Zhongtiao Mountain, from The Southern Jin Dynasty yongji and Shaanxi, east to Yubei Jiyuan, Mengxian and Taihang Mountains, north of the rich Jinnan Basin, south of the Central Plains of the Pingchuan River. The special geographical location made Zhongtiao Mountain a strategic place to defend the northwest, southern Jin and northern Henan, so since ancient times, countless rulers would send heavy troops to guard this mountain range to ensure the peace of the country.
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, in order to defend Shanxi, the northwest and the Central Plains, the Chinese army mobilized heavy troops to build a strong defensive line on Zhongtiao Mountain in the autumn and winter of 1937. As the war progressed, the Zhongtiao Mountain Defense Line became more and more important.
For the Chinese side, if they hold the Zhongtiao Mountains, they can use this as a base to overlook northern Henan and southern Jin, and shield Luoyang and Tongguan. Advancing can disrupt the enemy's rear and contain the Strength of the Japanese Army; retreating can rely on dangerous positions, actively defend, and cooperate with the entire anti-Japanese battlefield. For the Japanese army, in order to achieve the strategic goal of "consolidating north China, suppressing Luoyang, and peeking into Xi'an", the Zhongtiao Mountain Defense Line of the Chinese Army has become a problem that needs to be solved urgently.
The Japanese invasion of China
Thus, from the spring of 1938 to the beginning of 1941, the Japanese army, which had already occupied most of the territory of Shanxi, launched thirteen sieges against Zhongtiao Mountain, but all of them were repelled by the Chinese army. Faced with the long-unable to conquer Zhongtiao Mountain, the Japanese army was determined to implement the "Battle of the Central Plains" (that is, the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain), concentrate superior forces, and destroy the Zhongtiao Mountain defense line in one fell swoop, completely annihilating the main force of the Central Army north of the Yellow River.
On May 7, 1941, the Japanese troops on the outskirts of the Nakajō Mountain Defense Line, with the support of aviation troops, began a comprehensive attack on the Nakajō Mountains from the east, north and west. Despite the precautions, for various reasons, after 20 days of fighting, the Zhongtiao Mountain Defense Line was completely broken, and the Japanese army lost nearly 80,000 Chinese defenders at the cost of thousands of casualties, of which 42,000 were killed and 35,000 were captured.
The defeat of the Zhongtiao Mountain Defense Line, and the resulting disparity in casualty ratios, made the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain "the greatest shame in the history of the War of Resistance." In the past three years, why is the Zhongtiao Mountain Defense Line, which the Japanese army has been unable to conquer for a long time, so vulnerable today, becoming the greatest shame during the War of Resistance? In addition to the objective reasons for the large gap in weapons and equipment, we should analyze the pre-war preparations of the offensive and defensive sides.
Japanese army: gather heavy troops and plan carefully
In the past more than a dozen sieges of Nakajō Mountain, the main strength of the Japanese army was the 36th, 37th, and 41st Divisions responsible for blocking the Nakajō Mountain area, with less than 60,000 people, while the Kuomintang Central Army stationed in the Nakajō Mountain area had nearly 260,000 people. In other words, the Chinese army is four times the strength of the enemy and relying on favorable terrain to defend the Zhongtiao Mountain Defense Line.
In order to take Zhongtiao Mountain this time, the Japanese army specially transferred the 17th and 33rd infantry divisions from the central China battlefield to join the North China Front, and then transferred the 32nd and 83rd flying teams of the main forces of the 3rd Flying Group of the Kwantung Army to the two airfields of Yuncheng and Xinxiang to serve as air cooperation. This is not counting some of the puppet troops that cooperate with the Japanese army's actions, the total number of troops invested by the Japanese army in the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain has reached 100,000 people, and according to the combat strength at that time, 100,000 Japanese troops are fully capable of facing the frontal hard five or six hundred thousand central troops. Therefore, in terms of the number of troops, the Japanese army can completely gather heavy troops in order to break through the Zhongjo Mountain defense line.
The Japanese army gathered heavy troops to encircle Mount Nakajō
In addition, in order to cooperate with the attack on Mount Nakajō, the Japanese army had already launched the Battle of Southern Henan and Shanggao on the outskirts of Mount Nakajō in March of that year before launching the Battle of the Central Plains, creating a favorable campaign posture for a large-scale attack on Mount Nakajō. In April, the Japanese army adopted frequent requisitions and rumors to make the Nationalist government make the judgment that the Japanese army was likely to commit a crime from Jiyuan and Henggao Avenue, and successfully covered the japanese army's offensive deployment in the direction of Wenxi and Xia County to Zhangjiadian.
Before the battle began, the Japanese army also sent a number of special forces to infiltrate the Central Army's Zhongtiao Mountain Defense Zone, specifically lurking next to the headquarters of the defenders at all levels, with the aim of quickly paralyzing the command and communication system of the Chinese army after the battle began.
It is no exaggeration to say that the preparations made by the Japanese army before the battle are worth learning from the opponents!
