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After the end of the Fourth Campaign, the Chinese side did not raise the issue of armistice negotiations, but launched the Fifth Campaign, which was considered to be decisive in nature.
By the end of May 1951, the Volunteer Army had completed the second phase of the Fifth Campaign and retreated on all fronts, and the "United Nations Army" made a comeback and soon advanced to the vicinity of the 38th parallel.
The reality of this tug-of-war of great advance and retreat has enabled the Chinese leaders to have a more sober and objective understanding of the prospects for the development of the Korean War.
In this situation, Mao Zedong first solved the problem of adjusting the battlefield combat policy of the volunteers, and while establishing the idea of fighting a small war of annihilation, he also outlined the education of the volunteers on "the long-term and arduous nature of the Korean war situation."
When he learned that the Soviet ambassador to United States, Marek, had contacted Kennan of the United States State Department and conveyed the message that the United States side was interested in negotiating an armistice, Mao Zedong immediately realized that this was an opportunity that should be seized, and quickly agreed to negotiate with United States.
It was at this time that Mao Zedong's focus on Korea began to shift to planning and preparing for armistice negotiations.
1. Kim Il Sung visited
On 31 May, Kim Il Sung sent a telegram requesting to come to Beijing to "discuss various matters face-to-face," mainly on the issue of his views on the current military and political situation and his future operational policy.
In his telegram, he said: The DPRK issue must not be resolved peacefully, nor can the war end on the 38th parallel.
Obviously, Kim Il Sung at this time was not so sensitive to the signals of peace talks coming from the international community. Mao Zedong agreed to Kim Il-sung's visit to Beijing and asked Peng Dehuai to "come and talk with him."
On the evening of June 3, Kim Il Sung arrived in Beijing, but Peng Dehuai did not come with him because he could not leave because of the heavy command tasks at the front. During his talks with Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong discussed not only the issue of future operations, but also the principles and plans for dealing with possible armistice talks.
No specific record has been found about the specific content of the talks, but it is clear that Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung reached an agreement on the armistice talks.
On June 5, Mao Zedong telegraphed Stalin, saying that there were some problems that needed to be discussed with him.
Mao's telegram said:
"We feel that the war that we are waging in Korea has serious problems in terms of finances, in terms of frontal operations, in terms of the threat of the possibility of landing by the enemy from the rear coast. We would like to send Comrade Gao Gang to Moscow by plane within a few days to report to you and ask you for instructions on resolving various important issues. At the same time, Kim Il Sung is now in Beijing, and he is willing to go with Comrade Gao Gang to discuss these issues with you. ”
On June 9, before Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung left for Moscow, Mao Zedong telegraphed to Stalin:
"The question of the peace war and the question of the Volunteer Army's hiring of Soviet advisers were all dealt with by the high post."
The armistice talks have a bearing on the outcome of the Korean War, and the stakes are so high that there is an urgent need to unify thinking and coordinate action among the leaders of China, the Soviet Union, and the DPRK.
2. Stalin's discontent
In the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China, especially after the outbreak of the Korean War, whenever Chinese leaders needed to negotiate with Stalin on important matters, it was usually Zhou Enlai, who was both military and political and had rich diplomatic experience, to come forward. Gao Gang was sent to Moscow this time because Zhou Enlai felt unwell at the end of May, and with the approval of the central government, he is now resting in Dalian.
Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung flew to Moscow on 10 June on a special plane sent by Stalin. The circumstances of their talks with Stalin are described in detail in Shi Zhe's memoirs.
Stalin first inquired about the situation on the Korean battlefield in order to clarify the following questions:
(1) What is the real situation on the front, and are combat operations continuing?
(2) Comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the positions (strategic bases) occupied by the armies of the North and the South, can China and the DPRK hold their positions without wavering?
(3) What is the enemy's ability and possibility of counterattack? If you fight back, can you resist it? In a word, are the Chinese and North Korean armies currently in a favorable position?
He asked: Is it better to cease fire immediately, or is it better to talk about a ceasefire again after fighting again, correcting the position of the front?
In view of the fact that the Chinese and North Korean participants in the talks were not very clear about the meaning of the relevant conceptual terms, and often used the words ceasefire, armistice, peace, truce, and peace treaty in a mixed manner, and often did not convey the meaning of the words when expressing their views, Stalin spent a lot of time explaining the meaning of various concepts in the conversation.
He noted:
At this moment, you are using several words with completely different meanings in the conversation, so that people do not understand your opinions and do not know what your intentions and demands are.
