Zhu De's exploits
After establishing Mao Zedong's leading position in the party and the Red Army, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai actively cooperated with Mao Zedong in commanding the Red Army to march and fight, and made great contributions to the process of changing the situation in our army.
Here, I would like to talk about the important role played by Zhu De in the development of the Red Army, as well as some of my personal opinions, so as to express my deep nostalgia for Mr. Zhu.
During the period between Zhu De's rendezvous with Mao Zedong and his ascension to Jinggangshan and the first anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, although Zhu De had different opinions on the issue of the return of the 30th, 33rd, and 29th regiments of the southern Hunan peasant army to southern Hunan twice, on the issue of the principle of army building held by the Fourth Army of the Red Army in Longyan, Fujian, and on the issue of the Futian Incident and the suppression of rebellion, they all belonged to the issue of understanding on how to build the Red Army well and how to purify the interior and defeat the enemy. This is a normal phenomenon of ideological contradictions and struggles within the party, and it has been reached in later practice.
In the first, second, and third "encirclement and suppression" wars, Zhu De and Mao Zedong worked in unison and with one heart on tactical thinking, operational command, and the tasks of the Red Army.
Under their leadership, organization, and command, they won three victories in the anti-"encirclement and suppression" wars, which led to the rapid expansion of the base areas in the Soviet areas, the beginning of the building of political power, and the expansion of the Red Army not only in numbers, but also from guerrilla warfare in the initial stage to guerrilla warfare and movement warfare, and from the annihilation of a small group of enemy troops to the victory of destroying several enemy divisions. These are all available for historical data, and will not be repeated in this article.
Now we have to talk about the question of why Mao Zedong was able to win the fourth anti-"encirclement and suppression" war in the spring of 1933 after he was dismissed from his post as general political commissar of the Red Army at the Ningdu Conference.
There are many theories in contemporary writings, and I think that if the reader opens the historical archives, he can come to the right conclusions at a glance.
In the Fourth Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" War, the Central Red Army deployed its troops. The battle orders were all personally signed by Zhu De, chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, Zhu De, commander-in-chief, and Zhou Enlai, general political commissar.
At that time, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 500,000 troops, which was larger and more numerous than the previous three. The Red Army's more than 70,000 men, through the two battles of Huangpo and Caotaigang, annihilated three enemy divisions, captured more than 10,000 people under Li Ming, commander of the 52nd Division, and Chen Shiji, commander of the 59th Division, and surrendered more than 10,000 guns.
The main reason for the victory in this anti-"encirclement and suppression" war was that Zhu De and other comrades applied the successful experience of the previous three anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns, developed the ideological and tactical principles of waging a mobile war that he and Mao Zedong co-founded, persisted in proceeding from the actual situation, commanded the battle in a flexible and mobile manner, resolutely withdrew from Nanfeng, boldly retreated to the southern part of Yihuang with favorable terrain, resolutely resisted the operational policy of "leftist" adventurism, and won the victory in this anti-"encirclement and suppression" war.
It is precisely because Zhu De's thinking on army building and operational guiding principles are in the same vein as Mao Zedong's that although Zhu De attended the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee convened by the Provisional Central Committee headed by Bogu in January 1934, he did not let him join the core of the central leadership.
In the Guangchang Campaign, after Li De arrived at the Guangchang front, he did not first go to the forward positions to conduct on-the-spot inspections, but drew on a map of 1/100,000 in red pencil where each pillbox and bunker was built.
When we went down to survey and locate with the division and regimental commanders, we couldn't find out where the construction site was, because there was a big error between the map and the field, and what was on the map was not on the ground, but what was not on the map, but there was something on the ground, and it could not be implemented.
When we came back to report on the situation, Zhu De said to Li De with great dissatisfaction: How can we do it without giving the commanders of the regiments and divisions any flexibility and relying on the map to operate and command? In the past, we smashed the enemy's four "encirclement and suppression" tactics, relying on maneuverability and flexibility, concentrating troops, choosing concealed and favorable terrain, launching a surprise attack, and defending the city without defending the city to the death.
However, Zhu De's correct opinion was not adopted by Bogu and Li De. As a result, our army suffered heavy losses, which led to the defeat of the battle.