On the side of the national army: changing generals in the front, withdrawing the main force, lack of supplies, seeing death and not saving
Compared with the Japanese army, the defenders of Nakajō Mountain not only lacked the awareness of combat readiness, but also committed a series of military taboos.
Although the Zhongtiao Mountain Defense Zone belonged geographically to Shanxi, it was not the Jin Sui Army of Yan Xishan that undertook the defensive task, but the Kuomintang Central Army under the command of Wei Lihuang. It was also under the direct command of Wei Lihuang that the Chinese defenders crushed the Japanese siege of Zhongtiao Mountain more than ten times in a row. However, before the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain began, Wei Lihuang was placed under house arrest at Mount Emei, Sichuan, because he was "pro-communist", and he was replaced by He Yingqin, the chief of staff.
Wei Lihuang
Changing generals can be said to be a taboo for soldiers, and this kind of decision-making will directly affect the operation of the army. Different commanders have their own tactical ideas, Wei Lihuang operated Zhongtiao Mountain, the maximum number of central troops stationed here was 260,000, defending Zhongtiao Mountain is a core task of Wei Lihuang's first theater of operations, long-term front-line command experience, but also let Wei Lihuang have a lot of experience in the Japanese army's attack on Zhongtiao Mountain. After He Yingqin took over, he originally lacked the experience of front-line combat command against Japan, and his mind was all focused on anti-communism, not only did not strengthen the Zhongtiao Mountain defense line, but instead the main force of the Zhongtiao Mountain defenders, such as the so-called "iron pillar of The Zhongtiao Mountain", all of the 4th Army, the 5th Group Army, the 36th Group, and so on were transferred out to carry out anti-communist operations, and after these elites were transferred, the number of Zhongtiao Mountain defenders was reduced to 1670,000. Because of this, the Japanese army in this battle had an "overwhelming advantage" over the defenders of Nakajō Mountain in terms of numbers.
In addition to changing generals and drawing the main force, the defense line of Zhongtiao Mountain was mostly a single-line defense, lacking depth, and it was easy to be broken by the Japanese army. As early as 1939, Wei Lihuang and the Soviet advisers who guided China's War of Resistance specifically reported to Chiang Kai-shek, hoping to adjust it as soon as possible, but unfortunately it did not attract enough attention, and this problem was not dealt with in time until the outbreak of the campaign. It is precisely because the Japanese army clearly sees this that they will use special forces to infiltrate the Zhongtiao Mountain Defense Zone in advance and destroy the communication lines of the various defensive lines of the Chinese defenders, so that the Chinese defensive forces can only fight for themselves in wartime and cannot be uniformly dispatched.
Kuomintang Central Army
Mistakes in military deployment laid the groundwork for the fiasco at the Battle of Nakajō Mountain. The lack of supplies led to the weakness of individual combat effectiveness, which was also an important factor in the vulnerability of the Zhongtiao Mountain Defense Line. For three consecutive years, the Japanese army frantically snatched and destroyed grain and other materials in the Nakajō Mountain area, and at the same time blocked the Nakajō Mountain from the periphery, resulting in logistical supply difficulties in the Nakajō Mountain area. Poor food and clothing and lack of medical treatment made the Chinese defenders extremely weak and extremely ineffective. The gap in combat equipment itself is very large, and now the logistics are weak, and there is a shortage of grain, grass, and ammunition; under the attack of the enemy's "superior troops," how can we not collapse at the touch of a button?
Whether it was the Northern Expedition or the War of Resistance, there were many factions within the Kuomintang, and they were fighting with each other, which always seriously restricted the exertion of the combat effectiveness of the Nationalist army. After the outbreak of the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain, the Central Army of the First Theater of Operations, which was responsible for frontal resistance to the Japanese attack, was still unable to unite and coordinate its operations, not to mention the YanXishan Department and the southern huzong department adjacent to the battlefield, they all took the measure of watching the fire from the other side, watching from the sidelines, and almost did not make any reinforcements.
Before the Battle of Nakajō-san began, part of the Nationalist army was used to transport supplies
In general, the Battle of Nakajō Mountain allowed the Japanese army to effortlessly take the so-called "Eastern Maginot Line" of The Nakajō Mountain, which had been unable to be conquered for a long time, and had to affirm the sufficient preparations made by the Japanese army before the war. On the other hand, the defenders, always lying on the merit book of repelling the Japanese army 13 times in a row, seem to think that the Zhongtiao Mountain defense line is indestructible, resulting in the idea of a light enemy, in the face of a powerful invading enemy, under the premise of their own combat strength, they actually changed generals and withdrew the main force, with such an inexplicable "self-confidence", they could not be defeated!
The loss of Mount Nakajō was not as simple as the loss of more than 80,000 people by the Nationalist army. Because the Kuomintang lost its last base on the battlefield in North China and was unable to continue to contain the Japanese army north of the Yellow River, the Japanese army began to concentrate its forces on carrying out an unprecedented sweep of the anti-Japanese base areas led by the Chinese Communists, and the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines in North China fell into the most arduous period.
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