During the period of the agrarian revolution, when the Red Army withdrew from the base areas, it would leave some troops to stay in the local area to persist in fighting guerrillas, such as when the Central Red Army withdrew from the Soviet area, Xiang Ying and Chen Yi were left behind; when the Red Twenty-fifth Army withdrew, Gao Jingting and thousands of people held on to Dabie Mountain. In that year, when the Red Fourth Front left Eyuwan, there was also a person who insisted on staying, saying: "I am the secretary of the Eyuwan Provincial Party Committee, and it is my duty to stick to the Soviet area." I want to stay and fight guerrillas, even if I die here, I am willing. ”
He is Shen Zemin, secretary of the Eyuwan Provincial Party Committee.
Shen Zemin, a native of Tongxiang, Zhejiang, is the younger brother of the famous writer Shen Yanbing (Mao Dun). Shen Zemin joined the Shanghai Communist Group in May 1921, participated in the May Thirtieth Movement, and in the spring of 1926 went to the Soviet Union to study at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. In October 1930, he returned to Shanghai and was elected as a member of the Central Committee at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, serving as the head of the Central Propaganda Department.
In the spring of 1931, with the development of the Soviet movement throughout the country, the strategic position of the Eyu-Anhui Soviet Region became more and more important, and Zeng Zhongsheng, secretary of the Eyu-Anhui Special Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, Kuang Jixun, commander of the Red Fourth Army, and others commanded the Red Army to achieve major victories one after another, and the threat to the Kuomintang army was increasing day by day, and a strategic relationship echoing the north and south had been formed with the Central Soviet Region. In order to adapt to the development of the Eyu-Anhui Soviet District, the Central Committee decided to set up the Eyu-Anhui Central Sub-Bureau, which is directly under the Politburo of the Central Committee and higher than the local provincial party committees.
However, at this time, Wang Ming's "Left" mistakes, characterized by dogmatism, began a four-year reign in the central government, Zhou Enlai and others were severely criticized, and Zeng Zhongsheng and Kuang Jixun, who were trusted by Zhou Enlai, were also included in the scope of suspicion and criticism. Eyuwan wanted to be led by "trustworthy" people, so the central authorities decided to send Shen Zemin as the secretary of the Eyuwan Central Bureau.
Map of the situation in the Eyu-Anhui Soviet District
In late March 1931, Shen Zemin set off for the western Anhui base area in the Eyu-Anhui Su District.
The practice of the central authorities "parachuting" the top leaders of the Soviet base areas was jokingly called "head-changing techniques." Since the establishment of the Eyu-Anhui Soviet District, the central authorities have successively "parachuted" three groups of leaders into the Eyu-Anhui Soviet District.
In the spring of 1930, the Eyu-Anhui Base Area was initially completed, consisting of two parts, the Eyu-Anhui Border and the Western Anhui Province, and the Eyu-Anhui Special Committee of the CPC was established. Initially, Xu Pengren, a native of Dabie Mountain, served as the secretary of the special committee, but the central authorities replaced him and sent Comrade Guo Shushen. Later, he sent Zeng Zhongsheng to replace Guo Shushen. Zeng Zhongsheng was both literate and martial, and did a good job, but because Wang Ming's "left" leaning toward the wrong power, Zeng Zhongsheng, who insisted on his own views, was replaced.
Marshal Xu Qianqian said:
"Comrade Shen Zemin, also sent by the central authorities, is active and enthusiastic in his work, and is a good comrade, but he knows nothing about the military and lacks leadership experience, so Zeng Zhongsheng is much stronger than him.
Shen Zemin made a tour of western Anhui, and at the beginning of getting off the bus, he trained people at every turn, looked at everything here with colored glasses, which was also accusatory and picky, and when he came back, he made a serious criticism of Eyuwan. Shen Zemin completely ignored the arduous efforts of the local party cadres in Eyu-Anhui, criticized the achievements made by the base areas in the harsh environment as worthless, and even held that the development of the Eyu-Anhui Soviet Area was entirely the result of the spontaneous struggle of the local masses and not the result of the local party's leadership.
