Ji Chen, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Sun Yat-sen University (Zhuhai).
The Road to Rout: The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, by Oleg Arapietov, translated by Zhou Jian, Social Science Literature Press, July 2021, 640 pp. 128.00 yuan
In any case, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was a war of great importance, and was even called "World War Zero". As for the impact of this war on China, it goes without saying much. The first impression of most Chinese people on it must be "a war fought on Chinese soil by two imperialist countries." However, due to various reasons, the current understanding and research of the Russo-Japanese War in the domestic academic circles is still quite insufficient. In contrast, the relevant research of the two countries concerned has been endless since the end of the war, and it is extremely impressive in quality and quantity. In Japan, for example, after World War II alone, Nobuo Kiyosaburō, Shinoo Oe, Shun Kakuda, Nooo Ito, Chiba Kō, Naganan Masayoshi, and others all had heavy general works in the diplomatic, military, and political fields, and there were countless other works and papers on relatively detailed topics. Haruki Wada's book "The Russo-Japanese War: The Origins and The Beginning of the War" (Iwanami Shoten 2009-2010 edition, Sanlian Shoten 2018 Chinese translation) published recently is a comprehensive collection of Japanese, Russian, English and Korean historical materials and treatises.
The Russo-Japanese War: Origins and The Beginnings of the War. [Japanese] by Haruki Wada, translated by Yi Aihua and Zhang Jian, published by Sanlian Bookstore in February 2018
Due to foreign language learning and academic exchanges, domestic scholars know a relatively much about the current research status of Japanese academic circles, but they probably know very little about the equally large Russian achievements. The Russian side's research on the Russo-Japanese War claims that "before the artillery stopped, it began to write", accumulating a wealth of more than a hundred years. According to the survey of Russian scholars, there are currently more than 800 kinds of Russian literature on the Russo-Japanese War (ドミートリ-·Б·パヴロフ: ロシアにおける日露戦 Controversy Research の動向). Unfortunately, due to limited language skills, the vast majority of domestic scholars (including authors) can only read Russian literature through translation. Moreover, although the translation of Documents on the History of Russia and the History of Sino-Russian Relations flourished in the context of Sino-Soviet hostilities after the 1960s (typically represented by the "Russian Economics and The East" series published by the Commercial Press in 1965-1994), the pace has been very slow in recent years. If domestic scholars want to understand the Russian perspective on the Russo-Japanese War, they can often only rely on Romanov's "Russia in Manchuria", "Outline of the Diplomatic History of the Russo-Japanese War", and Malozimov's "Russian Policy in the Far East", which are classic but inevitably too old works.
In this context, it is particularly necessary for domestic academics to understand the achievements of the Russian side of the Russo-Japanese War. Russian scholar Oleg Alabitov's recent book, The Road to Rout: The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 (Argolitum Publishing House, 2014), recently launched a Chinese translation, which is one of the few such translations in recent years.
Born in 1963, the author received his associate doctorate in 1994 from the Department of History of Moscow University, his dissertation was on The oblusive general Obrukov of the time of Alexander III, and since 1997 he has remained an associate professor. It should be noted that russian professors are extremely difficult to promote, and even excellent scholars often retire with the title of associate professor. The author's main research direction is the diplomacy and military of the late Tsarist Russia, and he has written extensively, including the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, the foreign policy of the Emperors Alexander I to Nicholas II, and the rule of Tsarist Russia over Poland and the Caucasus.
The volume of the book is quite heavy (496 pages, 633 pages in the Chinese translation), from the diplomatic causes of the Russo-Japanese War to the end of the war. The book has a wealth of historical materials, but mainly Russian literature, supplemented by a small number of English documents, the vision naturally cannot be compared with the above-mentioned Wada monographs, but it is still a solid "Russian perspective" of the history of the Russo-Japanese War. In addition, it is surprising and regrettable that there is no academic review in the introduction of this book that is common to monographs, making it difficult for domestic readers to grasp its rational path. In my extremely superficial understanding, the russian academic research on the Russo-Japanese War after the collapse of the Soviet Union tended to be diversified in themes and viewpoints, and was often keen to study areas that had been neglected or prohibited in the past (such as the espionage work of the two sides during the Russo-Japanese War), and the evaluation of relevant figures also appeared to be overturned (such as Kuropatkin and Rozhestvinsky, who had long been denounced as fools, and some commentators also gave high praise). Relatively speaking, this book still chooses the traditional theme of the diplomatic background and combat process of the Russo-Japanese War, and the relevant evaluations are basically less innovative, giving people an "old-school" feeling.
