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“喆学（58）：精读复刻论文
《考虑公平偏好和绿色创新的绿色供应链策略研究》
制造商推动绿色创新
且制造商公平偏好(1)”
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increase knowledge, and leave beautiful.
Dear, this is the LearingYard Academy!
Today, the editor brings you the article
" Zhexue (58): Intensive reading and reproduction of the paper
"Research on green supply chain strategy considering fairness preference and green innovation"
Manufacturers promote green innovation
And manufacturers have fairness preferences (1)"
Welcome to visit!
本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍精读复刻论文《考虑公平偏好和绿色创新的绿色供应链策略研究》制造商推动绿色创新且制造商公平偏好。
This issue of the tweet will introduce the intensive reading and reproduction of the paper "Research on Green Supply Chain Strategy Considering Fair Preference and Green Innovation" from three aspects: mind map, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement. Manufacturers promote green innovation and manufacturers have fair preferences.
一、思维导图（Mind Maps）
二、精读内容（Intensive reading content）
(1) 基本假设(Basic Assumptions)
市场需求量与产品销售价格成反比，与绿色创新努力成正比。制造商和销售商的绿色创新努力会影响他们的运营成本，而且绿色创新成本与努力程度成正比。此外，还讨论了制造商的再制造成本节约、销售商的回收成本以及制造商为激励销售商参与回收而提供的回收补贴。
Market demand is inversely proportional to product sales price and directly proportional to green innovation efforts. The green innovation efforts of manufacturers and sellers will affect their operating costs, and the green innovation costs are proportional to the degree of effort. In addition, the manufacturer's remanufacturing cost savings, the seller's recycling costs, and the recycling subsidies provided by manufacturers to encourage sellers to participate in recycling are also discussed.
具体的总结如下：
The specific summary is as follows:
(2)模型的建立(Model building)
在制造商推动绿色创新并考虑公平偏好的情况下，供应链中制造商和销售商的利润和效用函数如下：
When manufacturers promote green innovation and consider fairness preferences, the profit and utility functions of manufacturers and sellers in the supply chain are as follows:
作者通过逆向归纳法求解得出以下结论。
The author obtained the following conclusions through reverse induction.
证明步骤：
Proof steps:
1.首先输入制造商利润函数、销售商利润函数、制造商效用函数、销售商效用函数。接着将制造商利润函数、销售商利润函数带入制造商效用函数、销售商效用函数，求解出具体的制造商效用函数、销售商效用函数。
1. First, input the manufacturer profit function, seller profit function, manufacturer utility function, and seller utility function. Then, substitute the manufacturer profit function and seller profit function into the manufacturer utility function and seller utility function to solve the specific manufacturer utility function and seller utility function.
2. 求解销售商的利润最大化问题。销售商的目标是最大化自身利润，因此需要对p求导数，并使导数等于零。求解该方程，得到销售商的最优定价p。
2. Solve the seller's profit maximization problem. The seller's goal is to maximize its own profits, so it is necessary to find the derivative of p and make the derivative equal to zero. Solve this equation to get the seller's optimal price p.
3. 将销售商的最优定价p代入制造商的利润函数。
3. Substitute the seller’s optimal price p into the manufacturer’s profit function.
4. 制造商的目标是通过选择最优的批发价 w和绿色创新努力 em来最大化利润。因此，对制造商利润函数分别对 w 和 e 求导，并令导数等于0。
4. The manufacturer's goal is to maximize profits by choosing the optimal wholesale price w and green innovation effort em. Therefore, the manufacturer's profit function is differentiated with respect to w and e respectively, and the derivative is set equal to 0.
三、知识补充（Knowledge supplement）
逆向归纳法（Backward Induction）是博弈论中用于求解动态博弈均衡的一种方法，尤其在具有完美信息的动态博弈中非常有效。它的核心思想是从博弈的最后阶段开始分析，然后逐步向前（即向博弈的开始方向）推导，以找出每个阶段的最优策略。
Backward Induction is a method used in game theory to solve the equilibrium of dynamic games, which is particularly effective in dynamic games with perfect information. Its core idea is to start the analysis from the last stage of the game, and then gradually deduce forward (that is, towards the beginning of the game) to find the optimal strategy for each stage.
逆向归纳法的基本步骤如下：
The basic steps of the backward induction method are as follows:
1、确定博弈的最后一个阶段：在这个阶段，参与者可以直接根据自己的利益做出决策，因为他们不需要考虑后续阶段的行动。
1. Determine the last stage of the game: In this stage, participants can make decisions directly based on their own interests because they do not need to consider the actions in the subsequent stages.
2、找出最后一个阶段的最优策略：对于每个参与者来说，在最后一个阶段选择能够最大化自己效用的策略。
2. Find the optimal strategy for the last stage: For each participant, choose the strategy that maximizes their utility in the last stage.
3、向前推导：知道了最后一个阶段的最优策略后，再分析倒数第二个阶段。在这个过程中，参与者会考虑到他们在后续阶段将如何响应自己的当前策略。
3. Forward deduction: After knowing the optimal strategy for the last stage, analyze the second to last stage. In this process, participants will consider how they will respond to their current strategy in the subsequent stage.
4、重复该过程：继续这个过程，直到博弈的最开始阶段。在每个阶段，参与者都会根据他们对后续阶段的最优响应来选择自己的最优策略。
4. Repeat the process: Continue this process until the very beginning of the game. In each stage, participants will choose their optimal strategy based on their optimal response to the subsequent stage.
5、找出均衡路径：通过这种方式，可以确定一条均衡路径，即每个参与者在每个阶段都选择了自己的最优策略，并且这些策略相互之间是一致的。
5. Find the equilibrium path: In this way, an equilibrium path can be determined, that is, each participant chooses his or her optimal strategy in each stage, and these strategies are consistent with each other.
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翻译：谷歌翻译
参考资料：谷歌、Chat GPT
参考文献：公彦德,开吉,王哲. 考虑公平偏好和绿色创新的绿色供应链策略研究 [J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 1(1): 1-14.
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