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Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?

Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?

Xinzhixun

2024-06-19 21:52Posted on the official account of Guangdong Xinzhixun

Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?

Last month's news of "TSMC Nanjing Factory Received 'Indefinite' Exemption" was recently taken out by a big V to stir up, and even alarmistly said that "TSMC Nanjing Factory is becoming a stinger that penetrates into China's chip industry", and the 100,000+ "Xiongwen" has also won a kind of popularity among the people who eat melons. As a media professional who has been working in the semiconductor industry media field for more than 10 years, I think it is better to stand up and say a few words about this erroneous view based on wrong facts.

Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?

1. TSMC's Nanjing plant has been granted an "indefinite exemption" and can expand production in the mainland?

First of all, there is a serious factual error in the first paragraph of this "eloquent article" of the big V.

The big V said, "TSMC Nanjing plant has obtained an indefinite exemption from the US Department of Commerce, which means that while the United States subsidizes TSMC, it no longer restricts TSMC from developing the chip industry in Chinese mainland, and TSMC can let go of expanding production in Chinese mainland, and does not need to apply for a license from the US Department of Commerce." ”

The actual situation is that TSMC has received subsidies from the United States for building factories in the United States, and it cannot continue to expand production in Chinese mainland. (TSMC's $65 billion investment in the U.S. has already received $6.6 billion in subsidies promised by the United States.) Similarly, TSMC's Nanjing plant was granted an "indefinite exemption" that does not include new expansions.

1. Restrictions on the guardrail rules of the "CHIPS Act" in the United States

In September 2023, the U.S. announced the "guardrail" rules of the CHIPS and Science Act as follows:

a. Prohibit recipients of CHIPS Act incentive funds from using the funds to build, modify, or improve semiconductor facilities outside the United States.

b. Restrict recipients of CHIPS Act incentive funds from investing in most semiconductor manufacturing in foreign countries of concern (including Chinese mainland) within 10 years from the date of the award.

The regulation prohibits substantial expansion of semiconductor manufacturing capabilities at cutting-edge and advanced facilities in the relevant country for a period of 10 years from the date of grant. The final rule ties the expansion of semiconductor manufacturing capacity to the addition of cleanrooms or other physical spaces, and defines material expansion as increasing a facility's production capacity by more than 5%. The threshold is designed to capture modest deals that expand manufacturing capacity, but allow fund recipients to maintain their existing facilities through normal business process equipment upgrades and efficiency improvements.

At the same time, the rule also restricts the expansion and new construction of mature processes in foreign countries of concern. Recipients are prohibited from adding new cleanroom space or production lines, resulting in a more than 10% expansion of the facility's production capacity.

c. Restrict recipients of CHIPS Act incentive funds from engaging in certain joint research or technology licensing efforts with foreign entities related to technologies or products that raise national security concerns.

If these guardrails are violated, the U.S. Department of Commerce can recover the full amount of federal financial assistance.

Obviously, if TSMC, which has received subsidies from the United States, continues to expand production in Chinese mainland in the next 10 years, even if the new capacity expansion mature process can only be controlled within 10%. However, capacity growth through optimization and upgrading of existing production lines should not be within this limitation.

2. TSMC's Nanjing plant has been granted an "indefinite exemption" which does not mean that it can expand production

As early as October 7, 2022, the United States introduced a new semiconductor export control policy to China, restricting the ability of wafer manufacturers located in Chinese mainland to obtain advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment in the United States (advanced logic processes below 16/14nm, DRAM at 18nm and below, and 3D NAND manufacturing equipment at 128 layers and above) unless licensed by the U.S. Department of Commerce. This includes foreign investors such as Samsung and SK hynix, as well as wafer fabs in Chinese mainland such as TSMC. In the same month, all three vendors were granted a one-year waiver for their mainland fabs, which means that they can obtain the restricted supply of U.S. semiconductor equipment without any additional procedures for one year, which also makes the production of their factories in Chinese mainland will not be affected by the ban for the time being.

