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Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

The famous Skunk Factory is Lockheed's Advanced R&D department, formally known as "Advanced R&D Project", but few people use this name. Originally a highly confidential black-box operation, specializing in short and fast special projects, it was later extended to pre-research, and now it is actually the main body of Lockheed's research and development. The history and experience of the skunk factory is worth noting.

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

The emergence of the ME-262 greatly stimulated the United States, which rushed to develop its own jet fighter, and the Skunk Factory came into being

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

The Lockheed P-80 became the first mass-produced jet fighter in the United States

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

Kelly Johnson also began his skunk saga

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

Today, the Skunk Factory has long been famous, and Lockheed has simply repaid the building with a large skunk image

In World War II, the U.S. Air Force (then known as the U.S. Army Air Force) learned the advanced nature of the German me-262 jet fighter on the battlefield, and on the other hand, obtained the first generation of jet engine technology from Britain, and hurriedly launched its own jet fighter development. As major aircraft companies focused on wartime production and improvements to existing models, the relatively idle Bell Aircraft Company was tasked with developing jet fighters, which later became bell p-59 "comets in the air", which was the reason why Bell jet and rocket aircraft technology was once leading in the early post-war period.

At the same time, the U.S. Air Force also asked major aircraft companies to carry out pre-research, so Lockheed assigned Kelly Johnson, who had led the design of the P-38 "Lightning" and others, to form a new task force, and finally successfully developed the Lockheed P-80 "Meteor", which was the first mass-produced jet fighter in the United States. The new department was highly confidential, but one day when a cartographer received a phone call from outside by mistake, on a whim, he reported that his house was a skunk factory that brewed bootleg liquor in cartoon movies, and the name spread later. Today, the Skunk Factory has long been famous, and Lockheed has simply brushed the building of the facility with a large skunk, and the cartoon image is cute.

Under Kelly Johnson's leadership, Skunk Factory designed the F-104 Star fighter, U-2 Dragon Girl and SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft, of which only the Star type is officially named, and both dragon girl and blackbird are started from common colloquialism and later "posthumously recognized". SR-71, which was supposed to be RS-71, was mistaken for SR-71 by then-President Johnson's careless mouth, and it will be wrong later. The Skunk Factory had to change 29,000 drawings for this, but that's a digression.

The 1950s were the era of high-altitude and high-speed pursuits. To achieve high altitude high speed with insufficient engine thrust, the best way is to reduce resistance, the key lies in the wings. In the 1950s, delta wings, trapezoidal wings and large swept wings represented different wing drag reduction ideas, each with successful examples. The delta wing has little supersonic drag, and can also be combined with the tailless configuration to become a tailless delta wing, but the sustained maneuverability of the medium air speed is insufficient, and the take-off and landing glide distance is also long, typical examples are the Cornwell F-106 "Triangle Javelin", Dassault "Phantom III" and so on. The maneuverability of the large swept wing is good, but the supersonic boost-to-drag ratio is not as good as that of the delta wing, typical examples are the North American F-100 "Super Sabre", MiG-19 and so on. Trapezoidal wingspan is small, thin wing, supersonic drag and maneuverability between the delta wing and the large swept wing, typical examples are the Northrop F-5 "Freedom Fighter", another typical example is the Lockheed F-104 "star".

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

The F-104 is known as a "widow maker", but lack of mobility is a necessary sacrifice in situations where insufficient thrust requires high altitude and high speed

Today's F-104 has a bad reputation as a "widow maker", but its poor maneuverability is a necessary sacrifice for high-altitude high speeds, and the same trapezoidal wing F-5 is not so extreme in its speed and height requirements, and is known for its excellent maneuverability, and today's F-18e can be regarded as a direct descendant of the F-5.

The F-104 was also an era without computational fluid dynamics and a supersonic wind tunnel, and Johnson had to study aerodynamics by firing a free-flying model of a rocket into the lake. It should be said that under the given conditions, Johnson brilliantly answered the design challenge, and the F-104 was heavily adopted by the U.S. Air Force and allied air forces, with a total production of more than 2500 aircraft. During the "Light Fighter" (LWF) program that eventually led to the F-16 and F-18, Lockheed presented the CL-1200 scheme, still using trapezoidal wings, with large swept inner wing segments with approximate edges. This is a deep improvement over the F-104. The CL-1200 failed, but it also shows that at least on paper, Lockheed was convinced that the basic layout could meet the mobility requirements of the LWF, but it was also disconnected from advanced technologies such as wing-body fusion, side strips, low wing load, and airway pre-compression.

