"Deciphering the Three Masters": The Heroes of the Red Army whom Mao Zedong named and took away

Lu Fugui

Looking back at the history of the Red Army, we can be shocked to find that our Party and our army actually won the "right to control information" during the Red Army period. Those who seized this leading power were the heroes of the CCP's radio technology reconnaissance represented by Zeng Xisheng, Cao Xiangren, and Zou Bizhao, who "deciphered the three masters" of the Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission.

On September 10, 1935, the Party Central Committee decided to lead the Red First and Red Armies and the Column of the Central Military Commission to leave the western Sichuan region and go north first, and when Mao Zedong made up his mind, he told Ye Jianying: The second bureau must be taken with it. He also instructed Ye Jianying to ask Zeng Xisheng, Cao Xiangren, and Zou Bizhao to go first.

Hero of the Red Army who made the "glass"

Zou Bizhao wrote a memoir, "The Glass." His first words were: "Mao Zedong said: 'In the war with Chiang Kai-shek, we bet on the treasure of the glass, see it accurately, and win it.'" This glass is the work of deciphering enemy codes. Zou Bizhao recalled: "When I was transferred to the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission in November 1932, the work of deciphering Chiang Kai-shek's code was being vigorously developed, and the comrades engaged in technical work in the Second Bureau were all working with full concentration. Deciphering Chiang Kai-shek's coded telegram was itself a great driving force, and naturally everyone's mood was very high. I was also actively involved in deciphering. "I broke the code with Director Zeng (Xi Sheng) and Cao Xiangren, so I gained experience and inspiration, and then I was able to break the code independently." "Since the fourth anti-'encirclement and suppression' campaign, the cipher used by Chiang Kai-shek has been greatly improved, and almost no explicit telegram book has been used as a base book, but a separate self-compiled codebook, which we call 'special edition'. The self-compilation is varied, which greatly increases the difficulty and workload of deciphering. The decipherers could no longer have any other time, and Comrade Cao Xiangren and I would no longer serve as newspaper operators, and the leaders asked us to specialize in deciphering (the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission set up a separate section, the Deciphering Section. Section Chief Cao Xiangren, Deputy Section Chief Zou Bizhao). ”

In February 1933, Cao Xiangren and Zou Bizhao deciphered Chiang Kai-shek's first special code and promptly cooperated with the Red Army's fourth anti-"encirclement and suppression" operation. By the eve of the Long March, radio reconnaissance had reached a peak stage of ease. Although the conditions are very difficult, it is possible to achieve the astonishing level of "the enemy sends and receives, and the enemy communicates with us"; the copy rate of the main control direction is often maintained at 100 percent, and the translation rate often reaches "one by one", and at many key moments, many miracles of "copying while passing" have been created.

Zou Bizhao said in his memoirs: "The enemy's secret code was deciphered, and the red army mastered all the deployment, mobilization, attempts, equipment, supplies, situations, and even passwords and signals of Chiang Kai-shek's army. In January 1933, the Red Army marched north from Lichuan to Jinxi, targeted the enemy isolated at Huangshidu, wiped out the thirteenth brigade of the enemy's Fifth Division, captured the brigade commander Zhou Shida alive, and threatened Fuzhou. Chiang Kai-shek sent Wu Qiwei's Ninety Division from Fuzhou to Huwan to attack north of Jinxi, and the General Headquarters of the Red Army was determined to annihilate the enemy. On 8 January, our troops set out at dawn, but Wu Qiwei's telegram of the advance at some point had not yet been received. Vice Chairman Zhou, Commander-in-Chief Zhu, and the heads of various regiments were all waiting for information from the Second Bureau. The comrades of the Second Bureau were even more engrossed in grasping the briefing of Wu Qiwei's radio station, and only after about 8 o'clock did they receive a telegram from Wu Qiwei's division setting out to advance. Our Deciphering Section immediately deciphered it. With this telegram, the various units of the Red Army marched separately to the designated positions, and after fierce fighting, Wu Qiwei's Ninetieth Division was severely attacked by the Red Army on its way, suffered heavy losses, and was defeated. After the red army was victorious, it immediately returned to attack Nanfeng. When the Red Army attacked the city, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized a large army to attack in 3 ways in an attempt to cut off our rear road. Therefore, our army gave up the capture of Nanfeng and attacked the enemy on the western road in the direction of Yihuang, and as a result, on February 27 and 28, the enemy Fifty-second Division and the Fifty-ninth Division, which were assembling, were destroyed in one fell swoop. Chiang Kai-shek was still not satisfied, and then advanced to Guangzhou from the middle road with the Eleventh and Ninth Divisions. On March 21, our army basically annihilated Chen Cheng's ace 11th Division at Caotaigang. Chen Cheng, commander-in-chief of the enemy's 'encirclement and suppression' army, heard the news that the Eleventh Division had been annihilated and vomited blood in a hurry. Chiang Kai-shek was also very distressed, saying in his handwriting to Chen Cheng: "This setback is miserable and abnormal, and it is the only hidden pain in my life." In this way, Chiang Kai-shek's fourth 'encirclement and suppression' was crushed in February and March 1933, on the edge of our base area, at the time of his mobilization and deployment. ”