On May 23, 2024, TSMC announced that the U.S. Department of Commerce has recently issued a "certified end user" authorization to TSMC (Nanjing) Co., Ltd., replacing the temporary written authorization issued by the previous Ministry of Commerce since October 2022, confirming that the goods and services involved in the U.S. export control regulations can be continuously provided to TSMC Nanjing plant for a long time, and suppliers do not need to obtain individual licenses to supply, and the Nanjing plant is expected to maintain the status quo.

According to Taiwan media reports, TSMC made it clear that this VEU authorization has not added new permissions, so it can only maintain the status quo of TSMC's Nanjing plant.

Xinzhixun also learned through TSMC insiders that although the license does not clearly state that it cannot be used for expansion, it sets a lot of restrictions for expansion, which is almost equivalent to that if TSMC's Nanjing factory wants to continue to expand production, it is impossible to import restricted American semiconductor equipment with this license.

So the conclusion of a certain big V was based on a completely wrong information from the beginning.

Second, the comprehensive dumping of Nanjing TSMC's mature process suppresses the growth of the mainland's mature process?

Let's take a look at the second paragraph of the big V: "The chip strategy of the United States is becoming clearer, that is, the advanced process is comprehensively suppressed, and the mainland is not allowed to OEM, and the mainland is not allowed to obtain advanced equipment." The comprehensive dumping of mature processes suppressed the growth of mature processes in the mainland. TSMC has played an important role in this, and TSMC's Nanjing factory is a stinger that has penetrated into the mainland chip industry. ”

There are still some implementation errors.

First of all, the United States has indeed comprehensively restricted China's development of advanced manufacturing processes, but it is inaccurate for the big V to say that advanced manufacturing processes are "not allowed to be manufactured for the mainland".

At present, in addition to being on the Entity List and being restricted by the "Foreign Direct Products Rule" (FDP Rules) (i.e., overseas companies cannot use products containing U.S. technology to serve Chinese enterprises), domestic enterprises are indeed unable to obtain foreign foundry advanced process foundry services. However, other Chinese chip design companies can still place orders for TSMC and Samsung to obtain their advanced process foundry services. For example, the latest chips of many domestic chip manufacturers are based on TSMC N6/N7 and even N4 process foundry.

Secondly, TSMC's Nanjing factory was originally an advanced process wafer factory, which mass-produced the 16nm process in October 2018 and subsequently upgraded to the 12nm process. At the beginning of the construction of the plant, the Nanjing plant originally planned the second phase of the expansion project, and the original plan was to start the second phase of the project after the first phase of 16/12nm was fully produced, and planned to introduce the 7nm advanced process. However, due to the resistance of Taiwan and the United States, coupled with the shortage of mature processes that broke out in 2021, TSMC shifted the second phase of the Nanjing plant to expand production at 28nm.

In 2021, TSMC officially announced that it will expand the production capacity of 20,000 pieces of 28nm process on the basis of the original 20,000 pieces of 16nm/12nm advanced process capacity of the Nanjing plant. Mass production of the expansion project began in the second half of 2022 and full production will be achieved in 2023.

In contrast, since 2021, SMIC, Huahong, and Crystal Integration, major wafer foundries in Chinese mainland, have been actively expanding mature processes.

According to the financial report for the first quarter of 2024, SMIC's monthly production capacity in the first quarter has reached 814,500 pieces of 8-inch wafers equivalent, an increase of about 51% compared with 540,000 pieces of 8-inch wafers equivalent in the first quarter of 2021. Hua Hong Semiconductor's monthly production capacity in the first quarter was about 391,000 pieces of 8-inch wafer equivalent, an increase of about 94.5% compared with the monthly production capacity of 201,000 pieces of 8-inch wafers equivalent at the beginning of 2021. The current monthly production capacity of Crystal Integration has also reached 115,000 pieces of 12-inch wafers, that is, about 200,000 pieces of 8-inch wafers. At present, the production capacity of SMIC, Hua Hong Semiconductor, and Crystal Integration is still expanding.