A ceasefire is a ceasefire that is needed for some reason during the fighting, on the front line, for a few hours, or a day or two, and then the fighting continues; An armistice is a long period of cessation of military operations, but the two sides are still in a state of war, the war is not over, and the war can still be resumed at any time, so it is not a peaceful situation; Peace, that is, peace talks and reconciliation, is a situation in which the belligerents reach an armistice, a state of relaxation or peace through negotiation in order to achieve a longer period of relaxation or a certain degree of peace, but it is not yet a consolidated peace situation. A peace treaty is not just a ceasefire, an armistice, a compromise, a peace, that is, a non-temporary reconciliation, but a total cessation of military operations, the elimination of hostilities, the transition to a situation of peaceful coexistence, in short, the elimination of all signs of war, wartime effects and traces.
Stalin said:
What I want to ask and want to understand is, what are the goals that we are talking about today, that is, what do you want to achieve? We should use a clear and precise concept of what category we are talking about, otherwise it will be confusing the more we listen.
You should first express your intentions with clear concepts before you can negotiate with the other party, and in any case, we ourselves should first express our intentions with clear concepts.
So, what are your intentions, desires, and demands?
The Chinese and North Korean side replied: Our wish is an armistice.
Stalin then asked:
Is it a truce on the spot, or is it a truce that has been made by both sides after certain adjustments have been made (i.e., adjustments to the defensive line or adjustments to the needs of geography and terrain)? Are there any troops or places on a certain side that are surrounded?
No one could answer Stalin's questions clearly, and even the map markers they provided were outdated.
Stalin had to ask the General Staff of the Soviet Army to send a general with a military map to explain the situation on the Korean front at that time.
Stalin asked again: should a certain date and time be determined as an armistice?
Speaking of this, Stalin was not very pleasant, because many of the circumstances were not clear to those with whom he was conlocuting.
3. Who will propose armistice negotiations?
It should be said that the peace talks on the Korean armistice issue are a special political, diplomatic, and military struggle waged by New China and the superpower United States in the international arena.
The Chinese side was inexperienced in such a complex struggle, and it lacked corresponding practical preparations at the beginning. Stalin's advice and tips are very informative.
On June 13, Stalin sent a telegram to Mao Zedong to state the position of the Soviet Union, stating: "We believe that it is a good thing to have an armistice. ”
On the 14th, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung, giving his opinion on how to propose peace talks:
We feel that in the current two months, when the Chinese and DPRK armies are on the defensive, it is not appropriate for the DPRK and China to put forward the proposal, but it is appropriate to use the following methods:
(1) Wait for the enemy to propose; (2) the Soviet Union made an indication to the United States based on Kennan's remarks to Malek; The above two ways can be done at the same time, that is, on the one hand, the Soviet Union can express something, and on the other hand, if the enemy asks, the DPRK and China can express their attitude.
In the most appropriate way, I would like to ask you to consult with Comrade Filippov (Stalin) and decide that, judging from the actual needs, it is clear that the Chinese side hopes to reach an armistice through negotiations, and then promote a political settlement of the Korean question.
However, under the specific circumstances at that time, there was indeed something unspeakable about the Chinese side, which was temporarily passive on the battlefield, taking the initiative to hold armistice talks.
Compared to a few months ago when the United Nations first proposed an armistice, there have been many changes on the Korean battlefield that are unfavorable to the Chinese military.
A few months ago, the Chinese and North Korean armies were on the offensive, facing the "United Nations Army" that had been beaten to the ground and terrified, and had withdrawn again and again.
At that time, the Chinese side had enough capital to put forward or reject proposals for armistice talks, and not only that, but it could also take advantage of the situation to offer higher prices to the enemy in order to win more benefits.
At present, however, the Chinese and North Korean armies have turned from a large-scale offensive to a northward contraction on the entire front, and some units have suffered serious losses in the pursuit of the enemy, and the battlefield situation is obviously unfavorable.
Under such circumstances, if China and the DPRK take the initiative to propose armistice talks, it will obviously be suspected of showing weakness, and even if they do, they will put themselves in a disadvantageous and weak position.
Based on this consideration, Mao Zedong hoped that either the enemy would take the initiative to come to talks, or the Soviet Union would take the lead in communication, and the Chinese and North Korean sides would follow up behind and push the boat down the river, and naturally open the door to negotiations.
The calculation is clever.
Although both warring sides were willing to call for an armistice, the meaning of the words came out of their mouths first. It's also a game.
4. Why did the Soviet Union help China propose armistice negotiations?
Judging from the situation of the two sides at that time, the United States was relatively favorable in terms of situation, and the "United Nations Army" was still on the offensive and showed relative strength on the battlefield.