Zou Bizhao's recollection is not only concrete and vivid, but also the "five elements" of when, where, who, what, and why are complete, concise and concise. It has left the process of the Red Army's painstaking smashing of the enemy's fourth "encirclement and suppression" to history and to future generations!

Zou Bizhao said in his memoirs: "The big glass we made also held Chiang Kai-shek, the chairman of the committee, in it. Chiang Kai-shek became the protagonist of the cup that we monitor day and night. He had a lot of confidence in the code he had painstakingly made up. But Chiang Kai-shek did not know until his death that all his codes had been deciphered by the Communists. It can be said that the void is at ease, and the unenlightened have no hatred. ”

Zou Bizhao issued a historic exclamation in his memoirs that "the void is at ease, and the unenlightened have no hatred" because he clearly knew the historical facts of that year. One of the most courageous historical facts is that Chiang Kai-shek was almost caught because of the deciphering of secret telegrams! In 1933, the Red Army smashed the enemy's fourth "encirclement and suppression." Zou Bizhao recalled: "After Chiang Kai-shek suffered such a fiasco, he personally came to the headquarters of the Chongren Middle Road Army to inspect. From the deciphered enemy telegrams, we are sure that Chiang Kai-shek is scheduled to take the waterway back during the day. Vice Chairman Zhou immediately dispatched the interception troops. Unfortunately, Chiang Kai-shek temporarily changed to a car and luckily escaped without catching him. "If Chiang Kai-shek had been caught, China's modern history would have had to be rewritten.

Our army deciphered all the enemy's secret telegrams, and not only did Chiang Kai-shek not know it, but even the senior Kuomintang generals were always in the dark. In 1933, the Red Army eliminated two Kuomintang divisions in one fell swoop near the Dengxian Bridge, and the famous Kuomintang general Li Mo'an was depressed and sent a poem to his wife in Shanghai with a code. Two of the sentences are: Dengxian went to dengxian by the dengxian bridge, how many red faces and tears dried up. Later, when Zhou Enlai met Li Mo'an in Xi'an, he said, "Your poems are well written. And read out the above two sentences, which made Li Mo'an stunned.

Zou Bizhao recalled: "Shortly after crushing the enemy's fourth 'encirclement and suppression', around April 1933, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission divided the second bureau into two parts, the front and the back. Comrades Zeng Xisheng and Cao Xiangren remained in the front. Comrade Qian Zhuangfei served as the director of the second bureau in the rear, and I was assigned to the second bureau of the rear (responsible for deciphering). The former rear reconnaissance station was merged into the second bureau. ”

