(The content of this article is based on authoritative sources, and there are literature citation sources at the end of the article)
In the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, Xu Shiyou led the Eastern Front Corps directly into the hinterland of Vietnam, like a sharp blade, causing the Vietnamese army to retreat one after another.
As a generation of famous generals, Xu Shiyou twice submitted combat plans to the Central Military Commission to annihilate Vietnam in one fell swoop. Based on a strategic height, the Central Military Commission terminated Xu Shiyou's plan to kill and instead adopted a more conservative combat method.
After months of fierce fighting, the Chinese army finally achieved its strategic goal, forcing Vietnam to abandon its persecution of the Chinese and safeguard its national interests.
Clever plan to destroy the enemy
In the face of the Vietnamese government's brutal persecution of the Chinese and its wanton aggression against Chinese territory, China had no choice but to fight back and defend its national interests and the rights and interests of the Chinese by force.
In this war, Xu Shiyou played an important role.
As a battle-hardened veteran, he submitted battle plans to the Central Military Commission twice before the war, attempting to annihilate the Vietnamese army in one fell swoop.
The battle plan submitted by Xu Shiyou for the first time was to use the roundabout outflanking tactics that our army is good at.
He suggested that the Kunming Military Region should set up a corps on the Western Front to enter Laos and tear a hole in central Vietnam.
At the same time, the Eastern Front Corps, which he personally commanded, joined forces with the Western Front Corps in northern Vietnam and Hanoi, forming a flank attack.
According to the preliminary assessment of the Central Military Commission, once this plan is put into practice, it will be enough to directly achieve the goal of completely annihilating 300,000 people in 16 divisions of Vietnam's two major military regions.
Back then, he relied on similar tactics to show his skills in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and won numerous results.
Times have changed, and Vietnam is not the Kuomintang or the Korean People's Army of the past, and the Central Military Commission cannot completely defeat it.
Although relations between China and Vietnam deteriorated, they were inextricably linked in history, and China at that time had not fully recovered and could not afford the ripple effects of Vietnam's national failure.
Therefore, the Central Military Commission rejected Xu Shiyou's battle plan.
Seeing that the first plan was rejected by the Central Military Commission, Xu Shiyou did not give up. Once he starts, he is confident that he can excel on the battlefield and create a brilliant record.
As soon as the war began, he continued to actively advise the Central Military Commission, hoping to persuade his superiors to finally adopt his plan.
After our army won a major victory in a phased manner, Xu Shiyou once again found an opportunity and submitted a second operational plan to the Central Military Commission.
Rational 抉择
Xu Shiyou's second battle plan was to hope that our army would postpone its retreat and reroute its march to Cambodia.
He believes that Vietnam's last elite main force is all stationed in Cambodia at this time, and if it can be smashed in one fell swoop, Vietnam will be unable to pose a threat to China for a long time, let alone wantonly cause trouble in Southeast Asia.
At that time, our army had already gained the upper hand in many battlefields, and Xu Shiyou had reason to believe that as long as our army was in action step by step, it would eventually destroy Vietnam's military strength.
However, the Central Military Commission is also soberly aware that even if the Vietnamese army is in a passive position, the price to be paid for continuing to expand the war will be heavy.
Due to the limited national strength at that time, it was very difficult for our army to supply logistics. Even if victory can be achieved in Cambodia, the road to withdrawal is destined to be a long way off.
Once attacked and harassed by Vietnamese guerrillas, our army may fall into a more passive situation.
If Cambodia is rashly attacked, it will inevitably arouse strong dissatisfaction and opposition from the international community, thus casting a shadow over China's international image.
More importantly, the Central Military Commission believes that the fundamental purpose of the self-defense counterattack war against Vietnam has been achieved.
The purpose of this troop dispatch is nothing more than to punish the Vietnamese government's arrogance and warn it not to wantonly provoke in Southeast Asia. Vietnam has already been hit hard in this war, and our army does not need to pay more.
In contrast, it is wiser to maintain peace and curb the spread of war.
Based on the above considerations, the Central Military Commission finally rejected Xu Shiyou's second operational plan.
As the supreme military leadership body, the Central Military Commission needs to coordinate the overall situation from a strategic perspective, and should not be confined to the immediate gains or losses.
Rather than completely crushing Vietnam, it may be more reasonable to maintain a local advantage and avoid falling into a quagmire.
Defeat the enemy
Although Xu Shiyou's plan was vetoed by the Central Military Commission, this did not affect the performance of our army in actual operations. Under the personal command of Xu Shiyou, the Eastern Front Corps was like a sharp saber that plunged straight into the hinterland of Vietnam.