In June, Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union Zhang Wentian organized relevant personnel to conduct a special study on the issue of the Korean armistice talks, and concluded that United States had recently changed its attitude toward the Korean War, which was manifested in an attempt to propose peace talks and an armistice under favorable conditions for the Soviet Union, and the Western media were also building momentum for this.
On May 23, the United States "Christian Science Monitor" carried an article saying that the retreat of Chinese troops has created an excellent opportunity for negotiations with China; The New York Times reported on the same day: The majority of delegates to the UN General Assembly believe that now is the best opportunity for an armistice in Korea.
On the 26th, the United Kingdom's "Spectator Weekly" commented: It is timely to negotiate a truce with the Chinese government; The News Chronicle also published an editorial advocating a ceasefire, also saying that the current is the best time for a truce.
In such an atmosphere of public opinion, the United States first proposed that armistice talks should be expected.
United States' tentative signal against the Soviet Union was given against this background. This provided an opportunity to open armistice negotiations and naturally pushed the Soviet Union into the position of the interlocutor.
The Chinese leaders took advantage of this and asked the Soviets to come forward to help them open the question, so as to avoid the reluctance and embarrassment of proposing armistice negotiations to the enemy when they were on the defensive on the battlefield.
On June 27, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko met with United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union Kirk in Moscow and confirmed the following:
The views previously expressed by Malik were those of the official Soviet Union; The armistice negotiations were only the first step in resolving the Korean issue, and the negotiations would take place between the commanders of the battlefield; The armistice, including a ceasefire, should be confined to purely military issues and should not include any political or territorial issues; Military representatives should discuss the issue of assurances to avoid the resumption of military operations.
On 30 July, Li Qiwei was instructed to issue a statement prepared by the National Security Council of China and United States through a radio station, proposing to the "commander of the Communist forces of Korea" to hold an armistice conference to negotiate the cessation of all hostile acts in Korea. On July 1, Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai replied to the telegram agreeing to the talks and making suggestions on the time and place of the talks.
The Korean armistice talks have thus pressed the start button.
Madeleine · Albright, former Secretary of State of United States, said:
For some United States, negotiation is clearly a sign of weakness, because in their view, the truly strong do not need to negotiate; The strong only need to show strength and impose their will on others.
In the Korean War, the United States, who did not want to negotiate a solution with their opponents, eventually took the initiative to go to the negotiating table. Although the Chinese side had lost its military strength when it entered the negotiations, it was still qualified to consider itself victorious on the battlefield.
Objectively speaking, China entered into the negotiations only when the Chinese Volunteers fought the "United Nations Army" headed by the US Army from the Yalu River to the vicinity of the 38th parallel, and it can be said that the negotiations were the result of their own fighting.
As Mao Zedong pointed out, now, the United States has begun to have a little intention to negotiate, which is not an easy task, which shows that our war is good; He also quoted the words of the ancients, "If you can fight, then you can make peace, and so are we."
5. Where to negotiate?
When both sides of the war expressed their willingness to hold armistice talks, the Chinese leadership immediately began preparations for the talks.
This work was carried out under the personal guidance and deployment of Mao Zedong.
The first thing to be resolved is the issue of the place of negotiation. Mao Zedong attached great importance to this, from the selection of the venue to the arrangement and arrangement of all aspects, he had specific instructions, and the content was meticulous and thorough.
Looking through the relevant telegrams of those years, people today will still sigh at the seriousness, concreteness, and meticulousness with which the country's top leaders took care of the relevant details.
Ridgway initially proposed that representatives of the two negotiators meet on a Denmark hospital ship.
He explains:
The ship was chosen because "both sides, including associated journalists, have equal and free access rights, it provides a completely neutral environment for both sides, free from threats posed by the presence of the armed forces of either side, and can provide all kinds of communication facilities".
The Chinese side, however, believes that the Denmark ship is anchored in the sea off the port of Wonsan off the east coast of North Korea, and that Wonsan is the first choice for the US military to carry out a possible flank and rear landing in the direction judged by the Chinese and North Korean forces, and that it is not appropriate to use the ship moored here and for indirect military purposes (to treat wounded soldiers of the "United Nations Army") as a place for negotiation.
On June 30, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Stalin, stating:
"Regarding the place of negotiation, Li Qiwei suggested that it be in Wonsan Port. Considering that this port is a fortified seaport of North Korea, and that the enemy forces are plotting to land here, it seems inappropriate to agree to hold a meeting in this port. ”
Li Qiwei did not object to China's proposal to change the venue of the talks, and declared that his gesture expressed "good wishes" that "the United Nations forces will end the bloodshed as soon as possible."