The addition of Zou Bizhao made the situation of radio technology reconnaissance work of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission quickly open up and achieve results: "On May 6, 1933, Zou Bizhao deciphered the enemy's secret telegram and learned that the Sixty-third Division of the Kuomintang Army had been dispatched by 4 battalions and 1 cavalry company from Lianhua County to rush to Chaling County via the Ninth Road to pick up military supplies and immediately report to the Revolutionary Military Commission. On May 6, our army advanced to the Ninth Road to meet the enemy, and on the 7th annihilated the enemy. The enemy's Sixty-third Division shrank to the county seat of Lotus County and did not dare to move. Liu Jianxu, commander of the first column of the Xiang Army, ordered the Forty-third Brigade and the Fifty-fifth Brigade to cover a transport battalion and escort military supplies from Chaling to Lotus. After our army learned of this information, it set up an ambush in Tang city, Lianhua County, and on May 29 annihilated the enemy's first unit, captured more than 1,000 officers and men below the enemy regimental commander, and captured more than 500 rifles and a radio station. The Red Eighth Army won two consecutive battles in a month and was commended by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. ”

"Three Masters of Deciphering", the highest honor of the Red Army

On July 9, 1933, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Revolutionary Army decided to award the Red Star Medal to the officers and men of the Red Army who had "made great merits" in the revolutionary struggle, and the Red Star Medal was the most noble honor of the Red Army period. There is even a saying in society that "the Red Star Medal is a gold medal for avoiding death". Although there is no factual basis for this claim, article 16 of the 1933 Provisional Regulations on Discipline of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army stipulates that: "Whoever has been awarded the Medal of Merit of the Soviet and has violated this decree may be reduced at his discretion." This shows the exalted status of this reward. Historical data show that the Red Star Medal was awarded only three times: the Founding Day of the Army in 1933, the Founding Day of the Army in 1934, and july 1935 (awarded to Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao, leaders of the Red Fourth Front). A total of 166 pieces were awarded. The winners of the first prize medal are only Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai and so on. Among the more than 80 second- and third-class Red Star Medal recipients, most of them are famous generals and combat heroes in the early days of the Red Army. The Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, which fought on the hidden front, also received the highest reward. Zou Bizhao recalled: "On August Day in 1934, the Central Military Commission awarded the Red Star Medal to the meritorious personnel of the whole army. Director Zeng Xisheng was awarded the Red Star Medal of the Second Class, and Comrade Cao Xiangren, chief of the Deciphering Section, and I (deputy section chief) were awarded the Red Star Medal of the Third Class (Zou Bizhao Medal Number 79). Vice Chairman Zhou and Commander-in-Chief Zhu personally went to the Second Bureau to issue the award and spoke at the meeting. They spoke highly of the work of the Second Bureau, encouraged us to do a better job in intelligence work, and personally mobilized everyone to rap and tell stories until late at night. Party history research experts say that Zeng Xisheng, Cao Xiangren, and Zou Bizhao, three Red Star Medal winners, are the first generation of codebreakers of the Central Red Army. It is the well-deserved "deciphering of the three masters" of the Central Red Army.

In the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, Zeng Xisheng, Cao Xiangren, Zou Bizhao, and others endured the pain of illness and stubbornly deciphered 352 codes of the Kuomintang army day and night under the cruel war environment, almost one a day. However, this big "glass" made by the Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission was discarded by Li De, who held great military power.

Zou Bizhao vividly described in his memoirs that Li De did not use the second bureau to decipher the intelligence as "jade turned into stone"! Zou Bizhao said: "In the fifth anti-'encirclement and suppression' campaign, although the second bureau provided the clearest information, it was still not good at fighting, and even we were very anxious. Chiang Kai-shek's head organs and all the headquarters of divisions and brigades equipped with radios, we know what they do, as long as they pass the telegram. However, since the fourth victory against 'encirclement and suppression', the Red Army has been in a passive situation of being beaten. "[Bogu] relied on the German Li De as an adviser and promoted him as an international representative, and in fact Li De commanded everything, and finally forced the Central Red Army to abandon its base areas and break through the Long March."

In October 1934, the Central Red Army began the Long March. The central organ of the CPC Central Committee is code-named the Red Seal Column, and the organ of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission is code-named the Red Star Column, of which the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission is called the Fourth Detachment, which does intelligence support work for the Party Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. During the Long March, in order to ensure that the work did not stop 24 hours a day, the fourth detachment adopted a two-echelon work system.