In this situation, Zhu De was silent and rarely spoke, and I can see that he was worried and deeply resentful of the "leftist" line. However, he strictly adhered to the party's discipline and never talked about the leading comrades of the Central Committee at that time in front of us staff officers or on other occasions.
Zhu De used this time to go deep into the Red Army units to conduct investigations and studies, and often gave lectures at the Red Army University in Ruijin and several specialized schools, mainly on the Red Army's successful experience in smashing the enemy's four "encirclement and suppression" campaigns. This was the strategy and method adopted by Zhu De in his struggle against the "leftist" line under that special environment.
Before the departure of the Long March, Zhu De's dissatisfaction and resistance to Bogu's "leftist" line can also be seen from a "small matter".
At the beginning of October 1934, when the Central Red Army was forced to make a strategic shift, the Party Central Committee provided each leading comrade with a stretcher, a mount, and a file box in accordance with their age, physical condition, and work needs.
In terms of age, Zhu De is already 48 years old, and he is the oldest among the central leading comrades (Dong Biwu, Xu Teli, Lin Boqu, and Xie Jueya acted with the Ministry of Health of the Military Commission, and were not included). However, Zhu De did not need a stretcher or a document box, but only two horses, one for riding, and one for carrying luggage and documents, thus saving six able-bodied comrades to enrich the combat company.
In fact, the horse carrying the baggage documents was used to contain the sick people who had fallen behind the team with Instructor Kang Keqing, and it became the common horse of our direct team, and I rode this horse many times when I was sick.
It is precisely because Zhu De used various methods to resist the "leftist" line in the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign that Chen Yun did not mention Zhu De's responsibility when talking about the military mistakes made in the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign in the manuscript of the outline of the "Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of Zunyi."
Many contemporary treatises on the Zunyi Conference talk about the contributions made by Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, and Zhou Enlai in establishing Mao Zedong's leadership.
In fact, from the Liping Conference to the Zunyi Conference, Zhu De was also Mao Zedong's most active supporter, for example, Zhu De signed the order of the Central Red Army to abandon the original plan of going north out of Xiangxi and joining the Red Second and Sixth Army Corps, which was precisely the support for Mao Zedong's correct proposition. Chen Yun was also an active supporter of Mao Zedong.
At the Zunyi Conference, although Zhu De did not make a tirade, he played a role that no one else could replace. Because Zhu De had high prestige in the Red Army, and this prestige was gradually formed and established in hundreds of battles after the Nanchang Uprising, he never left the army for a single day and always fought together with the soldiers. No one can belittle this kind of prestige that has been established in practice.
Why did Zhu De most actively support Mao Zedong to come out at the helm?
The reason is very simple: he cooperated and worked with Mao Zedong from the Jinggangshan period, not only created and expanded the Red Army, but also smashed the enemy's three "encirclement and suppression" together, and created the Central Soviet Region. This invisible but objectively existing solid wall of friendship cannot be torn down or dismantled. However, under the rule and command of the "leftist" line, not only did it not smash the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression," but on the contrary, it lost the central revolutionary base area. Practice in the three months after the strategic shift proved that the Red Army had lost half of its parts, and the three-man regiment was no longer able to reverse the situation, and only by electing Mao Zedong to take command could the Red Army and the party be saved, and the crisis could be extricated from adversity.
On the issue of crossing the Yangtze River north to join the Red Fourth Front Army, Zhu De's views were completely consistent with Mao Zedong's. At the military meeting held after the enlarged meeting of the Politburo, it was Zhu De and Liu Bocheng who suggested that they should go north from Chishui and choose the river between Yibin and Luzhou as the crossing point. Because they knew that this section of the river was wider and the flow rate was slower, which was conducive to the crossing of the river by large troops.
In the march from Guizhou to Yunnan and Sichuan, Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, and Nie Rongzhen often led their troops to take the lead, overcoming obstacles and opening up passages. Because they are from Sichuan, they have a better understanding of the people's conditions, topography, and climate. For example, after Liu Bocheng led the cadres and regiments to seize Kyaukpingdu and successfully collected seven wooden boats for the whole army to cross the river, Zhu De suggested that Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Chen Yun stay on the north bank of the Jinsha River to command the whole army to cross the river.
Before crossing the snow-capped mountains, each person should prepare a little chili pepper and ginger to resist the wind and snow, and this suggestion was also put forward by Zhu De, thus better ensuring the northward movement of the whole army.
