Lao Qin had previously written an article entitled "Chairman Mao's Designated Alternate Secretary Before Going to Chongqing, Who Overshadowed Chiang Kai-shek's First Command of the Battle," which tells the story of Chen Yun, who went deep among the masses and did mass work while serving as secretary of the North Manchuria sub-bureau in 1946, and created the North Manchuria base area with one hand and one foot. In November 1946, Du Yuming, commander of the Northeast Security Command of the Kuomintang Army, launched the plan of "attacking the north from the south, first the south and then the north", preparing to occupy all of southern Manchuria, and then relying on it to attack northern Manchuria. At that time, the military strength of our southern Manchuria was weak and the people's hearts were confused, and the idea of "withdrawing from southern Manchuria and going to northern Manchuria to join forces" appeared among the cadres of the south Manchuria sub-bureau. Just as the so-called "vicissitudes of the sea, the true colors of heroes", Chen Yun asked for his life at this time and took the initiative to ask to work in Southern Manchuria. In southern Manchuria, he commanded the third and fourth columns of the Northeast Democratic Coalition Army to open the prelude to the "Four Guarantees linjiang" campaign, and under the strategy of the "three lower jiangnans" launched by the northern Manchurian troops, he finally won a comprehensive victory in the "four guarantees linjiang" and smashed the Kuomintang army's attack on the base areas of southern Manchuria.
Today, Lao Qin specifically talks about the role played by Lin Biao in "three under the Jiangnan and four to protect the Linjiang".
The day before yesterday and the day before yesterday, Lao Qin lian wrote two articles, "In 1946, Huang Kecheng denounced Lin Biao for misjudging the war situation, and 13 years later, he realized that he had misunderstood Lin Biao" and "Huang Kecheng opposed the revision of Chairman Mao's title in his later years: Emotionally can't get by, or Chairman Mao is good" two articles, focusing on the spirit of Seeking Truth and Truth throughout His Life. He thought that Chairman Mao's decision to defend siping was wrong, and in 1959 he pointed it out bluntly in front of Chairman Mao. In April 1981, his article "On the Question of Evaluation of Chairman Mao and The Attitude Toward Mao Zedong Thought" would be published on the front page of the People's Liberation Army Daily, and Hu Qiaomu wanted to change the title of Chairman Mao in the article to "Comrade Mao Zedong", which was strongly opposed by him. His reasoning was "emotionally unacceptable".
Huang Kecheng is such a person who likes to be more real.
At the beginning of 1984, when he saw that Lin Biao's entry was blank in the interpretation of the marshal's entry in the military volume of the "Encyclopedia of China", he felt extremely uncomfortable and asked the members of the writing group to interview him, saying: "Since it is to write a history of historical figures, it is necessary to use a historical pen, one is one, two is two, Lin Biao's military ability is obvious to all, and it should not be hidden and not written." ”
Similarly, in the process of defending the base area of southern Manchuria, Chen Yunju made great contributions. But Lin Biao's exploits should not be erased either.
Speaking of which, Lin Biao is a man who has studied Chairman Mao's military thought extremely thoroughly.
Lao Qin wrote in "Who Goes to the Northeast to Preside Over the Military, Liu Shaoqi Held Up Three People, Why Is Chairman Mao Most Optimistic About Lin Biao?" The article details that Lin Biao has long received the teachings of Chairman Mao's ear to face the life since he met at Jinggangshan. Among them, the most touching plot is that around the New Year of 1930, he wrote a long letter to Chairman Mao, proposing: "How long can the Red Flag of Jinggangshan be fought?" Chairman Mao did not immediately spend five days writing him a reply of six or seven thousand words, that is, the famous article "The Spark of Stars Can Burn the Plains."
It can be said that Chairman Mao's care and love for Lin Biao is the same as that of teachers treating students.
Teachers teach hard, and students learn carefully.
Reporter Liu Baiyu once said: Lin Biao does not like to talk, does not love activities, likes to be alone in a corner, buried in meditation. Once, there was a general's gun that went off the rails, and he turned a deaf ear. In addition, Lin Biao liked to read books, and the small suitcase he carried with him contained several pamphlets, all of which were monographs of Chairman Mao's works, including "TheOry of Contradictions," "Theory of Practice," and "Strategic Issues of China's Revolutionary War." In addition to contemplation, he was looking through these books.