The author quotes a famous proverb in the introduction to the book: "It is well known that victory has a hundred fathers, and defeat is an orphan." (p. 34) For the Defeated Russian side in the Russo-Japanese War, the defeated "father" is naturally a title that the relevant figures are afraid to avoid. As early as the war, there was much debate within Russia about responsibility for the defeat. After the war, a number of Russian high-level officials competed to absolve themselves of responsibility and at the same time to hold the black pot to others, the most famous of which was a series of air pen battles between Kuropatkin and Witt. In this context, it is increasingly difficult to judge responsibility for Russia's failure. The "faint" tsar, the "greedy" close subjects, the "short-sighted" Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the "miserly" Ministry of Finance, the "incompetent" generals, the "lack of fighting spirit" soldiers, the "muddled" people, the "ignorant" intellectuals, and the revolutionaries who "collaborated with the enemy countries" were all used as targets of criticism by different people at different times.
Alexei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin
Sergey Witt
The last sentence of the introduction reads: "If we want to investigate the causes of the tragedy, it is necessary to analyze the background of the historical facts and understand the background of the decisions made at the Pevčeski Bridge ( press : Russian Foreign Office ), the General Headquarters , the Naval Building or the Winter Palace." The reasons for the decision and the nature of the defeat in the Far East are the main themes of this book. (p. 46) It follows that the book's sense of problem remains the traditional topic: How did Russia come to defeat? In fact, the author has already given a general answer to this question: "At the end of the 19th century, Russia was usually unable to concentrate its forces reasonably on the key fronts, which made it impossible for the empire to exert its superiority, because no empire could maintain its strength on all fronts of interest at the same time. Making enemies along the entire border is also fatal to the great powers. In the early 20th century, Russia failed to avoid such problems. At the same time, the army and navy's unsatisfactory mode of command also deprived Russia of the possibility of successfully emerging from the crisis. (pp. 45-46)
Such a statement is not a new theory, but it is a simple and clear way to express the core point of the book. Next, the main text is divided into two parts, "Diplomatic Background" and "War" (each divided into more than ten sections), which are discussed from the diplomatic and military perspectives. In the first part, the author gradually reviews Russia's policy in the Far East before the Russo-Japanese War, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. Interestingly, the first sentence of this section reads: "Since the signing of the Treaty of Nebchu in 1689, Russia has had to make huge concessions on the territorial division of the areas along the Heilongjiang River, so Russian policy in the region has been in a state of emptiness for a long time." Over time, by the middle of the nineteenth century, Russian policy here was forced to change. (p. 49) From the following point of view, the so-called "forced" refers to the stimulation of Russia by Britain, France, and the United States in the Far East. However, even in the author's discussion, it is really not clear that there is any "forced" element of Russia's expansion in the Heilongjiang River Basin. At the same time, the author argues that at the time "Russia's activities in the Far East were increasingly active, yet Russia was more inclined to engage in non-armed activities than military operations" (p. 50). This view may be barely valid if compared with the two Opium Wars. However, the author himself admits in the book that the Sino-Russian Treaty of Yaohun and the Treaty of Tianjin were signed with force as the backing, and that "the Russian side did not even need to fire at the Chinese side to obtain such huge benefits" (p. 56).
According to the author's division, roughly the 1840s and 1860s are considered to be the first stage of Russia's policy in the Far East, when Russia established modern diplomatic relations with China and Japan, and expanded its territory in the Heilongjiang, Ussuri and Sakhalin Valleys. The second phase of the 1870s-1880s was the russian Policy of the Far East, which was closely linked to the Anglo-Russian "Great Game" around Central Asia, in the form of the occupation of Ili, the annexation of Turkmenistan, and the invasion of Afghanistan. After the 1890s, the third phase was staged, and the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1891 marked a sharp upturn in Russia's Far East policy. The author spent more than two decades on this far more than the first two stages. Of course, the Russian Far East policy in this period has long been an old problem that has been repeatedly discussed in academic circles, especially as the "pre-war history" of the Russo-Japanese War. The author believes that the relevant discussion of this book may not be able to fully surpass the works of Nish, Malozimov, Wada Haruki and others, but the advantage lies in the fact that the perspective is relatively broad, jumping from the Far East to the Balkans, Persia, Armenia, the Bosphorus Strait and other places, and discussing the movement of the other head of the Russian two-headed eagle in a large section. Of course, many readers may feel that this is biased, but I think it is still necessary. Given the relative inadequacy of domestic academics about Russia's rivalry with other powers in these regions, these chapters in this book are all the more valuable. As the instructions of Tsar Nicholas II quoted in the book of 18 January 1903 state: "While we are wary of the East, we must focus our attention on the West. (p. 259) After all, Russia is still essentially a European country, and its strategic focus is still in the West. Only by understanding Russia's layout in Europe and West Asia can we better grasp the strategic significance of its Far East policy.
