He Chengjun, the word Xuezhu, is a native of Suizhou, Hubei. Second Class General of the Army of the Republic of China. He successively served as Chairman of the Hubei Provincial Government, Director of the Hubei Provincial Pacification, Director of Military Law Enforcement of the Military Commission, and Chairman of the Hubei Provincial Senate. In his early years, He Chengjun followed Huang Xing, Sun Yat-sen and others to engage in anti-Qing and anti-Yuan revolutionary activities. Because he was good at communication and was relied on by Sun Yat-sen. In 1917, Sun Yat-sen went to Guangzhou to convene the National Assembly, organized a military government to protect the law, and entrusted He Chengjun with the responsibility of liaising with the provincial armies, and entrusted him to pay attention to the control of the upper and lower reaches of the Yangtze River and Hubei Province, which was in danger of the safety of the world. At that time, the only survivor of the Hubei revolutionary armed forces was the Shi Xingchuan Division stationed in the area of Shashi in Jingzhou. He Chengjun immediately went to Shashi and "made every effort to instigate the banner of independence." In 1920, He Chengjun was stationed in Changsha in the name of Sun Yat-sen's representative, and contacted Tan Yanhong, then the governor of Hunan Province, and was also responsible for liaising with Sichuan and Hubei provinces. In 1922, he was ordered to go to Yunnan to lobby the local powerful Tang Jiyao.
Ho's direct relationship with Chiang Kai-shek began in the Sun Yat-sen era, and the two worked together in Xu Chongzhi's Cantonese army and participated in the aid of Fujian. After Sun Yat-sen's death, Chiang Kai-shek gradually rose to prominence in the competition within the Kuomintang. In 1926, the Northern Expedition was booming, Chiang Kai-shek became the commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army, and He Chengjun was the general counselor of the General Headquarters, and the two became direct superiors and subordinates. During the Northern Expedition, He Chengjun played an important role in Yan Xishan's participation in the Northern Expedition, Zhang Xueliang's change of banner, and Xu Yuanquan's co-optation.
In 1926, the Nationalist Government succeeded in the Northern Expedition, formally unifying China. However, there were constant factional disputes within the country, with pro-Chiang and anti-Chiang as the main contents. In the political arena at this time, especially in the eyes of the anti-Chiang faction, He Chengjun was a staunch supporter of Chiang and a helper of Chiang. In 1929, on the eve of Jiang Feng's Great War, Feng Yuxiang made the following analysis of the political choices of various military and political forces:
Li Renchao was imprisoned for Jiang because of mediating the overall situation, and then he dared to enter Beijing. Jiang Zhi's move is tantamount to suicide. Jiang Lian and Zhang Hanqing thought that they were helping, and they knew that Zhang did not contact others to attack him. Tang Mengxiao, Jiang's fierce rival, strides high, is not small, small is based on two lakes, big is to take the replacement, Gu Jiang wants to use it to help big things, is not equal to a dream. to Zhu Peide, Miao Peinan, etc., Wang's henchmen. Liu Zhi and Gu Zhu are the same, so He Yingqin's old ministry is also. The provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan have nothing to do with Jiang Su. It is the Jiang family's current support, only Chen Guofu, Liu Jiwen, He Chengjun's generation, He Zudao.
Li Renchao refers to Li Jishen, Zhang Hanqing refers to Zhang Xueliang, Tang Mengxiao refers to Tang Shengzhi, and Wang refers to Wang Jingwei. The focus of Feng Yuxiang's argument is that Chiang Kai-shek's strength is limited, the pro-Chiang camp is complex, and there is much to be done to oppose Chiang. In Feng Yuxiang's view, He Chengjun's support for Jiang is even above Liu Zhi and Gu Zhu's equal Huangpu lineage. At that time, Feng Yuxiang was actively opposing Chiang and needed to know himself and his enemy, and although what he said may not be all true, his analysis was at least serious and serious.