See, the books that Lin Biao carried with him were all the works of Chairman Mao, that is, he was not allowed to use Chairman Mao's military skills in military affairs.
In fact, the tactics lin biao has studied and created ,"three points and two sides," "three three systems," as well as tactics such as "one point and two sides of the siege," "four fast and one slow," "four groups and one team to solve siege street warfare," "three fierce tactics of pursuit," and "three ways of playing in three situations," and so on, all of which have the shadow of Chairman Mao's military ideological principles.
Strategically, Like Chairman Mao, Lin Biao attached importance to the creation of base areas and stressed that winning the war could not be separated from the support of the masses. Lao Qin in "Lin Biao ate foreign bread for a few years, will not fight"? In the face of criticism, Lin Biao responded in this article, saying that when Lin Biao arrived in the northeast, the first step in his work was to take root in the countryside and create a revolutionary base area. However, the situation did not allow him to do so, and in order to have enough chips at the negotiating table, the central authorities instructed him to compete with the Kuomintang for Shenyang, for Siping, for Changchun...
Lao Qin wrote yesterday in the article "In 1946, Lin Biao was called the "Fleeing General", he said: I think I ran too slowly" that after Lin Biao withdrew from Siping on May 19, 1946, he and Peng Zhen, Luo Ronghuan and others set a policy of retreating to the north of the Songhua River.
However, before crossing the river, he deliberately left three and four columns to let them go to Changbai Mountain to fight guerrillas and establish base areas.
Lin Biao's chess piece has great significance.
You must know that leaving two units in Changbai Mountain provides the possibility for our army to echo each other in Jiangnan and Jiangnan, and to contain the enemy with each other.
In fact, in the middle of September of that year, when Chiang Kai-shek's army was preparing to attack Harbin, Lin Biao called the Three Columns and asked them to attack Xifeng, and Jiang's army was suddenly confused and disregarded, and in the end, they had to change their strategy and urgently dispatch the New Sixth Army and the Fifty-second Army to the south.
In November, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to Du Yuming's plan to "attack the south and defend the north, first the south and then the north", clamoring that the Democratic Coalition Army in southern Manchuria would be driven to the Yalu River to drink water. Chen Yun stabilized the hearts of the army at the Seven Daojiang Conference and put forward the slogan of "making a big fuss in the Heavenly Palace in southern Manchuria."
Lin Biao already had a clear judgment on the development of the situation in the northeast, and he held that the development of the war situation in the northeast must go through three stages: The first stage is the process of us withdrawing from the city and letting the enemy occupy the city; the second stage is the process of contending with the enemy in the movement; and the third stage is the process of launching an all-round counteroffensive and annihilating the enemy's living forces in large numbers.
With regard to the enemy's policy of "attacking the north from the south and defending the north first, and then pursuing the north," Lin Biao telegraphed Chen Yun, saying that this is the beginning of the second stage, and that we must rely on mobile warfare to confront the enemy, eliminate the enemy in a mobile war, fight more and less, blossom at more points, and prefer to attack with small targets; as long as a war of annihilation is fought, the war situation will develop toward a situation favorable to our side.
Lin Biao repeatedly told him: If you don't fight, you won't fight, and if you hit, you will eat it.
The fourth column fought against the enemy's Twenty-fifth Division, known as the "Thousand Mile Colt," in Xinkailing, and feeling that the other side's firepower was too strong and ready to give up, deputy commander Han Xianchu quoted Lin Biao's original words that "if you don't fight, you won't fight, and if you fight, you will eat it" to motivate all the soldiers.
The determination of the troops to fight to the death came up, and finally completely annihilated the enemy's Twenty-fifth Division, the first record of annihilating an entire division of the enemy in the northeast battlefield, and received Chairman Mao's telegram commendation.
Han Xianchu's military ability was relatively high among the founding generals, and after he and the commander of the Three Columns, Zeng Kelin, formed a front finger, there was a fierce dispute over whether to destroy the enemy's Eighty-ninth Division.
The enemy's Eighty-ninth Division was Chiang Kai-shek's concubine unit, well-equipped and powerful, and Zeng Kelin meant that this was a hard bone, and that it should not be touched first, so as not to bruise his own teeth, saying that according to Lin Zong's instructions, "it is better to attack with small targets, and as long as a war of annihilation is fought, the war situation will develop in a situation favorable to our side."
