of the troops, many Communist Party members were forced to leave the team, and only Cheng Zihua was the only Communist Party member among the officers. He actively used the method of making friends to secretly win over and unite sympathizers among soldiers outside the party, and to accumulate strength so that he could organize military violence when conditions permitted.
Yue Weijun's unit was not a descendant of Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Kai-shek had long wanted to annex it, and Yue's anti-Chiang and anti-Whampoa officer sentiments were relatively strong, and although this unit had undergone several reorganizations, the influence of our party was still growing. At the beginning of October 1929, Cheng Zihua's 15th Independent Brigade, which was reorganized from Yue Weijun's department, went to Yangxin and Daye to attack the Red Army. At this time, the party Central Committee sent Ke Qingshi, Deng Qianyuan, and other comrades to Hankou to find Cheng Zihua, and Cheng Zihua promptly reported the relevant situation to them, and they also agreed to pull the troops out and join forces with the Fifth Column of the Red Fifth Army, which was operating nearby, to capture Daye City and stage a military riot. A month later, the Central Military Commission instructed that the military violence should adopt a plan of "internal and external cooperation". Cheng Zihua decided to revolt at 12 p.m. on December 14. At 11 o'clock that night, Cheng Zihua gathered party members and squad leaders of each company, first solved the reactionary officers, and then led the rebel troops to join the fifth column of the Red Fifth Army led by He Changgong and Li Can. Later, the five companies of the uprising were combined into the second detachment of the fifth column of the Red Fifth Army, and Cheng Zihua served as the detachment leader. In accordance with the principle of building the people's army, Cheng Zihua and others rectified the insurrectionary troops, eliminated the bad work styles in the old army, and turned them into a new type of people's army.
Daye Riot was a continuation of the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the Guangzhou Uprising and the Pingjiang Uprising, and was highly praised by the Party Central Committee as "the first sound of model military violence". In January 1934, due to the success of the Daye Military Rebellion, Cheng Zihua was awarded the Red Star Medal of the Second Class at the Second National Congress of the Chinese Soviets held in Ruijin.
In April 1931, he went to work in the Central Soviet Region, and successively served as the commander of the 307th Regiment of the 35th Red Army, the commander of the 3rd Independent Division, the commander of the 40th Division of the Red Fifth Army, the commander and political commissar of the 41st Division, the commander of the 14th Division, the commander of the 22nd Division, and the acting chief of staff of the Guangdong-Jiangxi Military Region. In the struggle against encirclement and suppression, he used Comrade Mao Zedong's strategy and tactics to mobilize the masses in depth, lure the enemy into depth, and destroy the enemy's vital forces, thus demonstrating outstanding military command ability. In January 1934, at the Second Congress of Chinese Soviets, he was awarded the Red Star Medal of the Second Class. He successively served as commander of the 40th Division and commander and political commissar of the 41st Division of the Red Fifth Army Corps, and participated in the second to fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" struggles. In the struggle against "encirclement and suppression", Cheng Zihua fought bravely and skillfully, commanded well, and made many military exploits.
Lead the Long March of the Red 25th Army
In June 1934, Zhou Enlai, vice chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, had a conversation with Cheng Zihua, then acting chief of staff of the Guangdong-Jiangxi Military Region. Vice Chairman Zhou said that the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base areas are very difficult, and according to the needs of work, the central authorities have sent Cheng Zihua to work in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base areas.
In June 1934, the Central Committee decided to send Comrade Cheng Zihua to work in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui revolutionary base areas. Before leaving, Comrade Zhou Enlai personally talked, analyzed the situation, and deployed tasks. After arriving in Hubei, Henan and Anhui, he served as the commander of the Red 25th Army.
Subsequently, Cheng Zihua went through hardships and dangers to reach the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area. At that time, the main force of the Red Fourth Front Army had been withdrawn, and the Red 25th Army, which was formed later, was seriously reduced in strength under the influence of Wang Ming's "leftist" line. Whether the Red 25 th Army would persist in standing still or carry out a strategic shift became the primary issue on which a decision was urgently needed at that time. Cheng Zihua said that the Red 25th Army's next course of action, combined with his experience of Vice Chairman Zhou's instructions, held that the enemy should not be allowed to lead the way by the nose and be trapped in the "fish pond" waiting for the enemy to drain the water and catch fish. Cheng Zihua said that it is possible to go to Funiu Mountain, where the bandit leader Fan Zhongxiu has been entrenched for many years in the past, so why can't the revolutionary base area led by our party gain a foothold?
On 11 November, the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Provincial Party Committee held a meeting of the Standing Committee at Huashanzhai in Guangshan County, Henan Province, at which the meeting unanimously agreed with Vice Chairman Zhou's instructions that the Red 25th Army should be fought out and a new base area should be created, and the meeting decided to move westward. The provincial party committee decided that Cheng Zihua would be the commander of the Red 25th Army, Wu Huan would be the political commissar, and the former army commander Xu Haidong would be reappointed as the deputy commander. After the Huashanzhai meeting, the provincial party committee instructed Gao Jingting, member of the Standing Committee of the provincial party committee and secretary of the Northwest Anhui Provincial Party Committee, to form the 28th Red Army again and continue to persist in the armed struggle in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui border region.
On December 16, the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Provincial Party Committee led the Red 25th Army to start the Long March from Hejiachong, Luoshan County, Henan Province. At the time of departure, the provincial party committee issued the "Declaration on the Departure of the Second Advance Team of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to the North to Resist Japan". The Red 25th Army first crossed the Pinghan Road and entered the Tongbai Mountains. After entering the Tongbai Mountains, he felt that it was not easy to gain a foothold here, so Cheng Zihua suggested to the Provincial Party Committee and Wu Huanxian Political Commissar that he move to the Funiu Mountains in western Henan. Later, because the Funiu Mountains did not have the conditions for establishing a base area, the Red 25th Army, under the leadership of Cheng Zihua and Wu Huanxian, defeated the enemy's encirclement, pursuit, and interception, entered southern Shaanxi, and successfully completed the first strategic transfer. As a result of its efforts, the Red 25th Army entered Shaanxi five months ago and initially established a revolutionary base area of nearly 500,000 people in Hubei, Henan, and Shaanxi.
In July 1935, the Red 25th Army learned that the Central Red Army had gone north to resist Japan and reached the edge of Qinghai and Gansu, so it decided to continue north to join the Central Red Army. After the Red Fourth Front Army left, the remnants of the Red 25th Army were left behind, and the generals stationed there, Wu Huanxian and Xu Haidong, actively expanded the Red Army, recruited some young and middle-aged people to enrich the troops, and reorganized a new army, the Red 25th Army.
Because of the uneven quality of the soldiers, most of them do not have a complete basis in military theory, and they act a little recklessly, sometimes ignoring military rules and discipline, these are bad habits that must be corrected.
On the first day of Cheng Zihua's arrival, the military department held a meeting, and Xu Haidong said that Cheng Zihua was capable of civil and military skills, and that there would inevitably be a better way to manage the army, and he was willing to give up his post as army commander and change to the post of deputy army commander.
In this way, Cheng Zihua became the commander of the Red 25th Army.
By then, it was the middle of 1934.
The main Red Army set out from Ruijin in mid-October, and the Red 25th Army left Hubei, Henan and Anhui on November 16.
Prior to this, Cheng Zihua made a lot of preparations to improve the combat capability of the army and cooperated with Wu Huanxian and Xu Haidong.
The newcomers could not change their "banditry", so Cheng Zihua and Wang Pingzhang repeatedly emphasized the eight disciplines of the Red Army, and also slightly adapted the "Song of the Three Major Tasks of the Red Army" made by Wang Pingzhang before and turned it into a catchy ballad: "Song of Red Army Discipline".
The Red Army was the most disciplined, acting according to orders, and not acting indiscriminately; Fight local tyrants to return to the public, and trade must be fair; The things of the workers and peasants shall not be taken for a penny; Speak kindly, and don't scold when you open your mouth; The toiling masses of the proletariat are all close to each other; Departure and camping, everything should be remembered; Upper floors, bales of grass, and clean houses; The borrowed goods must be returned, and the loss must be compensated; Defecate and find toilets, and do not search prisoners.
The combat strength of the contingent was poor, so Cheng Zihua asked the soldiers to participate in guerrilla warfare more and learn from their experience, and in just five months, there was a marked improvement in their thinking and actions.
Everyone has formed a consensus on how to treat the common people and how to treat the comrades-in-arms who share weal and woe around them.
After the start of the Long March, Cheng Zihua and everyone traveled around the country, and Xu Haidong insisted on fighting in the front and asked Cheng Zihua to take the troops to the rear to ensure safety.
However, at the beginning of the transfer, the Kuomintang army pursued relentlessly, and its strength was more than ten times that of the Red Army, and on the 25th day, Cheng Zihua was wounded in both hands while commanding the operation.
The Red Army troops set out from Dabie Mountain, passed through Tongbai Mountain and advanced towards Funiu Mountain, and the enemy troops set up layers of blockades along the way.
After arriving in the Shangluo Mountains, the Red 25th Army, which had no time to rest, was caught by the enemy's 60th Division, and the two sides fought fiercely.
The predecessor of the enemy's 60th Division was the old unit of the 19th Route Army, which has always been labeled as being able to fight and resist, and is a strong force that cannot be underestimated.
This unit was one step ahead of the Red 25th Army, and lay in ambush at the Red 25th Army's route, starting from Funiu Mountain and chasing it all the way to Yujiahe, always taking advantage of the Red 25th Army's unpreparedness to sneak attack.
During the battle, Wu Huanxian, Xu Haidong and Cheng Zihua all rushed forward, but the enemy's firepower was too fierce, and Xu Haidong and Cheng Zihua were wounded one after another.
Xu Haidong injured his left cheek, and Cheng Zihua's hands were pierced by bullets.
This is the second time Cheng Zihua has been injured in the hand, as early as 1928, when Cheng Zihua participated in the struggle to defend the Soviet power in Hailufeng, he was shot in the left hand by the enemy;
Now Cheng Zihua is using a telescope to observe the enemy's situation, and he was hit by a stray bullet again.
Old injuries were added to new injuries, bones were broken, and bleeding did not stop, Cheng Zihua became very ill at once.
The battle ended in victory, but the wounded Cheng Zihua developed a high fever.
The medical staff carried him back to the battalion headquarters, immediately took the methods of disinfection and splinting, and gave him anti-inflammatory and antipyretic drugs in time.
In the previous injury, his hands already had four fingers that were neither straight nor bending, and this time the pain left his hands with lifelong disabilities, becoming "claw-like crippled hands".
In this way, in order to avoid bacteria from invading the bone marrow, the doctor advised Cheng Zihua not to exercise vigorously, but he could not hold the reins and ride on horseback.
In order not to delay the progress of the march, he lay on a stretcher and was carried on the road by guards and stretchers.
Since Wu Huanxian's sacrifice, the Red 25th Army is inseparable from Cheng Zihua and Xu Haidong, and the injuries of the two have greatly reduced the morale of the soldiers, and Cheng Zihua has always been in sadness and self-blame.
Whenever he saw the stretcher man carrying himself, panting and unable to walk, he always sighed: "I am really a burden, my hand is injured like this, I can't get better, I can't die, I can't die, I live to suffer, and I drag down the troops......"
In addition to walking on the road, Cheng Zihua's daily life also needs to be taken care of by the guards, Cheng Zihua, who has bandages on his hands and can't move when hanging on his neck, can't do without others when he eats, dresses and washes.
He endured the pain every day, as long as he did what he could, he would not trouble others, and he also asked Qian Xinzhong, the director of the Red Army Hospital, to amputate his leg many times, he always felt that this would make his comrades less tired.
In addition, after the first battle of Yujiahe, although the Kuomintang army fled in a hurry, it was extremely proud of injuring Cheng Zihua and Xu Haidong, and some news released put the Red 25th Army in danger, which also made Cheng Zihua extremely uncomfortable.
On February 22, 1935, an article entitled "Red Bandits Suffered Casualties, Cheng Xu Was Seriously Injured" was prominently published on the third page of Shaanxi's "Xijing Industrial and Commercial Daily".
The content is roughly as follows: "Xu Haidong's remnants were repeatedly beaten by me, and the casualties were huge......
In addition to more than 100 casualties, the puppet army commander Cheng Zihua was wounded in the head, and the puppet deputy army commander Xu Haidong was wounded in the leg.
Since the two bandits were injured, they could not stand on their own feet, and every time they wandered, they had to be carried by people......"
Although the location of the battle and the parts of the wounded were incorrect, the enemy clearly knew that Cheng Zihua and Xu Haidong did not have strong combat effectiveness at that time, because they were so injured that they could only lie on a stretcher and march.
But the Red Army is a miracle team, which can always forge a new path in the midst of a crisis.
In order to let the soldiers stop worrying about him and save more physical strength to fight, Cheng Zihua washed his face and feet when his injuries were not healed, and when he couldn't hold the basin with his hands, he clamped it with his elbows, although he occasionally wet his clothes......
It was this spirit of helping me and helping you that made the Red 25th Army turn the tide and become the first unit to arrive in northern Shaanxi.
When the soldiers of the same unit recalled Commander Cheng Zihua, they all praised him as a good commander.
On the way north, after Wu Huanxian, acting secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Provincial Party Committee and military political commissar, died, Cheng Zihua took on the heavy burden of acting secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Provincial Party Committee and military political commissar, and Xu Haidong served as the army commander. Under the leadership of Cheng Zihua and Xu Haidong, the Red 25th Army arrived in Baoan County, the Shaanxi-Gansu revolutionary base in September. The Red 25th Army's Long March was only about 2,900 at the time of its departure, but when it reached northern Shaanxi, it expanded to more than 3,400 people, and the Red 74th Division, which remained in southern Shaanxi, also grew to nearly 2,000 people, becoming the only unit of the four main Red Army Long March that did not decrease but increased in number. Facts have proved that Cheng Zihua's arrival in Hubei, Henan, and Anhui, in accordance with Vice Chairman Zhou's instructions and his analysis of the situation in the base areas, played an important role in the provincial party committee's decision to implement the strategic transfer of the 25 th Red Army. This meritorious achievement of his was unanimously recognized by many veteran comrades of the 25 th Army of the Red Army.
The Red 25th Army's Long March reached the Shaanxi-Gansu revolutionary base area
The Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China was established
On December 8, 1934, the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China led the Red 25th Army into Luonan County, Shaanxi Province. In the battle of Yujiahe on December 10, the Red 25th Army annihilated more than 800 enemies. On the same day, it was changed to the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China. After the Red 25th Army entered Shaanxi, it successively conquered the four county towns of Ningshan, Foping, Zhen'an, and Luonan. On July 2, the Red 25th Army won a great victory at Yuanjiagoukou and annihilated most of the 1st Shaanxi Garrison Brigade. After learning that the Central Red Army had joined forces with the Red Fourth Front Army in western Sichuan and was preparing to continue its march north, the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee held an emergency meeting at Fengyukou in Chang'an County on the evening of 15 July. At the meeting, it was decided to lead the Red 25th Army to march west to the north in order to coordinate with the actions of the main Red Army in the northwest. The meeting also decided that the CPC's Hubei-Shaanxi Special Committee and Henan-Shaanxi Special Committee, as well as the guerrilla armed forces in various localities under their leadership, should continue to persist in the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi base areas.