In 1933, the "Folk Weekly" described in detail the history of He Chengjun's support for Chiang. The text states:
What kind of person is He Chengjun? It's worth introducing. He was originally a remnant of the Beiyang warlords, a little talented, and good at watching the wind and the situation. After the success of the Northern Expedition, the Beiyang warlords fell, and they surrendered to Lao Jiang and became the unrebellious minister of the Jiang family, and He Yingqin called Jiang's left and right arms. If there is a military incident, Lao Jiang must sit in the rear, and the military in front will be handed over to Erhe to take care of.
He Chengjun joined the League in his early years, followed Huang Xing, Sun Yat-sen and others to engage in revolutionary activities, and was a veteran member of the Kuomintang with a long history. Hu Hanmin, the anti-Chiang spiritual leader after 1932, also affirmed that Ho Chengjun "devoted himself to the revolution for decades, and all of them have a long history in the party". The "People's Weekly" called He Chengjun "the remnant of the Beiyang warlords", which is obviously a satirical position based on the stance, and it is difficult to say that it is objective. However, calling him Chiang Kai-shek's "unrebellious minister" is evidenced by a large number of facts.
According to the evolution of the political situation during the period of the Nationalist Government, He Chengjun's assistance to Chiang and support for Chiang can be roughly divided into two stages.
The first stage, 1928~1931. The Kuomintang established a national regime, and Chiang Kai-shek became the center of power as a military commander. However, its legitimacy was questioned by the opposition within the Kuomintang, and the struggle between anti-Chiang and pro-Chiang became the focus of domestic struggle. Under the circumstance that the Central Army was inferior to Feng Yuxiang and other anti-Chiang forces, He Chengjun's long-sleeved and good dancing skills, saying that he would move the whole world, and liaising with and commanding various miscellaneous armies to support and help Chiang Kai-shek, was an important factor in Chiang Kai-shek's victory in the factional dispute.
In 1929, the powerful faction in the north was dissatisfied with the disarmament of the reorganization led by Chiang Kai-shek, and secretly contacted and conspired against Chiang. He Chengjun was ordered to go north to set up an office of the Nationalist Government in Beiping, set up a northern parallel battalion of the army, navy, and air force, and folded the bottles between the Northwest Army, the Northeast Army, the Jinsui Army, and other miscellaneous units to win their support for Chiang Kai-shek. In March, the Chiang-Gui War broke out. He Chengjun served as the commander of the Ninth Army of the Fifth Route Army of the "Rebel Army", and jointly sent a telegram with the generals of the Fifth Route Army to oppose Gui and support Chiang. On 11 May, Ho Chengjun entertained the press in Beiping to defend Chiang Kai-shek's use of troops against the Gui faction, claiming that the crusade against the Gui faction was "a last resort" and that "even if an army violated the resolution of the reorganization meeting, the central authorities would also impose leniency and never use troops to resolve the matter by political means." "On behalf of the Central Committee, it declares that peace will never be changed in any way, and that all group armies shall not be mobilized on their own unless they are ordered by the Central Committee."
After the end of the Chiang-Gui War, the contradictions between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yuxiang became acute. Chiang Kai-shek, through the Kuomintang Central Committee, dismissed Feng Yuxiang from his party and government posts and launched an anti-Feng propaganda offensive, calling Feng "self-defeating from the revolution," "self-destructing his history," and "notorious for his treachery." He Chengjun responded quickly, first with Tang Shengzhi, Li Pinxian, and other generals of the Fifth Route Army, and sent a joint telegram to "count Feng's ten crimes", and then immediately separately issued a "Letter to the Officers and Soldiers of the Ninth Army of the Fifth Route Army", "Please unanimously crusade". In October 1929, the Chiang-Feng War officially began. Xu Yuanquan Division and Wang Jinyu Division of the Ninth Army of the Fifth Route Army were the main forces to fight Feng. Chiang Kai-shek used He Chengjun to control and command these miscellaneous armies.