In short, after the Zunyi Conference, Zhu De took the initiative to put forward many feasible proposals, and discussed with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and others the major policies of the whole army, so that the decision to join the Red Fourth Front Army could be successfully realized.
In 1938, the American journalist Edgar Snow wrote in his book "A Journey to the West":
"The historical course of the Chinese communist movement would not have been conceivable without its two twin geniuses, 'Zhu and Mao', and many Chinese actually see them as one person. Mao Zedong was the sober political head of this struggle, and Zhu De was its ardent heart, which gave life to it with action. One of the reasons why the Communist Party was able to maintain tight control over the Red Army was Zhu De's loyalty and obedience to the 'civilian' leadership. From Zhu and Mao down to commanders and political commissars at all levels, there was no struggle between military and political forces. The alliance of Zhu and Mao was not in competition with each other, but complemented each other. This is a fair and objective assessment by a foreigner.
From the point of view of work, it is inappropriate for Zhu De not to participate in the three-member military command group of the Central Committee, and it does not make sense from the organizational and command system of the Red Army. Because Zhu De is chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and commander-in-chief of the Red Army, while Mao Zedong is the political commissar of the former enemy, and Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang are vice chairmen of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, general political commissar of the Red Army, and director of the General Political Department, all the actions of the Red Army, combat orders, management and training instructions, etc., are not effective without the signature of the chairman and commander-in-chief of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission.
Moreover, it is impractical to exclude from the military command group the top military chiefs who have the most experience in combat practice and who have flesh-and-blood ties with the Red Army.
Fortunately, there was no contradiction between the two positions, because Zhu De was pure in party spirit, broad-minded, strict with himself, lenient with others, "without any political ambitions, he could accept orders, and therefore he could issue orders, and this was a very valuable factor in the leadership of the revolutionary army." "Zhu De's rare personality won everyone's love almost immediately. It seems that the origin of this personality is also his modesty, which may in turn be derived from his personal honesty and reliability. ”
On the other hand, the three-member military command group of the Central Committee headed by Mao Zedong invited Zhu De to participate in all major policy decisions, exercise his powers, and sign documents and telegrams.
History has proven that Snow's evaluation of Zhu De and Mao Zedong is completely correct.
The lofty prestige established by Zhu De during the 10-year civil war and the subsequent War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression was also reflected in the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China. On June 10, 1945, when the members of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party were elected, Zhu De ranked second in order of the number of votes per person, second only to Mao Zedong.
In the "Cultural Revolution", Zhu De was branded as a "black commander". For this reason, Mao Zedong said more than once: "It's the Red Commander, the Red Commander!" Zhu Mao Zhu Mao, Zhu De and Mao Zedong are inseparable, without Zhu, how can there be Mao. "Zhu Mao Zhu Mao, you are a pig (Zhu), I am the hair on the pig (Zhu)!" Mao Zedong used his surname to explain it interestingly, and he said the original face of history with great humor.
Wang Ming and Bogu "leftist" line issues
Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu) was not a member of the Central Committee elected to the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in Moscow in June-July 1928.
However, at the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee in September 1930 and for some time thereafter, Wang Ming rose up against the so-called "right-leaning opportunism" of the Central Committee and published a pamphlet entitled "Two Lines" or "Struggle for the Greater Bolshevization of the CPC," which was used as the capital of his activities, and under the new situation, he restored and developed the new political program of the "leftist" ideology and "leftist" policy of the Li Lisan period.
Thus, on January 7, 1931, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee held in Shanghai, Wang Ming was elected as a member of the Central Committee and a member of the Politburo under the manipulation of Mifu, deputy director of the Eastern Department of the Comintern, in his capacity as a representative of the Comintern, and he entered the highest leading organ of the Party Central Committee.
After the Fourth Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee, Wang Ming assumed the post of secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee, and he sent a large number of cadres to various localities to implement his "leftist" line. Although Xiang Zhongfa continued to serve as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and general secretary of the CPC Central Committee (defected after his arrest in June 1931), Wang Ming and others held the leadership of the Party Central Committee, resulting in the new "leftist" line occupying the leading position of the Central Committee.
Wang Ming lived in Moscow before leaving Shanghai in October of the same year, first as the representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Comintern, and then as a member of the Presidium of the Comintern to participate in the leadership of the Comintern, until November 1937, when he returned to Yan'an from the Soviet Union via Xinjiang.