Obviously, the 20,000-piece 12-inch mature process capacity of TSMC's Nanjing factory is very small compared with the mature process capacity of domestic local manufacturers. Even if you look at the 28nm production capacity alone, SMIC currently has Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Tianjin to carry out its new 12-inch wafer fab projects are focused on the 28nm process, which may add up to more than 180,000 pieces of 12-inch wafer production capacity, and the 20,000 pieces of 28nm production capacity of TSMC's Nanjing factory is nothing compared to it.

As for the price, according to Xinzhixun, the foundry price of TSMC's Nanjing factory's 28nm process (which has been developed to the fifth generation optimized version) is 15-20% higher than that of the local wafer foundry. Has anyone ever seen a high price dump? How can this "suppress the growth of mature processes in the mainland"? Could it be that the definition of dumping by Big V has gone beyond our ordinary people's cognition? Or are economists misdefining dumping?

From the perspective of TSMC's 28nm and mature process revenue proportion, in the first quarter of 2024, TSMC's 28nm revenue accounted for only 8%, and the mature process of 28nm and above accounted for only 26%. Compared with TSMC's revenue in the first quarter of 2021, the proportion of revenue has declined sharply, when the proportion of 28nm process was 11%, and the total proportion of mature process capacity of 28nm and above was 37%. It can be said that mature processes have long been the focus of TSMC's revenue expansion.

Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?
Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?

Moreover, judging from the development of mature domestic processes in recent years, not only has it not been suppressed by TSMC Nanjing Plant, but it is accelerating its growth!

According to market research firm TrendForce, in the global foundry mature process (28nm and above) market in 2023, the production capacity of Chinese mainland manufacturers has reached 29%, and it is expected to increase to 33% in 2027.

SMIC, a leading domestic wafer foundry manufacturer, also reported that its revenue increased by 19.7% year-on-year and 4.3% quarter-on-quarter to US$1.75 billion, setting the second highest record for the same period in history. According to the latest research report released by Counterpoint Research, SMIC surpassed UMC and GF with a 6% share (up 1 percentage point year-on-year and month-on-month), entering the top three in the global wafer foundry market for the first time.

Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?

Obviously, from the above introduction, it is not difficult to see that the argument of a certain big V is completely based on the "wrong facts" to draw the wrong conclusion.

Otherwise, how can it be that since TSMC's Nanjing factory expanded its production capacity to 28nm, China's mature process development has not only not been suppressed, but while the expansion of production capacity has accelerated, SMIC has even become the world's third largest wafer foundry? TSMC's Nanjing factory has not played the role of "suppressing domestic mature processes" and "stingers" as mentioned by a big V? Who's going to explain!

In other words, in the view of big V, the introduction of Tesla to Shanghai to build a factory in China is not also to suppress the development of the domestic new energy vehicle industry? What? At the beginning, the domestic new energy industry chain was not perfect, and the introduction was beneficial! Now that the domestic new energy industry is mature, the competition is becoming more and more fierce, Tesla's second phase of the energy storage project in China has been built, and it is also planned to build the third phase of the vehicle factory project.

Third, the lack of core or surplus, the cyclical nature of the industry is determined

A big V also said in his "Xiongwen" that he proposed in 2021 that "there will be no long-term shortage of chips at all, and the chip shortage at that time will soon ease, and there will be no shortage of chips in the world in 2023, or even a surplus." ”

However, the big V did not mention it at all in the article against TSMC's expansion in 2021, or rather, this view was put forward after following the dynamic development of the market in the later stage, and it was not a judgment based on industry analysis. Therefore, the semiconductor market itself is a cyclical market, which is determined by the global economic development cycle and the construction cycle of semiconductor production capacity.