On July 16, the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China led the main force of the Red 25th Army to the north along the western foot of the Qinling Mountains and continued the Long March. After that, the Red 25th Army crossed the Qinling Mountains in the south, feinted to attack Hanzhong, turned around and advanced to the northwest, entered the territory of Gansu, crossed the Wei River in the north in the Tianshui area, occupied Qin'an, and coerced the county seat of Jingning. On August 17, the Red 25th Army marched eastward along the West (An) Lan (Zhou) Highway and attacked the county town of Klonde. Then he crossed Liupan Mountain and arrived at the foot of Pingliang City. On August 21, the Red 25th Army was suddenly attacked by more than 1,000 people of the 35th Division of the Kuomintang Army when it crossed the Wangmu Palace to the west of Jingchuan County and waded into the Weihe River. Wu Huanxian, political commissar of the Red 25th Army, died heroically in the battle. The commanders and fighters of the Red 25th Army turned their grief into strength and annihilated all this enemy.
On September 7, the Red 25th Army reached the Leopard River in the Shaanxi-Gansu border area after an arduous Long March. The Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China held a meeting in Baozichuan and decided to change the post of commander of the 25th Red Army Cheng Zihua to military political commissar and deputy commander Xu Haidong to serve as army commander. Subsequently, the troops continued eastward, reaching Yongning Mountain in Baoan County on 9 September. When Xi Zhongxun and Liu Jingfan heard the news, they immediately sent people to Yongning Mountain to warmly welcome the Red 25th Army and quickly reported to the Northwest Working Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Northwest Military Commission.
On 11 (or 12 September), the Organization Department of the Northwest Working Committee of the Communist Party of China issued an urgent circular to the responsible persons of the party departments at all levels in order to welcome the Red 25th Army into the Shaanxi-Gansu base area, demanding that "seize this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to mobilize all party members and every toiling mass in the entire Soviet region to welcome the convergence of the Red 25th Army and the Shaanxi-Gansu Red Army, celebrate the great victory of the Red 25th Army in the north, and hold various forms of welcome and celebration meetings."
On September 15, the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China led the Red 25th Army to Yongping Town, Yanchuan County, where the Northwest Working Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Northwest Military Commission are located.
On September 16, according to the instructions of the Northern Bureau of the Communist Party of China, Zhu Lizhi and Nie Hongjun, who had arrived in the Shaanxi-Gansu base area in advance, and Cheng Zihua, acting secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, formed a delegation of the Northern Bureau of the Communist Party of China to the northwest, with Zhu Lizhi as secretary.
On 17 September, a delegation from the Northern Bureau of the Communist Party of China to the northwest presided over a joint meeting in Yongping Town, which was attended by the Northwest Working Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee, and the 25th, 26th, and 27th armies of the Red Army. Present at the meeting were Liu Zhidan, Gao Gang, Hui Zijun, Guo Hongtao, Cui Tianfu, Ma Mingfang, Zhang Xiushan, and other responsible persons of the Northwest Work Committee, as well as Xu Haidong, Dai Jiying, Guo Shushen, and other responsible persons of the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee, totaling more than 30 people.
The meeting decided to abolish the Northwest Working Committee and the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee and establish the Shaanxi-Gansu-Shanxi Provincial CPC Committee. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China is composed of Liu Zhidan, Gao Gang, Ma Mingfang, Wang Dacheng, Bai Qian, Zhu Lizhi, Gao Changjiu, Nie Hongjun, Xu Haidong, Guo Shushen, Guo Hongtao, Cheng Zihua, Mu Shengzhong, Mu Chunnong, Dai Jiying, etc., Secretary Zhu Lizhi, Deputy Secretary Guo Hongtao, Secretary-General Li Jingbo, Organization Minister Wang Dacheng, Propaganda Minister Guo Shushen, White District Work Minister Mu Shengzhong, and Women's Minister Bai Qian.
The meeting decided to reorganize the Northwest Military Commission, and also decided to organize the 25th, 26th, and 27th Red Army into the 15th Red Army Corps, with corps commander Xu Haidong, corps political commissar Cheng Zihua, deputy corps commander and chief of staff Liu Zhidan, and corps political department director Gao Gang and deputy director Guo Shushen. The Red 15th Army Corps had three divisions: the 75th Division was reorganized from the Red 25th Army; The 78th Division was reorganized from the Red 26th Army; The 81st Division was reorganized from the Red 27th Army. The total strength of the whole army is more than 7,000 people.
On September 22, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial CPC Committee issued a circular requiring all ministries, party groups, and party departments at all levels of the provincial party committee to conscientiously implement the "one-and-a-half-month work plan of the provincial party committee" and formulate their own one-and-a-half-month work plan in light of actual conditions and report to the provincial party committee. The current strategic tasks set forth in the "One-and-a-half-month Work Plan of the Provincial Party Committee" are: to strike head-on at the enemy's new offensive, break through the enemy's "encirclement and suppression," and meet the Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial Soviet Congress to be held on January 28 of the following year; On the basis of leading the masses in the autumn harvest movement and the struggle to divide the fields, we have fulfilled or exceeded the tasks of the campaign to expand the red charge month.
The Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China also established the Preparatory Committee for the Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial Soviet Government, and decided to convene the Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial Congress of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers on January 28, 1936, to elect the Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial Soviet Government. On 15 October, the Preparatory Committee for the Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial Soviet Government promulgated the "Decision on the Soviet Election Law and the Regulations on the Organization of the Soviets," unifying the election methods and organizational structures of the Soviet governments at all levels in the Shaanxi-Gansu base areas. It states: "The committees of the ministries of the provincial soviets may be increased at any time if necessary. As far as the needs are concerned, the ministries that should now be as follows: the Ministry of Labour; Ministry of Lands; Ministry of education; Ministry of Food; Ministry of National Economy; Department of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection; Treasury; Ministry of Military Affairs; Interior; Referee's Department. It also stipulated: "Establish a political security bureau and set up security sub-bureaus in each county." ”
The Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China is subordinate to the Northern Bureau of the Communist Party of China, and has jurisdiction over the Special Committee of the Shaanxi-Gansu Border District of the Communist Party of China, the Shenfu Working Committee, and the First Sub-district Committee of Northern Shaanxi (established in September 1935), and directly leads the county party committees of Chiyuan, Xiuyan, Zichang, Jingbian, Mixi, Yanchuan, Yanchang, and Yan'an. On the evening of October 2, 1935, the Kuomintang 84th Division stationed in Wayaobao was forced to abandon the city and flee under the heavy siege of the Red Guards and other local guerrillas. Subsequently, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Soviet Government of Northern Shaanxi Province decided to establish Wayaobao City, which has jurisdiction over five districts, and established Wayaobao City of the Communist Party of China with Cui Tianfu as secretary. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Soviet Government of Northern Shaanxi Province also moved from Yongping Town, Yanchuan County, to Wayaobao City on October 5. The Wayaobao Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China is directly under the leadership of the Shaanxi, Gansu and Jin Provincial Party Committees.
The Red XV Army was formed
September 18, 1935 is the fourth anniversary of the September 18 Incident. On this day, the inaugural meeting of the 15th Army Corps of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was held in Yongping Town. Liu Mouqing (who served as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission after the reform and opening up) recalled: "The Red Guards and the masses from dozens of miles around rushed to participate, and the slogan 'Welcome to the Red 25th Army' was hung horizontally at the venue, the red flag was unfurled, the singing was loud, and everyone was elated. Comrade Liu Zhidan and Comrade Xu Haidong successively made speeches, calling on the two armies to unite intimately, join hands and work together to smash the enemy's 'encirclement and suppression,' consolidate and expand the revolutionary base areas in northern Shaanxi, and cooperate with the actions of the main force of the Red Army. ”
The Red 25th Army, which arrived in northern Shaanxi during the Long March, and the Red 26th and 27th Armies in northern Shaanxi met in Yongping Town, Yanchuan, and were combined into the Red 15th Army
After the formation of the Red XV Corps, the corps established a headquarters, a political department, a manager's office, a health department, a traffic corps and a pistol regiment. The regiment has 75th, 78th and 81st divisions. Zhang Shaodong, commander of the 75th Division, Zhao Lingbo, political commissar, Bi Shiyi, chief of staff, and Zhou Biquan, director of the Political Department. Under the jurisdiction of the 223rd Regiment, the head of the regiment Chen Jinxiu, the political commissar Chang Yuqing; The 224th Regiment, head Han Xianchu, political commissar Wang Chengcheng; The 225th Regiment, the head of the regiment Lang Xianmin, and the political commissar Liu Zhen. The commanders of the 78th Division were successively served by Yang Sen and Tian Shouyao, and the political commissars were successively served by Zhang Mingxian and Zhang Dazhi. Under the jurisdiction of the 232nd Regiment, the head and political commissar Huang Luobin, the deputy head Wang Fugui; the 234th Regiment, regiment commander Guo Baoshan, political commissar Ma Peixun; Cavalry regiment, regiment commander Kang Jianmin, political commissar Gao Jinchun. He Jinnian, commander of the 81st Division, served as political commissar Zhang Dazhi and Cui Tianmin, chief of staff Ren Langhua, and director of the Political Department Li Chiran (Li Zonggui). Under the jurisdiction of the 241st Regiment, the head of the regiment Liu Mingshan, and the political commissar Li Chiran concurrently; The 243rd Regiment, the head of the regiment Li Zhongying, and the political commissar Wang Guochang.
The establishment of the 15 th Army Corps of the Red Army formed a powerful main force corps of the 25 th Army, the 26 th Army, and the 27 th Army, and laid an important foundation for smashing the third military "encirclement and suppression" of the Kuomintang authorities and consolidating and expanding the revolutionary base areas in Shaanxi and Gansu.
The Battle of Laoshan and the Battle of Yulin Bridge
1. Battle of Laoshan
With the Red 25th Army's Long March entering the Shaanxi-Gansu base area and the main force of the Central Red Army moving north to the Shaanxi-Gansu region, Chiang Kai-shek decided to transfer the main force of the Northeast Army to the Shaanxi-Gansu region to carry out military "encirclement and suppression". On September 13, Zhang Xueliang came to Xi'an by plane from Wuchang. Around this time, in addition to the 53rd Army (commander Wan Fulin) who remained in Beiping and Hebei, the rest of the 57th Army (commander Dong Yingbin), 67th Army (commander Wang Yizhe), cavalry corps (commander He Zhuguo), and the independent 105th Division (division commander Liu Duoquan) and independent 115th Division (division commander Xiong Zhengping) successively marched into the northwest region to join up with the 51st Army, which had earlier entered the Shaanxi and Gansu regions, and made every effort to "encircle and suppress" the Shaanxi and Gansu revolutionary base areas. On October 2, the Nationalist Government issued an order: "Jiang Zhongzheng is also the commander-in-chief of the 'suppression of bandits' in the northwest, and Zhang Xueliang is also the deputy commander." The next day's issue of Shanghai's "Zhonghua Ribao" carried the news of the establishment of the "Suppression of Bandits" General Headquarters in the Northwest under the headline "To Thoroughly Eliminate the 'Bandits' and Set Up a General Headquarters for the Suppression of Bandits in Xi'an, and Once the Organization Is Ready, Chairman Chiang Personally Inspects the Situation, and Zhang Xueliang Will Permanently Command Everything in the Future." On November 1 of the same year, the Northwest "Suppression General" was formally established in the South Courtyard Gate of Xi'an City.
Before the Red 25th Army arrived at Yongping Town, Yanchuan County, the 67th Army of the Northeast Army entered northern Shaanxi. The military headquarters of the army was stationed in Nakcheon. On September 13, the 110th Division of the army (division commander He Lizhong) was stationed in Yan'an. The 129th Division of the army (division commander Zhou Fucheng) left one battalion to garrison Ganquan, and the rest of the division marched into Yan'an on September 14. Wang Yizhe, commander of the 67th Army, led a special battalion of the military headquarters to Yan'an on September 15. After Wang Yizhe completed the deployment in Yan'an, he led the military special battalion back to Luochuan. The 107th Division of the 67th Army was stationed in the vicinity of Luochuan and Fuxian. At the same time, the 100th, 106th, 109th, and 117th Divisions of the 57th Army of the Northeast Army attacked the Shaanxi and Gansu base areas from the Heshui area of Gansu. The 86th Division of Jing Yuexiu and the 84th Division of Gao Guizi, which were stationed in northern Shaanxi, were also ready to move, attempting to flank the Shaanxi-Gansu base area and the main force of the Red Army with the Northeast Army.
In the face of the grim situation of "encirclement and suppression," the 15 th Army Corps of the Red Army seriously analyzed the current situation and determined the strategic direction of action. Xu Haidong recalled: "On the second day after the establishment of the 15th Red Army Corps, we discussed the operational plan against 'encirclement and suppression.' "When we were discussing the targets of the battle, some comrades proposed that they first attack the Jingyue Xiushi or Gao Guizi Division, which were stationed in the Mizhi area, go out of Hengshan, mingle with the Shenmu and Fugu Soviet districts, and then fight on three sides. After discussion, everyone agreed: eat these two troops, and have a greater grasp. However, at present, the army is pressing the border, and the destruction of these two troops will not deal a heavy blow to the enemy. It is better to fight the Northeast Army first, because if the main force of the Northeast Army is defeated by one or two divisions, the war situation in northern Shaanxi will be greatly changed. Xu Haidong recalled that after analyzing the enemy's situation, "we decided: to besiege Ganquan, mobilize the enemy in Yan'an, and block the road to fight its ambush."
In late September, after a three-day rapid march, the main force of the Red 15th Army advanced from Yongping to the area of Wangjiaping in the west of Ganquan City. Xu Haidong and Liu Zhidan went to the area of Dalao Mountain and Xiaolao Mountain between Yan'an and Ganquan to inspect the terrain and determined to set up an ambush here. On September 28, the 243rd Regiment of the 81st Division of the 15th Red Army suddenly surrounded Ganquan City. Other units entered the Laoshan area according to the original battle plan and set up ambushes on the mountains on both sides of the Xian (Yang) and Song (Jiachuan) highways.
On the morning of October 1, He Lizhong, commander of the 110th Division of the 67th Army of the Northeast Army, led his troops south from Yan'an to reinforce Ganquan. At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, its vanguard advanced to Baitupo south of Laoshan. The main forces of the Red 15th Army Corps, which had set up an ambush on the hillsides on both sides, immediately attacked. Fierce fighting ended at around 8 p.m.
In the Laoshan Campaign, the 110th Division of the Northeast Army, all of the 628th Regiment and one battalion of the 629th Regiment were completely annihilated, killing and wounding more than 1,000 people under Fan Yuzhou, chief of staff of the 110th Division, Yang Dexin, commander of the regiment, more than 3,700 under the regiment commander Pei Huancai, more than 300 war horses, 28 mountain artillery and mortars, more than 200 light and heavy machine guns, more than 5,000 long and short guns, 4 radio stations and a large amount of military supplies. He Lizhong was seriously wounded and fled to Ganquan City, where he died of his injuries on October 7.
The Battle of Laoshan was the first major victory fought by the Red 15th Army after its establishment. The victory in the Battle of Laoshan greatly boosted the fighting spirit of the army and people in the Shaanxi and Gansu base areas to smash the enemy's military "encirclement and suppression."
After the victory in the Battle of Laoshan, Yang Sen, commander of the 78th Division of the 15th Red Army, led his troops to the Yangquan area west of Fuxian County to reconnoiter the enemy's situation, and annihilated a battalion of the 619th Regiment of the 107th Division of the Northeast Army.