After Wang Ming went to the Soviet Union, Bogu continued to promote "leftist" adventurism. Due to Chiang Kai-shek's brutal White Terror, the Provisional Central Committee was relocated from Shanghai to Ruijin in the Central Soviet District in January 1933. After that, the party established the Shanghai Central Bureau. At the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee held in January 1934, the "leftist" line was developed to its peak.
In October of the same year, the Party Central Committee led the Central Red Army to withdraw from the Central Soviet Area for a strategic shift, and in early December, it suffered heavy losses in the Battle of the Xiangjiang River, and ordered the destruction of the only 100-watt high-power radio station in the Xiangjiang River.
Both the Provisional Central Committee and the Party Central Committee after the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee reported to the Comintern in advance on many major issues, including preparations for the strategic transfer of the Soviet area from Jiangxi to Xiangxi, because the Communist Party of China was under the leadership of the Comintern at that time and was a branch of it.
In the Resolution of the Zunyi Conference adopted on January 8, 1935, the Comintern's reply to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was mentioned four times, and the instructions of the Comintern were affirmed and supported.
Judging from the content of the citations, it is indeed different from the purely defensive line of Bogu and Li De in military affairs. In 14 articles, the trio was criticized by name.
After listening to Liu Bocheng's report, I learned that the meeting focused on criticizing Bogu and Li De's erroneous military line and their paternalistic bad style of leading the work of the Central Military Commission in which individuals took care of everything instead of collective leadership.
Zhou Enlai made self-criticism and assumed responsibility at the meeting, so that he remained one of the supreme military chiefs and the person responsible for the final determination of the military command entrusted by the party. But from the time he crossed the Chishui, Mao Zedong was actually the one who made the final decision, which proved Zhou Enlai's noble character of humility.
The "Zunyi Conference Resolution" does not contain Wang Ming's name, nor does it mention the "leftist" mistakes he made during the period when he was in charge of the Central Committee after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, and the problem of his relationship with Bogu.
In December 1936, after the Party Central Committee arrived in northern Shaanxi, Mao Zedong wrote an article entitled "Strategic Issues in China's Revolutionary War," pointing out that in the revolutionary war, in addition to the two mistakes of Chen Duxiu and Li Lisan's "rightist" and "leftist" opportunism, "the Communist Party of China also made the following two mistakes:
The first is the 'left' opportunist ...... from 1931 to 1934" says in note (vi): "...... Headed by two comrades, Chen Shaoyu (Wang Ming) and Qin Bangxian (Bogu), ...... ”
The resolution of the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party analyzes the mistakes of the third "leftist" line from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party in January 1931 to the resolution of the Zunyi Conference in January 1935:
"In January 1931, the Party ...... these 'leftist' dogmatists and sectarian elements headed by Comrade Chen Shaoyu ”
"From the establishment of the Provisional Central Committee headed by Comrade Qin Bangxian (Bogu) in September 1931 to the Zunyi Conference in January 1935, it was a period of continued development of the third 'leftist' line."
"All of the above is the main content of the erroneous 'leftist' line headed by the dogmatists Chen Shaoyu and Qin Bangxian, who ruled the whole party for the third time."
"Thus, in January 1935, at the enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee held in Zunyi City, Guizhou Province, led by Comrade Mao Zedong, the rule of the 'leftist' line in the Party Central Committee was victoriously ended, and the Party was saved at the most critical juncture."
The "Resolution of the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee" is very clear:
The "leftist" line of the two periods should be borne by Wang Ming and Bogu respectively.
In terms of time, Wang Ming is 9 months, and Bogu is 3 years and 4 months.
In terms of the degree of harm, "the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, convened by the Provisional Central Committee in January 1934, was the culmination of the development of the third 'leftist' line. ”
However, many contemporary writings, especially some authoritative monographs, do not analyze the third "leftist" line mistakes made by Wang Ming and Bogu from January 1931 to January 1935 in accordance with the above-mentioned correct and truth-seeking resolutions of the Party Central Committee, but simply engage in and generalize them to Wang Ming.
For example: "The Zunyi Conference concentrated all efforts on correcting the military mistakes of Wang Ming's 'leftist' adventurism and put an end to the rule of Wang Ming's erroneous leadership over the Party Central Committee......"
