At the Battle of Chosin Lake, the 3 corps of the 9th Corps of the Volunteer Army confronted the elite 10th Army of the US Army.
It set a record of completely annihilating a whole regiment of the US army in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, forcing the "United Nations Army" on the Eastern Front to retreat by sea, and the US military also experienced the "longest retreat" in history. Chairman Mao's later assessment of the battle was
"The 9 Corps ... Under extremely difficult conditions, a huge strategic task was accomplished"
Behind this, the soldiers of the 9th Corps paid huge casualties.
The battle suffered 19,202 casualties, 28,954 frostbite, and more than 4,000 frozen to death.
Because of the high proportion of casualties in extremely cold weather, whenever I read history to this point, I can't help but feel sad and emotional, and I can't help but have a question
: Why are there so few cotton coats and winter clothes for the 9 Corps?
Some articles have answers to this question simply as
"The time for entering the DPRK is tight, and it is too late to issue winter clothes." So what is the specific situation in history? Why is the time for the 9th Corps to enter the DPRK so tight? Why is it too late to send winter clothes such as cotton clothes? How did this all come about? Whose responsibility is it?
Why the 9 Corps
We now know that before the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the 9th Corps was assembled in the south as the main force attacking Taiwan.
So why was a troop trained in the warm south transferred to the icy North Korea?
To answer this question, we must first briefly understand the history of the 9 corps.
The 9th Corps was attached to the Third Field Army. It is a heroic force that has been in the war for a long time. Before entering the DYNASTY, the 9th Corps had three corps under its jurisdiction: the 20th, 26th and 27th Armies.
The 20th Army evolved all the way from the Red Army guerrillas who had fought guerrilla warfare in Fujian for three years, and was the most senior in the entire 9th Corps; the 20th Army was known for being good at fighting depth and penetration within the 9th Corps; the predecessor of the 26th Army was the luzhong military region unit during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and defense was their strong point; while the 27th Army was developed from the troops of the Jiaodong Military Region during the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and was good at fighting tough battles.
Commander of the 9 Corps at the time
Song Wheel of Time
He graduated from the fifth term of the Huangpu Period, made outstanding achievements in battle, participated in the Long March, fought against the Japanese, and defeated the Kuomintang reactionaries on the battlefield of the War of Liberation. Song Shilun's deputy
Tao Yong
With the title of "Desperate Sanlang", the shelling of the British Navy "Purple Quartz" during the Battle of the River Crossing was commanded by Tao Yong. The following three commanders are also fierce generals who have been fighting for many years.
The 9th Corps had rich combat experience, and in the War of Liberation, it encircled and annihilated Zhang Lingfu's reorganized 74th Army; the Huaye First Column, Eighth Column, and Ninth Column that participated in the war at that time were the later 20th, 26th, and 27th Armies; in the Battle of Huaihai, the 9th Corps severely beat Du Yuming's clique; and after the liberation of Greater Shanghai, the 9th Corps became the mouth of the masses because of its strict military discipline
"Sentinel under neon lights"
The 9th Corps had rich combat experience, strict military discipline, and the commanders of the Corps were all excellent commanders and fighters at that time, and there was no doubt that they were the elite of the People's Liberation Army at that time.
In the Korean War, the enemy we faced was the "United Nations Army" (mainly the US army), which was several times more prepared than itself, and was known as the most powerful army in the world at that time; and the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was related to the safety and security of the newborn republic.
Why was the 9th Corps so anxious to enter the DPRK?
The 9th Corps was originally assembled on the southeast coast as one of the main forces to liberate Taiwan.
At the beginning, the 9th Corps was designated as the second batch of troops to enter the Korean War, but the 9th Corps was initially used as a strategic reserve and did not require immediate entry into the DPRK.
However, "the plan could not catch up with the changes", and the plan of the 9 Corps to enter the DPRK was also changed many times.
On September 7, 1950, Chen Yi conveyed the latest instructions of the Central Military Commission; the task of attacking Taiwan and reorganizing the training was lifted, and the troops immediately concentrated on standby and prepared to go to Shandong for rectification and training.
On September 20, 1950, the 9th Corps ordered the armies to move north. From October 1, in the order of the 27th, 20th Army, Corps Headquarters, and 26th Army, they will go north in turn.
On October 12, the central government asked the 9th Corps to leave for North Korea ahead of schedule.
At this time, the troops of the 9 corps had not yet all arrived in Shandong.
Song Shilun proposed that the time of entry of troops into Korea be changed to November 15, and this proposal was agreed by the central government.
The 9th Corps was the second batch of troops to enter the DPRK, but at this time their combat tasks and objectives were not yet clear. On October 27, Chairman Mao referred to the 9 Corps in a telegram to Mr. Peng
From November 1, the meihekou area of Jilin was transported for pre-war rehabilitation, and the front line could be called up if there was a strategic urgent need, and if there was no such urgent need, it was not easily called.