2. Battle of Yulin Bridge
The defeat in the Battle of Laoshan caused the Northeast Army to lose its troops. For this reason, Chiang Kai-shek, who also served as commander-in-chief of the "suppression of bandits" in the northwest, flew from Chengdu, Sichuan, to Xi'an on 8 October to make arrangements for northern Shaanxi. The next day, Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Xueliang jointly issued a telegram order to "encircle and suppress" the Shaanxi-Gansu Red Army, strictly ordering: "The 67th Army will build fortifications in the areas around Fushi, Ganquan, Dunxian (Fuxian), and Yangquan, eliminate nearby bandits, focus on Dunxian, and maintain communication between Fushi and Dunxian counties." The telegram also demanded that Yang Hucheng's headquarters "build blockhouses on the line of Yichuan and Luochuan with the main force, focus on Luochuan, and prevent bandits from fleeing south." He also asked Yang Hucheng's division to "and the divisions of Jing (Yuexiu) and Gao (Guizi) to quickly eliminate the nearby bandits, and when the main force detours to the east, it will cooperate with all friendly forces to gather and annihilate the bandits of Liu (Zhidan) and Xu (Haidong)."
On October 11, Chiang Kai-shek flew from Xi'an to Luoyang, Henan. On the 13th, Chiang Kai-shek flew to Taiyuan, Shanxi, and summoned Jing Yuexiu, commander of the 86th Division, and Gao Guizi, commander of the 84th Division, to Taiyuan on the northern Shaanxi front, and together with Yan Xishan, jointly planned to strengthen the "encirclement and suppression" of the Shaanxi and Gansu base areas.
On October 20, Gao Fuyuan, commander of the 619th Regiment of the 107th Division of the 67th Army of the Northeast Army, led his troops from the county seat of Fuxian to Yulin Bridge, about 12 kilometers north of Fuxian, to carry out the task of "maintaining communication between Fushi and Dun counties". At the same time, a battalion of the 620th Regiment of the 107th Division entered the Yulin Bridge.
Yulin Bridge is located on the east bank of the Luo River between Ganquan and Ju County, and the Xian (Yang) Song (Jiachuan) Highway passes through the village. There is a fortress built in the village, which is close to the mountains and rivers, easy to defend and difficult to attack.
The Battle of Yulin Bridge proceeded relatively smoothly. Liu Mouqing recalled: "On the evening of October 24, the Red 15th Army Corps began to operate under the command of Comrade Xu Haidong, with the Red 75th Division as the main attack from east to west, and sent a battalion to guard the road leading from Yulin Bridge to Luochuan; With the Red 78th Division from west to east, it will first destroy a battalion of the enemy west of the river, and then attack the Yulin Bridge; The Red 81st Division attacked from north to south, encircled the enemy on three sides, and sent two troops to occupy the hill south of the Luohe River and the blockhouse on the plateau to the north. The attack began at dawn the next day, and after the enemy was compressed into the street, they used the caves to resist stubbornly, and our troops suffered heavy casualties. Later, thanks to the discovery and creation of the warriors, explosives were thrown from the chimney on the house, and the enemy was quickly annihilated. ”
By the afternoon of October 25, all four battalions of the enemy defending Yulin Bridge had been annihilated, and more than 1,800 people under Gao Fuyuan, the commander of the 619th Regiment, had been captured.
The Battle of Yulin Bridge was a victory won by the 15 th Army Corps of the Red Army in attacking the enemy's fortified strongholds under the condition of lacking equipment and experience in attacking fortified positions, and it was of great significance to the improvement of the combat effectiveness of the troops.
The victory in the Battle of Yulin Bridge put the units of the 67th Army of the Northeast Army stationed between Luochuan, Ganquan, and Yan'an into a state of embarrassment that they could not take care of each other. The victory in this battle also greatly boosted the confidence of the army and people in the Shaanxi and Gansu base areas in defeating the enemy.
Base Area "SF"
While the vast numbers of the military and people in the Shaanxi and Gansu revolutionary base areas actively countered the third military "encirclement and suppression" of the Kuomintang authorities, the executors of "leftist" dogmatism carried out erroneous purging within the base areas, causing a serious crisis in the Shaanxi and Gansu revolutionary base areas.
On July 25, 1934, at the joint meeting of Yanjiawazi in the Southern Liang, two letters of instruction from the Shanghai Provisional Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China and the representative of the Central Committee in the north were conveyed to the 26th Red Army. Guo Hongtao recalled: "The letter made erroneous criticisms of the Red 26th Army. For example, the Red 26th Army was accused of being a 'consistent right-leaning opportunist leader,' 'escapism,' 'top-notchism,' and 'a gun is omnipotent,' and so on. After the two letters were read, a discussion took place. After the meeting, Gong Fengchun of the 42nd Division sorted out the records and sent them to the central representative in the north. Guo Hongtao said: "After the meeting, based on the spirit of the letter of instruction and the records I had collated, I wrote an article entitled "The Main Lessons of the Protracted Struggle of the 26 th Army of the Red Army" (published in the Northwest Struggle, a publication of the organ of the Special Committee of Northern Shaanxi). In this article, I erroneously quoted the criticism of the Red XXVI Army by the Shanghai Provisional Central Bureau and the representative of the Central Committee in the North. ”
The Yanjiawazi Joint Conference left a hidden danger for the mistakes in the Shaanxi-Gansu base areas.
On July 5, 1935, Zhu Lizhi, who was dispatched by the Northern Bureau of the Communist Party of China to inspect the work in the Shaanxi-Gansu base area, arrived in Yongping Town, Yanchuan County, where the Northwest Working Committee was located. Zhu Lizhi recalled in July 1945 that before he left, Kong Yuan, the representative of the Central Committee in the north, instructed that "the right-leaning of the 26th Army in the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Region is very serious, and the Special Committee of the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Area has been mixed in with two rightists, Zhang Wenhua and Cai Ziwei, and the right-leaning opportunism of the Shaanxi-Gansu Border and the 26th Army has been influenced by these two rightists." He asked me to first launch a struggle against rightist abolitionism after I arrived in northern Shaanxi, to expose and isolate the rightists in this struggle, and then to suppress them. At the same time, he showed me a booklet of Hubei-Henan-Anhui 'Su F', which contained articles written by Zhang Guotao and Chen Changhao, as well as a preface written by the Central Committee, saying that Hubei-Henan-Anhui 'Su F' was a great victory. Today, it seems, this estimate is incorrect. Zhu Lizhi said: "After I arrived in northern Shaanxi, I first held a Yongping meeting, and I conveyed the instructions of tens of thousands of words of the 'Central (Central) Deputies (Table)', the content of which was exaggerated. At that time, it was the three 'encirclement and suppression,' and a resolution was made against the three 'encirclement and suppression'. Later, I also reported at the Wen'anyi meeting, and I talked about it for two or three days. The contents of these reports are a concretization of the instructions of the 'central representatives', and there are individual developments. ”
On July 21, 1935, the enlarged meeting of the Northwest Working Committee of the Communist Party of China held in Yongping Town, Yanchuan County, passed the "Resolution of the Enlarged Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Northwest Working Committee of the Communist Party of China". The resolution pointed out: "In the past, the Shaanxi and Gansu Party did not fully implement the correct instructions of the 'Central (Central) Deputies (Table)', which hindered the progress of the work. Hidden in the party were right-leaning abolitionists and opportunist elements represented by Cai Ziwei, whose ideas were actually passive sabotage of the party's line, despised the role of the masses in the revolution, distrusted the creativity of the mass revolution, and lowered the party's tasks. The resolution states: "This right-leaning abolitionists, who seek to prevent the implementation of the party's correct line; This right-wing opportunists, in fact they have stated that they want to abolish class interests, they are the enemies of the class. Therefore, under the correct leadership of the central representative in the north, the Shaanxi-Gansu Party mobilized all comrades of the party to unanimously expose the deceptive and traitorous role of right-leaning abolitionism and opportunism, and only by resolutely fighting and expelling and abolishing right-leaning abolitionist and opportunist elements can the Shaanxi-Gansu Party successfully accomplish all its glorious tasks. ”
After the Yongping meeting, Huang Ziwen, Cai Ziwei, Zhang Wenhua and others were arrested or placed under house arrest. The erroneous "suppression" of the Shaanxi and Gansu revolutionary base areas began to be gradually pushed forward.
Before the Red 25th Army entered the Shaanxi and Gansu Revolutionary Base Areas, it had a fierce battle with the 3rd Shaanxi Garrison Brigade in Jiujianfang, Lantian on April 9, 1935. The 7th and 9th regiments of the 3rd Police Brigade were defeated, and Zhang Hanmin, a secret CCP member who served as the commander of the brigade, was captured. Zhang Hanmin was captured along with more than 20 Communist Party members working in the Third Police Brigade. During the interrogation, although Zhang Hanmin and others repeatedly identified themselves as Communist Party members, due to the lack of understanding and trust between the two sides, Zhang Hanmin and other captured Communist Party members were still wrongly killed by the Political Security Bureau of the 25th Army of the Red Army. At the same time, Wang Feng, who had been assigned by the Shanghai Central Bureau to return to southern Shaanxi and work with the Communist Party members in Yang Hucheng's troops and the Red 25th Army, was also detained by the Political Security Bureau of the Red 25th Army. In September of the same year, after Wang Feng arrived in northern Shaanxi with the Red 25th Army's Long March, he was still wrongfully detained.
Regarding the wrongful killing of Zhang Hanmin and other Communist Party members, Guo Shushen recalled: The Red 25th Army "eliminated Yang Hucheng's Second Garrison Brigade and captured the brigade commander Zhang Hanmin alive during the battle in southern Shaanxi." Zhang is a secret member of our party, and the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee informed the 25th Army, and Zhang also sent people to send information to the 25th Army. However, the 25th Army thought that Zhang was a reactionary fascist and that it was a conspiracy for him to send information, so they killed Zhang. Among the captured Zhang soldiers, there was also a group of party members, who asked them to stand up and report, but they were all killed. Comrade Wang Feng went to contact him, and he was also arrested."
Zhang Hanmin's wrongful murder became an important factor in the erroneous "suppression" of the Shaanxi and Gansu revolutionary base areas. Guo Shushen said: "After the [Red 25th Army] dealt with Zhang Hanmin, it believed that the party in Shaanxi was unreliable, and there were many rightists and cancellations. It was with a distrustful attitude in northern Shaanxi. ”
After the establishment of the delegation sent by the Northern Bureau of the CPC to the northwest and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial Committee of the CPC, the erroneous "suppression of F" in the Shaanxi-Gansu base areas accelerated the pace of implementation. The "Notice on Printing and Distributing the One-and-a-half-Month Work Plan of the Provincial Party Committee" issued by the Shaanxi-Gansu-Jin Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China on September 22 clearly stated: "Promulgate the Red Martial Law Regulations, mobilize the government, poor peasant leagues, trade unions, and party and league groups, mobilize the masses, strictly implement the class line, and carry out the work of suppressing the law." In addition, we will establish a work system for the Political Security Bureau and step up the work of suppressing the F. ”
Nie Hongjun recalled: "On the third day after the Battle of Laoshan, I received a letter from the provincial party committee, saying that several people had been arrested in Yongping Town, and according to their confessions, it was revealed that many senior leading cadres such as Liu Zhidan, Gao Gang, Xi Zhongxun, Yang Sen, and Liu Jingfan were rightists and were very prepared for conspiracy activities. The provincial party committee ordered us to immediately arrest Liu and others at the front. I believe that it is possible for the letter from the provincial party committee to be true, but because the matter is very important, I did not dare to arrest him immediately. Immediately discussed with Xu Haidong and Guo Shushen, we felt: Since the provincial party committee sent a letter, it should be implemented, but considering the seriousness of the situation, the 'chaos' is too big, and we dare not act lightly. Moreover, we learned from the captured enemy's telegrams that the Central Red Army had arrived in Qinzhou, and in order to avoid mistakes, it was better to ask the Central Committee to come and settle the problem. After sending the report, the provincial party committee sent an urgent letter, emphatically pointing out that the provincial party committee has already carefully considered and decided on the issue of Liu and Gao Gao's rightists, and will send Guo Hongtao to the front in the near future to convey it and solve it in a coordinated manner. The result was not Guo Hongtao, but Cheng Zihua. ”
Cheng Zihua, who was the political commissar of the Red 15th Army Corps at that time, recalled: "When I went to the front from Yongping, Zhu Lizhi told me to transfer Liu Zhidan to the rear and command the northern front; Gao Gang was arrested and sent to the rear. I did this when I went to the front and conveyed the operational policy. Before I arrived, the troops at the front had already begun to 'suppress F' and arrested some people, and the cadres and fighters had a lot of opinions. Feeling that the situation was serious, I immediately ordered Zhu Yangxin (former head of the reconnaissance section of the 25 th Red Army), who was carrying out the task of 'suppressing F,' to stop arresting the people, and wrote a letter to Zhu Lizhi explaining the situation of the troops and asking them to quickly send cadres to the front. Soon, Guo Hongtao and Cui Tianmin went to the front, and Cui went to work in the army. ”
On October 9 (or 10), Liu Zhidan, deputy commander and chief of staff of the 15th Red Army, was arrested upon his return to Wayaobao. Around this time, some responsible persons of the former Red 26th Army, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Gansu Special Committee of the Communist Party of China, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Gansu Soviet Government were also arrested. Xi Zhongxun recalled: "At that time, Chiang Kai-shek was carrying out the third 'encirclement and suppression' of the Shaanxi-Gansu border area. As a result, such a strange phenomenon emerged: The Red Army fought at the front, resisted Chiang Kai-shek's offensive, and won victories one after another, but the executors of the 'leftist' opportunist line first seized power in the rear and arrested people later, and detained a large number of cadres including Comrade Liu Zhidan. ”
The executors of "leftist" dogmatism have arrested a large number of party, government, and military leading cadres. Before and after that, Jin Like, who had served as secretary of the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Special Committee of the Communist Party of China and secretary of the Chichun Working Committee of the Communist Party of China, was mistakenly killed in Sanjiayuan, Zhengning County, Gansu Province, and Zhang Jingwen, who had served as chairman of the Women's Committee of the Soviet Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Region, was wrongfully killed in Xiasiwan, Ganquan County. According to Zhao Qimin's recollection, during this period, "more than 200 cadres were also killed."
The erroneous "purging of F" in the Shaanxi and Gansu base areas is a serious spread of "leftist" dogmatism. Zhu Lizhi recalled: "The whole process of suppressing F is coercion, confession, and trust, and subjectivism has reached the extreme. ”
The erroneous "purging of F" carried out by the "leftist" dogmatist executors has put the party, the army, and the base areas in the Shaanxi and Gansu base areas in a state of terror, the morale of the army is unstable, and the people are uneasy, and even an "anti-water" rebellion has occurred. However, the Kuomintang authorities' "encirclement and suppression" of the Shaanxi and Gansu base areas has become increasingly intensified. Xi Zhongxun recalled: "The perverse actions of the executors of the 'leftist' opportunist line have aroused great misgivings and fears among the masses; the landlords and rich peasants have seized the opportunity to provoke incitement and counterattack, so that the masses in Baoan, Ansai, Dingbian, Jingbian, and other counties have 'turned against the water.'" The base area is in a serious crisis. ”
At the critical juncture when the Kuomintang authorities intensified their third military "encirclement and suppression" of the Shaanxi and Gansu base areas, the erroneous "suppression" in the base areas became more and more intense. Internal and external troubles have put the Shaanxi and Gansu revolutionary base areas in a serious crisis.
