<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="6" > Four Field General Series 25: Zhong Wei (I</h1>).
Author: Mast
The warrior with the most stories in the four fields is Zhong Wei. He has an open personality, is untamed, can fight, scold, and grab, and is one of the prototypes of the role of Li Yunlong in "Bright Sword", known as "China's Barton". He said that he had a bad relationship with the political commissar of a large number of partners, said that he left northern Jiangsu with his wife, children and guards in a rage, and said that he disobeyed orders and "mobilized" Lin Biao during the battle of Paoshantun . Even more mysteriously, it is said that he drew his gun and held the head of the deputy commander of the corps during the battle in Qingshuping. However, these statements, which the author has consulted a lot of materials and the recollections of the parties concerned, do have factual basis, but they obviously have exaggerated words or derivative elements; some are made up out of thin air, such as guns pointing at Commander Chen's head. Today, let's first talk about the relationship between Zhong Wei and the political commissar.
First of all, it should be noted that in the war years, the position of political commissars was usually higher than that of military commanders.
There is a plot in the second episode of the TV series "Bright Sword": the superior arranged for Zhao Gang to be the political commissar of the independent regiment. When he first arrived at the Independent Regiment, Li Yunlong was extremely snide to Zhao Gang, saying: "When we first met, we still made our words clearer, separating the military from the government, and doing our own thing; I have the final say in the war, and you have the final say in life... There is also thought work, and as for the rest, you should worry less. Some people think of Zhong Wei. In fact, this line, it seems that the political commissar can only manage life, seriously divorced from the facts, why say so?
First, during the war years, from the Red Army to the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression to the War of Liberation, our army basically did not distinguish between military and political affairs. There are many cases of military and political alternate positions, and many political work cadres can fight wars. Many of our army's generals served as political commissars in the early days, such as Wang Zhen, Yang Yong, Ye Fei, Yang Chengwu, and Deng Hua. Another prototype of Li Yunlong, Wang Jinshan, also served as deputy political commissar of the 385 Brigade during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. In fact, during the Red Army period, Zhong Wei served as the secretary of the general branch of the regiment, the political commissar of the regiment, and the director of the political department of the division, and never served as a military commander; in the first half of the War of Resistance Against Japan, he was also the regimental political commissar of the New Fourth Army. That is to say, before 1943, Zhong Wei had been engaged in political work. In the war years, there was no such thing as a military commander looking down on the political commissar.
Second, in the history of our army, we have always opposed individual heroism and emphasized organizational principles and collective leadership. The vast majority of cadres at that time, whether military or political work cadres, had strong organizational principles, obeyed orders and obeyed commands, and did whatever the organization called for. For example, at the beginning of the reorganization of the Red Army into the Eighth Route Army, Huang Yongsheng, commander of the 685 Regiment, and Deng Hua, deputy regimental commander (actually political commissar), "did not have a good relationship", and the result was that within a month, The commander of the Huang Regiment was transferred. This situation arises both as a difference of opinion at work and for individual reasons, not as a personal grudge. Even when Huang and Deng, who "couldn't get along", when Yan'an established the 2nd Brigade in August 1944, the two became partners, one was a brigade commander and the other was a political commissar. It is impossible for a new political commissar to be treated with such a way as Li Yunlong, who has spoken out in a manner that is not inferior in reality.
1938, Yan'an Kangda, Zhong Wei (back row left), Su Zhenhua (front row left)
Third, and most importantly, in a sense, in the war years, the position of the political commissar was higher than that of the military commander- Since the reorganization of Sanwan, the principle of who should command the barrel of the gun has been established. The Draft Regulations on Political Work of the Red Army issued in October 1930 and the Provisional Regulations on the Work of political commissars of the Red Army in November 1933 clearly stipulate that political commissars have the final say. For example, the regulations on the work of political commissars clearly stipulate that when there is a dispute between the military and political officials, the military commander must act in accordance with the opinions of the political commissar before obtaining instructions from his superiors. The "dispute" provided for here refers to all matters, including military command, that is, when the two sides disagree, the military commander must listen to the political commissar. Therefore, in the film and television drama, it is said that the military commander and the political commissar do not have a good relationship, and most of them are acting.
Due to changes in the situation, in October 1942, the "Provisional Regulations of the Political Commissar" were amended: except for combat operations, which were decided by the military commander, other matters were finally decided by the political commissar, but at the same time reported to the superiors. From this time on, the final decision-making power in the military was exercised by the military commander-in-chief, and it was no longer the main duty of the political commissar, but the political commissar still had the "political decision-making power", especially the right to organize and appoint cadres at all levels. That is to say, even after this, the commissar still has the final say in addition to combat operations.
Some articles say that Zhong Wei and the political commissar mostly do not have a good relationship, or do not look up to the political commissar. For example, in some articles about the battle of Paoshantun, it is also specifically said that "Zhong Wei and the political commissar have serious differences."
It should be said that Zhong Wei has a very strong personality, does not tend to be inflammatory, does not attach himself to the situation, has a straight heart, has a straight heart, has a rough and detailed combat command, has a hard work style, and has many ideas. Many people like such a warrior, and it is also eye-catching to put on the silver screen. Because of his strong personality, it was normal to disagree with the political commissar at work, especially in the war years when he was free to speak. But judging from some reminiscences, these differences in work are not the norm, nor are they serious enough to "have a bad relationship with the political commissar." Specific to the battle of Paoshantun, there is no such thing as a "serious disagreement" between the military and the government.
At 2:00 a.m. on March 10, 1947, the 5th Division of the 2nd Column, which had been ordered to advance eastward, discovered that there was an enemy reinforcement battalion in the Yongshenggong Pot Compound southeast of Shantun ( Paoshan Tun ). At this time, there were two choices in front of the division commander Zhong Wei: one was to continue to carry out the dongzong's order to march east, and the other was to fight the enemy in person first. In this regard, Zhong Wei immediately convened a meeting to study the action plan. At the meeting, two opinions were disputed, and Zhong Wei and others advocated fighting, saying that "this battle must be fought resolutely, and I alone am responsible for the mistake." Finally, the meeting decided to suspend the eastward advance and annihilate the enemy on the spot. Immediately, Zhong Wei arranged troops to organize an attack while reporting to the commander-in-chief of the 2nd Column and the East. After receiving the report, the commander of the 2nd Column thought that it was possible to mobilize the enemy to help the enemy and create a support fighter, so he immediately agreed to the plan of the 5th Division. The East later agreed to the 5th Division's battle plan.
From this point, it can be shown that Zhong Wei is not only a military commander who dares to be responsible, but also pays attention to organizational principles. The decision to attack the patron hill was submitted to the meeting for collective study. Although Zhong Wei is a "militant" with a prominent personality, he is not reckless. It can also be seen from this that some articles say that "Zhong Wei has serious differences with the political commissar" and "whoever dares to mention the word 'go' again will shoot whom", etc., are all speeches.
Of course, Zhong Wei, as a military commander, keenly discovered and grasped the fighter plane, as well as the flexible maneuvering in command, which was an important factor in the victory of this battle, and also created conditions for the follow-up encirclement points to provide assistance. To this end, the 5th Division was commended for "the enthusiasm and mobility of this kind of combat deserve praise and development."
In addition, Zhong Weiji's decision to act on the backer of the battle, "mobilizing Lin Biao" is true, and "disobeying orders" is untrue. Let's talk about this issue again.
【Deeply cultivate the history of war, carry forward positive energy, welcome to submit, private messages will be restored】