But soon the development of the Korean War broke this original arrangement
It turned out that at this time, the main force of our volunteer army was concentrated on the western front, and there were only about 30,000 people in two divisions of the 42nd Army on the eastern front. And on October 29, the U.S. military
The 1st Marine Division and the 7th Division were deployed to the south of Chosin Lake, and the US 10th Army is likely to move north to Chosin Lake.
The entire army of the US 10th Army is nearly 100,000 people, which not only has an absolute superiority in numbers, but also its weapons preparation and logistical supplies are higher than those of our army. If only two divisions were allowed to defend the US 10th Army, it would be very difficult once the Eastern Front was breached.
The volunteers on the Western Front would fall into a state of two-sided attack by the Us army, and the situation was very critical.
Therefore, the elite 9 Corps must enter the DPRK as soon as possible.
That's why on October 27 the Chairman was still saying", "If there is no urgent need, it is not easy to call", and two days later, on October 29, the Chairman said in a telegram
The possibility of a total of three divisions in the east, the pseudo-first, the pseudo-third and the US Seventh Division, attacking north from Xianxing is extremely likely, and it is necessary to use the main force of the Song Shi wheel to be sure of this aspect, otherwise it will be unfavorable to the overall situation.
I ask you to consider whether the remaining two armies, with the exception of the Twenty-seventh Army, which went straight to the front line from Tai'an or Manpu on November 1, would then be opened and the Ji'an area would be rested and ready for use if necessary.
The development of the Korean form tested the chairman's judgment step by step, and on October 31, the 9th Corps received the order to leave
The Ninth Corps all began on November 1 with one corps, and the other two corps followed without interruption.
On November 1, the 27th Army was the first to board a vehicle to the northeast. It was followed by the 20th Army and the 26th Army. And on November 2, the military order came down again,
After the two divisions of the 27th Army arrived in Andong (present-day Dandong), they did not stop and immediately entered Korea.
This can only show that the situation on the Korean battlefield is becoming more and more tense.
On November 5, the mission of the 9th Corps was already clear
“
Jiang Jie and Changjin should determine that the Song Corps should fully assume the role,
”
After several changes, on November 7,
The 20th Army, the vanguard of the 9th Corps, entered Korea from Ji'an and marched to the battlefield.
It is not difficult for us to see from the orders of the central authorities to the 9 corps, because of the rapid changes in the situation on the Korean battlefield, the tasks of the 9 corps have undergone great changes in a short period of time.
From the reserve team to "enter the DPRK immediately."
In a short period of time, about 150,000 people from the three armies, together with a large number of weapons and equipment, grain, herbs and medicines, and other military supplies, should be transported to the DPRK, which has to be said to be a huge test for the newly established new China.
Why is the winter coat of the 9 Corps insufficient?
The 9th Corps rushed into The DPRK, but the cotton coat winter clothes did not fully keep up.
As to why this problem is arising, the reasons are manifold.
There are both 9 Corps' own and logistical reasons.
The 9th Corps was assembled on the southeast coast before entering Korea, while the 9 Corps was mostly from East and South China, and most of the 9 Corps was southerners compared to the Northeast or Korea. The commanders and fighters of the 9th Corps were more adapted to the climate in the south and coastal areas, and they had no idea of the cold in North Korea, let alone that they were about to face the extreme cold weather that North Korea had encountered in decades. This can be seen in a telegram sent by Song Shilun to his superiors:
Equipped to supplement our full needs, the current winter clothes of the corps are sewn according to the Climate of Jiangnan, I am afraid that it is not hardy. We also have no experience in the cold climate, and we don't know how to sew to meet the standard.
From this telegram, it can be seen that the 9th Corps has no experience of the cold winter in North Korea and does not know what kind of cotton clothes can adapt to the climate of the area. The soldiers' existing cotton clothes are made according to the winter conditions in Jiangnan.
The lack of understanding of extremely cold weather has led some cadres to not pay attention to this.
Before the 60th Division of the 26th Army entered the DPRK, it left more than 600 cotton coats replenished in the northeast at home.
Although there are subjective reasons for the 9 Corps themselves, our descendants cannot be harsh on them for this.
Don't say 71 years ago, let's say that now, friends in the south are difficult to establish a specific concept of the cold in the northeast, how to wear clothes, how to prevent freezing, I think most of the friends in the south are also difficult to say one two three four five. 71 years ago, the transmission of information was not as convenient and rich as today, and the soldiers of the 9 Corps lacked understanding and experience in this, and we who opened the "God perspective" really could not be harsh on them.