In mid-September, the Red 25th Army and the Red 26th and 27th Armies led by Liu Zhidan joined and merged into the Red 15th Army, with Xu Haidong as the corps commander and Cheng Zihua as the political commissar. Subsequently, Cheng Zihua participated in the command and won the victories in the battles of Laoshan and Yulin Bridges, and captured a large number of guns, ammunition and supplies, which was of great significance to consolidating the northwest base area. After the 15th Red Army Corps and the Central Red Army joined forces, Cheng Zihua led his troops to participate in the battles of Zhiluo Town, the Eastern Expedition, the Western Expedition and the Mountain Castle, making important contributions to the consolidation and development of the revolutionary base areas in northern Shaanxi. Cheng Zihua was also one of the nine members of the Northwest Revolutionary Military Committee headed by Mao Zedong, and many telegrams from the Central Committee at that time were referred to as Xu (Haidong), Cheng (Zihua), Lin (Biao), and Nie (Rong Zhen).
He presided over the overall work of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region
After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Cheng Zihua went to work in the General Mobilization Committee of the National Revolutionary War of the Second Theater of Shanxi (hereinafter referred to as the General Association of War Movements) and served as the Minister of Armed Forces of the General War and Secretary of the Communist Party of China. Through the work of the past two years, the War Movement Association has successively developed more than 20,000 anti-Japanese armed forces under the leadership of our party.
After the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, Cheng Zihua served as a member of the Northern Bureau, and together with Peng Zhen, a representative of the Northern Bureau, Nie Rongzhen, deputy commander of the 115th Division, and Guan Xiangying, political commissar of the 120th Division, he formed the Jin-Cha-Ji Sub-Bureau (Northern Branch) to lead the struggle in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region. In January 1939, the Central Committee decided that Cheng Zihua would work in Jizhong and serve as the political commissar of the Third Column of the Eighth Route Army and the Jizhong Military Region, and strengthen the regularization of Lu Zhengcao's Third Column. The third column of the Eighth Route Army was a combination of the Lu Zhengcao People's Self-Defense Army and the Hebei Guerrilla Army, with a total of more than 60,000 people at that time. The internal composition of the third column is complex, the party's foundation is weak, and its combat effectiveness is very weak. Cheng Zihua, together with other leading comrades of the military region, studied and formulated a plan for speeding up the regularization of the Third Column and the Eighth Route Army. He assigned a group of veteran Red Army cadres and young intellectuals to serve as political commissars or directors of political departments in various sub-districts and regiments, and quickly established and perfected a complete set of political work systems for the Eighth Route Army in the third column units, thus regularizing the troops. After two reorganizations of the army, the military and political quality of the headquarters of the Third Column has been greatly improved, and a total of 16 main regiments have been created, which have basically met the requirements of regularization and the Eighth Route Army, and have become the backbone force for persisting in the anti-Japanese base areas on the plains behind enemy lines. After the "May Day Sweep" in 1942, Cheng Zihua concurrently served as the secretary of the Party Committee of the Central Hebei District, and further insisted on fighting on the plains in a difficult environment to consolidate the base area in the central Hebei region. He took the working group to Gaoyang and other places to conduct research and study on the tunnel struggle, and fully affirmed that the tunnel struggle was a great initiative of the people of central Hebei to transform the terrain, and that the tunnel struggle was widely carried out in central Hebei, making central Hebei a model for extensively waging mass guerrilla warfare on the plains in the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines.
In August 1943, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee redecided on the main personnel of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region and its sub-bureaus, with Nie Rongzhen as secretary of the sub-bureau and commander and political commissar of the military region, Cheng Zihua and Liu Lantao as deputy secretaries and deputy political commissars, and Xiao Ke as deputy commanders. It was decided that during Nie Rongzhen's trip to Yan'an to participate in the "Seventh National Congress," Cheng Zihua would be the acting secretary and political commissar of the military region. In 1944, Xiao Ke went to Yan'an to see a doctor, Liu Lantao went to Yan'an to participate in the "Seventh National Congress" of the party, and Cheng Zihua acted as the commander. During the two years from September 1943 to September 1945, Cheng Zihua wore many hats, taking charge of the work of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Sub-Bureau and the Military Region.
Beginning in 1944, Cheng Zihua commanded the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region to develop and expand in an all-round and vigorous manner, and in accordance with the needs of the development situation of the struggle in the base areas and the decision of the central authorities, the party committees, military regions, and administrative offices of the Hebei-Shanxi, Ji-Cha, Jizhong, and Jireliao regions were set up in an effort to expand the liberated areas. By the summer of 1945, the area of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei base area had expanded to 400,000 square kilometers, the population had increased to more than 25 million, the army had grown from the original 4 small regiments to 100 regiments, the troops had grown from 54,000 in the summer of 1943 to more than 320,000, and the militia had grown to more than 900,000.
The battle was fought in the Jichareliao area
After Japan's surrender, Chiang Kai-shek snatched the fruits of victory and sent a large number of troops to attack the liberated areas of Northeast China. In order to smash the enemy's conspiracy, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China established the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which was composed of Peng Zhen, Chen Yun, Cheng Zihua, and Wu Xiuquan, and Cheng Zihua was the commander of the Northeast Military Region. Later, due to changes in the situation, Lin Biao, who was originally scheduled to be the commander of the Jireliao Military Region, went to the northeast, and Cheng Zihua returned to Jireliao. Cheng Zihua successively served as deputy political commissar of the Northeast People's Autonomous Army, secretary of the Jireliao Branch and political commissar of the Military Region, secretary of the Jichareliao Branch and political commissar of the Military Region, and concurrently served as commander of the Jichareliao Military Region in May 1948. The location of Jichareliao region is important, it is the passage and link between North China and Northeast China, and it is the barrier and gate of Northeast China. Cheng Zihua has worked tirelessly and painstakingly to build the vast Jichareliao region into a consolidated base area for our party, and has done a great deal of work. He vigorously implemented the "May Fourth Directive" of the central authorities on land reform, carried out land reform in the whole region, turned land into the center, and promoted the work of production and support in all aspects.
By September 1947, the Jichareliao troops led by Cheng Zihua had rapidly expanded from less than 30,000 after the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression to 200,000, and were organized into three columns, eighth, ninth, and eleventh columns, five independent divisions, two cavalry divisions, and an artillery brigade. During this period, the support of the people of Jichareliao for the war was unprecedented, and in the three years from the end of 1945 to the end of 1948, the 16 million-strong liberated area of Jichareliao replenished more than 300,000 soldiers for the PLA, and the number of local troops grew to more than 400,000. During this period, Cheng Zihua led the Jireliao and later the Jichareliao troops to gallop across the country. Soon after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek organized a large number of troops to attack Chengde, the capital of Rehe Province. Cheng Zihua, Xiao Ke and other comrades led the first and second victories in the defense of Chengde, successively annihilating more than 31,000 Kuomintang troops, defending the Rehe Liberated Area, and delaying the reinforcement of the Kuomintang army to the northeast. In the summer, autumn, and winter offensives of 1947, Cheng Zihua led his troops to eliminate a large number of enemy forces in North China, so that the military posture of Jichareliao changed from a disadvantage to an advantage in terms of strategy, and directly cooperated with the operations in the northeast battlefield.
From September 1948, Cheng Zihua participated in the strategic decisive battle of the People's Liberation War with the courage of a large corps and the art of military command. He led the 8th, 9th, and 11th columns and three independent divisions of the Jicha Reliao Army to capture Suizhong and Xingcheng, cutting off the Beining Line, the enemy's main artery connecting the northeast and north China. This action realized Mao Zedong's strategic policy of "closing the door and beating dogs" and opened the curtain of the Liaoshen Campaign. Subsequently, Cheng Zihua served as the commander of the Second Corps of the Northeast Field Army, which was reorganized from the Second Front Command Post of the Northeast People's Liberation Army, and led his troops to carry out the famous Tashan Blocking Battle. The key to the victory of the Liaoshen Campaign lies in whether Jinzhou can be taken, and the Tashan Resistance Battle is related to the success or failure of our army's capture of Jinzhou. Cheng Zihua led the troops of the 4th and 11th Columns, facing the enemy with advanced technology and equipment and superior troops, fought bloodily for six days and nights in the Tashan area, did not lose an inch of land, completed the task of blocking the attack, and played an important role in ensuring that our army captured Jinzhou and even cooperated with the victory of the entire Liaoshen Campaign. Cheng Zihua won the victory of the Tashan Resistance Battle with his outstanding military command ability, and at the same time, it also made the Tashan Resistance Battle one of the most famous examples in the history of our army's warfare.
The 13th Corps of the Four Fields, the main force of the Four Fields, the commander of the untitled General Cheng Zihua, is attached to the 38th Army, which has the strongest combat effectiveness.
The 13th Corps of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was the main force of the Fourth Field Army; during the War of Liberation, it fought from Jicha Reliao to the border areas of Guangxi, fearless of strong enemies, dared to fight well, carried out orders resolutely, and was not afraid of any difficulties, and played a key role in many major battles.
Born in Jichareliao
In April 1947, in order to strengthen the strength of the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army, the Central Military Commission decided to transfer the Jichareliao Military Region (second-level military region) under the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region to the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army. In August 1947, in order to facilitate the centralized command of the newly formed 8th and 9th columns and the combat units of the Beining Line to launch the autumn offensive, the Eastern General Commander ordered the Jichareliao Military Region to form a forward command post (in December of that year, it also commanded operations in the name of the Southern Front Field Command). The command post was dispatched by the military region and was a temporary campaign leadership organ, with no subordinate units, and the main leaders were concurrently served by the leaders of the military region, including commander Cheng Zihua, chief of staff Huang Zhiyong, and deputy director of the Political Department Liu Suichun.
Cheng Zihua is older, and once served as the commander of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Red 25th Army, and led his troops on a solo Long March with Xu Haidong and Wu Huanxian. During the Anti-Japanese War, he went to Jinchaji to assist Nie Rongzhen in his work, and made great contributions to the establishment and development of the Jireliao base area.
In April 1948, the forward command post of the Jichareliao Military Region was renamed the 2nd Forward Command Post of the Northeast Field Army. Huang Kecheng, the newly transferred political commissar of the military region, concurrently serves as the political commissar of the command post, and the other leaders remain unchanged. Soon, Cheng Zihua and Huang Kecheng commanded the 11th Column (formed in March 1948) to participate in the Rehe and Luandong battles, destroying more than 10,000 enemies. In the battle of Longhua, they found and set up a hero Dong Cunrui who sacrificed himself to bomb the bunker.
On September 1, the 2nd Command Post in the Higashino Front was renamed the Higashino 2nd Corps. After the start of the Liaoshen Campaign, the 2nd Corps attacked from inside and outside Shanhaiguan on the Beining Line, captured Changli and surrounded Xingcheng, Shahousuo, and Suizhong, cutting off the connection between Jinzhou and North China. Subsequently, he commanded the 4th and 11th Columns and several local independent divisions to block the Kuomintang Army's eastward advance corps in the areas of Jinxi Tashan and Shaheying, effectively cooperating with Jinzhou's offensive and then smashing the enemy's attempt to recapture Jinzhou.
On December 12, the 2nd Corps of the Northeast People's Liberation Army was renamed the 13th Corps of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which was still under the Northeast Field Army. Corps Commander Cheng Zihua, Deputy Commander Peng Mingzhi, Chief of Staff Huang Zhiyong, Director of the Political Department Liu Daosheng, and former Political Commissar Huang Kecheng have been transferred back to the General Headquarters.
In the Pingjin Campaign, Cheng Zihua's corps was mainly responsible for the battles in the Pingbei and Pingxi areas, cutting off the Pingzhang Line, and cooperating with the troops of the North China Military Region to annihilate and encircle the enemy. After the peaceful liberation of Beiping, he briefly served as the Beiping Garrison Headquarters, and incorporated the 4th Corps Headquarters of the Kuomintang Army into the 13th Corps Headquarters.
In April 1949, the main force of Siye began to move south, and the 13th Corps commanded the 42nd and 47th armies and the first division of the North China Military Region to launch the An (Yang) Xin (Township) Campaign, destroying more than 33,000 enemies and sweeping away the last two major strongholds of the enemy in North China. In May, the 13th Corps was ordered to subordinate the 38th, 47th, and 49th armies, which were under the jurisdiction of the Fourth Field Army and the Central China Military Region (in June, the affiliation of each army was again clarified). Order of the Central Military Commission: Corps Commander Cheng Zihua, Political Commissar Xiao Hua (not yet in office), First Deputy Commander Li Tianyou, Second Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff Peng Mingzhi, and Director of the Political Department Liu Daosheng.
The 38th Army of the 13th Corps, commander Liang Xingchu and political commissar Liang Biye, under the jurisdiction of the 112th, 113th, 114th, and 151st divisions. The army, formerly known as the 1st Column of the East Field, originated from the Pingjiang Uprising in July 1928, is the core old unit of our army with the foundation of the Red Army, has a strong sense of honor and the spirit of enduring hardships, has a brave and tenacious style, has rich combat experience, is good in attack, defense, attack, and field battles, has a high campaign and tactical quality, and is the main force with the largest number of people, the best equipment, and the strongest combat effectiveness among the four field troops. Cao Lihuai, commander of the 47th Army, and Zhou Chiping, political commissar, have the 139th, 140th, 141st, and 160th divisions under their jurisdiction. The army, formerly known as the 10th Column of Dongye, was composed of old Red Army units and local independent divisions, commonly known as the "Fierce Advance Male Division". The 139th Division, formerly known as the Red 6th Army and the 359th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army, has a long history. The 10th column defeated the enemy Liao Yaoxiang's corps in the Liaoshen Campaign and became famous in the first battle. Zhong Wei, commander of the 49th Army, and Xu Binzhou, political commissar, have the 145th, 146th, 147th, and 162nd divisions under their jurisdiction. The army, formerly known as the 12th Column of Dongye, was composed of three independent divisions of North Manchuria, although the army was formed late, but it made rapid progress, and performed prominently in the siege of Changchun, and was the main force of the siege army. The army commander Zhong Wei was very characterful, active in combat, and dared to fight against orders.
Jinxi blocked
In September 1948, the Liaoshen Campaign was first fought on the Beining Line, and the 2nd Corps of Dongye had handed over the 8th and 9th columns to Dongye for direct command to besiege Jinzhou. Cheng Zihua led the 11th Column and the 4th, 6th, and 8th Independent Divisions, Cavalry Divisions, and Artillery Brigades to attack the Beining Line, taking Shanhaiguan as the intermediate point, and attacking inside and outside the Guan, and conquering Suizhong. According to the deployment of the Central Military Commission and Dongye, in order to ensure that our army conquered Jinzhou, Cheng Zihua and Huang Kecheng led the 4th and 11th columns, the 4th and 6th independent divisions and the Rehe artillery brigade to organize a defensive defense in the area of Tashan in Jinxi, and blocked the enemy's eastward advance corps to reinforce Jinzhou.
Tashan is not a mountain, just a village with more than 100 households between Jinzhou and Jinxi, called Tashan Fort, which is the only way for the enemy to aid Jinzhou, 30 kilometers away from Jinzhou. The slope is gently undulating, bordering the Bohai Sea in the east and Hongluoxian Mountain and Baitai Mountain in the west. The east side of the village is bordered by a railway, and the road to Jinzhou also passes through the village, so the strategic location is extremely important. Cheng Zihua, Wu Kehua, commander of the 4th Column, Mo Wenhua, political commissar, and Hu Qicai, deputy commander, went to Tashan to see the terrain. Accordingly, the 4th Column arranged key defense and firepower allocation.