At the beginning of 1930, the contradiction between Yan Xishan and Chiang Kai-shek intensified. Yan Xishan actively contacted powerful factions such as the Northwest Military Department and the Gui Department to form an anti-Chiang alliance to jointly fight against Chiang. He Chengjun, then director of the Wuhan camp and chairman of the Hubei Provincial Government, sent a telegram to Yan Xishan, urging him not to "stand out and make a difference, and advance by retreating". In mid-May, the Central Plains War officially broke out. Chiang Kai-shek's troops were assembled in the northern section of the Jinpu Line and the eastern section of the Longhai Line to deal with the main forces of Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang. He Chengjun's Third Army, which included Yang Hucheng's 17th Division, Xiao Zhichu's 44th Division, Wang Jinyu's 47th Division, Xu Yuanquan's 48th Division, Hao Mengling's 54th Division, and Liu Maoen's 66th Division, assembled on the Pinghan Line to prevent Feng Yuxiang's troops from attacking Wuhan southward. Due to the coordination and liaison of He Chengjun, the Third Army Corps held the Pinghan line. Except for the 11th Division, which once joined the right flank of the Pinghan Line, no other troops of Chiang Kai-shek's descendants have been to this battlefield.
On February 28, 1931, Chiang Kai-shek placed Kuomintang veteran Hu Hanmin under house arrest due to the issue of the law, which once again triggered a strong anti-Chiang political wave within the Kuomintang. On 30 April, Deng Zeru, Lin Sen, Gu Yingfen, Xiao Focheng, and others, who were also of Cantonese nationality with Hu Hanmin, sent a telegram to impeach Chiang Kai-shek in the name of the Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee, listing his six major crimes, and opening the prelude to the anti-Chiang side in Guangdong. He Chengjun claimed that "Yu Chiang's commander-in-chief was not good at the beginning, and Yu Deng Gu (i.e., Deng Zeru and Gu Yingfen) was not suspicious." He Chengjun claimed that his position was fair, but in fact he supported Chiang and opposed Guangdong. He Chengjun accused Deng Zeru, Gu Yingfen and others of "telling the truth", "harboring evil intentions", and "losing heart", while Chiang Kai-shek "endured hard work and endured humiliation, fought through the state, was in great difficulty, and cherished the honors", "The whole country is deeply dependent, who can bear to be suspicious and slandered?" On June 2, He Chengjun sent a joint telegram with He Yingqin and Liu Zhi, the generals of the Huangpu lineage, accusing Sun Ke, who had participated in the anti-Chiang government in Guangdong, of being "disloyal, unfilial, disrespectful, and unkind" and urging him to "turn back as soon as possible, put down the butcher's knife, and become a Buddha on the spot." At the end of December, under strong pressure from the Cantonese side, Chiang Kai-shek had to resign and go into the opposition, and Sun Ke set up a "caretaker cabinet". He Chengjun initiated the joint defense meeting of the nine provinces to resist, "At this time, he was not particularly under the command of the government, and he refused to abide by all the resolutions of the First Plenary Session of the Central Committee, and he was only obeyed by Jiang Zhongzheng."
The second stage, 1932~1936. After Chiang Kai-shek was reinstated in 1932, in the face of the increasingly serious national crisis, he took "fighting outside the country must first secure the interior" as the overall response strategy, which was strongly opposed by patriotic democrats in the CCP and the Kuomintang. Whether to support or oppose "to fight outside the country must first secure the interior" has prominently become the focus of domestic struggle. He Chengjun is a supporter and practitioner of this open policy. He served as the director of the appeasement of Hubei Province for a long time, and presided over the "suppression of the Communist Party" in Hubei Province. At the end of 1933, Li Jishen, Chen Mingshu and others launched the Fujian Incident against Chiang's resistance to Japan. He Chengjun was in line with the Nanjing Central Committee and Chiang Kai-shek, and severely reprimanded Li Jishen, Chen Mingshu and others for "calling Fuzhou chaos" and "rebelling against the party-state". Speaking of He Chengjun's performance during the Xi'an Incident, many commentators talk about his refusal to go to Xi'an, and regard it as the change of He Chengjun's intimacy with Chiang Kai-shek. In fact, He Chengjun once called Zhang Xueliang to severely reprimand him, ordering Zhang Xueliang to protect Chiang Kai-shek's safety and send him back to Nanjing, so as not to bring about his own destruction, and he still held a consistent stance of supporting Chiang. Refusing to go to Xi'an to take risks is not contradictory to supporting Chiang. Observing words and deeds, helping and supporting Chiang is He Chengjun's most important political choice. However, behind this public choice, is there any other option for Ho?