But it was also the beginning of Lockheed's climbing of the wrong tech tree. The U.S. Air Force has long been aware of the mistake of simply pursuing speed and height. In the '60s, the technical way to solve this problem was to change the swept wing, but this came at a high cost of weight, flight control complexity, reliability and serviceability. Driven by the fighter mafia, energy mobility became the dominant design idea, "returning to the basics" in simplicity and perfection, avoiding the trap of over-refinement, but this does not mean that it can be followed by the old ways. Lockheed's fighter design ideas were outdated.

But God closes a door and may open a window. Lockheed, faltering in the fighter world, accepted the project of the CIA high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft (which eventually led to the U-2), climbed another technology tree, and blossomed.

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

The U-2 used high-altitude flight to evade fighter interception, but in the end it was defeated by missiles, which were 4 U-2s lined up in a row in the square outside the Military Expo Gate

The U-2 not only relied on high ceilings to avoid interception by mainstream fighters and air defense systems, but also adopted early radar absorbing coatings, and the resulting total darkness at high altitude to reduce reflections was only a by-product. But after the U-2 was knocked out in Cuba, the Soviet Union and China, it was unreliable, and the CIA further proposed a double-three (triple sonic, thirty-thousand-meter lift limit) reconnaissance aircraft, which led to the SR-71.

50 years later, the SR-71 is still the world's fastest mass-produced manned aircraft, with design and manufacturing challenges in the '60s. The fuselage structure uses a large number of heat-resistant, lightweight, high-strength titanium, and the engine is a turbojet-stamping structure suitable for long-term double-three work. Pneumatically, the wide nose side strips not only generate additional lift in the air-thin double-three flight, but also compensate for the excessive downward moment caused by the aerodynamic center of the wing moving backward with speed. The aerodynamic shape of the SR-71 still seems to be full of sci-fi.

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

The SR-71 is the pinnacle of the Skunk legend of the 60s-70s

It was also the first generation of aircraft designed with radar stealth in mind. The inner wall of the intake tract is made of radar absorbing coating, and the flat belly makes the incident radar waves reflect in other directions, avoiding the formation of stable echoes. The wide, sharp edges also greatly increase the angle of incidence of radar waves in the lateral direction, reducing stable radar echoes.

The STEALTH DESIGN OF THE SR-71 WAS SUCCESSFUL RELATIVE TO THE RADAR TECHNOLOGY OF THE 60S AND 70S, AND HAD TO USE ANGLE REFLECTORS TO FLY SAFELY IN THE CIVIL AIR DOMAIN THROUGHOUT ITS SERVICE, NOR WAS REPORTED TO BE STABLY LOCKED BY HOSTILE FIRE CONTROL RADARS, NOR WAS THERE A RECORD OF EFFECTIVE ATTACKS. Of course, the latter is a combination of stealth and double three, which cannot be attributed entirely to invisibility.

In the 1970s, based on the experience of SR-71, the Skunk Factory designed the F-117 "Night Falcon" by combining scientific computational electromagnetics with computational fluid dynamics. This bizarre-looking "fighter" made a splash in the Gulf War, but after being shot down (one or two) during the Kosovo War in 1999, its operational use was drastically reduced.

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

The F-117 ushered in the era of invisibility

It is worth noting that the Skunk Factory did not launch a successful fighter design for the entire 60-80s after the F-104, except for stealth and related reconnaissance aircraft, special-purpose attack aircraft (the F-117 has no air combat capability, no radar, and can only rely on infrared photoelectric fire control to drop laser-guided bombs). These special-purpose aircraft have their own strengths and fame, but the actual use cycle is very short. The U-2 entered service in 1957 and began to fade out in the mid-1960s. The SR-71 was a bit longer, entered service in 1966, and was less used for strategic reconnaissance missions in the late 1980s. The F-117 formed its initial combat capability in 1983, and the first actual combat was the invasion of Panama in 1989, which was basically withdrawn from combat in the first few years of the 21st century.

In other words, the technical achievements of the Skunk Factory are based on a high degree of specialization. Its "special function" was far ahead of the forefront of aviation technology known to the world at that time, but it also made great sacrifices for this, and the overall performance was very unbalanced, affecting long-term use. Once the shortcomings are exposed, there is only a hasty withdrawal from combat use.

