But Hitler had other plans. Not without seeing the danger that the troops might fall into a siege, he did not think that it was a terrible thing: the German army in the salient and the besieged, because it was fighting on the inside, was often able to contain the Soviet army on the outside line, which was much better than letting the troops fall into a rout under the cold and the pursuit of the superior enemy. This line of thinking later formed the so-called "fortress" tactic.
Like Hitler's strategy of perseverance, this fortress tactic has been widely criticized, but it seems to have been affirmed again in recent years. But like any other strategy and tactic, the legitimacy of Hitler's "fortifications" and "strongholds" is to be judged on a case-by-case basis and cannot simply be regarded as right or wrong. In the northern part of the Eastern Front in 1941, this tactic was in a delicate position. On the one hand, the German retreat may have been chaotic in the snow and hit hard by the relentless Soviet army; on the other hand, the continuation of the fortification meant that a large heavy army would be surrounded by the Soviets, and would quickly lose its combat effectiveness without ammunition and supplies.
Loeb, on the other hand, could not accept the arrangement of putting the main force of an army group under siege, and immediately submitted his resignation. After his dismissal, Loeb was never appointed by Hitler again, and after the war he was court-martialed. But the court did not produce any evidence that was particularly unfavorable to him, so in the end only Loeb was sentenced to 3 years in prison. By and large, as an old-school soldier, Loeb did not seem to have any sympathy for either Hitler or his party, and his troops fought mainly in the pro-German Baltic region, with cleaner hands and feet than those of the Central and Southern Armies.
The commander of the 18th Army, General Ge von Küchler, became commander of the new Army Group North on 17 January. The post of commander of the 18th Army was replaced by Lindemann, the former commander of the 50th Army. Also removed was Brunnecht, chief of staff of Army Group North, who was replaced by Hassay. On 18 January, Küchler issued an order for the 2nd Army to hold the rear line, including Holm, and to send reinforcements from the 39th Motorized Army (which would be composed of the 8th Panzer Division and the 218th Infantry Division from Denmark). New troops from Western Europe will also be sent to the 2nd Army and the Holm front. German command at all levels, including Army Chief of Staff Halder, believed that holm's situation could be salvaged.
But the Soviets moved much faster than the Germans expected. The large number of reinforcements promised by Kuchler had not yet arrived, and on 23 January the vanguard of the 3rd Assault Army had reached Holm. The Germans hastily cobbled together a battle group to deal with it, commanded by Major General Theodore Scherer, commander of the 281st Guard Division, whose name the group was named after him. Scherer's troops were a jumble of miscellaneous units, including: some small units of the 385th Infantry Regiment, 3 infantry companies, 4 police companies, and some miscellaneous logisticians, totaling 3500 people. They were soon surrounded by the Soviets and could only huddle up in a 1.5 square kilometer fire zone.