The deployment of the entire 2 Corps is as follows: The front of the 4 vertical defense is from Tayu Mountain and Tashan in the east to the line of Baitai Mountain in the west. The 11th Column is located on the west side of the 4th Column, adjacent to the 4th Vertical Position from Baitai Mountain in the east, and to the old side in the west, serving as the first-line defense of Xinlitun, and several independent divisions are clamping down on the first line such as Dongyao Station and Shuangshupu in the south.
From October 10 to October 15, the 4th Column fought fiercely with the enemy for 6 days and nights, repelling dozens of fierce attacks by the Eastern Advance Corps. In the end, the enemy transferred to the "Zhao Zilong Division" (Independent 95th Division), which had strong combat effectiveness, and the commanders and fighters of the 4th Column responded calmly to the battle, killing and wounding the enemy batch after batch with machine guns, rifles, and grenades. In particular, on October 13, from dawn to late at night, the "Zhao Zilong Division", known as the invincible and invincible division, ran into a bloody encounter in front of our hero's position, and suffered heavy casualties.
On 15 October, the enemy had lost confidence and was unable to organize an effective group charge, and as soon as our troops counterattacked, they fled in disarray. At 12 o'clock on the same day, when Jinzhou was about to be lost and the defeat was decided, the enemy retreated on all fronts. After 6 days and nights of life and death struggle, the 4th column used his own life and blood to cast the Tashan steel position, a total of more than 6,000 enemies were annihilated, and more than 3,000 casualties were inflicted.
Tashan was defended and Jinzhou was liberated, but Chiang Kai-shek still dreamed of recapturing Jinzhou and joining forces with the Western Advance Corps of Zhangwu and Xinlitun. On October 25, the enemy army in Jinxi avoided Tashan in the direction of the main attack and turned to the 11th column position, and our army was already in full position. On the 26th, the enemy's four divisions were in full swing and pounced on the Shahe Battalion, the main position of our 11th Vertical and 33rd Division. The enemy was outnumbered, and our positions were lost during the day, and they counterattacked and regained at night. On the 27th, the battle became more intense, and the enemy relied on the tactics of the sea of people, and the wave impact repeatedly fought with us. Although the troops of the 33rd Division bravely resisted the enemy, because of the impotence of the fortifications, especially because of the lack of preparation for the surrounding defense in advance, they suffered a great disadvantage under the enemy's roundabout attack. In the whole day of fighting, I suffered more than 800 casualties. By 16 o'clock, the first-line position of the Shahe battalion was occupied by the enemy, and I was forced to retreat to the second-line position. Day and night, our army organized a counterattack and recaptured a part of the position.
On October 28, the battlefield of western Liaoning received the good news of the complete annihilation of the enemy's westward marching corps. At 9 a.m., the enemy launched its last attack, and the 11th Column, with high morale, resolutely resisted the attack, and by 14 o'clock a confrontation with the enemy was formed. That night, according to the order of the East General Telegraph, the Jinxi blocking task had been completed, and Cheng Zihua ordered the 11th Column to withdraw from its position. The Shahe Battalion of the 11th Column killed more than 2,000 enemies and suffered more than 1,500 casualties. As a new column that has just been formed for more than half a year, although the 11th Column has completed the task of ensuring the main force to completely annihilate the enemy in Jinzhou and Liao Yaoxiang's westward marching corps, it is still not very satisfactory in terms of combat quality, and there is still a big gap between it and the old main force of the 4th Column, which successfully organized the Tashan blockade.
Advance entry into customs
On October 29, 1948, according to the instructions of the Central Military Commission, the 2nd Corps led the 4th and 11th Columns, the 4th, 6th, and 8th Independent Divisions and the Cavalry Division of Jichareliao, a total of more than 120,000 people, to form an advance corps into eastern Hebei to participate in the North China operation. At this time, the advance team entering the customs was not only to take advantage of the victory to change the situation in North China, but also to smash the plan that the enemy Fu Zuoyi clique was implementing to sneak attack Shijiazhuang and destroy Xibaipo, the seat of the Central Committee of our Party, threaten Beiping from Yutian, Jixian, Zunhua and other places in eastern Hebei, and mobilize Fu Zuoyi's troops from the south to turn back. If you beat me Xibaipo, I will beat you Beiping and surround Wei to save Zhao to solve the crisis.
Sure enough, Fu Zuoyi saw that the plan was exposed, and the People's Liberation Army had already prepared, so he withdrew the sneak attack troops to Baoding. The Dongye 2nd Corps and the North China 2nd Corps, which rushed to Quyang and Wangdu, threatened Beiping from the east and south, creating favorable conditions for the Kuomintang army to annihilate the Pingjin area in the future.
The Liaoshen Campaign ended victoriously on November 2, 1948, and the entire Northeast was liberated, leaving the enemy forces in North China without barriers. The Battle of Huaihai began again on 6 November, and the enemy was even more shocked. In view of the dilemma of the Fu Zuoyi group's retreat, Mao Zedong ordered the Northeast Field Army to end its rest and recuperate, enter the customs as soon as possible, and launch the Pingjin Campaign in advance with the North China People's Liberation Army to annihilate the Fu Zuoyi group on the spot.
At the beginning of the campaign, the general policy of Zhangjiakou, Beiping, Tianjin, and other places where the Fu Zuoyi clique had gathered was to "isolate but not encircle" or "encircle but not fight" in order to stabilize the enemy and annihilate each one. In late November, the main force of our army in the northeast entered the pass in a big way and assembled in the Ping, Tianjin, and Tang areas, and Cheng Zihua was ordered to lead the Dongye 2nd Corps to advance from the Jixian area to the Yanqing and Huailai areas, and cooperate with the 2nd and 3rd Corps of North China to fight on the Pingzhang line.
At the end of November, the 3rd Corps of North China began to besiege Zhangjiakou, leading the enemy's main force, the 35th Army, to come to the rescue from Beiping. However, on the way to the west, the 2nd Corps of Dongye conquered Miyun on December 5 by the 11th Column (48th Army) and annihilated 1 division of the enemy's 13th Army. Miyun was lost, Fu Zuoyi was shocked, and quickly determined that the Northeast People's Liberation Army and the North China Liberation Army would jointly cut off the Pingzhang Line and go straight to Beiping. He hurriedly adjusted his deployment and ordered the 35th Army to rush back to Beiping immediately, Tianjin and Tanggu transferred three armies to strengthen Beiping, and the 13th Army and the 101st Army all shrank to the periphery of Beiping. In particular, once the 35th Army successfully withdraws to Beiping, the plan for the decisive battle of Pingjin carefully formulated by Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission will be quite unfavorable. Our army immediately took various measures to remedy the situation, and finally blocked the enemy's 35th Army in Xinbao.
On the Pingzhang line, the 2nd Corps of Dongye continued to approach Kangzhuang, Nankou, and Badaling, and the 4th Column (41st Army) surrounded and annihilated most of the enemy's 16th Army in Kangzhuang on December 10, cutting off the retreat of the 104th Army of the Huailai enemy. The enemy fled in a panic, pursued by 4 columns, blocked by 11 columns, and annihilated 13,000 people of the 104th Army, and only the army commander led a few people back to Beiping. Immediately afterwards, the 4th Column advanced westward again, strengthening the strength of our army encircling Zhangjiakou. In mid-December, the 5th Column (42nd Army) of Dongye, which had entered the pass, was also transferred to the command of Cheng Zihua's 2nd Corps, and together with the 11th Column, it attacked and advanced to Fengtai and Wanping through the western suburbs of Beiping, occupied Shijingshan and Mentougou, and advanced to Deshengmen, forming an encirclement of Beiping with the 1st Dongye Corps in the east and south and the 7th Column in North China.
Mao Zedong finally put his mind at ease, the Fu Zuoyi group couldn't escape, and Zhangjiakou, Xinbaoan, Beiping, and Tianjin were all trapped to death. From December 21, 1948 to January 15, 1949, our army successively used combat means to solve the enemy in Xinbaoan, Zhangjiakou and Tianjin, forcing Fu Zuoyi to lead the remaining 250,000 people to accept the peaceful reorganization in Beiping on January 31, 1949, and the Pingjin Battle ended successfully.
In the Pingjin Campaign, the 2nd Dongye Corps (13th Corps) led by Cheng Zihua successfully completed the combat tasks assigned by the Central Military Commission and Dongye, and made contributions to the advance march southward, cutting off the Pingzhang Line, encircling Beiping, and finally striving for the peaceful liberation of Beiping.
Advance to Central South
After the main force of Siye crossed the river south, the 13th Corps entered the Changde area of Hunan, and at this time the Corps was under the jurisdiction of the 38th, 47th, and 49th armies. In the previous battle of Yisha in July, the little brother of the 49th Army, the 13th Corps, fought vigorously, linking Shashi and Jiangling in Beibei, and after crossing the river, he liberated Gong'an, Lixian, Linli, and Changde in one go, and the battle went smoothly. However, on July 22, when the 145th Division of the army attacked the county seat of Lixian County in northern Hunan Province, it paid a great price due to the paralysis of the enemy and sacrificed 104 people alone. The 145th Division attached great importance to this and promptly and conscientiously summed up the lessons of the battle, but the 146th Division failed to pay full attention to it, and in less than a month, it planted a big heel in Qingshuping.
On August 4, Cheng Qian and Chen Mingren led 77,000 troops to revolt in Changsha. On August 7, more than 40,000 rebel troops defected and fled south. On August 8, Siye ordered the 49th Army, the 46th Army, the 40th Army, and the 5th Corps and the 18th Army of the 2nd Field Corps to pursue and win over the rebels. The 49th Army, which had advanced to the front line of Yiyang, Taohuajiang, and Anhua, advanced with all its strength to the south, and the 145th and 146th divisions of the army pursued and advanced to Yongfeng, Jieling, and the Baoqing area west of them.
On the evening of August 15, the 1st Battalion of the 437th Regiment of the 146th Division's advance guard unit arrived in the Qingshuping Jieling area, and was ambushed by the enemy's main force of the 7th Army of the Gui Department. For a while, the Gui army was pressed like a tide. The war was unprecedentedly cruel, and the area around Qingshuping was filled with gunsmoke, covering the sky and the sun, the sound of killing moved the ground, and the guns roared. The regiments of the division relied on simple fortifications and fought bravely. After a day of fierce fighting on the 17th, the regiments of the 146th Division were forced to retreat in the direction of Jiangkou. The 145th Division, which rushed to support and cover, was also forced to withdraw from the battle in the direction of Yongfeng. In this encounter, the 49th Army lost more than 1,270 people. As a result, Siye promptly realized the serious consequences of underestimating the enemy's mentality, and repeatedly instructed the troops to take strict precautions.
In September 1949, due to the abolition of the 14th Corps, its political commissar Mo Wenhua was transferred to the 13th Corps as political commissar, and the first deputy commander Huang Yongsheng was transferred to the 13th Corps as the deputy commander, and Zeng Guohua, the director of education of Huazhong Military and Political University, was also transferred to the chief of staff of the 13th Corps, and the 39th Army, the main force of the 14th Corps, was transferred to the 13th Corps.
In mid-September, the rest and recuperation of the troops of the Siye Army advanced in three routes, with the 38th Army and the 39th Army of the 13th Corps as the west route, taking Yuanling and Zhijiang from Changde and penetrating directly into Liuzhou to prevent them from escaping to Guizhou. Since going south, the two main forces have not yet won a big battle to fight, and this time the fighting spirit is high, and they have thrown off the iron feet and began to advance rapidly. Destroying all the way, the 38th Army occupied Zhijiang on October 2. In the battle of Huaqiao, the 113th Division completely annihilated more than 1,300 people from the 700th Regiment of the 103rd Army in only four hours, becoming an example of mountain warfare. The 39th Army also captured An Jiang and annihilated more than 4,000 people from the enemy's 100th Army and 55th Regiment at Yanjiao, southwest of the Hongjiang River. When the Western Route Army continued to pursue, our Central Route Army was engaged in a fierce battle with the enemy, and in one fell swoop captured the four main divisions of the White Division, and then marched eastward in accordance with the order and liberated Wugang and Baoqing.
The 13th Corps and the 47th Army of the 13th Corps stationed in Xiangxi also actively cooperated with the Hengbao battlefield at this time and attacked the 122nd Army of Song Xilian's Department, which was entrenched in the front line of Dayong. On the evening of October 16, the 1st Battalion of the 417th Regiment of the 139th Division took advantage of the enemy's negligence in defense and took advantage of the rainy night to sneak into the city, penetrate directly into the enemy's military headquarters, capture the enemy commander, and force him to order the defenders to surrender. In the Dayong battle, the 47th Army annihilated more than 5,500 enemies. After that, the 47th Army and the Xiangxi Military Region cooperated with Erye to pursue and annihilate the enemy Song Xilian group, liberate eastern Sichuan and take charge of suppressing bandits in Xiangxi.
After the Battle of Hengbao, Cheng Zihua left the 13th Corps and returned to Beijing, with Huang Yongsheng as the acting commander, leading the "Siberian Tigers" to continue southward.
Liberation of Guangxi
With regard to the annihilation of the last remaining fierce enemy in South China, the Bai Chongxi clique, the Central Military Commission decided to adopt the operational policy of a large-scale roundabout encirclement and completely annihilate the enemy in Guangxi. In this regard, the front committee of the Siye Front Committee deployed and marched to Guangxi with the 12th, 13th, and 15th Corps, the 2nd Field 4th Corps, and two local columns in South China, divided into three routes: west, north, and south. In the Guangxi Campaign, the 38th and 39th armies, the main forces of the 13th Corps, were still the western route armies, which detoured from the border of Hunan and Guizhou to the western part of Guangxi and closed the passage for the enemy to flee west to Yunnan through Guizhou. The 12th Corps was the northern road, advancing from the north of Guibei. The 4th Corps and the 15th Corps were the southern roads, which were outflanked by the Yuegui side. The 13th Army of the 49th Corps was the reserve, along both sides of the Xianggui Road and the Weibei Road into Guizhou, and was responsible for the tasks of clearing out the remnants of the enemy, maintaining transportation, and taking over the city.
At the beginning of November, before the battle began, the 13th Corps rested in the Anjiang, Dongkou, and Wugang areas of southwest Hunan Province, and Lin Biao sent a telegram from Hengyang, ordering all the 13th Corps of the Western Route Army to advance by car, from Anjiang to Fulu and Rongjiang in Guizhou, and then turn to Hechi, Donglan, Baise, and Longzhou in Guangxi, so as not to let the enemy escape to Yunnan or Vietnam. Huang Yongsheng, acting commander of the 13th Corps, and Mo Wenhua, political commissar of the 13th Corps, analyzed that it was very unrealistic, and it was difficult to solve the problem of vehicles, roads, gasoline, etc., so they reported the situation. After the arguments of Deputy Commander Peng Mingzhi, Lin Biao agreed that the 13 Corps should form a convoy and advance along the Anjiang River to the first line of Hengyang and Guilin, establish a command post on the march, and exercise command during the march.
On 6 and 7 November, the 38th and 39th armies, which were in charge of strategic detours, secretly set out westward from Dongkou and Wugang, entered the Miao and Zhuang areas on the border of Guizhou and Guizhou, and attacked Jingxian and Daodao, thus playing the prelude to the Guangxi Campaign.