At this time, the members of the Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission were: Zeng Xisheng, director of the bureau, and Qian Zhuangfei, deputy director of the bureau; Section 1 (Deciphering) Section Chief Cao Xiangren, Deputy Section Chief Zou Bizhao; Li Zuopeng, head of the second section (proofreading), and dai jingyuan and Duan Lianshao, translators, and six or seven others; Hu Lijiao, chief of the third section (reconnaissance), and Li Litian and He Junzhen, the investigators, and more than 10 others. In addition, there are more than 30 technicians and guard detachments, transport teams, and cooking squads. At the beginning of the Long March, the Central Red Army broke through three blockade lines in a row and entered Shonan in mid-November. On November 23, 1934, the Hunan warlord He Jian issued an order to urgently arrange two corps to assemble on the upper reaches of the Xiang River. This secret telegram was deciphered by the Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission on the same day, and a briefing was made to the corps on the 24th. However, at this time, the large force of more than 80,000 people of the Red Army was still more than 80 kilometers away from the Xiang River, and there was still a small line of water in the middle. At that time, Mao Zedong proposed not to cross the water. Bogu and Li De could not listen to any different opinions, stubbornly insisted on going to Xiangxi to meet the Red Second and Red Sixth Armies, and desperately drilled into the enemy's pockets, resulting in great losses. The Red Army lost more than 50,000 people in the Battle of the Xiang River, which broke through the fourth blockade line, accounting for more than 58% of the total strength of the Central Red Army. The blood of the Red Army discolored the river. The folk song "Three years do not eat Xiangjiang fish, ten years do not drink Xiangjiang water" began to circulate locally.

Mao Zedong saw the deciphering of the secret telegram in the old mountain boundary and urged the passage to transfer troops

When Chiang Kai-shek learned that the Red Army had rushed to cross the Xiang River, he immediately made an emergency arrangement to encircle it. Before the Red Army reached the Hunan Passage, the Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission deciphered many secret telegrams of the Kuomintang army. The Hunan warlord He Jian secretly said: "It is very obvious to judge that the bandits are looking for Xiao Bandit's hometown and sneaking west. "He Jiandian ordered the construction of 4 blockade lines, and 15 divisions waited for the net. In the face of such a serious enemy situation, Bogu and Li De still stuck to their predetermined plan, and on December 3 ordered the Red Army to go north to Xiangxi and join the Red Second and Sixth Red Armies.

On the afternoon of December 1, Mao Zedong crossed the Xiang River with the Column of the Central Military Commission on a pontoon bridge, and then climbed up the Yuecheng Ridge on the border between Xianggui and Xianggui in early December. Chengbu County copied Lu Dingyi's Long March diary, and Lu Dingyi recorded in his diary on December 5: "The headquarters of the Red Army triumphantly crossed the old mountain boundary. The Ninth Army arrived at Sheshui and Chayuan (the administrative village of present-day Chengbu Wutuan Town) and the Second Column of the Central Military Commission followed up with the Third Army. "In Chengbu County, on the South Mountain, there is a stone stele written by Lu Ding in the first hand that crossed with the central column of the Red Army, inscribed with the inscription "The Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army passed through this place on December 8, 1934"... It was precisely after crossing the Xiang River that Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, and Zhang Wentian, in their march together, hatched the question of discussing military defeat with the central authorities and avoiding enemy traps and diverting to Guizhou to continue their westward advance. In particular, after crossing the old mountain boundary, Mao Zedong, who began to have the right to make suggestions, judged that the Red Army should march west into Guizhou on the basis of the information of the Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, thus escaping the pocket array set up by Chiang Kai-shek in western Hunan Province. Lü Liping, operational staff officer of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, recalled: From the evening of December 11 to the early morning of December 12, the Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission deciphered the secret telegram deployed by Liu Jianxu, commander-in-chief of the First Corps of the Kuomintang Army, to intercept the Red Army, with the content of building a blockade line in the Suining area north of the passage to prevent the Red Army from sneaking north. When Mao Zedong saw the information sent to him by the Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and the plan of our army's operation the next day, he was very angry, immediately came to the first bureau, found Zhou Enlai and Bogu, and said excitedly: "If our army continues to go north out of western Hunan and is right in the arms of the enemy, won't it drill into the death hole?" That night, at Mao Zedong's request, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission held an emergency meeting, and with the support of Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang, Bogu and Li De were forced to agree to Mao Zedong's proposal and march in the direction of Liping, Guizhou, where the enemy's troops were weak, and avoided the fate of being annihilated by the self-casting net.

