Between Japanese-U.S. diplomatic instructions and operational orders
At 4:45 p.m. on November 26, Ambassadors Nomura and Raisu visited the State Council and received three documents from Secretary of State Hull, the so-called Hull Note.
The main point of this US proposal is that Japan and the United States agree to follow the principles that the United States has always advocated; The two countries advocate that all countries concerned with the Far East sign a non-aggression pact, which means reaffirming the nine-power pact; Japan withdrew all troops and police from China and French Indochina.
The US side believes that Japan has the following four ways to choose the first, agrees with the US proposal, and changes the policy;
Second, no longer launch armed attacks on the North and the South, but continue to wage all-out war in China;
Third, begin to withdraw troops to find out how China, the United States, and the United Kingdom reacted to it;
Fourth, always pursue established policies. Japan chose the last path.
The United States has also long believed that Japan will choose the fourth way. In this way, the tactical intentions of the U.S. head of state are increasingly shifting from diplomatic negotiations to war.
On the twenty-seventh day, the day after the Hull Note was presented, Hull said to Stimson:
"I've left it alone, and it's time for you and Knox —that is, the Army and the Navy— to play."
On the same day, twenty-seventh, in the Office of the Secretary of War, Secretary of war Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, Secretary of Naval Operations Stark, and General Zeller (on behalf of Army Chief of Staff Marshall) discussed the following two issues:
First, how to deal with the threat of Japanese aggression;
Second, what warnings should be given to U.S. military commanders in the Far East in the future.
On the twenty-seventh day, Marshall and Stark presented to the President an "Opinion on the Situation in the Far East", which mainly consisted of the following two points:
1。 It is expected that Japan will move south, in particular to invade Thailand;
2。 In order to confront this, we should try our best to avoid war against Japan before strengthening the Philippines' defensive strength.
These two points finally express the judgment, strategy and hope of the US military personnel. Secretaries Stimson and Knox agreed with the proposal. But the President, in order to avoid issuing the same common warning as the explicit declaration of recourse to war, did not agree to the proposal, but agreed to issue a "final vigilance order" to field commanders.
Thus, on the same day (November 27), Marshall issued a warning order to army units in the Philippines and Hawaii:
"Hostilities in Japan can happen at any time. If hostilities are unavoidable, the United States wants Japan to act publicly first. Your Ministry must use reconnaissance and other necessary means. ”
Stark issued instructions to the Pacific Fleet and the Asian Fleet, beginning with the statement that "this telegram should be regarded as a warning of war" and more specifically than Marshall's order: "The Negotiations between Japan and the United States have ended, and it is estimated that Japan will take aggressive actions in the next few days." It seems that the Japanese army is going to take action against the Philippines, Thailand, or the Isthmus of Kra (Malay Peninsula) or Borneo. You must take appropriate defensive measures. ”
On the morning of November 28, with the participation of President Roosevelt, a council of wartime ministers was convened. It was decided to draft a personal letter from the President to the Emperor of Japan, which contained "both a hopeful, peaceful and friendly tone and a warning to Japan," and a special address to the Diet by the President stating "the actions that the United States should take in the face of urgent events and the apparent danger of war."
On the other hand, on November 28, a telegram from Tokyo to ambassadors Nomura and Raisu showed an ominous sign that "the situation is becoming more urgent." Foreign Minister Togo began the telegram by saying: "The Hull Note is an unreasonable proposal for Japan" and said: "The Japanese Government absolutely cannot use this as a basis for negotiations." The Japanese Government's response to the proposal will inform you within two or three days, and in fact, the Japan-US negotiations are about to break down at this point. But at the same time, he instructed "not to give the United States the impression that the negotiations are about to break down." Tell them only that you are waiting for a directive, and that the government's intentions are unclear. You yourself believe that the Japanese Government has always made a legitimate claim that it will not hesitate to endure the greatest sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific."
The United States also learned of the contents of this telegram on the twenty-eighth day (Washington time) through "magic". Therefore, in the eyes of the United States, it is clear that Japan has stopped seeking talks with the United States and has finally made up its mind to take new military action. Japan has set a deadline for signing a police agreement on November 29, Tokyo time (November 28, Washington time), and it is imminent for Japan to start action.
As if this idea of Hull was confirmed, on December 1, the "Court Technique" deciphered the telegram from Tokyo on November 30 to the ambassador to Germany, which read as follows:
"The Japan-U.S. negotiations are now in a state of rupture. I hope you will tell Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in particular secret. There is an extreme danger of war between Japan and the United States and Britain, and the war will begin earlier than expected. ......”
The conclusive evidence that a rupture is imminent is becoming more and more apparent. The Japanese side held a council on December 1 and decided without painstaking effort on the "Question of Waging War against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands." Its contents are as follows:
"The negotiations between Japan and the United States, based on the "Essentials for the Implementation of the Imperial State Policy" decided on November 5, finally failed, and the Empire declared war on the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands."
On this day, Nagano, the commander-in-chief of the Military Command, issued the order "Order of the Sea No. 9" that "the Empire decided to start a war against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands in early December." On the second day, the order "Order no. XII of the Sea" with a specified time limit for the start of the war was issued: "The commander of the combined fleet must launch force in accordance with the order of the sea no. 9 after December 8."
At 5:30 p.m. on the second day, the "Dengxin Mountain 1208" was issued to the mobile troops that had departed from Shanguan Bay on Zetch Island at 6:30 a.m. on November 26 and were advancing towards Pearl Harbor (it was decided that the date of the war would be December 8). Attack as scheduled!) and notify "Decide to go to war." No return voyages are allowed. X day is eight days".
At this point, the target of war against the United States has finally left the string.