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

The u-2's ground maneuvers and take-offs are balanced with disposable pulley struts under the wings and discarded at liftoff

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

Landing is awkward, and it takes a long time to fly before reluctantly grounding

The combat and technical support of these highly specialized aircraft is also very cumbersome. The u-2's aerodynamic design can be equivalent to a glider with its own jet engine, and the extra-large scale ratio provides a huge range. But in order to save weight, the U-2 only has a bicycle-style landing gear, that is, two wheels one after the other, without lateral support. On the ground and before takeoff, there are two simple pulley struts under the wings to help balance and automatically discard after takeoff. But the landing procedure is awkward, not only the flight section is super long, the aircraft "refuses" to land steadily, but also to avoid the wingtip in the left and right swing to the ground, must be precisely balanced in the aircraft fuel tank to ensure absolute level, and on the ground by an experienced U-2 pilot driving accompaniment, at any time with radio pointing to the pilot who is controlling the landing. Even so, pilots have to slow down to stall at altitudes no more than 2 feet (a little more than half a meter) above the ground, causing the plane to "naturally fall" onto the runway instead of the usual controlled touch to the ground. Falling from a higher altitude will damage the landing gear, and to lower the height, it will require further lengthening and flying, and the night will be long, increasing the risk of the wingtips touching the ground because there is no absolute balance.

The SR-71 not only has a large set of awkward technical support requirements, but also an oil tiger. Reconnaissance missions from britain to Libya required 8 KC-135s to provide aerial refueling along the way. These are still dedicated KC-135s, because the SR-71 uses special fuel and cannot be cross-contaminated with fuel from general jet aircraft.

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

The prototype of the F-117, Have Blue, is even more notorious for its hopeless diamond, and its aerodynamic performance is desperate

The F-117 was called have blue during the prototype phase, and its predecessor was nicknamed hopeless diamond, meaning "hopeless diamond", reflecting the desperate aerodynamic properties resulting from the polyhedra requirements of stealth design. The mass-produced F-117 is still highly static and unstable after many improvements. Basic flight safety is no longer an issue, but maneuverability is certainly not a problem.

But skunk factories have accumulated the world's richest experience in stealth design and use in their long-term practice, and this expertise shone in the 90s. In the U.S. Air Force's "Advanced Tactical Fighter" (ATF) program, the Lockheed YF-22 defeated the rival Northrop YF-23 and eventually developed into the next generation of the U.S. Air Force's main fighter F-22. The Skunk Factory continued to work hard, defeating the Boeing X-32 with the X-35 in the "Joint Strike Fighter" (JSF) program, taking over the next generation of "low-end" fighters of the U.S. Three Armed Forces and allies, and becoming the hegemon of the Western fighter world in the next few decades.

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

But Skunk Factory's experience with stealth played a decisive role in atf bid victories

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

After atf, Lockheed continued to work hard and won the JSF bid

The role of the skunk factory's stealth experience in the atf win is easy to understand, but the skunk factory also correctly understands the balanced performance that the US Air Force deliberately emphasizes, not allowing stealth and super-patrol to overwhelm everything, otherwise the YF-23 should win. The F-35 can be seen as a single-engine f-22 in a sense, which is also a simplified and degraded version of the F-22. After 40 years of fading out of the world of fighters, the Skunk Factory has become a blockbuster, and the F-22 represents the highest level of Western fighters to this day, and the F-35 will be the largest number of fighters in the West in the coming decades.

The F-22 not only has stealth and super-patrol capabilities, but also has excellent maneuverability. Under the action of low wing load, high thrust-to-weight ratio and thrust steering, the F-22 has reached unprecedented heights in terms of continuous maneuverability, instantaneous maneuverability, over-stall maneuverability, supersonic maneuverability, etc. In the past, only the Su-27 and derivatives could boast of stunts, and there were many Su-27s and derivatives that could not do the action.

Did the Skunk Factory suddenly open Goldfinger? No, it's just that the times have changed, and the "black and white" of fighter technology has changed.

Aviation technology is a complex whole, but there is always black technology, white technology and gray technology in between. Black technology is highly confidential, is the unique skill of major aircraft companies; although white technology is also highly complex, it has matured for the entire industry, and is no longer a unique skill, and the level difference between companies belongs to quantitative change, not qualitative change.

There is also the issue of talent. Black technology talent is kept secret within the company, and only the people in the small circle of direct work know who is who. Companies dig up each other without saying anything else, and confidentiality regulations do not allow such a thing to happen. But the talents of white technology are relatively open. In fact, even within the company, black and white people do not circulate with each other. At the time of the atf bid, both Lockheed and Northrop submitted proposals by black and white people without each other's knowledge for final choice.

