The headquarters of the two armies combined and divided
On June 12, 1935, the 2nd Division of the 1st Army Corps, the vanguard of the Red Front Army, successfully joined the 25th Division of the Ninth Army of the Red Fourth Front Army at Dawei Town in Maogong (now Xiaojin) County after crossing the snow-capped Jiajin Mountain at an altitude of more than 4,000 meters.
On 16 July, the principal leaders of the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution and the responsible persons of the Ninth and 30th Armies of the Fourth Front Army held a meeting of the victorious divisions of the First and Fourth Front Armies at the Catholic Church in Maogong County
("Seventy Years of the Communist Party of China" says: "The meeting of the Red First and Fourth Front armies was held at the mouth of the two rivers north of Maogong", which is incorrect).
After eight months of arduous fighting, the Central Red Army broke through the pursuit and interception of hundreds of thousands of troops of Chiang Kai-shek and the warlords of various provinces, and finally brought the two main Red Armies that had been divided together. This not only strategically shattered the reactionaries' dreams of annihilating the Red Army, but also showed that the strength of the Red Army was still strong. This excellent situation greatly encouraged the Red Army's commanders and fighters' will to fight and their confidence in victory.
However, due to serious differences between the Party Central Committee and Zhang Guotao, the principal leader of the Red Fourth Front Army, over the direction of action of the two armies, the Red Army was later divided from a merger, which we did not expect at that time
Zhu De and Zhang Guotao fought in a tongue battle at the mouth of the two rivers
After the victorious rendezvous of the Central Red Army and the Red Fourth Front Army, the total strength of the Central Red Army and the Fourth Front Army was about 100,000 (the ratio of the strength of the Central Red Army to the Fourth Front Army was 2:8), which created extremely favorable conditions for continuing to develop the revolutionary situation and opening up a new situation.
However, after our army arrived in Maogong, it also found that the geographical environment in which we were located was not optimistic. Although the territory occupied by the Red Army is vast, the Greater and Lesser Jinchuan valleys and the surrounding areas in northwestern Sichuan are all high mountains and poor valleys, sparsely populated, and mostly inhabited by ethnic minorities, and there are complicated ethnic problems left over from history, which are not conducive to the Red Army's survival, development, and establishment of revolutionary base areas.
Therefore, the most important task facing the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution is to correctly formulate the strategic policy for the two main forces of the Red Army after they join forces. However, judging from the telegrams sent and received by the First Bureau of our General Headquarters from 16 to 20 June, the leaders of the Central Committee and the leaders of the Red Fourth Front Army discussed the fact that there were serious differences between the Party Central Committee, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and Zhang Guotao, the principal leader of the Red Fourth Front Army at that time, on the direction of action of the two armies.
In order to resolve this issue of strategic policy, the party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution sent a special telegram inviting Zhang Guotao to a meeting at Lianghekou to discuss this major policy.
The mouth of the two rivers, as the name suggests, is where two rivers meet. One is the Mengbi River flowing down from Mengbi Mountain, the big snow mountain in the north; The other is the Hongqiao River that flows down from Hongqiao Mountain in the east of Daxue Mountain, and after the two rivers meet, it is called the Fu River, which is the upper reaches of the Xiaojin River, and the river is turbulent. Located 70 kilometers north of Maogong, Lianghekou is a town of more than 200 households.
When Zhang Guotao came to the town from Maoxian (present-day Maowen) on the afternoon of June 25, Zhu De, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Bogu, and others, who had previously come here, led hundreds of people from the organs and units directly under the Central Revolutionary Military Commission braved the drizzle to greet him on the road south of the small street.
When Zhang Guotao saw the warm welcome of the central leading comrades, he got off his horse. Zhang Guotao was accompanied by his secretary general, Huang Chao, and nearly 100 cavalry guards and traffic teams. This is the first time I have met Zhang Guotao.
That evening, Zhu De took the initiative to visit Zhang Guotao out of the friendly feelings and unity among comrades who had not been seen for eight years (that is, after the Nanchang Uprising broke up in Guangdong). When recounting the old feelings, Zhang Guotao actually used a bad trick and said: "I didn't expect the First Front Army to become so weak, there are only 20,000 people left, while the Fourth Front Army has grown from 10,000 when it entered northern Sichuan to more than 80,000 now......"