In 2021, due to the surge in demand for work/study from home and online meetings caused by the epidemic, coupled with the impact of many factors such as supply chain disruption and supply-demand mismatch (mainly in the automotive market), there was a shortage of mature process capacity around the world. This also promotes a round of wafer factory expansion, and wafer factories generally take at least 2-3 years from construction to mass production, which also determines that it will take 2-3 years from the shortage of chips to alleviate or even surplus, but when this round of wafer factory expansion cycle ends, the market may quickly turn from excess to supply and demand balance, or even return to shortage.

Judging from the financial report for the first quarter of 2024, with the gradual recovery of market demand since the fourth quarter of last year, SMIC's capacity utilization rate in the first quarter of this year has increased to 80.8%, an increase of 4 percentage points from the previous quarter. Hua Hong Semiconductor's overall capacity utilization rate this year has risen to 91.7%, an increase of 7.6 percentage points from the previous quarter.

In the second quarter, as the market demand further rebounded, SMIC said in the latest response to the interactive platform, "The 28nm built production capacity has been at full load, not only producing standard logic circuits, but also making high-voltage drives, ISPs, civil and industrial MCUs, special storage NAND Flash, etc., and the 28nm production capacity is far from meeting the requirements." ”

Morgan Stanley also recently released a report saying that Hua Hong Semiconductor, one of the leading domestic wafer foundries, has also exceeded 100% utilization rate, and it is expected that wafer prices may be raised by 10% in the second half of this year.

Similarly, another major domestic wafer foundry factory, Jinghe Integration, said in response to investors' questions on the interactive platform: The current production capacity of Jinghe Integration is about 115,000 pieces/month, and the production capacity has been at full load since March 2024, and the current load of the company's production line is about 110%, and orders have exceeded the company's production capacity. The company has raised the OEM price of some products according to the market situation, and the company will adjust the OEM price accordingly in combination with the market situation and capacity utilization.

I would like to ask a big V, SMIC's current "28nm production capacity is far from meeting the requirements", Hua Hong Semiconductor's capacity utilization rate has also exceeded 100%, and the statement that "the current load of the company's production line is about 110%, and the order has exceeded the company's production capacity" slaps your face?

I seemed to hear the big V saying, "Impossible, absolutely impossible!" There must be a surplus! ”

Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?

What? You just said that "there will be no shortage of chips in the world in 2023, and there will even be a surplus", but you didn't say that there will be a surplus in 2024?

Then I would like to ask, where does the capacity of the fab come from? Is it planted in the ground today and grown tomorrow? If we don't start a large-scale expansion in 2021, how will we respond to the current demand?

Although there will be a surplus in 2023, this is mainly due to the global economic downturn to suppress consumer demand, and the intensive opening of wafer expansion capacity in the past. However, the current situation is that since the wave of expansion in 2021, SMIC and Hua Hong Semiconductor, which have continued to expand production (production capacity has increased by 51% and 94.5% respectively compared to the beginning of 2021), is now in short supply! If we hadn't expanded production at that time, how big would the gap be now? Has a certain big V thought about it?

4. TSMC's mature process resources in Taiwan, China have been exhausted?

The big V also mentioned in his article that because the chip manufacturing industry needs to consume a lot of water and electricity, and will produce a certain amount of pollution, as well as low-end engineers who need to see the machine, the resources of Taiwan's mature process in Taiwan have been exhausted, so the Nanjing factory is using the mainland's resources and market to suppress the mainland wafer foundry and dump at low prices.

The logic here is a bit confusing, could it be that a fab with a mature process will consume more water and electricity and pollute more than a fab with an advanced process? Anyone with a bit of common sense knows that advanced processes are more difficult and complex than mature processes, requiring more water and electricity, and using more chemicals to manufacture.

Although Taiwan, China has frequently experienced water and electricity shortages in summer in recent years, TSMC has not stopped building factories on the island.