The second part is longer and more valuable to the author, especially when there is less research on the military history of the Russo-Japanese War than on diplomatic history. The author first takes a comprehensive inventory of the Russian forces and facilities in the Far East before the war, and compares them with the Japanese army. Naval power comparison is the easiest to do. Based on the comprehensive statistics of the number of ships and technical data of the two sides, it is not difficult to know that the strength of the Russian side is far superior to that of the Japanese side, but it is quite inferior in the Far East, and the indicators such as naval guns, armor, and speed are also in the inferior position. In terms of naval bases, Russia's two major military ports in the Far East, Vladivostok and Lushun, not only lack the ability to repair ships, but also are far from the Japanese coast, which is not conducive to active attack; they are thousands of miles apart from each other, and it is difficult to form a horn. Of course, if the Japanese fleet set out from the mainland to attack the Russian military port, the road was equally far away. However, due to its geographical superiority, Japan quickly took control of Korea as soon as the war began, and set up a temporary anchorage in the town bay in southern Korea, which confirmed the russian admiral's pre-war concern: "The southern bay of Korea can not only be used for the long-term berth of the enemy fleet, but also cut off the various links between Vladivostok and Lushun port, which are 1100 nautical miles apart." (p. 310)
Moreover, Vladivostok and Lushun's role as military ports is very misplaced. Vladivostok had the ability to repair battleships, but its location was too remote to be used only as the home port for a small squadron. The port of Lushun was home to the main force of the Pacific Fleet, but it lacked large docks, which often had to travel to the Baltic Sea for repairs before the war.
Lushun is not only Russia's largest military port in the Far East, but also the largest defensive fortress, and the long-term offensive and defense between Japan and Russia here is the most brutal scene in the war. However, the author points out that Lushun should have been more difficult to capture. Due to the huge amount of money required, Lushun's defense project was only about fifty percent completed before the war. As for Jinzhou and Dalian, which are the rear of Lushun, the degree of fortification is far lower. Therefore, the Japanese army easily surrounded Lushun in the war.
The comparison of the strength of the army is relatively complicated, and there is no particularly concentrated analysis in the book, but it is scattered in various chapters. Here's a little summary:
Similar to the situation in the Navy, the total strength of the Russian Army was also far superior to that of the Japanese army, but its strength in the Far East was limited. At least in the early stages of the war, the Russian army was smaller than the Japanese. Although Russia had been sending reinforcements from the west during the war, it was severely constrained by the ability of the unfinished Trans-Siberian Railway to pass.
There are also great problems with the deployment of troops by the Russian side. The author concludes three points (355 pages), which the reader may confirm from time to time in subsequent chapters. The first is the arbitrary division of troops, resulting in the formation of a "hodgepodge of detachments" on the front line. For example, in the Battle of Fengtian, the Russian army's improvised Troops of Launits (fifty-one infantry battalions and several cavalry and artillery units) came from eleven different armies, with the result that "the troops did not know the commander, the commanders were not familiar with the troops, and everyone was like neighbors" (p. 514).
Second, the role of the General Staff was underestimated, resulting in the loss of control of the management of the troops. Some Russian officers believe that "the platoons, companies, and battalions of the Russian army are not worse than the Japanese army on the battlefield, but the larger the team, the worse it is to the Japanese" (p. 498). What is even more humorous is that the Russian army has achieved the ultimate in command of the superior. Commander-in-Chief Kuropatkin personally appointed officers at the company commander's level, so much so that the commander of the Siberian Military District sarcastically stated that three company commanders appeared on the front line, that is, commanders of three army groups, and all officers above the battalion level were under the command of Kurobatkin (p. 502).