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

In the LWF era, Lockheed climbed the wrong technology tree, cl1200 did not reflect the low wing load, large side strips, wing body fusion and other advanced aerodynamic technologies of the 70s, and still stayed at the level of deep optimization F-104, and it was not suspensefully defeated

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory
Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

In the atf and JSF era, Lockheed climbed the technology tree of stealth and knocked the old McDonnell Douglas into the desperate situation of selling boeing

Look at the tech tree from the Skunk Factory

McDonnell Douglas missed the technology tree of stealth, and the A-12, which was "too big to fall", was cut off alive

In the atf and JSF era, stealth is no longer a mysterious black technology, but still a dark gray technology, which is a key technology and a good trick for skunk factories. The supercruising mainly depends on the engine and has little to do with the aircraft company. As long as the pursuit of absolute avant-garde, mobility technology is almost white technology, or has been "mainstreamed", flying fire push integration, active control, vortex lift, wing body fusion, airway pre-compression, etc. is no longer the only skill of any aircraft company. The F-22's aerodynamic design is of a high standard, but the F-22 is not as avant-garde in pneumatics and flight control as the Northrop YF-23, and the span is smaller than stealth and supercruising. This is a continuation of the F-15 tradition of simplicity and perfectionism, and also creates the conditions for the adoption of aerodynamic design methods and flight control technologies that have been mainstreamed. Compared with the f-15, F-16, and F-18 (collectively referred to as the "Ten Series") leading the aerodynamic design revolution, the f-22's pneumatic technological progress is a quantitative change, not a qualitative change.

As a mainstream fighter, the ATF is not only required to meet the specified technical requirements, but also needs to be sufficiently adaptable to the specific situation of the battlefield that may deviate from the requirements. This requires a full balance of performance and avoids specialization. Correctly locking the key black technology, borrowing the original missing door in the white technology balance technology spectrum, in order to obtain a balanced and comprehensive design, this is the key to the F-22's standout.

In contrast, Northrop's stealth skills are also more powerful, and the problem is that the YF-23's aerodynamic design is too avant-garde, resulting in performance specialization. In addition to the YF-17 that was passed on to McDonnell Douglas, Northrop also relied on white technology to "cover" mobility, which could not effectively prove that the technical risk had been reduced to a level acceptable to the US Air Force, and the performance was not balanced enough.

On the other hand, in the LWF era, the Lockheed CL-1200 was fundamentally locked in the wrong key technology, and was left behind by the advanced pneumatic technology of Northrop, General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas. But in the era of stealth, General Dynamics-McDonnell Douglas's strength is still aerodynamic design, and there is a lack of experience with stealth. The A-12 "Avengers" cooperated by the two companies can be called "small B-2", but the demons are in the details, the two families' understanding of stealth stays in the realm of white and gray, lack of technical preparation for the unique difficulties caused by stealth, and underestimate the project and cost control, resulting in the A-12 research and development progress being delayed again and again, the expenditure exceeding and surpassing, and finally being dismounted. Failing to properly lock the stealth of the tech tree eventually forced McDonnell Douglas to sell itself to Boeing and General Dynamics to Lockheed.

This illustrates an interesting problem: there are many aspects of aviation technology, no one can cover all aspects, and climbing the technology tree is the key to success. But this is a scientific and technological forest, not just a scientific and technological tree, and the correct scientific and technological tree is not absolute, it is advancing with the times. With the development of aviation technology, the once popular black technology may become white technology, then this technology tree did not climb was not a big problem, and the current shortcomings can be made up. Of course, the key is to be able to persist until now.

To this day, stealth is not white technology, but it is far less dark and gray than the ATF era. Mobility is white technology. If the ATF or JSF bids are reopened today, McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics may be able to compete with Lockheed and Northrop, but this "if" is no longer possible. This makes the bidding for the next generation of US fighters particularly noteworthy, which technology tree is the key, artificial intelligence and manned-unmanned team combat? This is beyond the traditional field of aircraft engineering. In fact, stealth has gone beyond the pneumatics and structures that traditional aircraft companies focus on.

But black and white technology is relative. For the United States, where aviation technology is balanced and developed, different aircraft companies can alternately develop and surpass in an orderly manner. But for countries where aviation technology is not well developed or unevenly developed, the lack of doors is the lack of doors, which may already be white technology for others, and still black technology for themselves. Then only honestly fill in the gaps. This is a problem at different levels.

On the other hand, the experience of skunk factories also reflects the importance of diversity in the scientific forest. While McDonnell Douglas, Northrop, General Dynamics, and others were all climbing the tech tree of mobility, Lockheed climbed the tech tree of stealth, and Northrop later climbed up. It's hard to say whether this was vision or coincidence, but the counterexample was the Soviet Union. MiG and Sukhoi have different emphases, but both have their technology trees from the Central Fluid Mechanics Institute, so miG and Sukhoi of different eras have great similarities in aerodynamic design concepts. This homogeneity did not have much of a problem in an era when aerodynamics still dominated fighter design, but it encountered many difficulties in the era of stealth.

For China, Cheng Fei and Shen Fei have formed two relatively independent fighter development and manufacturing centers. The history of skunk plants shows that moderate duplication of construction and the necessary healthy competition are beneficial and should be maintained.