He revealed his dissatisfaction with the leadership of the Party Central Committee and wanted to win the support of Zhu De, who had the most combat experience, in an attempt to seize the supreme power of the Party and the Red Army. When Zhu De found that the tone of Zhang Guotao's conversation was not right, he immediately tried to persuade him, saying that he had only more than 800 people left after the battle at Sanheba and only a few thousand people when he was in Jinggangshan, and that he could still create a revolutionary base area, expand the Red Army, and smash Chiang Kai-shek's four "encirclement and suppression" of the central Soviet region, and persuaded Zhang Guotao to have confidence, and now that the two armies have converged, the Red Army has 100,000 people, and the situation is very good.
At the same time, Zhu De expounded the specific opinions and reasons of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution on the direction of action of the two armies, and pointed out that the plan for the westward expansion of the Red Fourth Front Army was not only very difficult, but also had no future. On the contrary, the Shaanxi and Gansu regions, where our army advanced northward, had a wide territory, convenient transportation, abundant products, and were mostly inhabited by Han people, so the Red Army was convenient for mobile operations and created a consolidated revolutionary base area.
Zhu De's "war of words" and patient persuasion that night made Zhang Guotao's desire for power somewhat restrained, and he verbally agreed with the correct opinions of the party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution.
On the morning of 26 June, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting at the headquarters of the Lianghekou Headquarters and the First Bureau to discuss the course of action after the convergence of the two armies.
Present at the meeting were: Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Zhang Guotao, Bo Gu, Wang Jiaxiang, Deng Fa, Liu Shaoqi, Kaifeng, Liu Bocheng, Li Fuchun, Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Dehuai, Lin Boqu, and a total of 16 people.
It should be noted that Chen Yun, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, did not attend the meeting because he was sent by the Party Central Committee to Shanghai after the Red Army captured Tianquan on June 7 to resume the Party's secret work in the White Zone.
After the Provisional Central Committee moved into the Soviet zone in 1933, the party in the White Zone suffered heavy losses in succession, and it was very difficult to carry out its work; After the Party Central Committee crossed the Xiangjiang River with the Red Army's Long March, it lost contact with the Shanghai Party. Under these circumstances, although the Red Army was in the midst of a difficult journey northward, it was very far-sighted for the Central Committee to send a member of the Standing Committee to work in the White Zone.
Later, Chen Yun went deep into the Kuomintang-ruled areas, conveyed the spirit of the Zunyi Conference to the underground party, and effectively carried out the work in the white areas. In September of the same year, he went from Shanghai to Moscow to report to the Comintern on the situation after the withdrawal of the Central Red Army from the Central Revolutionary Base Area, and to participate in the work of the CCP delegation to the Comintern. The post of political commissar of the Military Commission column that he originally held was taken over by Cai Shufan.
According to the archives of the Central Archives, Zhou Enlai first made a report on the current course of action on behalf of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution, and then Zhang Guotao gave a briefing on the activities of the Red Fourth Front Army, expressed his agreement with the report of the Central Committee, and at the same time put forward the proposal that the First and Fourth Front armies concentrate 20 regiments to fight Hu Zongnan in the Songpan area.
After that, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, Bogu, Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, Deng Fa, Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, Nie Rongzhen, Kaifeng, Liu Shaoqi, Zhang Wentian and others spoke one after another, "all adopted Enlai's strategic policy."
Mao Zedong was the fifth speech, and after agreeing with Zhou Enlai's report and Zhang Guotao's speech, he focused on five issues, namely, the establishment of base areas after the convergence of the two armies, the nature of the war, a high degree of mobility, the concentration of troops, and unified command. When talking about the issue of concentrating troops, he specifically mentioned that "in the main attack, such as the attack on Songpan, Guotao is right to say that it wants 20 regiments," which reflects the party Central Committee's respect for the comrades of the four front armies and their earnest desire for unity.
At the end of the meeting, Zhang Wentian was entrusted with drafting a decision for the Politburo. On 28 June, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee formally issued the "Decision on the Strategic Guidelines for the First and Fourth Front Armies after Their Convergence."
