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In 1955, in Beijing, a solemn ceremony was underway to confer military ranks. In this year, many valiant generals were given new military ranks in recognition of their outstanding contributions to the war. However, in the dazzling list, there was an unexpected missing name - Nie Heting. The general, who had distinguished himself in the Northeast Theater, failed to be promoted at the first ceremony because of his reckless behavior in the past. But what's the story behind it? How did he regain recognition in the midst of frustration?
The initial formation of the Red Army and the role of Nie Heting
When the Red Front Army was initially formed, Nie Heting, as chief of staff, was responsible for formulating operational plans and strategic layouts, and his position in the army was particularly crucial. As political commissar, Peng Dehuai paid more attention to the political work of the troops and the maintenance of morale, and the cooperation between the two laid a solid foundation for the development of the Red Army.
In that turbulent era, together with Peng Dehuai, in the face of a complex enemy situation and a difficult environment, they jointly judged the hour and sized up the situation, and formulated a series of strategies and tactics suited to the actual situation of the Red Army. Nie Heting's military talents were put to full play in this process, and he not only studied the enemy's dynamics in depth, but also personally participated in the development of detailed plans for the offensive and defense. His tactics were often to surprise and shift quickly, allowing the Red Army to maximize its combat effectiveness with limited resources.
Nie Heting's straightforward personality made him very decisive in tactical discussions and decision-making. On the battlefield, this personality allows him to make quick decisions, command troops to maneuver quickly, and often gain a tactical advantage before the enemy can react. In addition, his outspokenness in the army also earned him the respect and trust of the soldiers, which was very beneficial for maintaining discipline and morale in the army.
In cooperation with Peng Dehuai, Nie Heting was often responsible for specific operational command, while Peng Dehuai coordinated and supported from the height of politics and overall strategy. The cooperation between the two was very tacit, Peng Dehuai's political acumen and Nie Heting's military precision complemented each other, and jointly promoted the success of a series of important battles of the Red Army.
Nie Heting during the Anti-Japanese War
After the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, Nie Heting was assigned by the Central Military Commission to the Jinchaji Base Area and served as the chief of staff of the Fourth Army Division of the Central Hebei Military Region. In this role, Nie was responsible for planning and directing the battles, and his unit endured numerous battles during this difficult period and became an important force in the region against Japanese aggression.
During his tenure in office, Nie Heting paid special attention to the flexible use of tactics and the use of geographical advantages. Under his command, the troops used guerrilla tactics to carry out frequent surprise attacks on the Japanese army, which undermined the enemy's morale and effectively dismantled the enemy's supply lines. The troops he led were able to quickly assemble and disperse in a very short period of time, making it difficult for the Japanese army to capture and encircle them.
In one specific operation, Nie Heting commanded troops to take advantage of the darkness and familiar terrain to carry out a surprise attack on a Japanese warehouse. The troops quietly approached the target location at night, quickly launched an attack, and successfully captured a large amount of military supplies, including guns, ammunition and supplies, which not only caused direct material losses to the Japanese army, but also greatly improved the material supply capacity of our army and enhanced the ability to continue operations.
In another operation, Nie Heting adopted a strategy of combining dispersion and concentration, first dispersing the enemy through small-scale harassment, and then concentrating the main force to defeat one of the enemy's battalions in one fell swoop. With this tactic, the troops he led not only effectively avoided the risk of a head-on clash with the main Japanese forces, but also repeatedly succeeded in destroying the enemy's outposts and headquarters, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.
During the Anti-Japanese War, Nie Heting paid special attention to the collection and analysis of intelligence, which played a key role in many operations. He often personally went deep into reconnaissance or sent trustworthy detachments to conduct reconnaissance, collecting enemy dynamics and weaknesses. This timely and accurate intelligence provides a scientific basis for operational decision-making, enabling precise strikes in every operation, and greatly improving operational efficiency and success rate.
In the fierce fighting that lasted for three and a half months, Nie Heting led his troops to fight more than 300 battles, without missing a beat, and his tactical use and military leadership ability were fully displayed. These battles not only dealt a huge blow to the Japanese army militarily, but also greatly demoralized the Japanese army psychologically, and accumulated important experience and materials for the final victory of the Anti-Japanese War.
Study and meet Chairman Mao
In the spring of 1942, Nie Heting ended his combat mission in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei base area, and was transferred back to Yan'an by the Central Military Commission to enter the Central Party School for systematic study. The study at this stage mainly focuses on the in-depth study of Marxist theory and Chairman Mao Thought, and how to apply these theories to actual war and political activities. Nie Heting participated in a variety of courses, including party history, political economy, and military strategy, which were designed to lay a solid theoretical foundation for his future political and military positions.
Nie Heting had in-depth exchanges with party members and cadres from all over the country here, and jointly analyzed the political and military situation at home and abroad at that time, which was of important guiding significance for his later work.