In fact, when the Joint Staff Committee instructed Li Qiwei to propose a Denmark hospital ship as the venue for negotiations, it took into account that the Chinese side might not agree, so it noted in advance in the list of action plans: "The alternative could be a location closer to the front line, such as Kaesong." ”
After the venue for the negotiations was determined, Mao Zedong issued a series of instructions on the preparation of the meeting venue.
On July 2, he sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai, Kim Il Sung, and Gao Gang:
"Comrade Peng Dehuai is requested to order the responsible military chiefs in the Kaesong area to quickly arrange the houses (tents, tents, utensils, and food) for the Kaesong peace talks meeting to be held, and to arrange reliable guards, so as to ensure the safety of the meeting and not to cause chaos. The dormitories of the enemy delegation (there may be dozens of people, including journalists), the dormitories of our delegation, and the meeting venue must be properly furnished. ”
He also specifically instructed that a dormitory must be specially arranged for Li Kenong, Qiao Guanhua and others, members of the behind-the-scenes work team who came to give specific guidance to the talks, which is 1~2 kilometers away from the venue.
Telegram Requirements:
"The joint secretary sent a sensible and capable responsible cadre to the Kaesong area to direct the above arrangements. What is the situation in Kaesong, I hope to check it as soon as possible. ”
Mao Zedong's instructions, specific to the houses, utensils, food, and safety guards for the meeting, and even considering how far the distance should be from the dormitory to the venue, have only one basic requirement, that is, "no chaos is allowed under any circumstances."
This shows how much Mao Zedong attached importance to this negotiation.
6. How do I start a negotiation?
In order to prevent mistakes in the details from affecting the holding of the talks as scheduled, Mao Zedong sent two telegrams at 4 a.m. on July 4, one asking Kim Il Sung to send a person in charge, with a number of staff members and necessary items, to the Kaesong area as soon as possible.
"If there are no houses in the area, you have to bring a tent. All the items and equipment required by the conference personnel of both sides must be brought with them. Everything must be ready by July 8. ”
Another telegram instructed Peng Dehuai:
"If there are mines planted in the Kaesong area, they must be removed, especially the landing place of Deputy Li Qiwei's plane, the car passage, and the vicinity of the meeting venue, so as to ensure safety and prevent chaos."
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai carefully deliberated on the substantive issue of what kind of agreement should be reached through negotiations, and after repeated high-level communication with the Soviet Union and the DPRK, they formed a basic plan before the negotiations officially began.
At first, Mao Zedong spoke to Stalin about the terms of the armistice only by mentioning the issue of demarcation of the border by the 38th parallel.
In his telegram to Stalin on June 13, he stated:
"Under the terms of negotiation, the 38th parallel is the boundary, and a small area can be drawn between the north and south of the 38th parallel as a buffer zone, but it is not possible to draw only the buffer zone in the north and not the buffer zone in the south. South and North Korea do not interfere with each other. ”
None of the other demands were addressed in this telegram.
Later, after some reflection and discussion, the Chinese side gave a more comprehensive consideration to the terms of the agreement to be reached, which was elaborated in a telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin on July 3.
The main contents are summarized into 5 articles, and the possible reactions of the other party are estimated one by one.
Article 1, "The two sides agree to issue a ceasefire order at the same time", which is estimated that the enemy may have no objection.
Article 2, "The withdrawal of each side by 10 miles from the 38th Parallel and the establishment of a demilitarized zone in the area south of and north of the 38th Parallel" and the restoration of the status quo ante before 25 June 1950 is estimated to be something that the enemy may raise objections to, but it is difficult for the enemy to criticize because of this fairness.
Article 3, "The two sides shall stop transporting arms from outside the DPRK to the territory of the DPRK and from the territory of the DPRK to the front-line troops", it is estimated that the enemy may propose this clause, so it seems that the Chinese side should take the initiative to propose it, or not to say a word thereafter.
Article 4, "Establishment of a Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee", estimates that the enemy may propose a similar provision, so we may initiate it or wait for the enemy to propose it before accepting it.
Article 9, "Release of prisoners of war by both sides", it is estimated that the enemy may propose to replace one by one, while our side demands the release of all prisoners of war, and this matter may cause controversy.
Mao Zedong called the above "five fundamental points that we think of that should be resolved in the talks between the military representatives of the two sides."
There is nothing in these five articles that China has always advocated in the past to withdraw all foreign troops from the DPRK. Mao Zedong asked Stalin to consider whether this article should be made a condition.
As for Kim Il Sung's request and the repatriation of refugees from both sides, Mao Zedong believed that "the implementation of this matter is quite troublesome, and the representatives of North and South Korea may have many disputes on this issue, which may affect the decision on other major issues," and therefore advocated that the discussion of this article be postponed to a future political international conference.
(End of text)
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