TSMC revealed at the "2024 Technology Forum Taiwan Station" event that benefiting from the demand for HPC, AI and smartphones, TSMC's 3nm production capacity will increase by more than 3 times this year compared with last year. At the same time, TSMC has seven factories under construction this year, of which 3 are advanced process wafer factories and 2 are packaging factories, all of which are located on the island of Taiwan, China.

Specifically, in terms of wafer foundry, in Taiwan, China, the newly built Hsinchu Fab 20 and Kaohsiung Fab 22 are both TSMC's 2nm wafer fabs, which are progressing smoothly and have begun to be installed and are expected to be mass-produced in 2025; In terms of packaging plants, TSMC Radio's AP5 factory is responsible for mass production of CoWoS and is preparing for mass production this year; The Chiayi AP7 factory will be built this year and mass produced in 2026, and will be responsible for mass production of SoICs and CoWoS.

Obviously, in the face of the three-fold increase in 3nm production capacity this year, as well as the water and electricity demand brought about by the addition of two advanced process fabs and three advanced packaging fabs, TSMC should have been evaluated, and if the local area cannot meet the resources it needs, it will not build locally. So since these factories with greater water and electricity consumption can support them, how can it be that the construction of mature process fabs with less water and electricity resources will not have resources? You must know that TSMC had planned to build a new 28nm wafer factory in Kaohsiung, but it was canceled because it chose to build a mature process factory in Kumamoto, Japan.

5. Comparison of subsidies for TSMC's overseas and mainland factories

In recent years, as countries have paid more attention to the semiconductor manufacturing industry, they are spending money to attract semiconductor manufacturers to build wafer factories locally, such as the United States has nearly $53 billion in the "CHIPS and Science Act", and the European Union has 43 billion euros in the "European Chips Act". In this context, as a leading manufacturer in the global wafer foundry industry, it has naturally become the focus of governments around the world.

TSMC has announced plans to invest $65 billion and build three cutting-edge process fabs in Arizona. Among them, the first wafer fab has begun to be installed, and it is expected to mass produce 4nm next year; The second wafer fab, which started construction at the end of 2022, is expected to mass produce 3nm in 2028; The third fab is still being planned, which is expected to be a 2nm process and enter mass production by 2030. The U.S. government will provide $6.6 billion in subsidies.

Although TSMC previously expanded its 28nm production capacity on the basis of the existing 12/16nm in the Nanjing factory, which may be slightly backward compared with the current cutting-edge process, Japan and Germany still provide generous subsidies for TSMC to set up factories in the local area, even for 12/16nm and 28nm processes.

For example, in Kumamoto, Japan, TSMC plans to build two wafer fabs, and the first wafer fab in Kumamoto will start construction in April 2022, and it is expected to mass produce 22/28nm and 12/16nm processes in the fourth quarter of this year; The Kumamoto Plant 2 has not yet started construction, and the 6/7nm process is expected to be mass-produced in 2027.

According to Japanese media reports, the Japanese government has provided subsidies of up to 476 billion yen (about 21.9 billion yuan) to TSMC's first wafer factory in Kumamoto. For the second fab with more advanced technology, a subsidy of 730 billion yen (about 33.57 billion yuan) will be provided.

In Dresden, Germany, TSMC plans to invest 10 billion euros with partners to build a 16nm wafer fab, which is expected to start construction in the fourth quarter of this year and mass production in 2027, mainly to meet the needs of European customers. To this end, Germany plans to provide TSMC with a subsidy of 5 billion euros.

In contrast, the introduction of TSMC Nanjing plant in Chinese mainland does not provide subsidies on the same scale as Japan and Germany, and the subsidies for TSMC's Nanjing plant expansion 28nm project do not seem to be high.

According to TSMC's financial report data, in 2023, TSMC's Japanese subsidiary JASM and China's Nanjing subsidiary will receive subsidies from the governments of Japan and Chinese mainland totaling about NT$47.545 billion (about RMB 10.65 billion), a significant increase of 5.7 times compared with the subsidies obtained in 2022 of about NT$7.051 billion (about RMB 1.58 billion).