After crossing the sparsely populated Miaoling Mountains, the 38th and 39th armies occupied Liping and Rongjiang, forcing the Baibu Liu Jiashu Corps to withdraw to the northwest of Guangxi. After that, the 38th Army continued to advance towards Sien, Donglan, and Baise, cutting off the enemy's retreat route to Yunnan from the west. The 39th Army turned to Guyi and Rong'an, inserted itself into the hinterland of Guangxi, captured Liuzhou on November 25, and almost captured Bai Chongxi, who was in a hurry to Nanning. Our other two armies also made rapid progress, and successively launched a large-scale encirclement and annihilation in Bobai, Lianjiang, and Qinzhou, annihilating most of the living forces of the Bai Chongxi group.
The 39th Army continued its pursuit south from Liuzhou and occupied Nanning on December 4. Then, regardless of fatigue, he cooperated with the 13th Army and the 43rd Army of his brother troops to bravely pursue and annihilate the enemy who tried to flee Vietnam, and successively liberated Longzhou, Shangsi, Mingjiang, Ningming and other counties in southwest Guangxi, and intercepted and annihilated more than 10,000 enemy Huang Jie's corps. On December 11, the 343rd Regiment of the 115th Division entered the Sino-Vietnamese border fortress town of Nanguan (now Friendship Pass) and planted the red flag on the city tower. On the 14th, the 43rd Army of Youlin entered Langxu and Passian, blocked the border line, and the Guangxi Campaign ended victoriously.
Prior to this, on 9 December, the Central Military Commission ordered the establishment of the Guangxi Military Region, which was composed of the organs of the 13 Corps and the Guangxi Military Region, which had been stationed in Nanning. Commander and political commissar Zhang Yunyi, acting commander Huang Yongsheng, deputy commanders Li Tianyou and Peng Mingzhi of the 13 th Corps were appointed first, second, and third deputy commanders of the Military Region, and Mo Wenhua, political commissar of the Corps, was appointed deputy political commissar of the Military Region. After that, except for the 114th and 151st Divisions of the 38th Army, which were temporarily under the command of Chen Geng's 4th Corps, marched into Yunnan, and the 115th Division of the 39th Army protected the road and suppressed bandits in the area between Guilin and Liuzhou, the main forces of the two armies began to move north. The 47th Army broke away from the 13th Corps and stayed in Xiangxi. The 49th Army formed the Guibei Command Post in Guilin, and the divisions under its jurisdiction were also the Pingle, Liuzhou, and Guilin military sub-districts to carry out the work of suppressing bandits and building up the government. Siye also left the 12th Army of the 45th Corps in Guangxi as a mobile combat force. At the beginning of February 1950, the 134th Division of the 45th Army commanded by the Guangxi Military Region annihilated more than 6,700 people from the 17th Corps Headquarters of the White Department and the remnants of the 100th Army in the Pingerguan area.
Development continues
In April 1950, the 13 Corps was dismissed from the Guangxi Military Region, and because of the heavy work of suppressing bandits, the Corps organs had not yet separated from the organs of the Guangxi Military Region, and they had to undertake the task of the all-army strategic reserve assigned by the Central Military Commission. 40th Army (went north in early July and did not stop in Henan). A large part of the reason why the 38th and 39th armies went north to Henan was that Guangxi lacked grain and could not supply it for a long time. After the 40th Army and the 43rd Army liberated Hainan Island, the 43rd Army was left on both sides of the Qiongzhou Strait and the 40th Army was transferred north.
On June 25, the Korean War suddenly broke out, forcing China to make all preparations as soon as possible. Although the 13 Corps stationed in the Central Plains was fully staffed and strong, it did not have a sound command structure, and the corps organs were basically all left in Guangxi, and they could not come over for a while. At this time, the 12 Corps Headquarters of Siye was changed to the Navy and the organs of the Hunan Military Region, and the 14 Corps Headquarters was transferred to the Air Force a year ago, and the 21 Corps reorganized by Chen Mingren's uprising troops would not be considered, and the only thing that could be used was the 15 Corps Headquarters in Guangzhou, plus the commander of the Corps, Deng Hua, had just successfully commanded the crossing of the sea and landed on the liberation of Hainan Island, and its stability and comprehensiveness had been affirmed by the Central Military Commission and the Central and Southern Military Region. On July 8, the Military Commission ordered that the 15th Corps and the 13th Corps should exchange numbers and organs, and Deng Hua, commander of the 15th Corps, should be appointed commander of the 13th Corps, and lead the 38th, 39th, and 40th armies to immediately go north to form the Northeast Frontier Army to deal with the situation in Korea.
In May 1951, the 15th Corps and the Guangdong Military Region were expanded into the South China Military Region. In July 1952, the South China Military Region was abolished, and the organization was merged into the Central South Military Region moved from Hankou to Guangzhou, and at the same time, the Guangdong Armed Work Department of the Central South Military Region was established, which later developed into the Public Security Force Department of the Central South Military Region and the Guangdong Military Region, and the Guangzhou Military Region Public Security Force Headquarters and the Guangdong Military Region.
The "Battle of Miyun" can be said to be a little-known battle in the War of Liberation, in which our army annihilated more than 5,300 enemies at the cost of more than 1,100 casualties, and won a complete victory.
However, many people say: Although our army won this battle, it should not be recognized.
Because this battle directly affected the overall situation of the war, from the perspective of the overall situation, this is obviously unfavorable to our army's subsequent operations.
Because of this, after this battle, General Cheng Zihua, who was responsible for leading the campaign, was also transferred out of the army, and finally failed to be awarded.
So, what's the story behind this?
In November 1948, the Liaoshen Campaign had just ended, and before the Dongye troops had time to rest, they immediately prepared to wave their troops into the customs to participate in the upcoming Pingjin Campaign.
Dongye ordered the original Tashan blocking force, which was closest to the pass, as well as the Second Corps Headquarters, the Fourth Column, and the Eleventh Column to form the Dongye Advance Corps, with Cheng Zihua as the commander, and led the army to enter the pass first.
Cheng Zihua is a veteran Red Army who participated in the Long March, and he has been a "tiger general" recognized by the whole army for his life as a horseman and has made great achievements.
In the Tashan Resistance Battle, he led the army to defend Tashan, but under the difficult conditions of being outnumbered and inferior in weapons and equipment, he repelled many enemy attacks one after another, not only did not let the enemy advance half a step, but also annihilated more than 6,000 people.
The victory of the Tashan Resistance Battle greatly guaranteed the capture of Jinzhou by the main force of Dongye and laid a solid foundation for the victory of the Liaoshen Campaign.
In the movie "Armageddon: Liaoshen Campaign", Mr. Lin has such a classic line: "Tell Cheng Zihua, I don't want casualty numbers, I just want Tashan!" ”
At that time, the four columns responsible for the blockade of Tashan were subordinate to Cheng Zihua's Second Corps.
However, what people didn't expect was that when Cheng Zihua led the lead to enter the customs, such an incident happened.
At that time, the main task of the advance corps was to cut off the Pingsui Railway, and at the same time to cooperate with the troops of the North China Military Region to encircle and annihilate Fu Zuoyi's "trump card" 35th Army, and at the same time cut off the enemy's reinforcements in Beiping.
Due to the special nature of the task, the advance corps' entry into the customs was carried out in a covert manner, because once Fu Zuoyi's 35 th Army was alarmed, it would inevitably affect the strategic deployment of the central authorities.
After Cheng Zihua received the order, he led his troops to start a rapid march, preparing to go to Pingxi via Jixian and Miyun to cut off the Pingsui Railway.
However, when the army marched to Miyun, Cheng Zihua suddenly had a temporary idea to take it down as a logistics transit station for the army.
Of course, the reason why Cheng Zihua decided to capture Miyun is also related to the strategic position of Miyun itself.
Miyun County is located in the triangle of the confluence of the Chaohe River and the Baihe River, guarding the Pinggu Railway and the crossing of the Chao and Baihe rivers, which is an obstacle on the way of our army's westward advance.
If Miyun is not taken, it will be impossible to control the ferry, and it will be difficult for the baggage vehicles of the advance corps to pass.
Therefore, Cheng Zihua's decision to capture Miyun is actually understandable, but his estimate of the number of defenders in the city is quite different.
According to the initial investigation information, there is only one security regiment and one police brigade defending the enemy in Miyun, and all of them add up to only one or two thousand people.
However, this is very different from the actual situation!
Miyun has been a battleground for soldiers since ancient times, and was taken the lead by the Kuomintang army after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War.
During the Liaoshen Campaign, the Kuomintang Miyun garrison was worried that our army would enter the pass, so they strengthened and transformed it on the basis of the original city fortifications.
For example, the city wall of Miyun County was originally nine meters high, but in order to strengthen the defense, the enemy added a one-meter-high battlement to its foundation, and built many light and dark bunkers inside and outside the city wall.
In addition, the Miyun defenders also demolished all the houses and shops within 200 meters outside the city to form an open field, so that the invading enemy had no place to hide.
In the city, they used sandbags to block the city gates and roads, and even the streets and alleys were built with temporary fortifications and bunkers, coupled with the geographical advantages of Miyun itself surrounded by water on three sides and facing mountains on one side, the county town of Miyun at this time was already an iron wall, which greatly increased the difficulty of our army's siege.
It is worth noting that at this time, the Miyun garrison was composed of the 463rd Regiment and the 465th Regiment of the 115th Division of the 13th Army, the 1st Regiment of the Temporary 63rd Division, the Rehe Security Regiment and the Miyun County Police Brigade, with about 7,000 people and well-equipped.
But at this moment, the advance corps is ready to send arrows, and even if Miyun is a hard bone, he must gnaw it down.
At 8 o'clock on December 5th, our army launched a general attack on the enemy defending Miyun!
As expected, due to the enemy's complete military arrangements first, our army's advance speed in actual combat was relatively slow, and the casualties were very large, and the difficulty of the battle greatly exceeded Cheng Zihua's expectations.
During the battle, the 8th Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 429th Regiment of our army fought with less than 20 people, and the 9th Company suffered all casualties, and the battle was very tragic.
However, despite this, our soldiers did not flinch in the slightest, they fought valiantly, regarded death as home, and destroyed the enemy's light and dark bunkers one after another.
Wang Yonggui, commander of the 5th Company of the 2nd Battalion of our army, took the lead in the battle, led the soldiers to fight from the street to the end of the street, broke through the enemy's barricades one by one, and after running out of ammunition, he used bayonets to engage in fierce hand-to-hand combat with the enemy.
During the battle, Company Commander Wang Yonggui unfortunately died heroically, and the more than 170 people in the company finally fought only 38 people. After the war, the company also won the honorary title of "Miyun Sharp Knife Company".
After a day of bloody fighting, on the 22nd of the night, the defenders of Miyun County were basically cleared out, and Miyun County was liberated.
According to post-war statistics: At the cost of 1,143 casualties (one says more than 1,500), our army annihilated more than 5,300 enemies (more than 6,000 in one case) and won a complete victory.
However, due to the urgency of the military situation, the advance corps did not have time to rest and clean up the battlefield, so it handed over all post-war matters to the local government and marched west overnight.
However, although the Battle of Miyun was won, it did affect the overall situation of the Pingjin Campaign.
This was because this battle alarmed the enemy prematurely, exposed the attempt of our Northeast Field Army to secretly enter the customs, and even delayed the time for the main force of the advance corps to cut off the Pingsui Railway, which almost caused serious consequences.
When the news of Miyun's loss came, Fu Zuoyi was greatly surprised, he knew that Miyun was the barrier of Beiping, and if Miyun was lost, the safety of Beiping would be seriously threatened.
In addition, Fu Zuoyi also quickly realized our army's intentions, so he hurriedly ordered the 35th Army to quickly return to Beiping from Zhangjiakou to strengthen Beiping's defensive strength.
In order to ensure that nothing goes wrong, Fu Zuoyi also ordered the main force of the 104th Army stationed in Huailai to meet it, and ordered the 16th Army stationed in Nankou to contain our army's actions in the direction of Kangzhuang.
While ensuring the smooth withdrawal of the 35th Army, Fu Zuoyi also ordered the troops stationed in Tianjin, Tanggu and other places to quickly reinforce Beiping.
Although the 1st Brigade of the 1st Column of the 3rd Corps of the North China Military Region stubbornly held back the 35th Army at Shalingzi for three days, it was finally forced to abandon its position because the enemy was outnumbered and suffered heavy casualties.
After the loss of Shalingzi, the retreat of the 35th Army became unimpeded.
Under such circumstances, if Cheng Zihua's advance corps could not arrive in time, then the 35th Army would smoothly withdraw to Beiping.
However, as far as the situation at that time was concerned, it was impossible for Cheng Zihua's troops to arrive, and the withdrawal of the 35th Army was a foregone conclusion.
However, what is gratifying is that Guo Jingyun, who was the commander of the 35th Army at the time, was reluctant to dismantle the machinery and equipment in the military repair station, so he had to dismantle it and take it away, coupled with some personal matters, which caused the retreat of the 35th Army to be delayed for a whole day, and it was this day that directly doomed the tragic end of the 35th Army and the situation of the entire Pingjin Campaign.
After a day and night of rapid marching, the troops of our North China Military Region finally arrived at the predetermined position, and at this time Cheng Zihua's troops also arrived.
Under the encirclement of the two armies, Fu Zuoyi's "trump card" 35th Army was completely annihilated by our army.
After the 35th Army was annihilated by our army, Fu Zuoyi began to ask Lao Jiang for help, but what he got was Lao Chiang's repeated perfunctory.
Fight and can't win, run and can't run away, at this time Fu Zuoyi has reached the point of a dilemma, if he really wants to fight with the People's Liberation Army, then the thousand-year-old imperial capital of Beiping City will definitely be buried in the artillery fire, in this way, Fu Zuoyi has become a historical sinner.
On the contrary, if he leads his troops to revolt and surrender to our army, he will not only be reused, but also his reputation and his troops will be preserved.
Therefore, after the liberation of Tianjin, Fu Zuoyi completely gave up his illusions and led his troops to revolt, and Beiping declared peaceful liberation.
After the peaceful liberation of Beiping, Cheng Zihua served as the commander and political commissar of the Beiping garrison. After April 1949, Cheng Zihua served as the commander of the 13th Corps of the Fourth Field Army.
However, at the later summary meeting, Chairman Mao first praised some soldiers who had made meritorious contributions, and then changed the conversation and began to criticize Cheng Zihua.
Just imagine, if the 35th Army had not been wiped out at that time, then the entire Pingjin Campaign would have fallen into a stalemate, and our army would have to pay a heavy price if it wanted to liberate North China.
As the commander of the advance corps, Cheng Zihua took the liberty of attacking Miyun undoubtedly with a certain risk, although he won in the end, but it was very unfavorable for the overall situation.
If the 35th Army really succeeds in retreating, the consequences will be incalculable.
In a rapidly changing battlefield, one person and one gun can make or break the tide of battle, let alone a well-equipped army of tens of thousands of people.
After the war, Cheng Zihua also realized his own problems, and he took the initiative to review the organization.
After the founding of the People's Republic of China, Cheng Zihua was transferred to a local post, and in 1955, when the whole army was "awarded", it was entirely possible to confer the rank of general according to his qualifications and military exploits, but because he was no longer serving in the army, he finally failed to confer the title.
After 1956, Cheng Zihua was transferred to the Finance and Trade Office of the State Council as deputy director, and then successively served as Minister of Commerce, Deputy Director of the National Construction Commission, Secretary of the Secretariat of the Southwest Bureau and Executive Deputy Director of the Southwest Third Line Construction Committee.