Local and military cadres in Eyuwan have great opinions on this, and are even more opposed to the unjustified depreciation of the base areas and the Red Army. Xu Jishen, an outstanding general of the Red Army, talked about his impression of Shen Zemin and summed it up in eight words: "The body is full of thorns and is unpopular." ”
Without waiting for Shen Zemin to officially take office, Zhang Guotao came again. Zhang Guotao had long wanted to find a place to show his fists, and he took a fancy to the new and vigorous territory of Eyuwan, volunteered to propose to go to Eyuwan as a "representative of the Central Committee," and won the trust of Mifu and Wang Ming, deputies of the Communist International, by fiercely criticizing Qu Qiubai and praising Wang Ming. They adopted his suggestion and issued the "Resolution of the Central Committee on the Provincial Party Committee of Eyuwan Province": Zhang Guotao was the chairman of the Eyuwan Military Commission, Shen Zemin was the secretary of the Eyuwan Provincial CPC Committee, and Zhang Guotao, Shen Zemin, and Chen Changhao were members of the Eyuwan Central Bureau.
At this point, the Eyu-Anhui base area formed the troika of Zhang Guotao, Shen Zemin, and Chen Changhao.
In order to make room for Zhang Guotao, Shen Zemin was demoted by half a grid from the secretary of the Eyu-Anhui Central Bureau to become the secretary of the Eyu-Anhui Provincial Party Committee, but Shen Zemin still had a great right to speak and was one of the powerful figures in the Eyu-Anhui Soviet District.
Shen Zemin is an outstanding writer and professor, specializing in literary creation and propaganda and agitation. Xu Xiangqian, who has always been loyal, said that he had only enthusiasm for politics and "nothing about the military."
The troika composed of Zhang Guotao, Shen Zemin, and Chen Changhao lacked strategic acumen and military knowledge, and was unwilling to let Zeng Zhongsheng, Kuang Jixun, Xu Xiangqian and others dominate the military, and proposed a series of specious military plans, which led to fierce conflicts.
In June 1931, the Eyu-Anhui base area was in short supply of grain, while the Kuomintang troops on the outskirts were on the defensive at this time, and the situation was favorable to the Red Army. Zeng Zhongsheng suggested that the troops go south, attack Pu (Chun) Huang (Mei) Guang (Ji), restore the old base areas, and also achieve three things at once: solve the grain problem, restore the old areas, and contain the troops that the Kuomintang is preparing to send to the Central Soviet Region.
Shen Zemin strongly opposed it without hesitation, and scoffed at the idea of "three victories in one fell swoop", insisting that the Eyu-Anhui Red Army should not go south, but should move east. He, Zhang Guotao, and Chen Changhao racked their brains to come up with a plan of action to "attack Yingshan, attack Qiantai, and threaten Anqing", intending to directly threaten Nanjing with troops and mobilize the Kuomintang army by attacking big cities.
Shen Zemin spoken out against the "Lisan Line" (the "Left" adventurism mistake), but the plan he proposed was the standard "Li San Line".
Zeng Zhongsheng, Kuang Jixun, Xu Xiangqian and others all sighed, such a childish plan can also be handed? If the Red Army were to go on a crusade, it would run away from the base areas for a long time, and there would be a shortage of soldiers, food, and guns, and the actual situation of the Red Fourth Army would not have such conditions. On the contrary, it is better to fight steadily and steadily, relying on the old areas to gradually develop to the south.
Xu Xiangqian analyzed: "We have black eyes on the enemy situation, terrain, and mass situation in the Qiantai and Anqing areas, and we may suffer hardships and lose battles if we run from a long distance to attack. ”
As far as the advantages of marching south are concerned, Xu Xiangqian said this: The Huangguang area is an old base area, and the party's foundation and mass base are relatively good; from Yingshan Straight down, it is only a 200-mile journey, and all along the way are red areas. More importantly, that area was garrisoned by the Kuomintang Tenth Army, and Chiang Kai-shek planned to transfer the army to Jiangxi to participate in the "encirclement and suppression." If we hold this enemy back, we can directly alleviate the military pressure on the central base areas.
Their correct opinion was rejected.
However, after Zeng Zhongsheng and Xu Xiangqian led the Red Fourth Army on a campaign, they resolutely changed the marching route and marched south in spite of the great risk of personal honor and disgrace, killing more than 5,000 enemy soldiers and capturing more than 4,000 guns, basically restoring the old area of Pu (Chun) Huang (Mei) guang (Ji), and at the same time restraining the return of an army of the Kuomintang army, effectively cooperating with the anti-"encirclement and suppression" of the Central Soviet Region.