In 1945, after the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Seventh National Congress, Nie Heting was given the opportunity to meet Chairman Mao. This meeting was of great significance to Nie Heting. During the meeting, Chairman Mao spoke highly of Nie Heting's military command and political work in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei base area, which was not only a recognition of his military talent, but also an affirmation of his political position within the party.
After this meeting, Nie Heting returned to the party school to continue his studies and integrate the guiding ideology mentioned by Chairman Mao in the meeting into his own study and thinking. He began to pay more attention to the integration of theory and practice, and explored how to better apply the party's theory and policies to actual warfare and political activities.
Nie Heting's decision-making and controversy in the Northeast Liberation War
With the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Nie Heting was sent to the Northeast to participate in the important stage of the Liberation War with Lin Biao, Xiao Jinguang and other leaders. The Northeast Battlefield was one of the key areas to liberate all of China, and Nie Heting's performance during this period once again validated his military talent and leadership.
At the critical moment of the Northeast Liberation War, the uprising of the Kuomintang's provisional 53rd Division near Shenyang became a major strategic opportunity. Nie Heting showed great decisiveness and ability to think independently when dealing with this incident. The uprising of the provisional 53rd Division was essentially a complex military and political issue. After learning that the provisional 53rd Division was willing to lay down its arms and support the People's Liberation Army instead, Nie Heting quickly made a decision to support its uprising.
In this decision-making process, Nie Heting did not wait for the approval of his superiors, and he believed that it was crucial to respond quickly on the battlefield. Although his decision, although later criticized by Lin Biao, it was actually effective in reducing the fighting in Shenyang and other places, avoiding large-scale urban destruction and civilian casualties. Nie Heting made this decision with the big picture in mind - protecting this important industrial town in Northeast China will have an important impact on the subsequent economic recovery and regional stability.
Regarding this matter, Lin Biao's opinion is obviously stricter. In Lin Biao's view, any military action and political decision-making must be clear and unambiguous, and there should be a clear line between uprising and surrender. He believes that although Nie's decision-making is fast, it lacks the necessary procedural approvals, which may to some extent lead to confusion in the implementation of policies. As a result, Lin Biao criticized Nie's actions and stressed the need for stricter observance of military discipline and chain of command in similar situations in the future.
Despite facing criticism from his superiors, Nie's decision ultimately proved beneficial. The smooth uprising of the provisional 53 Division significantly reduced the duration of the battles, preserved the infrastructure of Shenyang, and provided conditions for the rapid restoration of regional economic and social order. This incident also became a good story among Nie Heting's troops, showing his courage to be responsible as a military leader.
In addition, Nie Heting also performed well in other military operations in the Northeast Theater. The troops under his command repeatedly successfully attacked the defensive positions of the Kuomintang army, demonstrating his deep understanding and precise execution of the use of tactics. Nie Heting's performance in the northeast strengthened his prestige in the army, and although there was some controversy over the handling of the uprising of the provisional 53rd Division, his overall performance was still regarded as an important contribution to the Liberation War.
Rank Conferment and Character Reflection
Nie Heting's performance in the Liberation War was undoubtedly outstanding, especially his contributions to the Northeast Battlefield, making him a strong candidate for promotion to senior general. However, due to some reckless decision-making in the past, he failed to receive the rank of lieutenant general at the first investiture ceremony in 1955, which attracted some attention at the time.
The key figure behind this decision was Luo Ronghuan, who conducted an in-depth analysis and weighed in when considering Nie Heting's promotion. Luo Ronghuan believes that although Nie Heting has extraordinary talent in military command, his way of acting is sometimes too direct and lacks the necessary caution, which is a factor that needs to be carefully considered among high-ranking generals. Therefore, Luo Ronghuan decided to postpone Nie Heting's promotion when he was first conferred the title, as an opportunity to educate and be vigilant.
The 1955 award ceremony was held in Beijing, and many generals were awarded new military ranks on this day, and the scene was solemn. Although Nie Heting was not awarded the title at this ceremony, he did not show obvious dissatisfaction or loss, but continued to do his duty in his position. He has deeply reflected on his own actions, while also paying more attention to details and procedures in his daily work to show respect and understanding for the decisions made by his superiors.
Four months later, as Nie Heting showed a more mature and steady attitude in his work, the issue of his rank was put on the agenda again. This time, Luo Ronghuan fully affirmed Nie Heting's overall performance, believing that he had proved through practical actions that he had the quality and ability to serve as a senior general. Therefore, in a relatively low-key internal ceremony, Nie Heting was officially awarded the rank of lieutenant general.
References:[1]Jiang Congshan, Liu Lanfang, Liu Lin. Jianghuai Literature and History,1997,0(6):45-51