"From this point on, Wang Ming's 'leftist' adventurist line began a four-year reign within the central leadership organs."
Replace "headed by two comrades, Chen Shaoyu (Wang Ming) and Qin Bangxian (Bogu)" to "Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu) and others ... Wang Ming's 'leftist' adventurism ruled the party for four years...... In January 1935, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China convened the Zunyi Conference, which established the correct leadership of the new Central Committee represented by Mao Zedong, thus ending the rule of Wang Ming's 'leftist' adventurism in the Party Central Committee. ”
The first and second editions of the first volume of Mao Zedong's Selected Works are inconsistent in notes 6 and 7 of Strategic Issues in the Chinese Revolutionary War, and the author believes that note 6 of the first edition is in line with historical facts.
Some Long March history books include a photo of Wang Ming in Moscow.
From the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee to the Zunyi Conference, the party's third "leftist" line should be based on the "Resolution of the Zunyi Conference," the "Resolution of the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee," and Chen Yun's specific analysis of the contents of the manuscript conveyed by the enlarged meeting of the Zunyi Political Bureau. Do not leave the time, place, and conditions, and do not use the method of putting on a crown and wearing a li, so that people can distinguish the boundary between right and wrong.
If a certain issue in the resolution of the Party Central Committee is wrong in practice, it is entirely appropriate to correct and comment on it in a realistic manner.
For example, the "Resolution of the Zunyi Conference" said: "The arduous struggle against 'encirclement and suppression' for a year and a half has proved that the political line of the Party Central Committee is undoubtedly correct. ”
This kind of content that affirms the political line while negates the military line is not only limited in understanding at that time, but also enables comrades who make the mistake of the "leftist" line to have a process of self-understanding and waiting.
Although Wang Ming and Bogu both made the mistake of "leftist" line, and their nature was the same, and Bogu's "leftist" leaning time was longer than Wang Ming's, but their later situation was different.
In the struggle against Zhang Guotao's right-leaning opportunism of splitting the party and splitting the Red Army, he firmly stood on the correct line of the party Central Committee headed by Mao Zedong, made self-criticism and corrected his mistakes after arriving in northern Shaanxi, successively served as the head of the organization department of the CPC Central Committee, the Yangtze River Bureau, and the Southern Bureau, founded and presided over the work of the "Liberation Daily" and the Xinhua News Agency, was still elected as a member of the Seventh Central Committee of the party in 1945, and went to Chongqing in February 1946 to participate in negotiations with the Kuomintang. On April 8 of the same year, on the way back to Yan'an from Chongqing, he was killed in a plane crash and became a revolutionary martyr.
Recently, someone wrote "The Biography of Bogu", in which he devoted himself to the revolution at the age of 18 and sacrificed his young life at the age of 39, making a comprehensive evaluation of his 21-year revolutionary career.
During his participation in the leadership of the Comintern, Wang Ming did some useful work, such as participating in the drafting of the "August 1 Declaration" issued in the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on August 1, 1935, "A Letter to the Compatriots of the Whole Country for Resisting Japan and Saving the Country," calling for the cessation of the civil war and the unanimous resistance against Japan.
However, after returning to Yan'an from the Soviet Union in November 1937, during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, he shifted from "left" to right, opposed the principle of independence in the united front, and made the mistake of right-leaning capitulation.
After the founding of the People's Republic of China, when Wang Ming served as director of the Legislative Affairs Committee of the Government Council, he still did not correct his mistakes, settled in the Soviet Union in the name of "curing diseases", and published many articles attacking the Party Central Committee, especially in the book "Fifty Years of the Communist Party of China", frantically attacking the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong, standing on the opposite side of the party and the people, Wang Ming died of illness in Moscow on March 27, 1974.
Although the content of this section is not directly related to the staff work, since the Party Central Committee headed by Bogu led the Central Red Army to carry out the strategy from Ruijin to Zunyi, as a staff member of the Party Central Committee's office, I know that although Bogu's "leftist" retreat and escape doctrine and Wang Ming's "leftist" line are in the same line, they are not directly related to each other and cannot replace each other, and each has its own account.
However, many authoritative contemporary treatises use Wang Ming instead of Bogu without explanation. In order to restore the original appearance of history, so that future generations can know the relationship and difference between Wang Ming and Bogu, and not be confused, this section is written in close.