Facts have proved that Shen Zemin has indeed lost sight of the strategic direction of sending troops. Xu Xiangqian recalled: "Opposing attacks on Anqing far away from the base areas and advocating the gradual outward development of relying on the strong foundation of the masses in the base areas is in line with Comrade Mao Zedong's thinking. ”
After that, Shen Zemin and others temporarily remained militarily silent for a while, and the Eyu-Anhui Soviet Region also ushered in a major military development, first expanding the Red Army to form the Red Twenty-Fifth Army, and then forming the Red Fourth Front Army on the basis of the Red Fourth Army and the Red Twenty-fifth Army.
From November 1931 to June 1932, the Red Fourth Front successively won victories in the four major battles of Huang'an, Shanghuang, Sujiabu and Huangguang, annihilating more than 60,000 enemy troops, ranking second in the country in terms of the number of troops and the population of the base areas, and reaching the peak of the Eyu-Anhui base area.
At this time, Shen Zemin was once again enthusiastic, and he put forward an unbelievable and unbelievable point of view according to his own judgment: Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang Central Army is going to fail, it has become a "partial division" and will be abandoned by imperialism. In the future, the Red Fourth Front will fight directly against the imperialist armies.
Because the base areas were divided and surrounded by the Kuomintang army and lacked direct communication with the outside world, when he learned about the changes in the situation at home and abroad through only a few words, Shen Zemin wishfully believed that these were all the direct results of the anti-"encirclement and suppression" struggle in the Eyu-Anhui Soviet region, linked the major changes at home and abroad to the Eyu-Anhui Soviet Region, and even the "129 Incident" in which Japan launched an attack on Shanghai was also said to be to threaten Wuhan down the Yangtze River after capturing Shanghai, in order to directly attack the Eyu-Anhui Soviet Region.
This is not just a disregard for reality, but a whimsy.
Shen Zemin explained his views to the Provisional Central Committee of the COMMUNIST Party of China, and even Bogu, the secretary of the Provisional Central Committee who was also surprisingly "Left" at the time, felt absurd and unceremoniously denounced it as "nonsense that does not care about the facts", but Shen Zemin still stubbornly insisted on his own views.
The joy of victory bred a feeling of blind arrogance, and Shen Zemin and others also proposed to "attack and fight without stopping", attack Macheng, and approach the outskirts of Wuhan. At this time, Chiang Kai-shek had gathered more than 300,000 people from 31 divisions (brigades) and launched the fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Eyu-Anhui Soviet Region.
Xu Xiangqian suggested that the troops be gathered together to prepare for the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign. However, Zhang Guotao was also infected by the fanatical atmosphere of victory, and he supported Shen Zemin's proposal and asked Xu Xiangqian to lead troops to attack Macheng, and Xu Xiangqian had to obey the order.
Xu Xiangqian, commander-in-chief of the Red Fourth Front
At this point, the danger has come.
Taking advantage of the emptiness in the rear of the Eyu-Anhui Soviet Area, in early August 1932, the Kuomintang troops completed the three-sided encirclement of the Eyu-Anhui Soviet Area from the northern, eastern, and western fronts, and immediately attacked Qiliping and Huang'an, the center of the Eyu-Anhui base area. The main force of the Red Fourth Front was unable to attack Macheng for a long time, and it rushed north, and the momentary recklessness of Zhang Guotao and Shen Zemin put the Red Fourth Front army in an unprecedented passive situation.
First, the base area in western Anhui was lost, and then the main areas of the Eyu border were also occupied by the Kuomintang army. Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Wang Jiaxiang, and others in the front of the Central Bureau of the CPC Soviet District called the Eyu-Anhui Soviet District in mid-September asking them to use the method of "luring the enemy to go deep" to break through the Kuomintang troops invading the Soviet zone. However, at this time, Zhang Guotao had completely lost the confidence to smash the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" and did not carry out this instruction.
Zhang Guotao planned to leave 1 division for Eyuwan, and the rest of the main force temporarily jumped to the outside line. Shen Zemin resolutely opposed, he hoped that the troops could stay and wait for the timing to change, and also believed that at least 2 divisions of troops were needed to defend the base area.
