Japan, as a global military power, is wary of Japan's new military [II]

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It is believed that Japan is returning to the traditions of early strategic thought, which advocated regaining the status of a pre-war power. According to this approach, Japan is seen as a free partnership and alliance on a regional and global scale, which could lead Japan to gradually move away from its dependence on the United States, or to develop a different strategic course from the United States. All of these explanations provide some traction to think about Japan's growing global military presence. But none of them are enough individually, even if combined, to provide accurate analysis. It has been argued that Japan's stability within the framework of the Yoshida Doctrine, its minimalist military line, and its continued efforts to hedge as it has done in the past, especially to prevent kidnapping, do not seem to be at odds with the reality of Japan's expanding military power. and Alliance Commitments. Japan continues to be fundamentally constrained by anti-militaristic sentiment at home, an argument that is hardly convincing in the face of almost all post-war constitutional obstacles and the systematic dismantling of the prohibition on the use of force.

Japan may have more partners and more multilateral frameworks than before, but the idea of being designed as a major pillar of "internationalism" or its security policy, or as an alternative to the U.S.-Japan alliance, seems very questionable. Because it's important to note that Japan is devoting relatively limited military resources to many of these multilateral activities, and is trying to ensure that those multilateral efforts that it does invest resources in usually include U.S. support for U.S. strategies, that don't detract from bilateral relations in any way, and that focus on U.S. allies and partners. Finally, while Japan's desire for greater military autonomy can be said to be part of the rhetoric and agenda of many of its key decision-makers, given the deepening of bilateral military cooperation, arguably indivisible, the desire for absolute strategic independence, and the ability to translate into a viable option out of the U.S.-Japan alliance, this factor therefore differs from many existing explanations of Japan's emerging global military role. The argument is not to deny the practicality of these explanations, but rather the need to go beyond them,

In order to carry out a more critical and effective synthesis, some sharply revised interpretations, and therefore the general conclusions about the military trajectory of Japan are different. It stood aside, and in some way surpassed other literatures that had been preparing for some time to oppose the wisdom they had embraced, and to point to Japan's new, more radical trajectory military stance. Thus, this factor's perception of Japan's military role is that the changes are far greater than those of Hagstrom and Hansen. Thus, the impact of this factor on Japan's military role is that change far outweighs continuity; There are still some remnants of minimalism and hedging that are not close to security policy and relations with the United States, but this is the impact of great changes and deepening U.S.-centric military cooperation; Anti-militarism still influences Japan's security debate to some extent, but it has been eroded to the point where it is no longer a fundamental determinant or obstacle to military policy. Similarly, Japan's internationalism, in some cases, has grown in quantity, but it is still not of high quality in name and relatively limited in scope and substance,

and is very obedient and committed to supporting the goals of the U.S.-Japan alliance with Japan's security at its core. Bilateralism, in turn, means that the impulse for a more autonomous Japanese security policy remains largely suppressed and is not yet a serious strategic goal. Contrary to many mainstream analyses to date, this factor holds that Japan's overriding international security activities—whether geographically or functionally, or in cooperation with new bilateral partners or multilateral frameworks—have been and will continue to find ways to align with and ultimately strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S. regional security presence in defense of Japan. Japan no longer readily confirms the traditional postwar security classification: it has no obvious hedges, is increasingly averse to East Asian politics and society, and considers itself an increasingly capable and reliable ally of the United States in its military posture and challenging security environment. Japan's interest in the broader security of the international community remains relatively minor and sometimes insignificant.

Japan's military "going global" is a means of ultimately moving towards and strengthening U.S. security relations rather than "de-centering" rather than "de-centering," relying on, constraining, and managing the overarching parameters of traditional bilateral alliance impulses. Japan's role as a global military power actually means being an integrated U.S. ally and working with other partners within and beyond the Asia-Pacific region in a "bilateralism-plus" model, even if the scope expands, still takes cues from the priorities of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The expectations that many other countries have from Japan as a total-marginal one, and as a result, military partners outside of this U.S.-centric framework to assist in solving their own or broader global security problems may prove to be limited or illusory. This element further explains not only the trajectory, qualities, and limitations, but also the main driving force behind Japan's rise and direction as a global military power. Japan's evolving military stance is part of a broad shift in the country's grand strategy,

This shift was generated by changing international and domestic drivers, encapsulated by the "Abenism" articulated by the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and continues to influence his successors, even if the term is not explicitly used. Abeism provides Japan with a more active security and military role, but ultimately centers on strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, with other forms of international military cooperation subordinated to bilateral alliance requirements. The argument for this element is divided into four main parts. Section II traces Japan's changing strategic and military outlook in the postwar period, as well as the ways in which Japan's new post-Cold War perceptions of external threats and deep concerns about the decline of U.S. hegemonic military power, as well as the decisive shift in major strategies that culminated in Abenism—as well as fundamental changes in military posture over time, as domestic politics shifted. The result is that Japan talks about a new three-tier security strategic capability in the form of increasing its own military power, reinvesting in the US-Japan alliance, and newly exploring complementary frameworks for international and multilateral cooperation. explores the transformation of defense doctrine and capabilities,

Thus a more powerful military position was formed. Japan's significant enhancement in the field of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare has examined its capabilities in the procurement of qualitative advanced weapons systems, mobility and joint operations. The trend of accumulating resources in Japan is discussed. The military system, as well as considering the option of striking against the Vietnamese sea shield, now has the possibility of going beyond the function of a defensive shield and obtaining its own spear together with the offensive forces of the United States. The key argument is that Japan's development of these formidable capabilities is more pronounced in devoting it more to defending the homeland of China and North Korea and enhancing compatibility with the U.S. military than any broader international security role or attempts to establish autonomy from bilateral alliances. Section 4 analyzes the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan's fundamentally changing functions and conditions of participation in it. It has been argued that Japan is seeking to "double" its support for the US-Japan alliance and to accept that Japan must play a more active role in supporting its allies, now involving the possibility of putting it head to shoulder with the United States through collective self-defense,

This involves a strengthened shield role, but even if necessary, a spear role, as well as a deeper and almost inseparable integration of JSDF doctrine and capabilities with those of the United States. Japan shows red hedging its alliance commitments and is convinced that it is now at the forefront of the US military strategy in the region and may be obliged to try to defend East Asia and the "first island chain", including Taiwan. Section 5 investigates Japan's importance in national and multilateral frameworks and in their overall military posture. It argues that while Japan has increased the amount of international cooperation in terms of geography, functions, and partners, the relative amount of energy and resources invested in it is often legitimized, designed and committed primarily to strengthening U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation, and does not provide or seek to reduce dependence on the United States. Thus, Japan continues its essentially "bilateralism-plus" approach of cooperation internationally, because even with more "attached" partnerships, these remain only as a complement to strengthen the core of the US-Japan alliance, rather than offering anything that deviates from its objectives. Stay tuned for the next installment.