During the special period, he was severely impacted, and was once imprisoned, and was not able to come back until 1975, when he later served as Minister of Civil Affairs and Secretary of the Party Leadership Group.
In 1988, Cheng Zihua took the initiative to apply for retirement, and his later life was plain and low-key. On March 30, 1991, General Cheng Zihua died of illness in Beijing at the age of 86.
In fact, on the other hand, the Battle of Miyun, although the battle was finally won, from the perspective of the overall war, it still has a certain risk.
If it were not for the 35 th Army's cocooning, it would have been relatively difficult for our army to smoothly win the victory in the Pingjin Campaign.
Through this incident, it also sounded a wake-up call for other commanders and fighters, that is, do not take decisions for granted, and must obey the instructions of your superiors, because what you see may only be the gains and losses of one city and one pool, while what the superior leaders see is the operation of the overall situation of the war.
If the front-line commanders and fighters all fight according to their own ideas and do not obey the orders of their superiors, then not only will they not be able to win, but they may even be eaten by the enemy one by one.
This is the reason why the first article in the "Three Disciplines and Eight Points of Attention" is "all actions are subject to command".
But then again, although Cheng Zihua was transferred out of the army, his position and rank in the local work are also not low.
In short, no matter what, General Cheng Zihua's military exploits are obvious to all, although the battle of Miyun almost caused a bad impact, but the liberation of Miyun also cleared the way for our army to advance westward.
The liberation of Miyun was the first tough battle after Dongye entered the customs, and made an important contribution to the victory of the Pingjin Campaign.
Cheng Zihua led his troops to lead the advance corps of the Northeast Field Army into the pass, and undertook the combat mission of the Pingzhang Line (Pingzhang Line refers to the section from Beiping to Zhangjiakou in the eastern section of the Pingsui Line) in the Pingjin Campaign, and cooperated with the North China troops to fight. Before the leading organs of the Northeast Field Army entered the customs, the Central Military Commission authorized Cheng Zihua to take unified command of the Second and Third Corps and local troops in North China to conduct operations on the Pingsui Line. In order to unify the leadership, the Central Committee decided to set up the Pingsui Frontline Committee, with Cheng Zihua as secretary and Luo Ruiqing as deputy secretary. Cheng Zihua led the 2nd and 3rd Corps of North China and the advance corps of the Northeast Field Army to cut off the enemy's westward escape route in Zhangjiakou one after another, and annihilated the enemy's two armies and five divisions, disrupting Fu Zuoyi's defensive deployment, and finally achieving the strategic goal of seizing the Fu faction and dragging the Chiang faction, thereby keeping the Fu Zuoyi group in the Pingjin area, and covering the entry of the main force of the Northeast Field Army. Then Cheng Zihua's corps, together with the Northeast Field Army's Xiao Jinguang First Corps and the North China Military Region and other fraternal troops, formed an encirclement of Beiping, and under the powerful political offensive of our army, Beiping was peacefully liberated. After the peaceful liberation of Beiping, Cheng Zihua served as the commander and political commissar of the Beiping garrison, organized and commanded the solemn Chinese People's Liberation Army Beiping entry ceremony, and with the cooperation of other troops, quickly stabilized the social order in Beiping.
In April 1949, Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Zhu issued the "Order to March to the Whole Country", and Cheng Zihua led the 13th Corps of the Fourth Field Army, which was reorganized from the Second Corps of the Northeast Field Army, to the south along the Pinghan Railway. At the same time, after leading his troops to cross the river, he actively cooperated with the fraternal troops to fight, won the victory of the Hengbao Campaign, and liberated the entire territory of Hunan. At the same time, from the end of 1948 to June 1949, the entire army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army successively formed 16 corps, and among the first commanders of the 16 corps, one was awarded marshal, three were awarded generals, and eleven were awarded generals after the founding of the People's Republic of China.
In September 1949, the Central Committee decided that Cheng Zihua would be appointed secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee, chairman of the provincial government, and commander and political commissar of the Shanxi Provincial Military Region. After 22 years of arduous revolutionary war, Cheng Zihua transferred to the local area and devoted himself to the fiery construction of New China.
Participate in nation-building
After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as Secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, Chairman of the Provincial People's Government, and Commander and Political Commissar of the Provincial Military Region. After October 1950, he was transferred to the National Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives as deputy director, director and party secretary. In 1956, he was appointed Deputy Director of the Finance and Trade Office of the State Council. In 1958, he was appointed Minister of Commerce and Secretary of the Party Leadership Group. In 1960, he was appointed deputy director and deputy secretary of the Party Leadership Group of the National Construction Commission. In 1961, he was appointed Executive Deputy Director and Deputy Secretary of the Party Leadership Group of the State Planning Commission. After 1964, he served as Secretary of the Secretariat of the Southwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Executive Deputy Director of the Southwest Third Line Construction Committee. He was persecuted and imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution. After 1975, he went to study in the reading class of the Central Party School. In March 1978, he was appointed Minister of Civil Affairs and Secretary of the Party Leadership Group. From August 1980 to March 1988, he served as Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
When the title was conferred in 1955, many people did not understand that Cheng Zihua was not awarded any military rank. You must know that whether it is military exploits or qualifications, Cheng Zihua is no worse than some founding generals.
It is known that during the Red Army, Cheng Zihua also served as the superior leader of Xu Haidong, who was later awarded the rank of general.
Of the commanders of the 19 corps of the PLA, the vast majority of commanders were awarded the rank of general. Cheng Zihua is the only corps commander who has not been awarded a military rank, so why didn't Cheng Zihua get a military rank? Was he the one who made a serious mistake?
Throughout Cheng Zihua's life, whether it is in terms of qualifications, military achievements, or political status, he ranks very high in the party and the army.
In terms of seniority, Cheng Zihua joined our party in 1926, before the Long March, Cheng Zihua had already served as a Red Army division commander-level cadre, and after the Long March, he served as the political commissar of the Red 15th Army Corps.
Before the Long March, Cheng Zihua was ordered to work in the Red 25th Army, and Xu Haidong took the initiative to resign from the post of army commander and let Cheng Zihua serve as the army commander and he himself served as the deputy army commander.
Although Cheng Zihua has not been in the army for a long time, it can be learned from Xu Haidong's initiative to serve as Cheng Zihua's deputy, and it can also be known that Cheng Zihua's qualifications are indeed not ordinarily high.
In the Anti-Japanese War, for a long time, Yang Chengwu and many other later founding generals were Cheng Zihua's subordinates.
From the analysis of military exploits, Cheng Zihua's military exploits are also very great.
At the end of the Long March, the Red 25th Army, led by Cheng Zihua and Xu Haidong, was the only unit in the Red Army that did not decrease, but increased.
You must know that during the Long March, the Central Red Army was reduced from nearly 100,000 to less than 10,000 when it arrived in northern Shaanxi. The Red Fourth Front Army was also reduced by more than half.
On the other hand, the Red 25th Army, at the beginning of the Long March, this force had only 2,900 people, and when it arrived in northern Shaanxi, the whole army already had nearly 3,500 people, not including the 2,000 Red 74th Division left in southern Shaanxi. To be able to do this, Cheng Zihua's exploits can be imagined.
During the Anti-Japanese War, Cheng Zihua carried out a combat purge in the central Hebei region, and in just a few years, Cheng Zihua turned the second-line troops in the central Hebei region into a first-line field corps that can fight well.
During the Liberation War, there were three columns in Dongye (that is, the later "Four Fields"), with a total of 200,000 troops, all of which were elites trained by Cheng Zihua.
Although the Tashan Resistance Battle was not specifically commanded by Cheng Zihua, it was also a victory under the leadership of Cheng Zihua, all of which is enough to show that Cheng Zihua's military exploits are very great.
From the perspective of political status and political influence, Cheng Zihua is also not to be underestimated.
In April 1945, our party held the Seventh National Congress, and Cheng Zihua and Xiao Jinguang, another corps commander in the early days of Dongye, became alternate members of the Central Committee.
You must know that in the Seventh National Congress, even if he can be elected as an alternate member, when he was awarded the title in 55, the lowest military rank was also a general, and General Chen Geng was an alternate member of the Central Committee at that time, so it can be seen that Cheng Zihua's political status is very high, by analogy, if Cheng Zihua can really be awarded a military rank, a general is at least, and the possibility of a general is also very high.
So, why didn't Cheng Zihua get a military rank in 55 years?
There is a theory that this is related to Cheng Zihua's failure to save the Central Red Army in 1935.
In 1935, when the Red 15th Army led by Xu Haidong and Cheng Zihua repelled the Northwest Army of the Northeast Army, just as they were preparing to expand the results of the battle in one go, they unexpectedly obtained information about the Central Red Army in the Tianshui area of Gansu.
At this time, Xu Haidong advocated sending troops to meet the Central Red Army, because Xu Haidong understood that the Kuomintang heavy troops were always pursuing the Central Red Army, and the Central Red Army suffered extremely heavy losses.
Cheng Zihua objected. Cheng Zihua's reason is also very sufficient, the time shown by this intelligence is already a month ago, a month ago the Central Red Army was in Tianshui, maybe now they are almost in northern Shaanxi, at least now they are likely not to be in Tianshui.
In addition, the strength of the 15 th Army Corps of the Red Army was not large, and once troops were sent to meet the Central Red Army, the strength of the Shaanxi and Gansu base areas would inevitably be empty, and once the Northeast Army and the Northwest Army, which numbered more than 100,000 troops, received information that the strength of the base areas was empty, the consequences would be unimaginable.
Cheng Zihua was seriously injured at that time, and in order to stop Xu Haidong, he even asked soldiers to carry him to the corps headquarters. After some persuasion by Cheng Zihua, Xu Haidong finally adopted Cheng Zihua's opinion.
During the Anti-Japanese War in Yan'an, some people took out this matter and said that because Cheng Zihua presided over the work in Jinchaji, the matter was not finally resolved.
In 1954, a party comrade mentioned this matter again, and Cheng Zihua said it clearly. Therefore, Cheng Zihua has not been awarded the title for 55 years, not because he did not accept the Central Red Army in 1935, not to mention that Chairman Mao is a broad-minded leader, and he will never blame any general for this kind of thing.
Cheng Zihua did not get a military rank, and there is a saying that many people agree with, that is, at the end of 1948, Cheng Zihua did not listen to Chairman Mao's orders and fought the "Battle of Miyun".
In order to force Fu Zuoyi to revolt peacefully, and in order to preserve the ancient city of Beiping, the Central Military Commission formulated an operational plan to annihilate the 35th Army, the most elite unit under Fu Zuoyi.
Once the 35th Army is eliminated, Fu Zuoyi will not have the confidence to confront the PLA and peacefully liberate Beiping, and the possibility will be greatly increased.
In Chairman Mao's battle plan, the People's Liberation Army will dispatch several corps to encircle Fu Zuoyi's 35th Army from the west, south, and northeast.
The northeast direction is in charge of Cheng Zihua's corps, and the other two sides are in charge of Yang Dezhi and Yang Chengwu.
In some TV series and articles, because of the battle of Miyun, the 35th Army detected the combat intentions of the PLA, so it escaped from the encirclement of the PLA in time and retracted to Beiping.
After Chairman Mao learned of the situation, he criticized Cheng Zihua. Some people speculate that the Battle of Miyun is likely to be an important reason why Cheng Zihua failed to evaluate his military rank in 55.
In fact, these are unfounded speculations. Combined with Cheng Zihua's memoirs and real historical data, it can be known that Cheng Zihua did take Miyun when he surrounded the 35th Army. However, Cheng Zihua only sent one column to fight Miyun, and the other column still carried out the original battle plan.
After that, Cheng Zihua cooperated with Eryang not only to annihilate the 35th Army, but also to cripple the two armies sent by Fu Zuoyi for reinforcements. It is clearly recorded in Cheng Zihua's memoirs that after the war, the Military Commission issued a general order to commend the three corps.
The reason why Cheng Zihua really didn't get the rank was not because Chairman Mao didn't trust him, not because of the Battle of Miyun, but because of an important instruction from the Central Committee.
When awarding military ranks, the central authorities clearly stipulate that comrades who have been transferred to work in the military system to local areas are not allowed to be awarded military ranks unless there are special circumstances, such as Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.
In the entire PLA system, only Chen Yi is special, and after he became mayor of Shanghai, he was still awarded the title of marshal, because Chen Yi is the supreme leader of the New Fourth Army and a representative of the New Fourth Army.
Cheng Zihua was appointed by the central government as the number one leader of Shanxi Province in September 1949, and has been working on the economic front since then. For Cheng Zihua, the central government has always trusted and reused, and for many years, Cheng Zihua successively served as the Minister of Commerce, Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and other important positions.
New China is full of stars, but there are not many generals from the north, and Cheng Zihua is one of the more prominent ones. As a general from Yuncheng, Shanxi, Cheng Zihua has made many outstanding contributions to the establishment of New China.
In 1949, the People's Liberation Army was reorganized, and the five major PLAs successively formed 19 field corps, and Cheng Zihua, as the commander of the 13th Corps, was the only northerner. At the same time, Cheng Zihua was also the only corps commander who failed to participate in the awarding of titles.
Cheng Zihua, who can be literate and martial, why didn't he participate in the award? If he participates in the awarding of titles, what kind of military rank can Cheng Zihua get? In order to answer these two questions, let's take a look at Cheng Zihua's resume!
Since Cheng Zihua joined the revolution, he has been engaged in the work of military command. At the age of 21, he was sent by his superiors to study at the Wuhan branch of the Whampoa Military Academy. In August 1927, the Teaching Regiment of the Second Front Army of the National Revolutionary Army, which was reorganized from the military academy, marched east to Jiujiang to prepare to participate in the Nanchang Uprising. Unable to catch up with the uprising, Cheng Zihua went to Guangzhou and participated in the Guangzhou Uprising in December of that year. After the failure of the uprising, Cheng Zihua went with his troops to carry out guerrilla warfare in the Hailufeng area, and later returned to the north due to wounds, refound the organization, and was ordered to enter the old army to carry out military transportation work.
In December 1929, Cheng Zihua successfully led the "Daye Rebellion" and led the uprising team to join Peng Dehuai's Red Fifth Army, which established his historical role in the people's army.
After joining the Red Army, Cheng Zihua showed outstanding military talent, under the command of Mao Zedong, he participated in all the anti-encirclement and suppression, made many military achievements, and was also respected by Mao Zedong.
He and Mao Zedong still have such a story. In 1932, Mao Zedong talked to him. As usual, Mao Zedong would first ask the other party about their place of origin. Cheng Zihua replied: "People from Yuncheng, Shanxi." ”
When Mao Zedong heard this, he quipped: "Oh, then you and Guan Yu are fellow countrymen." Some people say that Guan Yu was born as a blacksmith, right? ”
Cheng Zihua replied: "There is such a saying, but some people say that he sells tofu." Subsequently, Cheng Zihua changed his words:
"I don't like Guan Yu, when I was in school, it was after the First World War, the principal hung eight portraits of historical celebrities such as Yue Fei, Guan Yu, and Qi Jiguang in the classroom, and asked the students to choose one person as their own learning model. Many students choose Guan Yu, but I choose Qi Jiguang. ”
Mao Zedong was surprised when he heard it: "Guan Yu is a martial saint, and he is the same villager as you, why don't you choose?" ”
Cheng Zihua replied: "At that time, the idea was that Japan forced Yuan Shikai to sign the 21 Articles, and to destroy China, learning from Guan Yu could only be Chinese to fight Chinese, and Qi Jiguang was to fight against the Kou, take him as an example, and in the future, throw pen to paper, fight Japan, and save China." ”
Mao Zedong laughed: "Good! Good! If you have few ambitions and have a role model, you will definitely succeed. ”
Subsequently, Mao Zedong sent Cheng Zihua to the newly reorganized Red Fifth Army Corps, and successively served as the political commissar of the 41st Division of the 14th Army, the commander of the 42nd Division, and the 14th Division. Transform this unit from the old army into the main force of the Red Army.