The decision stated: "After the convergence of the First and Fourth Front Armies, our strategic policy is to concentrate the main forces to attack northward, to destroy the enemy in large numbers in a campaign of movement, to first take southern Gansu, to create base areas in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu, and to place the Soviet movement in China on the most consolidated and broader basis, so as to win victory in the northwestern provinces of China and even in the whole of China." ”
On 29 July, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee convened another meeting of the Standing Committee to study the organizational issue of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. In order to strengthen unity with the Red Fourth Front Army, it was decided to add Zhang Guotao as vice chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao as members of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission.
On the same day, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and the General Headquarters further formulated a plan for the Songpan campaign.
After that, the Party Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission led the main force of the Red Army to the north, crossed the second and third snow-capped mountains, Mengbi Mountain and Changban Mountain, and reached the Heishui (Luhua) area in mid-July.
Before the two armies met, Zhang Guotao spread to the Red Fourth Front Army that the 300,000 men of the Central Red Army were marching westward, and he deliberately exaggerated it. When he saw that the Central Red Army had suffered considerable losses, was weak in constitution, and its troops were fatigued, and the total strength was only more than 20,000 due to the long-distance march and the battle of 10,000 miles, he thought that it was the political line of the Party Central Committee that caused the Central Red Army to suffer such heavy losses.
The strength of the Fourth Front Army under his leadership was three times greater than that of the First Army, and the troops were strong and strong, and there were many men and guns, so his line was correct. He also boasted that he was one of the 12 delegates to the party's first congress and a veteran of the party, and that no one could compete with him except Mao Zedong.
Therefore, from the Lianghekou Conference, Zhang Guotao's spearhead was aimed at Mao Zedong, wooed Zhu De, lobbied Zhang Wentian, and undermined the unity of the Party Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission with Mao Zedong as the core of leadership. After this move was completely bankrupt, Zhang Guotao returned to the headquarters of the Fourth Front Army and openly vented his dissatisfaction with the Party Central Committee at a cadre meeting under the pretext that the so-called Lianghekou Conference had not resolved the "unified command" and "organizational issues."
Under these circumstances, in order to strengthen the unity of the two front armies, the party Central Committee went north side by side and sent a central condolence group composed of Li Fuchun, Liu Bocheng, Lin Boqu, and Li Weihan to the headquarters of the Fourth Front Army in Zagunao (present-day Li County) to offer condolences, and was warmly welcomed by the commanders and fighters of the Fourth Front Army.
However, Zhang Guotao challenged the Central Committee's condolence group, demanded power from the Party Central Committee, and incited his supporters to send a telegram to the Central Committee, suggesting that Zhang Guotao, Chen Changhao, and others should serve as the main leaders of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and even the Party Central Committee.
On July 16 and 18, Chen Changhao sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution, stating that "the post resolutely advocates the centralization of military leadership, otherwise it will not be possible to successfully destroy the enemy." The post is still to ask Tao to be the chairman of the Central Military Commission, General Zhu (as) the commander-in-chief of the former enemy, and Vice Chairman Zhou and chief of staff. After the Central Political Situation decided on the major policy, he gave the Military Commission an independent decision" (1), insisted on reorganizing the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and the General Headquarters of the Red Army, and usurped the power of military command.
Although the party Central Committee resolutely rejected the unreasonable demands of Zhang Guotao and a very small number of his followers, at the same time, in order to strengthen the unity of the party and the collective leadership of the two fronts, it recruited Zhang Guotao to work at the headquarters, and made concessions. Zhou Enlai suggested to the Party Central Committee that he no longer concurrently serve as the General Political Commissar of the Red Army. On July 18, the Party Central Committee appointed Zhang Guotao as General Political Commissar of the Red Army.
On the 20th, the following adjustments were made to the organizational and command system of the Red Army and the positions of cadres:
Zhu De, chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and Zhang Guotao, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Jiaxiang, vice chairmen.
Zhu De, commander-in-chief of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, Zhang Guotao, chief of the General Political Commissar, Liu Bocheng, chief of the General Staff, and Bogu, director of the General Political Department.
