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Strategic Deployment: The decisive action of the Western Route Army
In 1949, as the strategic superiority of the Chinese People's Liberation Army became increasingly prominent throughout the country, the 13th Corps of the Siye Corps of the Western Road Army launched a key military operation. This force started from Wugang in southern Hunan and advanced rapidly along the Hunan-Guizhou border, and the speed and tactical arrangement of the troops showed a high degree of organization and determination.
With the pace of advancement, the troops first liberated the Rong River. Rongjiang, as a small town with a key geographical location, occupies an important position in the strategic layout of the PLA. The troops quickly took control of the town without strong resistance, ensuring the smooth follow-up operation. The troops then continued to advance southward, and soon occupied Congjiang. The occupation of Congjiang further consolidated the PLA's influence in the region and laid a solid foundation for the next operation.
Subsequently, the troops continued to move south until they reached the river. The strategic location of Hechi is extremely important for the entire Guangxi region as it is located at the intersection of several major transportation routes. The arrival of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) quickly changed the local military situation and made the deployment of the Kuomintang army passive.
After consolidating their positions in Hechi, the troops continued their strategic plan and shifted the focus of the operation to the Jinsha River. Through a series of swift and precise military operations, the PLA successively occupied key positions along the Jinsha River, which not only ensured the PLA's supply line, but also provided strategic support for further advance into the western Guizhou region.
After completing the campaign along the Jinsha River, the operation of the Western Route Army entered a new stage. This 1,500-mile-long strategic detour not only demonstrated the PLA's high strategic strategy and excellent marching ability, but also directly threatened Baise, a military town in western Guangxi. The geographical location of Baise was extremely important in the military layout of the whole Guangxi, controlling the main routes from Guangdong to Guangxi and further to Yunnan and Guizhou.
Bai Chongxi's tactical adjustments
In the face of the strong offensive of the People's Liberation Army, Bai Chongxi felt unprecedented pressure. In order to hold strategic points and stop the further advance of the PLA, he quickly adjusted his tactical layout. Bai Chongxi ordered his troops to carry out rapid geographical movements, the core of which was to secretly assemble forces on the Bobai, Yulin, Beiliu and Lingxi lines to form a solid defensive line. Due to the importance of their geographical location, these areas became key defensive points for the Kuomintang army.
The 3rd Corps and the 11th Corps, in accordance with Bai Chongxi's orders, quickly assembled in the designated area. These two corps were deployed on the front line, directly facing the main direction of attack of the PLA. Their task was to build fortifications in the Bobai and Yulin areas, taking advantage of the local terrain, setting up obstacles and mines in preparation for the attack of the PLA. In Beiliu and Lingxi, they set up ambush circles, hoping to inflict heavy losses on the PLA when it attacked.
The commander of the 3rd Corps, Zhang Gan, was known among the Kuomintang army for his unique divination habits. At every important juncture of the war, he always asked his subordinates to bring a compass and perform divination, trying to find good fortune and evil in battle. This practice led him to be nicknamed "General Compass" by his subordinates and opponents. There are many stories circulating in the army about Zhang Gan's use of the compass to predict the war, and these stories have been passed down orally among the troops and have become a peculiar legend.
Zhang Gan's habit may have been initially merely to boost morale, trying to use the soldiers' belief in traditional superstitions to strengthen their will to fight. He often took out his compass before the troops advanced, performed a mysterious ritual, and then announced the good fortune. Such rituals often cause a stir among the soldiers and increase their confidence in the upcoming battle.
However, as the war deepened, Zhang Gan himself gradually became convinced of the effect of this divination. Whenever he made a major decision, he relied on the instructions given by the compass. This reliance on non-scientific divination results led to his military decision-making increasingly detached from the actual battlefield situation, sometimes even ignoring reconnaissance reports and battlefield analysis, and acting solely on compass instructions.
At the same time, Bai Chongxi also instructed the 1st and 10th Corps to retreat to the Guangdong-Guizhou border. This strategy is designed to conserve forces for a contingency and allow room for a possible counterattack by actively retreating. During the retreat, these units were responsible for carrying out sabotage missions with the aim of weakening the pursuit capabilities of the PLA. They have damaged several transportation arteries, demolished bridges, blown up roads, and severely affected the transportation of heavy equipment and supplies to the PLA. Although this sabotage operation brought certain difficulties to the advance of the PLA, its impact was limited due to the strong logistical support and high mobility of the PLA.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) was not surprised by these tactical adjustments by Bai Chongxi. Through the information of scouts and local guerrillas, they quickly grasped the movements and dispositions of the Kuomintang troops. The PLA commanders quickly adjusted their tactics and adopted a strategy of encirclement and intersperse, aiming to put pressure on the KMT's defensive line from multiple directions and seek to break its defensive layout.
