The Vietnam Self-Defense Counterattack, also known as the Sino-Vietnamese border self-defense counterattack, was a military operation conducted by China against Vietnam in 1979. The context of the war is complex, involving changes in international politics, geostrategy, and relations between the two countries.
In 1979, Vietnam, with the support of the Soviet Union, claimed to be the "world's third military power", provoking and violating China's borders, and at the same time, Vietnam also sent troops to occupy Cambodia, seriously threatening China's national security and regional stability. Against this backdrop, the Chinese government decided to take military action to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and at the same time as a sanction for Vietnam's actions.
In the process of making decisions, Deng Xiaoping used the metaphor of "children who are disobedient and will be spanked" to vividly express China's position and determination toward Vietnam. This is not only a response to Vietnam's provocative behavior, but also a manifestation of the Chinese government's firm will to safeguard national interests.
On February 17, 1979, the Chinese army launched a self-defense counterattack against Vietnam in two directions, Guangxi and Yunnan. The Chinese army has invested more than 200,000 troops and mobilized a variety of arms, including army, artillery, and armored troops, to form a powerful offensive. In the early days of the war, the Chinese army quickly broke through the border defense line of Vietnam and penetrated about 40 kilometers into the territory of Vietnam, demonstrating the combat effectiveness and tactical level of the Chinese army.
In the course of the war, the Chinese army adopted the tactics of interspersed and roundabout encirclement by multiple routes, striving for a quick victory. Especially on the Eastern Front, the Chinese army quickly conquered strategic points such as Gaoping and Tongdeng through a pincer offensive. On the Western Front, the Chinese army successfully crossed the Red River under the cover of night, capturing key areas such as Lao Cai. The successful application of these tactics not only effectively dealt a blow to the morale of the Vietnamese army, but also created favorable conditions for the Chinese army to conduct in-depth operations.
However, the war did not come without a cost. The Chinese army also encountered some difficulties and challenges in the operation, such as the influence of natural conditions such as complex terrain and harsh climate, as well as the stubborn resistance of the Vietnamese army. However, with its firm will and excellent command, the Chinese army generally controlled the dominance of the battlefield and accomplished its strategic objectives.
Later in the war, the Chinese army, having achieved its intended objectives, began to withdraw in an orderly manner. During the withdrawal, the Chinese army also carried out sabotage of military installations in the occupied areas in order to weaken Vietnam's military capabilities. By March 16, all Chinese troops had withdrawn to China, ending a nearly month-long self-defense counterattack.
Although the war of self-defense and counterattack against Vietnam was not long, its impact was far-reaching. It not only dealt a heavy blow to Vietnam militarily, but also politically demonstrated China's determination to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, the war also had an important impact on the international situation at that time and became an important event in Asia during the Cold War.
In the context of the self-defense counterattack against Vietnam, there is an opinion that this 10-year actual battle has significantly increased the strength of the Chinese army. However, according to the analysis in Article 12, this view ignores an important fact: for a large country like China, such progress is far from enough. China's military strength should not be limited to its achievements in conflicts with neighboring countries, but should also focus on the broader international arena and long-term defense needs.
When political commissar Deng Xiaoping made a decision on the self-defense and counterattack against Vietnam, he compared Vietnam to a "little friend," and this metaphor profoundly revealed China's strategic vision and national goals. Deng Xiaoping's statement was not only a contempt for Vietnam's provocations, but also a clear guide to the development goals of China's military and the country as a whole. He stressed that China's goal is to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and it should not be satisfied with the progress made in conflicts with small countries.
This kind of strategic vision and national goal requires that the Chinese armed forces must have a higher level of combat effectiveness and strategic capability. As pointed out in Article 13, since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, China's armed forces have made great historic achievements in national defense and army building, deepening political construction, reforming and strengthening the army, strengthening the army with science and technology, strengthening the army with talents, and governing the army according to law. These achievements are precisely the embodiment of the Chinese armed forces' continuous pursuit of higher goals and greater progress under the guidance of Political Commissar Deng Xiaoping's strategic thinking.
At the same time, we must also realize that although the self-defense and counterattack war against Vietnam has tempered the Chinese army to a certain extent, it has also exposed some problems and shortcomings. Article 14 mentions that in the course of national defense and army building in the new era, the Chinese armed forces need to further innovate military strategic guidance, establish military strategic guidelines for the new era, and establish a general program for overseeing the construction and use of military forces. This requires us to face history squarely, clearly understand the limitations of the war, avoid falling into historical mistakes, and promote the modernization of the Chinese armed forces with a more open mind and a more long-term vision.
In addition, to improve the strength of China's armed forces, it is also necessary to work the building of qualified personnel. Article 14 emphasizes that the way to strengthen an army is to win souls. The Chinese armed forces implement the strategy of strengthening the army with talents in the new era, adhere to the correct political direction of talent work, focus on preparing for war and cultivating talents, strengthen the layout of military personnel modernization, and promote the construction of a new "three-in-one" military talent training system. All these measures are aimed at ensuring that the Chinese armed forces can have a high-quality contingent of qualified personnel and provide solid talent support for the realization of national goals.
In short, although the self-defense and counterattack war against Vietnam has enhanced the strength of the Chinese army to a certain extent, we must not be complacent because of this. As Political Commissar Deng Xiaoping emphasized, China's goal is a sea of stars, and we should continue to promote the modernization of the Chinese armed forces with a more open mind and a more long-term vision, so as to contribute to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.