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今天小編為您帶來博士論文《考慮消費者資訊和公平關切的定價及管道選擇研究》2.3 管道選擇研究。
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Today, the editor brings the "Channel selection research of the doctoral dissertation 《Research on pricing and channel selection that considers consumer information and fairness concerns》”.
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内容摘要：Abstract
本期推文将從思維導圖、精讀内容、知識補充三個方面介紹博士論文《考慮消費者資訊和公平關切 的定價及管道選擇研究》2.3 管道選擇研究。
This issue's tweet will introduce the doctoral dissertation 《Research on pricing and channel selection that considers consumer information and fairness concerns》 from three perspectives: mind mapping, detailed content analysis, and supplementary knowledge, focusing on channel selection research.
思維導圖：Mind mapping
精讀内容：Intensive reading content
本小節介紹了管道選擇的文獻綜述。首先介紹了關于不同的管道結構分析其對供應鍊定價和利潤的影響的研究，又介紹了本文與其他研究的不同，本文管道結構相關的研究更多關注于上遊供應商入侵這經典一問題。
This section presents a literature review on channel selection. It first introduces studies that analyze different channel structures and their impacts on supply chain pricing and profits. It then highlights the differences between this paper and other studies, noting that this paper's research on channel structure focuses more on the classic issue of upstream supplier encroachment.
然後作者介紹了關于供應商入侵的文獻綜述。供應商入侵的文獻已有諸多成熟研究，很多學者認為上遊供應商入侵會加劇市場競争進而損害零售商的利潤。然而，也有學者論證供應商的進入行為在一些情況下會讓管道成員有利可圖，這類研究解釋了供應商入侵對管道選擇存在更多可能性的影響。并介紹了以前研究的不足之處，上述綜述的供應商入侵文獻，均沒有考慮入侵政策對基于消費者行為資訊的定價的作用。最後介紹了本文關于供應商入侵的研究，本文第四章和第五章則重點讨論供應商入侵政策同BBP的戰略關聯，分析入侵在不同的情形中決策的變化和利潤的影響。第四章先探究供應商進入與否對多種BBP實施政策的影響，以及最終供應鍊均衡的情況。
Then, the author presents a literature review on supplier encroachment. There is already a wealth of mature research on supplier encroachment, with many scholars believing that upstream supplier encroachment intensifies market competition and thus harms retailers' profits. However, some scholars argue that supplier entry can be profitable for channel members in certain situations. This type of research explains the broader potential impact of supplier encroachment on channel selection. Additionally, the author points out the shortcomings of previous studies, noting that the aforementioned literature on supplier encroachment does not consider the impact of encroachment strategies on pricing based on consumer behavior information. Finally, the paper's research on supplier encroachment is introduced. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the strategic association between supplier encroachment strategies and BBP (Behavior-Based Pricing), analyzing the changes in decisions and profit impacts under different scenarios. Chapter 4 first explores the impact of supplier entry or non-entry on various BBP implementation strategies and the resulting supply chain equilibrium.
最後作者介紹了本文關于供應商入侵的研究貢獻：（1）第四章研究基于消費者行為資訊的價格歧視，且通過模型刻畫出通過消費者前期消費行為獲得資訊的動态過程；（2）本章考慮了多種形式的價格歧視，零售商能實施BBP，供應商入侵前提下在直銷管道能實施BBP，再擴充到供應商也能在傳統分銷管道對零售商實施批發價歧視；（3）本章發現在能夠實施批發價歧視的情況下，存在BBP能夠刺激供應商入侵的均衡區域，這指出價格歧視同入侵政策有多種作用的可能性。而第五章思考了消費者認知偏好的作用，論證入侵與BBP更深層面的交叉應用，即将消費者對公平偏好這一實際而現實的認知問題納入政策變動因素進行考量。該章節進一步拓寬供應商入侵方面文獻，并發現公平關切對管道成員的定價和供應商入侵都有不可忽視的影響。
Finally, the author outlines the contributions of this paper's research on supplier encroachment: (1) Chapter 4 investigates price discrimination based on consumer behavior information, modeling the dynamic process of acquiring information from consumers' previous consumption behavior. (2) This chapter considers various forms of price discrimination, where retailers can implement BBP (Behavior-Based Pricing). In the context of supplier encroachment, suppliers can implement BBP in direct sales channels, and the study extends to suppliers being able to implement wholesale price discrimination against retailers in traditional distribution channels. (3) This chapter finds that when wholesale price discrimination can be implemented, there exists an equilibrium region where BBP can stimulate supplier encroachment, highlighting the multiple potential impacts of price discrimination on encroachment strategies.Chapter 5 considers the role of consumer cognitive preferences, demonstrating the deeper intersection of encroachment and BBP by incorporating consumers' perceptions of fairness into the strategy considerations. This chapter further broadens the literature on supplier encroachment, revealing that fairness concerns significantly impact both the pricing of channel members and supplier encroachment.