However, Han Xianchu believed that the enemy's Eighty-ninth Division was arrogant and arrogant, and it was very taboo among Chiang Kai-shek's army, and once it was besieged by us, it would fall into a situation of being alone and helpless, and quickly collapse.
Neither of them could convince anyone, so they reported it to Lin Biao and let Lin Biao decide.
Lin Biao's call back was very simple: fight the enemy's Eighty-ninth Division, under the unified command of Han Xianchu.
Han Xianchu was overjoyed, and commanded the third and fourth columns to launch a fierce attack on the enemy's Eighty-ninth Division, and the battle situation was just as he had expected, completely annihilating more than 7,000 people of the enemy's Eighty-ninth Division.
Unfortunately, Du Yuming had a special car and slipped away early.
The enemy's Eighty-ninth Division was annihilated, and the enemy was greatly shocked.
No one expected that on January 6, 1947, Lin Biao suddenly led the main force of 12 other artillery regiments of the 12 divisions in Beiman, braving the cold of minus 40 degrees and stepping on the thick ice on the Songhua River to attack Changchun and Jilin.
The Kuomintang army was suddenly completely stunned.
Lin Biao then besieged his Tamu with four divisions, carried out reinforcements at encirclement points, and annihilated more than 5,000 enemy reinforcements from Jilin, Jiutai, and Dehui.
This was the Battle of Jiangnan, which was highly praised by Chairman Mao afterwards.
Plans for a nationalist attack on Linjiang were foiled on 20 January.
Lin Biao left a small detachment to monitor and contain the Kuomintang troops in the area north of Jiutai and Yongji, and he himself led the main force to withdraw to Jiangbei on the 19th.
When the Kuomintang army attacked Linjiang for the second time, it was disturbed by these small detachments left by Lin Biao.
When the Kuomintang troops launched the third attack on the Linjiang area in three ways, Lin Biao led 12 divisions of the Northern Manchurian army to cross the river on February 21 and attacked back at Dehui and Jiutaiyi. The Kuomintang army was overwhelmed and exhausted, and hastily ended the third offensive against the Linjiang area.
Especially worthy of the big book is the Battle of The Three Lower Jiangnan.
Lao Qin had previously introduced in the article "Thunderbolt Fire in the Founding Generals, Dare to Fight a Battle Without Orders, Directly From the Division Commander to the Commander of the Column", Zhong Wei, the commander of the 5th Division of the Second Column, is a fierce character, and he has not been able to sing the protagonist in the previous two river crossing battles, and has always felt itchy and intolerable. On the third trip to Jiangnan, his 5th Division reached the southwest of Paoshantun and learned that the two battalions of the 262nd Regiment of the enemy's 87th Division were stationed in the southwest of Jiangjiatun and Wang Kuidian, and he did not discuss or ask for instructions, commanded the troops to fight, and attracted the enemy's other units to a steady stream, and the battle became bigger and bigger, so that Shantun became the main battlefield for annihilating the enemy, and even Lin Biao accepted his command.
In the Battle of Paoshantun, our army annihilated most of the enemy's 88th Division, inflicted heavy losses on the 87th Division, and won a complete victory in the "Three Lower Jiangnans."
After the war, Lin Biao greatly praised Zhong Wei, saying: "We must dare to fight a victorious battle of disobeying orders, just like Zhong Wei did in Paoshantun and disobey orders three times." ”
Later, Lin Biao also promoted Zhong Wei to commander of the Twelfth Column.
Looking closely at Lin Biao's attitude toward Han Xianchu, Zhong Wei and others, it is easy to figure out the reason why the four wilds are strong.
The three-down Jiangnan and Four-Guarantee Linjiang Operation was a clever coping strategy of "fighting in the south and pulling in the north and fighting in the south" that Lin Biao carefully conceived in light of the actual situation.
In this three-and-a-half-month battle, our army annihilated more than 40,000 Kuomintang troops, recovered 11 towns, and smashed the enemy's strategic plan of "attacking the north in the south, first in the south and then in the north", forcing it to change from offensive to defensive position in the northeast battlefield. That is to say, our army's base areas in southern Manchuria, northern Manchuria, eastern Manchuria, and western Manchuria have all been greatly developed, creating favorable conditions for our army to shift from strategic defense to strategic counteroffensive.