Third, the capacity of reserve forces was overestimated, resulting in a lack of coordination in mobilization. After the military reforms of 1874, Russia replaced conscription with conscription, thus having a large reserve force, which was also a common practice in European countries at that time. However, russia's reserve system has not been tested enough before. Before the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the Russian army had sufficient time to mobilize and cover up the imperfections of this system. After the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, russian reserve soldiers trained for less than three months. Such a force is naturally embarrassed by a war. For example, the 54th Infantry Division consisted of a group of reservists who were not very young (thirty-five to forty years old) and had never been on the battlefield, and immediately after getting off the train, they took part in the Battle of Liaoyang. Although the division commander was a tactical expert transferred from the Military Academy of the General Staff, he was unable to command such a unit, and the division was immediately defeated after entering the battle. (pp. 432-434)
The Russian Army also had shortcomings in the use of weapons, typically machine guns. At the beginning of the war, the Russian army had only one machine gun company and eight machine guns in the Far East, and it did not change until the end of the war. The Japanese army's use of machine guns was significantly superior to that of the Russians. For example, in the Battle of Fengtian on February 25, 1905, the Russian army had 275,000 men and 56 machine guns; the total strength of the Japanese army was almost the same as that of the Russian army (270,000 people), but there were 200 machine guns. The Japanese anticipated machine-gun fire "like peasants in the sweltering heat of summer" (pp. 358, 509).
So, returning to the question at the beginning, how did Russia come to defeat? The concluding part of the book does not integrate the entire book to extract a series of conclusions, mainly to expound the political and military impact of the Russo-Japanese War on Russia, which is what I am not satisfied with. The last few paragraphs of the epilogue are quite interesting to read: after accusing Japan of "attacking the Soviet Union" since the Japanese invasion of Siberia, the author quoted Stalin's "Letter to the People" published on September 2, 1945. One of them, which I have previously translated from Shinji Yokozuna's book "The Russo-Japanese War", has also quoted: "Those of us of the older generation have been waiting for this day for 40 years." Stalin's blunt participation in the war against Japan as revenge for the Russo-Japanese War (a colonial war provoked by what Lenin called the Russian autocracy) has always been seen as one of the manifestations of his chauvinist ideas. Some Russian scholars have divided the study of the history of the Russo-Japanese War in contemporary Russian academic circles into two orientations: "objectivism" that emphasizes positivism and "pan-Slavism" that advocates "patriotism". In my opinion, the style of this book basically belongs to the former. However, from this way of finishing, the author is still very "uneasy" about Russia's defeat that year.
The Russo-Japanese War: The First Inter-Great Power War of the 20th Century, by Shinji Yokote, translated by Yoshitsune, published by Social Science Literature Publishing House in April 2019
In the process of reading, the author also found that some of the statements in the book seem to be negotiable, and several are listed here:
In June 1856, French missionaries were arrested in Xilin County, Guangxi, and beheaded after a long period of torture. In October, The British launched the Second Opium War, citing the reluctance of local governments to investigate. (p. 50) It is well known in China that the reason for The Second Opium War by The British was not the Father Ma incident mentioned here, but the Alor incident.
"On August 19, 1858, Japan and Russia signed a treaty at Edo (present-day Tokyo) ... Tariffs on Goods Exported by Russia, such as timber, coal, metals, weapons, steam engines, etc., were reduced by 5%. (p. 55) This treaty, the Treaty of The Rapprochement of Commerce between the State of Rusia of Japan, and the original text of the treaty (annexed to the Catalogue of Merchant Taxes in the Statute of Trade between the Ports opened by the Lucia Merchants in Japan), were taxed at five percent, not five percent.
"On April 17, 1900, the Guangxu Emperor issued an edict in the Beijing Daily, strictly ordering the local government to curb riots and rebellions." (p. 231) Here it seems that the Beijing Daily, which was published in the private newspaper, is used as an official distribution channel such as a government gazette.
"The Russian Minister to Japan, Ramzdorf, noted ... On 22 February 1901, Izvolsky wrote to the Foreign Secretary..." (p. 247) This should be a simple clerical error, Ramzdov is the Foreign Minister, and Izvolsky is the Minister in Japan, which is exactly the opposite.
There may be more unsatisfactory points in the translation, but here are a few in page number order:
"(1902) The Japanese Sixth and Twelfth Divisions conducted airborne, landing, and encounter drills" (p. 21) before the aircraft was invented, and of course there could have been no airborne landings.