At 9 o'clock on January 3, 1935, the Red Army launched a fierce attack at the crossing of the Wujiang River, defeated the Lin Xiusheng department of the Third Brigade of the Qian Army, and successfully crossed the Wujiang River. The Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission deciphered the enemy's secret telegrams and learned that the Guizhou warlord Wang Jialie pleaded with Chiang Kai-shek to send troops to encircle him. However, Chiang Kai-shek was overstretched: he sent Liao Ze of Liu Xiang's Third Brigade to aid the Qian troops, and originally planned to enter Suiyang and Meitan, but because he was afraid of going deep alone, he only entered Songkan. Xue Yue's 8 divisions were taking the opportunity to seize Wang Jialie's Guizhou territory, staying in Guiyang and Qingzhen, unable to cross the Wu river north. The Xiang Army had to deal with the Red Second and Sixth Red Armies, and it was difficult to enter Qian. Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly transferred Guan Yunxiang's Ninth Army from Eyu to Sichuan and Qian. The Central Revolutionary Military Commission analyzed from these frequent exchanges of secret telegrams that Chiang Kai-shek's forces around Guizhou and Zunyi were very empty. This situation bought time for the Zunyi Conference and the rest of the Central Red Army, and on January 7, the Central Red Army outwitted Zunyi. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to use this precious time to convene the Zunyi Conference, while at the same time resting and expanding the Red Army. The comrades of the Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission continued to wait day and night at the radio station, paying close attention to the enemy's movements and ensuring the smooth convening of the Zunyi Conference until january 19, when the Red Army left Zunyi.

Mao Zedong later told Zeng Xisheng, director of the Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission: "Without your intelligence, Bogu may only 'Bogu' and not 'pass through the present', and will not agree to change the direction of the march; If you don't go to Guizhou, let alone Talk about Zunyi, let alone the Zunyi Conference! Entering Guizhou, you are out of the force. ”

Mao Zedong named the people who were taken away

The radio forces not only listened to and deciphered the telegrams of the Kuomintang army in time, but also used this specialty to be fascinating. In March 1935, the main force of the Red Army crossed the Chishui River for the fourth time and prepared to cross the Wu River in the south. At this time, the Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission deciphered the secret telegram and learned that the six divisions of the Kuomintang Zhou Hunyuan and Wu Qiwei had turned to the southeast to approach the main force of the Central Red Army, and at the same time there were three divisions of the Kuomintang Army on the south bank of the Wu River. If the two enemy forces formed a joint encirclement, the Central Red Army would face a fierce battle. So Zeng Xisheng made a bold suggestion: to impersonate Chiang Kai-shek's secret telegram and cause the 6 divisions to move away from the southeast. After the fake telegram was sent, Zhou Hunyuan and Wu Qiwei were convinced, and their troops went to the new drumming field under the command of the Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. The Central Red Army avoided a bloody battle and successfully crossed the Wu River 3 days later.