The 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 9th Army Corps of the Red Army were changed to the following:
First Army: Army Commander Lin Biao, Political Commissar Nie Rongzhen, Chief of Staff Zuo Quan.
Three armies: Army Commander Peng Dehuai, Political Commissar Yang Shangkun, Chief of Staff Xiao Jinguang.
Fifth Army: Army Commander Dong Zhentang, Political Commissar Zeng Risan, Chief of Staff Cao Lihuai.
32nd Army: Army Commander Luo Binghui, Political Commissar He Changgong, Chief of Staff Guo Tianmin.
The numbers of the armies under the Red Fourth Front Army remained unchanged. Namely:
Fourth Army: Army Commander Xu Shiyou, Political Commissar Wang Jian'an, Chief of Staff Zhang Zongxun (former commander of the Third Army Corps).
Ninth Army: Army Commander Sun Yuqing, Political Commissar Chen Haisong, Chief of Staff Chen Bojun (former Chief of Staff of the Fifth Army Corps).
30th Army: Army Commander Cheng Shicai (acting), Political Commissar Li Xiannian, Chief of Staff Li Tianyou (former commander of the Third Army Corps).
31st Army: Army Commander Yu Tianyun, Political Commissar Zhan Caifang, Chief of Staff Li Jukui (former commander of the First Army).
33rd Army: Army Commander Luo Nanhui, Political Commissar Zhang Guangcai, Chief of Staff Li Rong (former commander of the Military Commission Cadre Regiment and Battalion).
The formation of the general command of the former enemy
On 21 July, after listening to a report by Zhang Guotao, Xu Xiangqian, commander-in-chief of the Red Fourth Front Army, and Chen Changhao, political commissar of the Red Fourth Front Army, on the military and political situation of the Fourth Front Army in Heishui, the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution decided:
The General Headquarters of the Red Fourth Front Army was promoted to the General Headquarters of the Red Army's former enemy, Xu Xiangqian concurrently served as the commander-in-chief of the former enemy, Chen Changhao was appointed political commissar, and Ye Jianying was appointed chief of staff.
In order to strengthen the staff work of the former enemy's general headquarters, at the request of the leading comrades of the Red Fourth Front Army, a number of relatively capable staff cadres were transferred from the general headquarters to work with Ye Jianying.
What I remember are: Bi Zhanyun was the chief of the reconnaissance section, Lai Guangxun was the chief of the map section, Lu Jixi was the deputy chief of the operations section, Cao Danhui was the head of the radio station, and there were more than 10 people, including Chen Maosheng and Huang Minghuang as translators and telegraphers, and Liu Tiansheng, a section member.
I was very impressed with this transfer.
I remember that on the morning of July 22, Vice Chairman Zhou Enlai came to our operations section, and when I was not on duty that day, he sat down at a table and beckoned me to sit down. Then he started talking to me.
Zhou En said that the leaders of the four front armies have put forward a request that staff officers and confidential personnel be needed to enrich and strengthen the work of the headquarters of the four front armies, and the central authorities have appointed Ye Jianying as chief of staff of the former enemy's general headquarters. Then, Zhou Enlai said that Ye Jianying and Liu Bocheng were very experienced in the staff work of the Red Army and had made great achievements. We just want to come up with such cadres and equip them with the four front armies.
Zhou Enlai looked at me with concern and said, "The organization has decided to let you go as the deputy chief of the operations section." ”
He then asked me, "Comrade Jianying is your old chief, are you happy to go with him?" What's the difficulty?"
When I said I was obedient to the organization, he smiled and nodded.
Zhou Enlai also told me that Comrade Bi Zhanyun, who served as the head of the reconnaissance section of the former enemy's general headquarters, was assigned to the Fourth Front Army, as well as Chen Maosheng and several other confidential personnel.
In the end, he repeatedly instructed me to pay attention to learning from each other, do a good job of unity, and strive to do a good job after we arrived in the Fourth Front Army.
Speaking of this, Zhou Enlai said meaningfully: "Unity is powerful, unity is victory!"
