Strategy is like the next big chess game, you need correct strategic thinking, in order to take a step to see the back of the multi-step, at the same time, also need to win the battle tactically, especially at the key points, if the tactics are "slaughtered dragons", I am afraid that the overall strategic situation will change.
Read the telegram draft of "Mao Zedong's Military Collected Writings", understand the strategic thinking of "Sun Tzu's Art of War" from it, and excerpt six strategic understandings for your reference.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="3" > about strategy</h1>
Strategy, once considered a Western concept, actually stems from China's wisdom of "plotting power", whether it is "Lao Tzu" or "Sun Tzu's Art of War" embodies strategic thinking, and Sima Biao of the Western Jin Dynasty even wrote the book "Strategy".
What is strategy?
War, the "war" of war and competition.
Slightly, Xunzi: "Slightly larger." "It's rough, rough.
Therefore, the strategy is to build a directional layout of future elements from a macro perspective, which must not only exert the existing strength and efficiency to the extreme, but also focus on the future and lay out the future force construction or generation.
Among them, the direction judgment and the existing force and the future force construction layout, its connection should be opened through tactics.
If you read Sun Tzu's Art of War carefully, you can appreciate that there are specific ways of thinking and operation methods, tools and models in his 6,000 words.
The reason for writing the strategy is that I saw in the "Mao Zedong Military Anthology" that many contents in 1945 involved layout points, the time for the first counter-offensive had arrived, and the defeat of the Japanese aggressors had been clearly seen; although the specific time of Japan's defeat at that time was uncertain, the dawn of our victory had already appeared; secondly, the Kuomintang had created all kinds of troubles in the stage of stalemate, sabotaging the united front, in order to show the intention after victory, so the advance layout was conducive to building a favorable situation for the future.
The "Tasks of 1945" embodies the expansion of the Liberated Areas, vigilance against sweeping, the reorganization and training of the existing self-defense forces and militias, the reorganization of regular armies and guerrillas, the enhancement of their combat effectiveness, the strengthening of internal unity among the armed forces, the consolidation of the united front, and the making of all kinds of full preparations for the victory over the Japanese aggressors, including the strengthening of production work.
"The Jin-Cha-Ji troops should strive to develop toward the areas occupied by the Japanese army," "Sweep away the stubbornness and mobilize the masses to establish and consolidate base areas," "Establish a base area in northern Hunan and then move south," "The base area in the Xiang'e-Gansu Border Region must be established," "It is very necessary to open up Xuchang and other places in Zhengzhou," "The operational policy of the troops entering Henan is to defend to the west and attack eastward to the south," "To buy time to establish the Wuling base area in northern Guangdong and southern Hunan," and "Prepare to join hands with Wang Zhenwang's first Daoist department to create the Xiangyue border base area, these are all points of layout."
Just like doing the market, a point made into a base area, made into a demonstration effect, will affect the surrounding area, and gradually by the base market to affect the surrounding hinterland market, and then affect the radiation market.
At the same time, it also issued "Preparing to Cope with the Inevitable Situation of Civil War," although it was a telegram from the Eyu-Anhui Border Region, which also showed that there was a general judgment of the future situation and required preparations in all aspects, as Sun Tzu's Art of War said, "If there is no shame in not coming, there is nothing to be done; there is nothing to be ashamed of, and there is nothing to be attacked."
In this layout, with the last article "The Last War Against the Japanese Kou", the content of the Anti-Japanese War part was completed, and the content of "The Last War against the Japanese Kou" was consistent with the content of Mao Xuan, which was studied last year and will not be repeated here. (Read Military Anthology 71)
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="67" > the difference between strategy and tactics</h1>
The difference between strategy and tactics is that the categories of "land" are different, strategy focuses on the overall situation, and tactics are based on the battlefield.
The second half of the fourth volume, from the Battle of Changchun to the Battle of Jinan, reflects strategic thinking and layout.
In fact, in the period of the Liberation War, it can be clearly felt in the "Mao Zedong Military Anthology" that it is a big game of chess, which is completely different from reading the biography of a certain general, and the command wisdom that belongs to the campaign or tactical level and is specific to the specific battles or specific battles of a certain strategic area.
When I talk about Sun Tzu's Art of War, I always stressed that only by understanding the tactical system of Sun Tzu's Art of War can we understand its strategic thinking.
Tactics take into account the situation between the enemy and ourselves in a certain area, and design battlefields and war days to complete the work of troop deployment, momentum creation, and morale stimulation; of course, there must also be specific means such as showing shapes, pretending, enticing the enemy to go deeper, and encircling in a roundabout way.
The strategic consideration is to coordinate the cooperation between various strategic regions, divide and disperse the enemy's forces, so that their troops cannot be freely moved and supported between various regions. Embodied in the telegram, some require the cooperation between two or three regions, some provide opinions on the combat plan of a certain group, and some reject the request for a certain combat unit to reinforce their own area.
In short, from this telegram, which is strung together in a timeline, distributed in various strategic areas, is the planned layout of a larger campaign, from which we can learn strategic thinking. (Read Military Anthology 90)
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="69" > third, strategic thinking</h1>
In strategic thinking, there are two ways of thinking, one is hedgehog thinking, and the other is fox thinking.
