How should journalist Han Bing report define the failure of Italian football? In Sacchi's view, it was a full-blown rout at the academy and club level, reflected on the national team, but this does not explain Mancini's success in the first 3 years, especially the European Cup. In Capello's view, this was an atypical Italian defeat, as Mancini departed from the tradition on which Italian football used to succeed. Everyone is trying to find the most fundamental reason for Italy's exit, including Mancini himself. But whether it's luck, system or style, which is the decisive factor?
One thing is undeniable, as Capello put it, Mancini's past success does not represent the present. Failure means that changes must be made, and helping Mancini to lift the 433 "little fast" of the European Championship, at least for now, is out of date. Capello wants Italy to catch up with the trend of football, from Guardiola 15 years ago to Klopp in the present. But this is still not typical Italian football, or an atypical follow-up.
Sacchi has channeled the anger of public opinion to a deeper level of shrinking youth training and the compression of local player space brought about by too many foreign players in Serie A, while Capello has avoided the system issue and only discussed the more direct style issue. In an interview with Sky Sports, Capello provoked the "style dispute" that has been hotly discussed in the past few days, he believes that Italian football has been imitating Guardiola for the past 15 years, but the result is the loss of offensive penetration and traditional confrontational advantages, and the failure brought about by the difficulty of scoring continues to dampen the morale of Italian football.
Capello directly pointed out that he hopes that Italian football will fully learn Klopp-style efficient football in the future, and believes that Atalanta, Fiorentina and Genoa have completed Klopp-style tactical experiments in Serie A. Atalanta has become the representative of serie A offensive football in recent years, and Genoa's Bleusing is even more radical and rich in tactics than Klopp's. Most Italian clubs, including the national team, are generally behind in terms of tactical style, and the players do not have the technical advantages of the Spaniards, but they also insist on pass control and small forwards or even no front formations, resulting in offensive stagnation, slow pace of the game, and lack of positive "goal" tactics.
Mancini, who promised to change the typical style of Italian football that lacked skill, single tactics and was not creative when he took office 4 years ago, introduced 433, abandoning the traditional strong center in pursuit of midfield passing and team attacks of small forwards. But Mancini, who has seen high-speed, high-intensity football and success in the Premier League, certainly will not copy Guardiola's passing tactics 15 years ago. To be precise, Mancini can only "heal the headache" of Italian football on the basis of not having enough good players, trying to open the situation through the tactics of the small forward team that looks very "Guardiola".
The combination of high-post pressing and passing control is indeed Guardiola's stunt in Barcelona's sweep of Europe in the 2008/09 season, but Klopp's high-pressure football is also emphasized oppression. Mancini's tactics had been very successful in the previous three years, creating a 37-game unbeaten run and 13 consecutive wins, proving its power. The same tactics can win the European Championship, but also in the case of poor personnel, poor luck, 4 qualifiers lost 6 points to be forced to the play-offs, and in the overall advantage of the situation by North Macedonia, certainly not which style can determine the success or failure of the problem.
Of course, Capello is by no means unreasonable, and the Mancini 433 is facing a dense defense in the pursuit of pass control, and it is bound to be difficult to play a high-speed breakthrough and a more penetrating attack. This is true for Bulgaria, Northern Ireland and North Macedonia, because there is no penalty area fulcrum, the physical confrontation ability is insufficient, the opponent is resolutely posing in the iron barrel formation, and most of the more than 30 shots are actually ineffective attacks in Capello's mouth. Italy's weakness on the offensive end was already evident in some european championship games, but the world cup qualifiers that followed were thoroughly amplified by more pragmatic opponents.
Mancini hopes to bring Italian "beautiful football" and bid farewell to the traditional defensive counterattack "ugly football", but it turns out that the success of the Italians is rooted in a typical Italian defensive system. Anti-traditional innovation in the midfield can gain an advantage for a period of time by virtue of the unfamiliarity of the opponent, but it will soon be targeted to counteract. What's more, even Mancini himself cannot deny that italian football does not have real top stars, and it is impossible to seize fleeting opportunities like Rossi, Baggio, Vieri and Big Inzaghi.
The defensive line on which Mancini has been successful is a combination that has lasted for 10 years, and these 10 years are the 10 years of the total collapse of the Italian youth system. The only Italian international who can stand in the top five leagues is Verratti, and the Italian club has only Juventus able to barely maintain its standards in European competitions after 2010, and in recent years, it has deteriorated with the aging of the main team. The failure of the Milan Duo, Roma and Napoli to succeed in Europe means that homegrown players do not have the experience of playing at a high level. Today's Serie A is no longer the "little World Cup" of the 1990s, and any advanced tactics that are not achieved by players who are good enough are empty talk.
"Milan Sport" summed up the defeat of the Italian team this time, did not shy away from the style of the dispute, but more emphasis is in the face of the reality that Italy from the youth training to the league is no longer the european first-class level. Only by accepting this helpless status quo can Mancini and his possible successors devise tactics for Italy that match its own strengths and characteristics. For example, the inevitable return of traditional strong centers, such as defensive counterattacks re-entering the mainstream, such as no longer extravagantly looking forward to finding a technical midfielder. At a time when the Italian national team, which was still full of youth training 20 years ago, can only continue to supplement key positions through naturalization, the future of Italian football may depend more on the quality of naturalized players.
At the very least, Jorginho will remain an indispensable mainstay in midfield, and Lazio's Filipe is likely to gradually pick up the main beam in the defensive line. This transition period can be a bit lengthy, after all, compared to France, Germany, Portugal, Belgium and even the Netherlands, which are more resourced in immigrants and naturalized players, Italy can hardly expect high-level naturalized players, and can only pin its hopes on the slow recovery of the youth training system. Mancini admits to looking forward and focusing on the future, but the future leaves him with very limited options. The same is true for a possible successor, Cannavaro, Gattuso or Ancelotti, which is the current state of Italian football.