The 9 Corps itself had no experience, but the logistics department knew. Roughly at the end of August or early September 1950, the logistics department had already formulated a winter clothing supplement plan for the 9 Corps, and the northeast, north China, east China, and central and southern regions were each assigned to make cotton clothes, cotton shoes, gloves, and hats.
On October 18, the logistics department believed that it would be necessary to prepare another "200,000 sets of cotton clothes".
North China, Northeast China, Central South China, and East China each made 50,000 sets, and completed in December.
That is to say, at this time, the supply plan of the logistics department to the 9 Corps is probably scheduled to be completed in December. This is based on the fact that the 9 Corps is not so anxious to enter the DPRK. The situation on the battlefield changed rapidly, and the time of the 9 corps' entry into the DPRK was changed many times and repeatedly advanced.
At that time, New China had just been established, everything was in ruins, and in the face of sudden changes, the logistics departments hurried to catch up, but there was still a big gap.
After the 9th Corps arrived in Shandong, Song Shilun reported the situation to the Shandong government. The Shandong side offered to help solve the problem, but before Shandong could catch up with the cotton clothes, the 9th Corps had already boarded the military column going north.
On the other hand, the original 9 Corps was scheduled to assemble at Shenyang and Meihekou, and the winter clothes given to the 9 Corps were also transported to these two places as planned. As a result, after the plan was changed, the materials had to be re-transported from Shenyang and Meihekou
Ji An, this was undoubtedly a severe test for the fragile transportation capacity at that time, and it was inevitable to be in a hurry.
After arriving in the northeast, He Jinnian, an old comrade-in-arms of song Shilun, was then the deputy commander of the Northeast Military Region. As soon as He Jinnian heard Song Shilun complaining, he immediately ordered that a total of 50,000 pieces of Japanese coats and cotton shoes captured in the warehouse of the Northeast Military Region be given to the 9 Corps. When the 9th Corps was in Shenyang, it also accepted about 35,090 cotton coats from the original 13 Corps. At the same time, the Northeast Military Region made all-out efforts to make cotton coats, and various localities urgently dispatched a batch of cotton coats to support them.
By the end of November, a total of more than 220,000 cotton coats of various types had been distributed to the 9 Corps.
Seeing this, some friends may ask, the 9 Corps has a total of only 150,000 people, and more than 220,000 cotton coats and surplus? Why is there not enough on the battlefield?
Well, this brings us to another problem: the logistics of the Volunteer Army could not keep up.
That is to say, although winter clothes such as cotton coats are available, the limited transportation capacity cannot guarantee that cotton coats will be distributed to every soldier. At that time, the Northeast Military Region had calculated,
The volunteers had 1,500 cars for food alone, and the total number of cars in the volunteer army at that time was less than half. When I first entered Korea in October, there were a total of 735 volunteer cars.
And these 735 vehicles, under the indiscriminate bombardment of the US military, lost 315 vehicles by November 2.
Moreover, at that time, New China lacked self-made production capacity for automobiles, and the cars ordered from the Soviet Union could not be put in place for a while.
Limited capacity must be prioritized to ensure the availability of ammunition and food.
In this way, the distribution of more than 200,000 cotton coats was a huge project, which led to the 9th Corps receiving far fewer cotton coats in the early days of the DPRK than the number of cotton coats planned.
At this point, we can summarize:
Because of the rapid changes in the situation on the Korean battlefield, the 9th Corps entered the DPRK earlier than originally planned. However, the logistics capability of winter clothing did not keep up with this change, the 9 Corps lacked awareness of the extremely cold weather, coupled with the relatively backward logistics system of the Volunteer Army in the early days of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea could not fully meet the requirements of winter clothing transportation, many reasons eventually led to the problem of the lack of cold equipment faced by the 9 Corps in the Battle of Chosin Lake, which was caused by China's backward industrial system at that time, and could not and could not be attributed to an individual or unit.
Living today, it is difficult to imagine how weak our industrial and material foundations were at the beginning of the founding of the People's Republic of China, and it is also difficult to imagine that in the weather of minus 40 degrees, the soldiers still had to maintain a fighting state, and it is also difficult to imagine how the martyrs of the Volunteer Army fought with such rudimentary equipment and advanced enemies and won one victory after another.
This history deserves to be remembered, and the group of young people in 1950 deserves to be remembered. Without them, we wouldn't be where we are today.
The few pages we see in the history books, and the few shots we see on the screen, are the lives of the martyrs of the volunteer army who have fought in blood. At that time, behind them was the motherland, and because of them, we now have the opportunity to talk about the future.
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Resources
Analysis of Issues Related to the Battle of Chosin Lake
"A Brief Analysis of the Reasons why the Volunteer Army Failed to Completely Annihilate the American Army in the Battle of Chosin Lake"