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introduction
Before the War of Liberation began in 1946, there was a huge gap in the number of armies between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.
In the face of the Kuomintang army, which exceeded 4.3 million and was equipped with all-American equipment, the total number of our army was less than 1.5 million.
However, it was precisely because of this far outnumbered enemy that we not only won the war, but the number of PLA troops had exceeded 5 million in September 1949.
In summing up the reasons for the failure, Chiang Kai-shek's government liked to emphasize the factors that led to unfavorable cooperation due to the lack of local warlords at their disposal.
So why is it that our army has many generals with a large army, but there is no situation of self-respect for the army?
(Comparison between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party)
1. Warlord separatism has always existed, how can our army break the situation?
Looking at China's history, reunification and separatism have always run throughout.
As mentioned in the opening chapter of "Romance of the Three Kingdoms", "if you join for a long time, you must be divided, and if you divide for a long time, you must be together" seems to be an objective law that cannot be escaped, and it is also a strange circle that the regime cannot escape.
(The beginning of "Romance of the Three Kingdoms")
Even if it is as strong as the Han and Tang Dynasties, as long as it passes its heyday, it will be replaced by various forms of local armed secession, and the land of China will once again usher in an era of war.
Whether it is a powerful family in the local area, or a reckless ordinary people. It seems that as long as you have soldiers in your hands and raise troops to fight, you can lay a huge piece of territory.
Relying on this base area, whether it is plotting against the world or living in a remote corner, it is always a headache for the central power. This has been the case for thousands of years.
(Warlord Power Map)
Far from it, even the Chiang Kai-shek government, the closest regime to the People's Republic of China, could not command all the local warlords as arm-and-arm.
It can be seen that the Northern Expedition did not so much eliminate the warlords, but only eliminated the old warlords, and provided the conditions for the new warlords to ascend.
(Warlord becomes faction)
When our generals have heavy troops in their hands and their power is unprecedentedly expanded, will they repeat the mistakes of history? And what is it that not only avoids the formation of new warlords, but also ensures the combat effectiveness of the army?
The leaders of the older generation gave the answer: in the basic principle of "the party commands the gun", Chairman Mao's personal charm also played a great role.
Second, Chairman Mao's personal status was won by his own ability
In the book "Romance of the Three Kingdoms", for Zhuge Liang, who Liu Bei put down his body and invited him three times, the two brothers Guan Yu and Zhang Fei did not look down on it at first. The reason is also very simple: for the "rough people" who lead troops to fight, it is useless to talk about the sky, and they have the ability to win a battle to show us.
(Three visits to the thatched house)
Chairman Mao's personal political level and literary accomplishment were well-known before he participated in the revolution. But in the eyes of the generals who were born in the army, it is inevitable to regard him as a weak scholar.
This kind of fixed thinking ended until the Red Army suffered a failure in the counter-encirclement and suppressed and retreated to the northwest. After that, Chairman Mao commanded the "Four Crossings of Chishui", which played the million-strong army of the Kuomintang and subverted the cognition of all commanders.
(Shiwatari Akamizu)
Although Chairman Mao will have more amazing "operations" in the future, this battle is tantamount to the "Battle of Bowangpo" after Zhuge Liang came out of the mountain, and he established his reputation in our army in one fell swoop.
Whether it was at that time or later, many commanders who could fight in our army have emerged over the years, but they all admired Chairman Mao after learning from the chairman's military command experience.
With such a person "town", no Xiao Xiao dares to act rashly.
(Chairman Mao in Yan'an)
At the beginning of the founding of the Red Army, Chairman Mao was already preparing for the Red Army not to repeat the mistakes of its predecessors. He advocated the use of a combination of politics and management to build a modern army.
Modernization here does not only refer to weapons and equipment, military ranks, but also fundamentally changes the definition of the army.
The armed forces under the leadership of the party are the sons and daughters of the people, the warriors who defend their homes and the country, the pioneers in emergency rescue and disaster relief, and the pioneers in the development of rich countries and wasteland.
With such a goal, the meaning of the army's existence has ushered in a new change, it is no longer a tool of violence, it will not become someone's private army, and the warlord division will lose the breeding ground.
So how do we achieve our goals? Our party used four words, that is, "the party commands the gun."
Third, it is very important to have an army that can fight, and it is even more important that an army that can fight is in the hands of the party
On the issue of controlling the armed forces, Chairman Mao once said without hesitation: "Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun is never allowed to command the party." But with guns, you can really build a party. ”
At this point, he paused, and added: "We have to admit that the barrel of a gun can produce not only power, but also everything. ”
(Poster from the 60s and 70s of the last century)
It is precisely because of his thorough understanding of military power that Chairman Mao attaches great importance to the political construction of the army, and it is precisely on this basis that the grassroots construction of the people's army on the mainland is also based on this concept.
The purpose of the armed forces accepting the party's direct leadership is a consensus that has been engraved in the marrow of our armed forces since the period of Sanwan's reorganization. Party organizations at all levels have penetrated down to the company-level units, and the political commissars are not only political leaders, but also combatants who take the lead.
This is the well-known "branch built on the company".
(Founding General Huang Kecheng was also a political commissar)
In this way, the army, which is firmly integrated with the party spirit, is the staunchest supporter of the party. In 1938, Zhang Guotao, who held military power, betrayed, but was unable to mobilize every soldier under his command to rebel with him, which shows the loyalty of the people's army to the party.
In addition to the organizational principles of the army, the personal charm of the leaders of the older generation can also deter Xiao Xiao, so that once they have different intentions, they will inevitably fall into an isolated situation, and no one wants to follow.
(Chairman Mao and Zhang Guotao)
Zhang Guotao was not the first senior leader of our party to betray the revolution, and he thought that he had everything under control. However, once the nature of abandoning principles is revealed, they will inevitably find that the warlords' system is completely unworkable, and they cannot make the army an enemy of our party by relying on their command.
Of course, the lessons of a thousand years of history, we have watched generation after generation repeat the mistakes of the past, and our army can avoid them, and they cannot be explained thoroughly in a few words. For example, in the well-known "swapping cups" incident, Chairman Mao asked Deng Gong what the situation in China would be in the future, and Deng Gong's reply was that it was likely to return to the situation of warlord division and confrontation between the north and the south.
Therefore, Chairman Mao and Deng Gong tacitly used a trick of "cups to rematch" to exchange the commanders of major military regions, avoiding the situation of warlord separation. Until now, the mainland has attached great importance to army building, requiring cadres to take up posts in different places, to be transferred for 10 years, and at the same time to avoid the situation of gathering together with fellow villagers.
In this way, we can ensure that our army will always be loyal to the people, not to a certain general.
(Deng Gong)
With the test of time, any person whose revolutionary purpose is not pure, who has degenerated after holding power, will gradually be eliminated by the people's army.
This process is like a big wave sweeping sand, and it can be tempered to leave real gold.
Resources
[1] Zhang Leifeng, Deng Dongzhi, Shang Zongchang. The branch is built on the company, and it must be stronger on the company[N].People's Liberation Army Daily,2023-11-06(005).
[2] Li Ning, Zhong Ying. Contemporary Guangxi,2023,(16):57.)
[3] Ma Ning.1973 Eight Military Region Commanders Swap Documentary[J].Party History Wenyuan,2022,(07):61-63.
[4] Chen Xubin. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, why did the three changes in the large military region[J].Honest Government Outlook(First Half Month),2015,(12):67-68.)