In 1934, Cheng Zihua was ordered by Zhou Enlai to work in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Region to convey the instructions and guidelines of the Central Committee on the implementation of the transfer. At this time, the main force of the Red Fourth Front Army had already marched to Sichuan, and only the Red 25th Army, which had more than 3,000 people, remained. Under the unanimous recommendation of Wu Huanxian and Xu Haidong, Cheng Zihua was appointed as the commander of the Red 25th Army.
Cheng Zihua, Xu Haidong and Wu Huanxian joined forces to lead the Red 25th Army to defeat strong enemies and defeat the Northeast Army, the Northwest Army and the Ningxia Majia Army in succession. While other Red Army armies fought less and less, the Red 25th Army fought more and more, and its equipment became more and more sophisticated. The Red 25th Army was also the first team to arrive in northern Shaanxi, creating important conditions for the later meeting of the three main forces.
During the Anti-Japanese War, Cheng Zihua returned to Shanxi and led the army and civilians to resist the enemy together with Lu Zhengcao, and created the famous Jizhong Base Area. After Nie Rongzhen went to Yan'an to participate in the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Cheng Zihua became the actual commander of the Jinchaji base area.
During the War of Liberation, Cheng Zihua was appointed secretary of the Central Branch of the Jichareliao Liberated Area, commander of the Military Region and political commissar, and became an important force connecting the two liberated areas of Northeast China and North China.
After the Jichareliao Liberated Area was transferred to the Northeast Liberated Area, Cheng Zihua was mainly responsible for military command, and brought out the 8th, 9th, and 11th columns, and the Jichareliao troops rapidly expanded from less than 30,000 after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War to 200,000. These troops became the main forces of our army to participate in the decisive battle of Liaoshen.
In the Liaoshen Campaign, Cheng Zihua was even more in the limelight. He first led the 8th, 9th, and 11th columns and three independent divisions of the Jichareliao Army to capture Suizhong and Xingcheng, cutting off the Beining Line, the enemy's main artery connecting the northeast and north China. This action realized Mao Zedong's strategic policy of "closing the door and beating dogs" and opened the curtain of the Liaoshen Campaign.
Subsequently, Cheng Zihua served as the commander of the Second Corps of the Northeast Field Army, which was reorganized from the Second Front Command of the Northeast People's Liberation Army. Cheng Zihua was the only corps-level commander of the Northeast Field Army at that time.
When the main force of the Northeast Field Army besieged Jinzhou. The Kuomintang organized the so-called Eastern Advance Corps, which rushed to the aid of warships and a large number of aircraft. Under the order of the East General, Cheng Zihua led the 4th and 11th columns to hold Tashan. This is the complete "Battle of Tianwang Mountain".
Although Tower Hill is known as Tower Mountain, there is actually neither a tower nor a mountain, and the so-called commanding height is just a small hill. On the contrary, Tashan was close to the sea and was within range of the Kuomintang warship, the Chongqing. It is really facing heavy artillery on land, naval artillery at sea, and aircraft in the air, and there is no danger to defend and it is extremely dangerous.
After Cheng Zihua received the task, he risked his life to conduct reconnaissance on the front line and study how to build fortifications. He decided to take advantage of the valuable experience of the battle in Songzhuang in Jizhong during the Anti-Japanese War, and take advantage of the flexible characteristics of half of the stragglers inside and outside the village walls to counterattack the enemy or evade artillery fire.
After the battle began, the Kuomintang's amphibious attack on land, sea and air pressed our army to the point that it could not raise its head. The Chongqing only needs one shell to reimburse the strength of one platoon of our army. At this moment, the independent 95th Division, known as the "Zhao Zilong Division", came to kill, and they braved the dense rain of bullets of our army, under the command of the shirtless battalion commander and regiment commander, and launched a suicide attack. Cheng Zihua learned that the division was mainly Cantonese, and in view of his previous experience in dealing with Guangdong troops, he suggested to the leaders of the column that white-knuckle warfare should be used to deal with Zhao Zilong's division. Because the Guangdong troops are not afraid of artillery, but they are afraid of big blades. As expected, the incomparably brave 95th Division was defeated in the white-knuckle charge of our army.
In this way, the Kuomintang stormed Tashan for six days, but they were never able to make a gap, and Jinzhou had long been liberated under the heavy artillery of Dongye. Chiang Kai-shek couldn't help but say abruptly, "This is the death of the party-state." In fact, it was not the death of the heavens, but the excellent command and stubborn stubbornness of our army made it difficult for the Kuomintang army.
The battle of Tashan made Cheng Zihua famous. In "The Great Battle", Mr. Ma Shaoxin's sentence: "Tell Cheng Zihua, I don't want numbers, I just want Tashan!" It also makes Cheng Zihua's name well-known to the people of China.
After the Liaoshen Campaign, Cheng Zihua entered the pass with the Dongye Army and participated in the Pingjin Campaign. However, in this campaign, Cheng Zihua's command caused a series of controversies. In the eyes of many netizens, it was Cheng Zihua's performance in the Pingjin Battle that made him an "untitled general".
In the midst of this battle, our army is engaged in the most important new security campaign. At that time, our army was storming Zhangjiakou, trying to cut off Fu Zuoyi's connection with his old nest, Suiyuan. Fu Zuoyi saw that the situation was not good, so he immediately sent his own starting force, the 35th Army, to help. Fu Zuoyi is well versed in the truth of "if you lose your land, you will lose your land". So he personally warned Guo Jingyun, the commander of the 35th Army, that once there was an abnormality in the rear, he would immediately return to Beiping. To this end, Fu Zuoyi also specially allocated 400 American-style Dodge trucks to the 35th Army. As a result, the 35th Army became a rare rapid mobile unit in China at that time, which could be attacked and retreated.
And Mao Zedong also clearly understood that the annihilation of the 35th Army was the key to forcing Fu Zuoyi to comply. So the 35th Army was attacked from the west, south, and northeast.
In the west and south, Yang Dezhi and Yang Chengwu led the two major corps in North China to be responsible for making chopping boards and restraining the 35th Army. And in the northeast, the Northeast Advance Corps galloped towards the rear of the 35th Army. And the commander of the Northeast Advance Corps is Cheng Zihua.
According to Mao Zedong's plan, Cheng Zihua will go through the road, sweep through Beiping at the fastest speed, and go straight to Zhangjiakou. After receiving the order, Cheng Zihua set out from Jixian and Sanhe areas and advanced rapidly towards Huailai and Nankou. When the 11th Column of the Northeast Advance Corps arrived at Miyun, Cheng Zihua found that although the city was small, it controlled the Chaohe River and Baihe crossings. In addition, according to the investigation, there is only one security group in Miyun City, and it is completely possible to slaughter this little lamb. So Cheng Zihua decided to attack Miyun City with 11 columns.
However, after the siege of the city, it was discovered that our army's previous intelligence was wrong, and there were 4 regiments in Miyun City, and the attack on Miyun changed from "holding sheep by hand" to "gnawing hard bones".
After two days of fierce fighting, Miyun City was broken. However, in this battle, the Northeast Advance Corps failed to reach Pingzhang County on the 8th in accordance with the requirements stipulated by the Central Military Commission. More importantly, Fu Zuoyi also realized from the Battle of Miyun that the Northeast Field Army had entered the customs in advance. Frightened, he immediately telegraphed Guo Jingyun to return to Beiping immediately.
Just as the 35th Army was fleeing in the direction of Beiping, the Corps in charge of North China also made successive mistakes, causing the enemy to successfully pass through our army's defense line between Shalingzi and Xuanhua.
Mao Zedong was furious and on December 6 he severely criticized the leaders of the Northeast Advance Corps and the 2nd and 3rd Corps. In the telegram to Cheng Zihua, Mao Zedong's message was full of anger:
"The orders you have sent to Yang and Li several times are not in line with the specific situation, and they all conflict with the provisions of the Central Military Commission on severing the contact between Zhang and Xuan. Now Yang and Li have allowed the 35th Army to flee eastward, and it is not known whether Yang, Luo, and Geng will be able to stop the enemy in Xinbao. You yourselves do not fight the dense clouds with the rear guards, but use the vanguard to fight the dense clouds, thus delaying time. In this case, it may be that before you arrive, the 35th Army and the enemy have fled eastward, and you have nothing to do when you arrive, and you will go back and forth in vain......"
And this scene is also reflected in "The Battle of Pingjin", Mao Zedong was very angry with Cheng Zihua, especially accusing the Northeast Advance Corps of doing too much and startling the snake.
With the wide influence of "Armageddon", there are erroneous rumors in the market: "It is precisely because of Cheng Zihua's excessive actions in Miyun that he lost the trust of the great man." ”
But judging from the actual development, this statement is simply nonsense. Cheng Zihua did make mistakes in the new security campaign, but he quickly corrected the mistakes. With the cooperation of the North China Corps, the Northeast Advance Corps successfully rushed to Pingxi, cut off Pingsui, and the 35th Army became a turtle in the urn.
After the Northeast Field Army arrived, it captured Xin'an City in three strikes and five divisions, and the 35th Army was annihilated, and the army commander Guo Jingyun was forced to commit suicide. Therefore, Cheng Zihua's mistake did not affect the overall situation of the Pingjin Campaign. After the war, Cheng Zihua's Corps, together with the 2nd and 3rd Corps in North China, was warmly commended by the Central Military Commission. After the war, Cheng Zihua was appointed secretary of the Pingsui Front Committee, and Yang Chengwu and Yang Dezhi Corps were under his command.
Obviously, Cheng Zihua did not lose Mao Zedong's trust, but was entrusted with important tasks. After the reorganization of the People's Liberation Army, Cheng Zihua became the commander of the 13th Corps. You must know that the 13th Corps has the top strong army in our army - the 38th Army. If Cheng Zihua is not reused, how can he hand over the 38th Army to him?
After the battle of crossing the river, Cheng Zihua led the 13th Corps to the south, participated in the Battle of Hengbao, pursued all the way along Xiangxi for half a month, annihilated more than 8,600 enemies, cut off the road for the enemy in southern Hunan to retreat west to Guizhou, and cooperated with the army to eat up the main force of Bai Chongxi's group. Later, the army was waved to capture Dayong and Sangzhi, which created favorable conditions for Liu Deng's army to march to the southwest.
However, at this moment, a turning point in Cheng Zihua's career appeared. After the Battle of Hengbao, Cheng Zihua was ordered by the Military Commission to serve as a party and government leader and commander and political commissar of the military region in Shanxi Province.
On the occasion of the complete victory of the War of Liberation, the central authorities used to send military cadres who were very close to the province to preside over the local work, such as Ye Jianying in charge of the work of the party, government and army in Guangdong, Zhang Yunyi and Li Tianyou in charge of the work in Guangxi, Xiao Jinguang in charge of the work in Hunan, Li Xiannian in charge of the work in Hubei, Ye Fei in charge of the work in Fujian, and so on.
Among our army, there are not many senior leaders from Shanxi, Xu Xiangqian and Bo Yibo are both from Shanxi. But Xu Xiangqian and Bo Yibo both have to work in the central government and can't get rid of themselves, so Cheng Zihua has become the first choice to sit in Shanxi.
At this time, Cheng Zihua had been fighting in the army for 22 years, and he was reluctant to take off his military uniform no matter what. Cheng Zihua once interceded with Mr. Lin, but Mr. Lin said: "I am reluctant to let you go, but the central government has already issued an order, and now there is a shortage of people everywhere, you still obey your fate!" ”
In this way, Cheng Zihua left the army and transferred to local work. However, transferring to a local area does not mean that you cannot participate in the evaluation. After all, Ye Jianying, Chen Yi, Zhang Yunyi, Li Tianyou, Ye Fei and others all transferred to local work, and finally participated in the evaluation. Cheng Zihua could also participate in the 1955 award.
When the titles were conferred in 1955, the central authorities stipulated that all leading cadres who did not participate in the military rating in 1952 and were transferred to local posts, including envoys stationed abroad, generally did not participate in the work of grading military ranks. This is "general", not necessarily not necessarily not participating in the evaluation.
However, a turning point came. In 1951, Cheng Zihua only stayed in Shanxi for more than a year before he was transferred to the central government and assigned a seemingly "inexplicable" job - deputy director of the National Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives. In Shanxi, in addition to serving as secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee and chairman of the provincial government, Cheng Zihua also served as commander and political commissar of the Shanxi Provincial Military Region, and still retained his military post. And this time, Cheng Zihua really said goodbye to the army.
In our army, there are not many people who understand the economy, but Cheng Zihua is definitely one. During the Jin-Cha-Ji period, Cheng Zihua presided over the large-scale production movement, which freed the Jin-Cha-Ji base area from famine. When Nie Rongzhen learned about it, he couldn't help but sigh: "I didn't expect you Cheng Zihua to not only fight!" ”
Now that New China has turned to economic construction, Cheng Zihua naturally has to take on more responsibilities. The work of the supply and marketing cooperatives seems "inexplicable" to Cheng Zihua, a general, but it is actually "appropriate".
Practice has proved that Cheng Zihua has done an extremely good job in the leading position of the Supply and Marketing Cooperative, and has made great contributions to the recovery of the national economy. As a result, Cheng Zihua has been engaged in economic construction in his later career. In 1961, Cheng Zihua was transferred to the State Planning Commission and appointed as executive deputy director. Later, he was ordered to go to the southwest to carry out the construction of the third line.
The focus of the construction of the third southwest line is the construction of the Panzhihua Iron and Steel Plant, from the selection of the plant site to the commissioning of the factory, Cheng Zihua personally participated in it. Only one year later, the Panzhihua project completed its preparations. Construction began in 1966, iron was smelted in 1970, billets were rolled in 1972, and steel was produced in 1974. It can be seen that Cheng Zihua not only has outstanding military talent, but also has a surprisingly high economic ability.
Because of this, Cheng Zihua is no longer suitable to participate in the evaluation. In 1955, when the military rank system was implemented in the whole army, Cheng Zihua was impressively included in the list of 21 "local leading cadres with historical ties with the army and ties with a certain region" submitted to the Military Commission by the General Cadre Department of the People's Liberation Army to confer military ranks. But in the end, Cheng Zihua still missed the general's Venus.
If Cheng Zihua participates in the evaluation, what military rank will it be? Xu Haidong, who came from the Red 25th Army with Cheng Zihua, has the rank of general. At that time, Cheng Zihua was the army commander, and Xu Haidong was the deputy army commander. During the Anti-Japanese War, Xu Haidong recuperated due to illness and withdrew from the front-line command. Therefore, Cheng Zihua surpassed Xu Haidong in terms of overall military merits.
At the same time, the corresponding rank of the regular corps is basically general. With Cheng Zihua's outstanding qualifications and military exploits, at least he is a general, and it is not surprising that he has won the rank of general. You must know that among the generals in Dongye, such as Deng Hua, Han Xianchu, Hong Xuezhi, Huang Yongsheng, Li Tianyou, Liu Zhen and others, they are all subordinates of Cheng Zihua. Cheng Zihua is fully capable and qualified to confer the rank of general.