After that, the Central Red Army entered Yunnan, and after firing a false shot at Kunming, it immediately seized the time to cross the Jinsha River. However, Chiang Kai-shek sent aircraft to reconnoiter and found that the Central Red Army had the possibility of moving north. Immediately ordered the Kuomintang troops to "pursue and intercept them in the starry night." The Nationalist 13th Division was only a day and a half away from the Central Red Army Rear Guard. Lü Liping of the First Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission recalled: "On May 4, 1935, the General Headquarters of the Central Military Commission was at the Kyaukpyeong Ferry Crossing in Yunnan, and the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission deciphered the enemy's report, and learned that Wan Yaohuang, commander of the Kuomintang 13th Division, in order to preserve his strength, did not want to go deep into the tail chasing our army alone, so he lied to Chiang Kai-shek, and in the direction of his advance, he did not find any traces of the communist army, so he decided to rest in situ on Tuanjie Street for a day, and then return along the same road to cooperate with friendly forces to 'encircle and suppress' the communist army from other directions. Mao Zedong thought that he could use this contradiction to win four or five days. He pointed to the map with a red pencil and said to several of our staff officers: Do you know the story of Zhuge Liang borrowing the East Wind in the Three Kingdoms era? We are now borrowing the contradiction between Chiang Kai-shek and Wan Yaohuang to transfer the main force here to cross the river. In the future, I will write a story for future generations! Therefore, on May 5, the Red I and Red Iii Legions, which could not cross the river because they could not cross the river without boats, converged along the trail to Kyaukpyeongdu. The troops arrived on time, crossed the river in turn, and reached the north bank on May 9. By the time Wan Yaohuang's division arrived at the river on the 10th according to Chiang Kai-shek's warrant, the Red Army had all crossed the Jinsha River and the ferry had burned down on the north bank. This made Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to make the Red Army the second Shi Dakai to fail. In August 1981, Zou Bizhao wrote a script called "Crossing the River" based on his own personal experience, which described this history in detail and vividly.

On June 14, 1935, the Red First and Fourth Fronts met the division in Xiaojin County, Sichuan. Zou Bizhao recalled: "After meeting with the Four Fronts Army, it was Mao Ergai who was stationed in the area for a long time. Beginning in 1933, the first, second, and third stations engaged in both communication and reporting services and deciphering. After the meeting of the First and Fourth Fronts, the relationship between the two deciphering units was very harmonious, and they supported us with a batch of gasoline. However, the joy of victory in the two fronts did not last long, and the leadership of the Red Army went wrong. Zhang Guotao prided himself on being strong and strong, wanted status, and caused a split.

Zou Bizhao recalled: "When crossing the meadow to Brazil, the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission was stationed in the general headquarters of the former enemy. Commander-in-chief Xu Xiangqian, political commissar Chen Changhao, and chief of staff Ye Jianying. At dusk on September 10, Chief of Staff Ye informed us to return to the Central Military Commission garrison immediately, and asked Zeng Xisheng, Cao Xiangren, and I to go first, and the second bureau units came later. When we arrived at the Central Military Commission's garrison, we first saw Commander Peng Dehuai, and he was very happy to see us coming, as if relieved. Only then did he know that Zhang Guotao had ordered the Red Army troops to return to the north without authorization, and then crossed the grassland to the south, and the central authorities decided to lead the First and Third Armies to continue north. The atmosphere is tense and the troops are stepping up their guard just in case. ”

The "central decision" mentioned in Zou Bizhao's memoirs was that on September 10, 1935, the central government decided to lead the Red First and Red Third Armies and the Central Military Commission column out of the dangerous situation in western Sichuan and go north first. "Because the operation was hasty and secret, even some of the combat staff officers around him were not informed. But when Mao Zedong made up his mind, he told Ye Jianying, chief of staff: The second bureau must be brought along. He also instructed Zeng Xisheng, Cao Xiangren, and Zou Bizhao to go first. From this historical fact, we can see the importance of the second bureau and the core role of Zeng, Cao and Zou, who are engaged in deciphering work, in the second bureau."

Zou Bizhao once recorded in detail the results of the deciphering work of the Second Bureau of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, named "The Contribution of Painstaking Efforts".

From October 1932 to January 1938, the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission deciphered more than 1,050 codes for the central and local armies such as Jiang, Xiang, Guangdong, Sichuan, Gui, Qian, Dian, Ma Hongkui, and Zhang Xueliang, an average of 17 per month. In particular, in the nearly four months from January 19 to May 9, 1935, the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission, in the dangerous environment of urgent military conditions and the enemy's heavy troops chasing and intercepting, successively broke through 94 codes of the enemy in front of Chiang, Xiang, Gui, Dian, and Sichuan, timely and accurately detected a large amount of secret information such as the deployment of the enemy's troops, and correctly commanded the Red Army to carry out operational operations such as the two occupations of Zunyi, the four crossings of Chishui, the breakthrough of the Wujiang River, and the qiao crossing of the Jinsha River for the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, successfully completing the 25,000-mile long march and realizing the division of northern Shaanxi. Provides strong intelligence support. ”