On March 5, the 126th Division of the 42nd Army of the Eastern Front took Xialang, and the Independent Division of the Guangxi Military Region captured Gaobaling. These were Vietnamese border fortresses, the fall of which meant that our troops had broken through the Vietnamese army's defensive line and approached Hanoi.
In the face of the menacing Chinese army, Vietnam was obviously defenseless. After several rounds of hard encounters, the garrison around Hanoi was finally unable to stop the unstoppable advance of our army.
On 10 March, the Eastern Front finally captured the city of Hanoi, and the Vietnamese army had to withdraw from the capital and move to other areas.
Faced with the loss of Hanoi, the top of the Vietnamese government fell into a deep panic.
At that time, their only option was to urgently move the capital and try to avoid the advance of our army. The results were soon discovered by our troops, and on March 12 the troops of the Eastern Front began to advance into the interior, exerting continuous pressure.
Seeing that the situation was becoming more and more critical, the Vietnamese military could only continue to retreat.
On 13 March, troops from the Western Front joined the battle group and launched an offensive from Yunnan near Laos. Under the two-front attack, the Vietnamese army was on the verge of collapse and was unable to organize effective resistance.
Eventually, under intense military pressure, Hanoi was forced to announce the relocation of its capital, and the last government personnel were hastily evacuated on March 16.
From the outset, we did not want to crush Vietnam completely, but only to teach it a stern lesson about its wrongdoing. Now, this goal has been successfully achieved.
Therefore, on March 16, the last batch of Chinese military vehicles also drove out of Vietnam and returned to the embrace of the motherland.
Although there are still some small-scale encounters taking place, on the whole, the war of self-defense and counterattack against Vietnam has ended.
During the war, the performance of our army can be described as outstanding. Despite the casualties, in general, the cost was far less than the gain.
In addition to conquering Hanoi and other important towns, our army also made efforts to recover a large amount of munitions and materials that had previously been provided to Vietnam.
Countless officers and men were heartbroken on the battlefield to find that the arms and ammunition provided by China when it was selflessly helping each other were abandoned on the positions by the Vietnamese army at will.
Lessons learned
Although the self-defense and counterattack war against Vietnam achieved a strategic victory, many problems and deficiencies of the Chinese armed forces were also exposed in the course of actual operations.
It is precisely this war that has become an important opportunity to promote the modernization and reform of our army.
At that time, the main equipment of our army, such as the Type 56 semi-automatic rifle and the Type 59 and Type 62 tanks, also exposed obvious deficiencies on the battlefield.
The Type 56 semi-automatic rifle is difficult to maintain stable shooting in a humid environment, and its fire cover capability is insufficient; Tank armament suffered heavy losses in mobile combat. This prompted our army to speed up the pace of research and development of new equipment, and the Type 81 automatic rifle and subsequent new tanks and weapon systems came out.
Third, at the level of tactical theory, our army was not well prepared for modern joint operations at that time. There is a lack of scientific guidance in the coordinated operation of infantry and tanks, and the use of personnel carriers is inefficient.
Our army has begun to strengthen the study of modern military theories and has explored a complete set of new tactical systems suited to the modern battlefield.
In this war, the Chinese army also realized the shortcomings of the current military rank system. The temporary appointment of the command relationship was chaotic, which affected the effectiveness of the operation.
If Xu Shiyou's suggestion had been adopted at that time and the Vietnamese army had been completely wiped out in one fell swoop, Vietnam would have suffered a devastating blow, and it would probably have taken decades to regain its spirits.
Under such circumstances, it will be a long process for Sino-Vietnamese relations to return to normal.
However, due to the wise decision of the Central Military Commission, although Vietnam was taught a heavy lesson, it was not completely defeated.
Although Vietnam's national strength has been hit hard, there will still be room for future development. This has created the necessary conditions for the process of normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations after 30 years.
In 1986, the new leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam came to power, re-examined its China policy, and gradually eased relations between the two sides
In 1991, Vietnam's supreme leader personally visited China, officially ending the 31-year standoff.
Since then, economic and trade exchanges between the two countries have been rapidly resumed, and diplomacy has become more active.
Resources:
[1] Huang Xingqiu. 70 Years of Sino-Vietnamese Relations:Base Axis and Direction[J].Nanyang Studies,2020(01):31-40.DOI:10.14073/j.cnki.nywtyj.2020.01.003.
[2] Tang Guochen. The construction and enlightenment of the ruling party of the Communist Party of Vietnam since the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations[D].Shanghai Foreign Chinese University,2021.DOI:10.27316/d.cnki.gswyu.2020.000849.