"Alexander III's successor was deeply influenced by Nazi ideas" (p. 41), when the Nazi Party had not yet emerged, suspecting the mistake of "Nazism" or "nationalism" or "nationalism" (2017).
"Send a delegation led by Admiral Putiatin" (p. 52), who was a vice admiral, not an admiral. Russian aдмирал (equivalent to English admiral) refers narrowly to admiral and general in the broad sense. There are many cases in which other admirals are translated as "admirals" (such as Seymour, who was then a lieutenant general), and I will not repeat them here.
"In 1869, a Duke of Aberdeen ordered the construction of a small armored ship" (p. 89), which should refer to the Japanese Navy's ironclad ship "Dragon Horse", which in 1869 was the Alexander Hall & Co. Company in Aberdeen, England. Ltd) started construction. "A Duke of Aberdeen" was mistranslated.
"Colonel Merkel, a professor at the Berlin Military Academy invited by Japan, to give a lecture at the Army University" (90 pages), and "holding a lecture" translates as "teaching" (Merkel was an instructor at the Japanese Army University from 1885 to 1888). In addition, Mei's rank at that time should be major.
"The Japanese army has 6 army divisions and 1 elite division" (p. 90), and the "elite division" should be called the "Guards Division".
"Here we encounter the Japanese fleet commanded by Vice Admiral Ito" (p. 100), "Ito" should be "Ito" (祐坭), and the two surnames are homophones in Japanese.
"During the reign of the Hun king Aitzel" (p. 245), "Aitzer" should be changed to the common translation "Attila".
"Under the leadership of Field Marshal Roberts of Kandahar Province" (p. 251), "Field Marshal Roberts of Kandahar Province" shall be referred to as "Field Marshal Roberts, Count of Kandahar" or "Count Roberts of Field Marshal Kandahar".
"Elected neither from among the citizens of the states members of the Berlin Congress nor from among the citizens of the Balkan states" (p. 284), the "Berlin Congress" shall be the "Congress of Berlin", that is, the meeting of Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, And Turkey in 1878 to amend the Treaty of San Stefano.
"Muroran Villa in Kyoto" (p. 290), "Muroran Villa" should be "No Neighbor's Temple". "Muroran" is pronounced similarly to "murinan" in Japanese.
"Baron Kurino, Minister of Japan to Russia, submitted to Ramsdorf a note of severance and his resignation" (p. 302), the "resignation" was submitted to his superiors, and the wording here is obviously inappropriate, as if it were a mistake in "recredentials".
"Soldiers had to live crowded into 35 'battalion squads' scattered around Jinzhou, Chinese adobe barracks" (p. 312), where "camp class" is clearly a transliteration and should be called "yingpan," the Chinese term for military barracks at the time.
"The Fuji and Xiao battleships under repair and the nearly sunken Battleship Shikishima" (p. 405), "Akatsuki" (Asahi), the former being a destroyer and the latter a battleship.
"Battleship towed back to anchorage in the harbor" (p. 405), "barge" is an unpowered transport vessel, which should be a mistake of "tugboat" here.
"At that time the gunshots were fired not far from the Tsar" (p. 492), and the "gunshots" should be "shells", indicating that a salute gun at that time had mistakenly fired live ammunition.
"The scopes of many firearms have long been damaged" (p. 575), and the "scope" should be a mistake of "ruler".
"The Japanese Minister to Korea, Count Ito, already controls the country" (p. 592), and the "Minister to Korea" should be the "Governor of Korea."
Enumerating these translation issues is by no means intended to be harsh on the translator. In fact, the author believes that these details aside, the translation of this book is basically smooth and satisfactory. Moreover, it is not difficult for the reader to find out from these questions that translating this book requires expertise in many fields, such as the history of international relations, military history, Russian history, Japanese history, and Japanese language, which is quite difficult. For translators who are Russian teachers rather than researchers of history, undertaking such a "challenging" (postscript) translation work is already respectable in itself, and such mistranslations are understandable. I hope that these places will be revised when this book is reprinted or reprinted.
(Regarding the degree and title system in Russia, the author is under the advice of researcher Tang Shichun, and hereby expresses his gratitude.) ）
Editor-in-Charge: Zheng Shiliang
Proofreader: Luan Meng