On October 10, 1932, the main responsible persons of the Eyu-Anhui Soviet District held their last meeting in the Dabie Mountains, and formally decided to leave 2 divisions to defend the Soviet area, and the 3 divisions of the Red Fourth Army and the 73rd Division of the 25th Red Army moved west with the headquarters of the Front Army. At this meeting, Shen Zemin and Zhang Guotao clashed verbally, repeatedly blatantly denouncing his pessimism and paternalism.
At the moment of crisis, Shen Zemin showed his amazing responsibility, and he took the initiative to ask to stay in the Soviet zone and take 3,000 fighters to fight guerrilla warfare with the Kuomintang army to defend this arduously created revolutionary base area.
Under the siege of the superior forces of the Kuomintang, Shen Zemin, together with the other members of the provincial party committee who remained in the base area, firmly shouldered the heavy burden of leadership of the Eyu-Anhui Provincial CPC Committee, desperately supported it with a weak force, and rebuilt the Red Twenty-fifth Army, becoming the new main force of the Red Army in the Eyu-Anhui Soviet Region.
The reason why their chain of command has not been adjusted, their military establishment has not been reorganized, and their methods of struggle have not changed is because of one thing: Shen Zemin and his comrades-in-arms all believed Zhang Guotao's oath not to abandon Dabie Mountain, and believed that the main force of the Red Fourth Front would choose the opportunity to return and reunite with them. After all, Eyuwan is the hometown and "root" of the Red Fourth Front.
Before the Red Fourth Front moved, Zhang Guotao swore: I will never leave you, and said that the main force will only temporarily jump to the outside line, and will fight back later.
By December 1932, the Red Twenty-fifth Army had read in the captured newspapers that the Red Fourth Front had arrived in the Sichuan-Shaanxi area. Only then was they convinced that the main Red Army would not return. Zhang Guotao went farther and farther, obstinately going his own way and completely abandoning the Eyu-Anhui Soviet District and other comrades-in-arms who insisted on sticking to the Soviet Area.
Shen Zemin felt incredible: "Chairman Zhang (Guotao) did not say goodbye! Yin Yin's expectations turned into a heavy blow, and Shen Zemin wrote a letter and drafted a report to the Central Committee, exposing Zhang Guotao's mistakes through reasonable and well-founded facts and documentable telegrams.
Shen Zemin was both one of the top decision-makers in the Soviet Union and a witness to many major events; he was both a main follower and collaborator of Zhang Guotao and later a major opponent of Zhang Guotao's decision to march west. Although he once carried out the erroneous "Left" line and inflicted serious losses on the Red Army and the base areas, he was able to face reality squarely, understand the mistakes, and resolve to "change his mind and start over again, and made a bitter review on behalf of the provincial party committee. In his report to the Central Committee, he described the facts and analyzed the evidence not only accusing Zhang Guotao of his mistakes, but also strictly analyzing his own mistakes, which made people lament his frankness.
After the report was written, it was handed over to the leading members of the Eyu-Anhui Provincial CPC Committee and the Red Twenty-fifth Army for circulation, and the report, which was jointly signed by Shen Zemin and 8 other members of the military and political leadership of the Eyu-Anhui Soviet Region, was the first document within the party to positively reflect Zhang Guotao's mistakes.
The report also reminds the central authorities that they should remain vigilant against Zhang Guotao's strategic orientation.
Although the report drafted by Shen Zemin has not yet fully realized the true root cause of the mistake, it can bravely face up to reality, sincerely admit the mistake, and begin to put forward a more correct policy. This was very valuable at a time when the "Left" mistakes were still dominant in the whole Party.
Taking this report as the boundary point, the military and people of the Eyu-Anhui Soviet District gave up the illusion of waiting and entered a new stage of independent revolutionary struggle with the Eyu-Anhui Provincial Party Committee as the leading core and the Red Twenty-fifth Army as the main force. Shen Zemin realized that he had followed Zhang Guotao's "Left" mistakes, openly broke with Zhang Guotao, and corrected his mistakes in the arduous struggle.
On November 20, 1933, Shen Zemin died of malaria at the age of 33 in Tiantai Mountain, Huang'an, Hubei Province.
During the years of fighting in Eyuwan, Shen Zemin showed the spirit of a Communist Party member who was highly responsible for the revolutionary cause and the quality of being bright and upright, he was hardworking and simple, loyal to his duties, selfless work, until the last breath of his life, and finally sacrificed in his post. Xu Xiangqian once summed up Shen Zemin in six words: "He is a good person, and he is very left." ”