Although TSMC did not say how much subsidies for Japan and Chinese mainland respectively, previous data showed that the Japanese government decided to subsidize TSMC Kumamoto Plant 1 up to 476 billion yen (about 22.95 billion yuan, which will be subsidized in stages), which should also be the main reason for TSMC's surge in government subsidies in 2023. In this way, among the 1.58 billion yuan of subsidies obtained by TSMC in 2022, it is possible that the subsidies for the 28nm expansion project of TSMC's Nanjing plant account for the main part. It should also be pointed out that this subsidy includes the purchase cost of real estate, plant and equipment, as well as part of the cost and expense of building the plant and production and operation, and is not entirely a direct capital subsidy. Even so, it is far from the amount of subsidies of more than 10 billion yuan provided by Japan and Germany.

Sixth, who is handing the knife to Lao Mei? Who is the "stinger" of China's chip industry?

As mentioned earlier, major countries and regions around the world, including the United States, China, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, etc., are actively developing the semiconductor manufacturing industry, and even India, Malaysia, and Vietnam have introduced relevant incentive policies.

At the same time, the United States has also continued to introduce various restrictive policies to restrict the development of semiconductor manufacturing in Chinese mainland, even Taiwanese/foreign-funded enterprises such as TSMC, Samsung, SK hynix and other Taiwanese/foreign-funded enterprises in Chinese mainland have also been restricted. The U.S. aims to want these Taiwanese/foreign-funded companies to move their fab capacity out of the mainland, and the so-called "permanent exemption license" also restricts them from continuing to expand their production capacity in Chinese mainland.

In this context, a big V also disregarded the facts, describing TSMC's Nanjing plant as a "stinger into China's chip industry", hoping to drive TSMC out of Chinese mainland, seemingly speaking for the domestic semiconductor manufacturing industry, but actually "handing the knife" to the United States.

In addition, according to the logic of a certain big V, SK hynix still moved its old 8-inch wafer fab in South Korea to China a few years ago to develop mature process wafer foundry and expand domestic DRAM production capacity, which is also suppressing China's wafer foundries and domestic DRAM manufacturers?

Similarly, Samsung's Xi'an plant previously had 48/64-layer 3D NAND capacity in Phase 1 and Phase 2, even though Phase 2 and Phase 2 expanded a few years ago with 100+ layers of 3D NAND. In 2020, domestic NAND Flash manufacturers have mass-produced 128-layer 3D NAND. According to the logic of a big V, Samsung's expansion in China is backward production capacity, and the purpose is also to suppress domestic NAND Flash manufacturers?

If those public opinion in the name of "protecting the domestic semiconductor industry" is allowed to "hand the knife" to the United States prevail on the Internet, and even affect the decision-making of some governments and enterprises, it is really a "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry. Because, the development of domestic enterprises does not rely on the "shouting and killing" of foreign-funded enterprises in China to grow, and benign market competition is the best "growth hormone".

Today, some people can crusade against TSMC in the name of protecting the domestic wafer foundry industry, and tomorrow they may crusade against Samsung and SK hynix's factories in China in the name of protecting the domestic storage industry; In the future, it may even be possible to label all domestic manufacturers with foreign parts as long as they are useful to foreign parts and carry out a crusade! Allowing this kind of irrational public opinion to engage in confrontation is the "stinger" that hinders the healthy development of the domestic industry.

At present, the market in Chinese mainland is still an open market, and it has neither refused to allow Taiwanese/foreign-funded enterprises such as TSMC to enter, nor has it prevented domestic chip design manufacturers from manufacturing chips outside the mainland. Even if TSMC is driven away, it will not be able to avoid competition in building factories overseas, but will also lead to a reduction in domestic controllable production capacity. Unless we close ourselves, and even prohibit domestic chip design manufacturers from handing over to wafer foundries outside the mainland, as many Internet trolls say, but if we think that this can promote the development of domestic chip manufacturing, it is really a big joke.