知識補充：Knowledge supplement
1、管道沖突 Channel conflict
管道沖突是組成營銷管道的各組織間敵對或者不和諧的狀态。當一個管道成員的行為與其管道合作者的期望相反時，便會産生管道沖突。有水準沖突、垂直沖突和多管道沖突三種類型。其原因主要在于管道成員間不相容的目标，對現實的不同了解，以及各自的領域沖突等。
Channel conflict is the state of hostility or disharmony among the organizations that make up a marketing channel. Channel conflict arises when the actions of one channel member are contrary to the expectations of their channel partners. There are three types of channel conflict: horizontal conflict, vertical conflict, and multi-channel conflict. The main causes of channel conflict are incompatible goals among channel members, different perceptions of reality, and conflicts within their respective domains.
水準管道沖突指的是同一管道模式中，同一層次中間商之間的沖突。産生水準沖突的原因大多是生産企業沒有對目标市場的中間商數量分管區域作出合理的規劃，使中間商為各自的利益互相傾軋。這是因為在生産企業開拓了一定的目标市場後，中間商為了擷取更多的利益必然要争取更多的市場佔有率，在目标市場上展開"圈地運動"。
Horizontal channel conflict refers to conflicts between intermediaries at the same level within the same channel structure. The primary cause of horizontal conflict is the production enterprise's failure to reasonably plan the allocation of intermediary numbers and regions within the target market, leading intermediaries to undercut each other for their own benefit. This happens because, after the production enterprise has developed a certain target market, intermediaries inevitably compete for more market share to gain more profits, engaging in a "land grab" within the target market.
垂直管道沖突指在同一管道中不同層次企業之間的沖突，這種沖突較之水準管道沖突要更常見。垂直管道沖突也稱作管道上下遊沖突。一方面，越來越多的分銷商從自身利益出發，采取直銷與分銷相結合的方式銷售商品，這就不可避免要同下遊經銷商争奪客戶，大大挫傷了下遊管道的積極性；另一方面，當下遊經銷商的實力增強以後，不甘心目前所處的地位，希望在管道系統中有更大的權利，向上遊管道發起了挑戰。在某些情況下，生産企業為了推廣自己的産品，越過一級經銷商直接向二級經銷商供貨，使上下遊管道間産生沖突。是以，生産企業必須從全局着手，妥善解決垂直管道沖突，促進管道成員間更好地合作。
Vertical channel conflict refers to conflicts between enterprises at different levels within the same channel. This type of conflict is more common than horizontal channel conflict and is also known as upstream-downstream channel conflict. On one hand, an increasing number of distributors, acting in their own self-interest, adopt a combination of direct sales and distribution to sell products, inevitably competing with downstream distributors for customers, which significantly discourages the downstream channel's enthusiasm. On the other hand, as the strength of downstream distributors grows, they become dissatisfied with their current position and seek greater power within the channel system, challenging upstream channels. In some cases, production enterprises, in order to promote their products, bypass first-level distributors and supply directly to second-level distributors, creating conflicts between upstream and downstream channels. Therefore, production enterprises must address vertical channel conflict from a holistic perspective to promote better cooperation among channel members.
管道間沖突随着顧客細分市場和可利用的管道不斷增加，越來越多的企業采用多管道營銷系統即運用管道組合、整合。不同管道間的沖突指的是生産企業建立多管道營銷系統後，不同管道服務于同一目标市場時所産生的沖突。
Inter-channel conflict arises as customer segmentation and available channels increase, with more and more enterprises adopting multi-channel marketing systems that utilize channel combinations and integrations. Conflicts between different channels occur when a production enterprise establishes a multi-channel marketing system and different channels serve the same target market.
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參考文獻：[1] 江豫. 考慮消費者資訊和公平關切的定價及管道選擇研究 [D]. 合肥: 中國科學技術大學, 2023.
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稽核|Wang