Vice Chairman Zhou Enlai has always been thorough and meticulous in his work, which we are all familiar with and admire. Since the Zunyi Conference, every policy decision made by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission has been implemented by Zhu De and his specific organizations. He often personally took charge of the work of several of our staff officers, was on duty with us, and marched with us. Sometimes, the troops at the headquarters had already set out, and in order to send out the telegrams directing the movements of the troops in time, he insisted on waiting until the telegrams were sent before he went with us to catch up with the troops.
In the days when he assisted Mao Zedong in commanding the Red Army's victorious Long March, Zhou Enlai always worked tirelessly day and night. This time, how can we not be deeply moved by the meticulous care given to the work transfer of an ordinary cadre like me?
Of course, Zhou Enlai's personal grasp of the issue of the transfer of a group of cadres at this time is of unusual significance, because at this time Zhang Guotao's conspiracy to split the party and the Red Army was underway, and Zhou Enlai's ideological work on mobilizing cadres was to strengthen the sincere unity of the commanders and fighters of the two fronts.
In late July, Chief of Staff Ye Jianying led us from Heishui to serve in the general headquarters of the enemy in front of Maoergai.
The staff work of the former enemy's general headquarters was developed and perfected on the basis of the staff office of the general headquarters of the Red Fourth Front Army.
The staff work of the Red Fourth Front Army ranged from the birth of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army in the Huang'an and Macheng uprisings in Hubei in September 1927 to the establishment of the Red Fourth Front Army on November 7, 1931; From October 1932, when the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Region was transferred to the Tongjiang, Nanjiang, and Bazhong regions of Sichuan to establish the Sichuan-Shaanxi Revolutionary Base Area, to March 1935, when the Jialing Jiangxi Expedition was crossed, and in June of the same year, it joined forces with the Red Army in the western Sichuan region.
Considerable progress and enrichment have been made in all staff operations, especially in operations, reconnaissance, and communications, and they have initially met the needs of the gradual expansion of the scale of the war, and have fulfilled all the tasks assigned by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and the head of the General Headquarters.
Chief of Staff Ye Jianying led us from Heishui to the enemy's headquarters in front of Maoergai, and repeatedly briefed us on the excellent situation after the two armies joined forces and the strengths of the four front armies such as being brave and good at fighting and obeying orders, and told us that after we arrived there, we must respect the leadership, pay attention to study, and build good relations.
At the end of July, our group arrived at the Maoergai General Headquarters and were welcomed by Commander-in-Chief Xu Xiangqian, Political Commissar Chen Changhao, and comrades from the headquarters. After Xu, Chen, and other leaders briefed us on the situation, Chief of Staff Ye immediately led us to carry out various staff operations.
At that time, under the leadership of Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao, the staff work of the General Headquarters had a good foundation, but there were also some deficiencies: The original organizational structure was not yet perfect, the division of labor was not clear enough, and the business was not proficient enough. As a result, the daily affairs of Commander-in-Chief Xu Xiangqian and Political Commissar Chen Changhao were too busy, reducing their time and energy to think about major issues.
For example, combat orders and reports on the enemy's situation were personally drafted by Commanders Xu and Chen. Chief of Staff Ye Jianying held that in order to change the busy situation of the chiefs, it should be an urgent task to improve the organizational structure of the staff organs of the General Headquarters, enrich the personnel, and improve the methods.
Therefore, after obtaining the consent of Commander-in-Chief Xu Xiangqian, Political Commissar Chen Changhao, and Deputy Chief of Staff Li Te, the organizational structure and operational division of the staff organs of the General Headquarters were first formulated, and the following sequence was determined based on the General Staff Office: (See the sequence list of the General Headquarters of the former enemy of the Red Army on the next page)
After Ye Jianying set up the above-mentioned organs, he immediately convened a meeting of cadres to personally explain the tasks and working methods of various bureaus and sections, and thus in a short period of 10 days, he initially straightened out the relationship between the staff organs of the headquarters and clarified their responsibilities.
For example, the cavalry and transportation units of the four fronts are better than the armies on the other side in reconnoitring the enemy's situation and passing on orders and instructions, while in writing combat documents and summing up work in a regular format according to the needs of actual combat, and on the other hand, the armies are more experienced, and everyone works together to strengthen the work of the organs and markedly improve their work efficiency.