Constant pressure from the PLA
Beginning on November 25, the Nationalist forces launched a series of raids on the Lianjiang, Maoming, and Xinyi fronts in Guangdong in an attempt to turn the tide of the war. The fighting in these areas was characterized by complex terrain, and the Kuomintang troops, taking advantage of the familiar terrain, organized several small-scale ambushes and raids. They laid mines and blasting traps against the PLA's supply lines and advance routes, hoping to slow down the PLA's advance.
Although the Kuomintang army gained a temporary tactical advantage in some parts, these efforts of the Kuomintang army were quickly offset by the fact that the overall strategic layout was already at a disadvantage, and the PLA was efficient and firm in the execution of tactics. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) responded quickly and accurately to the surprise attack of the Kuomintang troops, mobilizing nearby forces to quickly encircle and neutralize the small Kuomintang forces that launched the raid.
By 27 November, the PLA's 4th Corps had completed its combat deployment in the frontline areas around the Lianjiang River, and was ready for battle. The corps' troops set up strong defensive lines at key points such as communication arteries, bridges, and important villages and towns, equipped with sufficient artillery and machine guns, and built fortifications in preparation for a possible large-scale counteroffensive by the Kuomintang army.
The PLA's continuous assault began to unfold from multiple directions, trying to completely cut off the retreat and supply lines of the Kuomintang army. In the Maoming area, the PLA, taking advantage of its superior artillery and tank forces, launched intensive artillery bombardments and charges at key positions defended by the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang troops in these areas were repeatedly lost positions under the double blow of the PLA's fire suppression and mobile forces.
At the same time, in Xinyi, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) carried out a flanking attack on the Kuomintang army through the flexible use of mobile forces and local rebel forces. The PLA troops made a detour from the flank, cutting off the rear route of the Kuomintang troops, leaving them in a passive defensive state. Under the continuous pressure of the PLA, the morale of the Kuomintang troops fell further, and many units began to collapse.
A decisive victory in the Battle of Baise
By the beginning of December 1949, the PLA's strategic deployment was nearing completion. The 15th Army and the 43rd Army successfully joined forces east of Bobai and coordinated with the 14th Army south of the Nanliu River to form a comprehensive encirclement of the Kuomintang 3rd Corps. This strategic encirclement move was the result of the PLA's meticulous planning to completely cut off the Kuomintang's military power in Guangxi.
The actions of the PLA were swift and powerful, and they used the tactics of a large number of infantry and artillery to encircle the county town of Bobai from several directions. Under this pressure, the Kuomintang's defensive line was gradually compressed, and it was impossible to maintain the original tactical layout. The loss of Bobai, as a key strategic point at that time, meant the complete collapse of the Kuomintang power in Guangxi.
On December 2, the Bobai County Library, which had been transformed into the temporary headquarters of the Kuomintang 3rd Corps, was in chaos. As the People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues to approach, there is a tense atmosphere inside and outside the library. The shouts of the People's Liberation Army continued, and the artillery fire continued, shaking the entire county. Under this extreme pressure, the organizational structure of the Kuomintang army began to disintegrate, and the soldiers' will to resist gradually dissipated.
The remnants of the Kuomintang 3rd Corps were soon completely surrounded by the PLA. During the siege, Zhang Gan's command failed, and his troops were unable to form an effective resistance. The offensive of the People's Liberation Army came like a tidal wave, and the Kuomintang soldiers surrendered or fled the battlefield one after another. Zhang Gan, the general who was once known for his compass divination, finally laid down his arms and accepted the arrangement of fate in this desperate situation.
With the fall of Bobai, Zhang Gan's military career came to an end. He was captured by the People's Liberation Army and sent to the Gongdelin War Criminals Management Center. There, despite being in a cage, Zhang Gan's character remained unchanged, and he still maintained a kind of attachment to traditional culture. He asked the prison administration to buy him a copy of the Zhou Yi, an ancient Chinese philosophical book that deals with the complex theories of divination and numerology.
While in prison, Zhang Gan had an interesting conversation with a correctional officer. When he got "Zhou Yi", he mysteriously told the discipline that only two people can really understand the deep meaning of this book in today's China. Out of curiosity, the disciplinarian asks who these two people are. Zhang Gan proudly pointed to his nose, claiming that one of them was himself. When the discipline asked who the other person was, Zhang Gan replied proudly that it was Mao Runzhi. In these words, Zhang Gan not only expressed confidence in his own cultural attainments, but also inadvertently revealed a kind of recognition of Mao Zedong's opponent, albeit with irony and self-deprecation.
Reference: Ding Naixian. Inheritance,2000,0(6):45-47