Over the past few years, the development of the domestic chip design industry has been significantly ahead of the development of the domestic chip manufacturing industry, and it can be said that the domestic chip manufacturing industry is also driven by the rapid development of the chip design industry. At present, there are still many chip design manufacturers in China that are accelerating their development by using overseas advanced processes. Although there has been a breakthrough in domestic advanced process manufacturing, the production capacity is very limited and cannot meet its own needs. Only when the level of domestic chip manufacturing comes up, it is possible to undertake more orders for domestic advanced process chips. Therefore, what we need to do now is to seize every opportunity to develop and unite all the forces that can be united.

Brief summary:

At present, a large number of excellent chip design companies in China, including the previous success of the HW Kirin series, are inseparable from the help of TSMC. Even in 2020, affected by the first ban in the United States, TSMC still resisted the pressure to comply with the regulations of less than 25% of the technology sources in the United States and continue to manufacture for HW. Subsequently, the United States upgraded the proportion limit to 10%, and TSMC still confirmed that it met the requirements after evaluation and continued to OEM for HW. In the end, the United States upgraded its control again, upgrading the proportion of American technology sources to more than 0% as long as it is useful, that is, it is regulated, and TSMC was forced to be unable to OEM for it, after all, as a company, how to confront the US government? Even so, before the ban took effect on September 15, 2020, TSMC also delivered more than 8.8 million chips to HW by coordinating order insertion, expedited, etc.

Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?
Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?

△ This is the news headline 4 years ago, and then look at the current public opinion orientation

Even now, TSMC still uses its advanced process technology to provide foundry services for many excellent chip design companies in China that are not restricted by the "foreign direct product rules" of the United States, helping domestic high-end chips to enhance the competitiveness of their products.

In addition, according to Xinzhixun's exclusive information, TSMC originally planned to continue to expand production to a certain extent after the completion of the 28nm expansion of the Nanjing plant, and the plan was also supported by FGW, but due to non-economic factors (restrictions from the US government, such as not giving permissions, setting a lot of restrictions, etc.), it was forced to cancel.

Will a certain big V snicker and say: "Look at my influence, TSMC Nanjing Factory was supposed to continue to expand production, but now it has been stirred up by me and Lao Mei!" ”

Lao Mei should be able to say: What a good comrade, "Listen to me, thank you!" ”

In summary, the expansion of TSMC's Nanjing plant is a simple business act, which is conducive to the development of the domestic semiconductor industry and to improve the domestic semiconductor self-sufficiency rate. Taking a step back, is TSMC's Nanjing plant in Chinese mainland? Is it under Chinese management? So, if the factory is overseas, can we still manage it? In that case, why not let it be controlled by us at home? Why do some people just like to follow the rhythm of the old United States and want to drive these production capacity outside Chinese mainland? These people just have to escalate the free competition between Chinese mainland enterprises and Taiwan enterprises from the internal contradictions among the people to "contradictions between enemies and ourselves." Some laymen even claim to be "experts" and have not even figured out the basic facts, so they come to spray and hype up traffic in order to show their "patriotic feelings" and "wisdom and wisdom." Is this "stupid" or "bad"?

In the end, the author borrowed a passage from Chairman Mao as the end of this article: "Who is our enemy? Who are our friends? This question is the first question of the revolution. "We must make as many of our people as possible and as few of the enemy's people as possible."

Final statement: In order to avoid wasting saliva with trolls, please confirm before commenting, whether you recognize the fact that TSMC "obtained an indefinite license" and cannot let go of the expansion of production in Chinese mainland? If this fact is recognized, is the argument of the big V a wrong conclusion based on the wrong facts? The core of this article is to discuss this issue, if you don't recognize it, like to put aside the facts, then there is no need to comment! Thank you!

Author: Xinzhixun-Rogue Sword

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  • Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?
  • Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?
  • Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?
  • Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?
  • Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?
  • Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?
  • Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?
  • Who is the "stinger" that has penetrated into China's chip industry?

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