Ma Xiaolin (Professor, Zhejiang Chinese University)
On January 26, the Franco-German-Russian-Ukrainian "Normandy model" quartet aimed at resolving the Ukraine crisis concluded in Paris, stressing the need to accelerate the implementation of the Minsk agreement and resuming the meeting in Berlin two weeks later. This is the first time in three years that all parties have reached a consensus, but this "peace conference" effort only loosened the exhaust valve of the Ukrainian crisis pressure cooker, and did not fundamentally solve the crisis. On the same day, the United States rejected Russia's demand that NATO not pull Ukraine into the partnership and other security guarantee conditions, which means that the two sides will continue to play games.
Ukrainian President Zelenskiy spoke highly of the Paris talks, saying they were significant and provided an opportunity to reach the solutions needed to achieve peace. He stressed that Ukraine's immediate priority is to achieve a stable and unconditional, secure and credible ceasefire in Donbass, and called for the strengthening of the "Normandy model" mechanism and the holding of summits at the level of the leaders of the countries concerned in order to implement the Minsk agreements and achieve a "just and stable" peace in Donbass. In a statement from the French presidential office, the representatives of the Quartet discussed the importance of the tripartite contact group on Ukraine (Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE) and said that it would strengthen the work of the mechanism to accelerate the implementation of the Minsk agreement.
The Normandy model, a multilateral mechanism for European parties to independently negotiate a solution to the Ukrainian crisis, stems from a series of consultations held by Russian, French, and Ukrainian leaders during the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the Normandy Landings in France in June 2016. The Minsk Agreement, a package of military and political agreements signed by the leaders of the four countries in February 2015, was centered on a ceasefire, withdrawal, arms reduction in eastern Ukraine, and the initiation of constitutional reforms to give the two states special status to ensure ethnic Russian rights. However, the Donbass region of Udong has always been in the midst of low-intensity conflicts and has become the focus of attention.
Zelenskiy's remarks this time are obviously optimistic and positive, indicating that the Kiev authorities are eager to get out of the crisis and avoid triggering the Ukrainian-Russian war. This tone is very different from his position in April, which called for an amendment to the Minsk agreement, and also shows that after Russia's struggle with the powerful forces of the United States, NATO and the European Union, Ukraine is powerless to control its own fate and can only find a way to avoid paying more for a great power showdown.
In fact, on the eve of the "peace conference" in Paris, the Ukrainian government had already "defended" Russia and staged a farce of inconsistencies and self-renegades. On the 24th, Danilov, secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, declared that there was no basis for the claim that Russia planned a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and that the movement of Russian troops in the area near the border of the country began a long time ago. It is well known that more than two months ago, Ukraine's intelligence chief, Budanov, sang about so-called intelligence from the United States, accusing Russia of attacking Ukraine from all directions in January or February 2022.
After the White House changed coaches last year, Russia and the Western camp led by the United States played a game to "shift the axis" and "return" from the Middle East to the Central and Eastern European regions. The Biden administration, which has a chaotic policy and obsessed with values diplomacy, has intensified friction with major strategic opponents while implementing a global strategic contraction to show the "return of the United States" and maintain its western ally status. This double adjustment of strategy and tactics has led to the recurrence of the "old wounds" of the Ukrainian crisis, which once gave way to the struggle for the Middle East's sphere of influence, and the relations between the two sides are tight across the board, almost on the verge of erupting.
The decline of US strength and diplomatic chaos, the difficulty of the Western camp, the general pattern of Europe's desire for Russia and the global game of great powers falling into a stalemate, prompting Moscow, who is good at seizing opportunities, to oppose the guests, to issue an "ultimatum" for NATO to stop its eastward expansion and the United States to abandon the threat of arrival, and on the pretext of the winter war readiness inspection exercise, mobilize the western, southern, and eastern theaters to train troops in the western, southern, and eastern theaters, and link up with the Belarusian military to carry out global linkage exercises in the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic waters, and even the Mediterranean Sea. Put on a posture of not hesitating to fight with NATO.
However, the Biden administration, which has angered Russia, has exposed its shortcomings in war timidity and avoidance, repeatedly claiming that it will not retaliate militarily for a possible Russian invasion and replace it with severe sanctions. What is even more surprising is that Washington actually took the lead in withdrawing diplomats from Ukraine and triggered allies such as Britain, France, Germany and Australia to follow suit, sending two negative messages to the outside world: war is about to break out, and Ukraine is about to be abandoned. The "runaway" move of the main NATO members has disappointed and panicked the Ukrainian government, so much so that it has issued a war response manual to citizens. The New York Times ridiculed Washington for making a "plan for the subjugation of the country" for Ukraine.
The Biden administration lacks courage and strength at the door, which is diametrically opposed to the White House's practice of forcing the Soviet Union to retreat from the Soviet Union in the Cuban crisis in 1962, exposing the hegemony of the United States and not hegemony, and also pushing down a new round of dominoes: NATO's small partner Croatia "turned against the war" and announced that once the Russo-Ukrainian War broke out, its own army would break away from the NATO camp. NATO's main force, Germany, refused to provide military aid to Ukraine and preventEd Estonia from supplying German-made weapons to Ukraine; another NATO cadre Turkey was busy brokering and reconciling Russian-Ukrainian contradictions.
The essence of the "Normandy model" is that France and Germany mediate the Russian-Ukrainian crisis in the middle, reflecting a certain European sense of autonomy and the desire to deal with the crisis independently. The revival and success of this model, as well as the soft talk of the Kiev authorities, show that Europe wants to abandon the Russian invasion "scarecrow" established by the United States, so as not to "take the chestnut in the fire" for it. 46.8% of the EU's natural gas and 40% of the fuel vehicle exhaust catalyst palladium come from Russia, so neither the military nor the energy can afford to offend this strong neighbor in the East.
Still, the long-standing fear of Russia in the United States and Europe has not been dispelled, and the United States has formally rejected Russia's list of security needs. Ukraine's internal ethnic rift is still a pain as a sequelae of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the recovery of Crimea is a pipe dream. The key issue for the Kiev authorities to rationally ponder is probably to "cling to the shortcomings" to the greatest extent under the federal system and avoid the continued Russification of eastern Ukraine, rather than for the 2008 NATO invitation in Bucharest to join the alliance, and Georgia will both become the funeral of the geopolitical game.