This is derived from a British fable, hedgehog thinking is a particularly prominent sense of direction, looking for the goal and desperately moving forward, even if there is resistance, confident that they can break through the resistance, often leaders with this kind of thinking, can not adapt to the environment well, resulting in the inability to reach their destination.
Fox thinking is particularly adaptable, people with this kind of thinking can effectively use the environment, to survive and develop, but the sense of direction is relatively poor, easy to get lost in the middle.
American strategists integrate these two kinds of thinking and call them grand strategy, which has both a clear direction and the ability to adapt to the environment in the process of moving forward.
In the process of reading "Mao Xuan" and "Mao Zedong's Military Collected Writings", it can be clearly felt that Chairman Mao is a great leader who combines these two kinds of thinking, and American strategists also use Committee Member Mao as a typical example in the book to illustrate this point.
These two kinds of thinking are also fully embodied in the "Resolution of the Central Committee on Military Strategic Issues" of the Wa Yao Fort Conference on military strategic issues.
The resolution is divided into three parts, the first of which deals with the strategic line, which clearly defines "the policy of 'integrating the civil war with the national war' under the general task of resisting the Japanese imperialist attack on China with a resolute national war."
The second part talks about the basic principles of operational command: it is necessary to carry out active defense rather than pure defense, to strike later (to lure the enemy deeper), to oppose pre-emptive strikes; to oppose opportunism strategically and to oppose adventurism; in the general principle of combat, whether offensive or defensive, it is necessary to combine walking with fighting, concentrating troops in the main direction, and strategically hitting people with one fist; persisting in strategic protracted warfare, quick decisive battles in campaigns, opposing protracted battles in campaigns, and opposing attrition; having full combat preparations; and having an overall outlook. Take the strategic principle to guide the campaign tactical policy, link today to tomorrow, link the small to the large, link the part to the whole, oppose taking one step at a time, and so on.
The third part talks about the road map for strategic realization, mainly using three steps to achieve the task of opening up the Soviet Union and consolidating and developing the existing Soviet zone.
Judging from the content of the entire resolution, there are both clear directions and specific operational principles, as well as specific operational road maps and specific tasks.
Generally speaking, in terms of orientation, it is necessary to match the national and international environment, and it is necessary to establish an anti-Japanese national united front; operationally, it is necessary to match the local battlefield environment, expand the Soviet area, and consolidate and expand the base areas. (Read 30 military anthology)
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="68" > fourth, the strategic formation path</h1>
There are two strategic paths, one is top-down formulation, and the other is from tactics to strategy.
The top-down formulation is based on the judgment of the future to determine the direction, which is relatively highly matched in the agricultural era and the industrial age, while in the information age, there are more changes, and it is often difficult to have accurate judgments about the future.
From tactics to strategy, most of the strategies in war are carried out in this way, because the battlefield environment is changing rapidly, just like today's fragmented information age.
Today, I have read more than a dozen telegram drafts, and in the instructions for the deployment of various base areas and guerrilla warfare, I have come to the article "Strategic Issues of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War." When I read "Mao Xuan", I have already interpreted it in detail.
Clausewitz said in "The Theory of War" that fighting is the starting point of the logic of war, it is a shrinking war, and it is also a cell in war.
And "Sun Tzu's Art of War" is different from the theory of war, it is about the "art of war", that is, the art of command, teaching generals how to build military power and use military force, inspired by Clausewitz, I think the starting point of the logic of "Sun Tzu's Art of War" is tactics.
Because in the art of command, the basis of commanding people and things (weapons and equipment, logistics materials, etc.) is tactics, it is a shrunken strategy, but also an organic part of the strategy, so the use of established tactics, the ability to create tactics because of the enemy, whether for military generals, or for enterprise marketing generals is a very important quality.
In the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the two sides constantly engaged in tactical contests based on the strengths and weaknesses of the other side in order to avoid each other's advantages and give full play to their own advantages.
Any organization, in the process of operation, starts from tactics, first creates an effective tactic that matches its own resource strength and overall environment, and can adapt to the needs of a certain period of time and upgrade it to a strategy, which is a very practical strategic implementation path.
In the Internet environment, the path of enterprises from tactics to strategy is also a more efficient path, we can only see the faint light ahead, it is difficult to judge the specific direction, but excellent generals, to be able to rely on the faint light to bring the army to victory. (Read Military Anthology 60)
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="70" > five, strategic layout, and strive for the initiative</h1>
During the Xi'an Incident until the outbreak of the All-out War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in July 1937, Chiang Kai-shek returned to Nanjing and began to prepare for an attack on the Red Army in northern Shaanxi.
On the one hand, the Red Army was promoting public opinion against Japan and, on the other hand, it was actively negotiating, and at the same time, it was also taking the initiative in the military to grasp the initiative on the battlefield.
On January 1, 1937, a telegram said "Preparing to deal with the pro-Japanese attack", which was that intelligence had been obtained, and the Kuomintang troops were preparing for war in the name of exercises and secretly marching towards Luonan, so the Red Army also began to make preparations.
According to the telegram on January 7, "If the enemy is determined to start a war, the main force of the Red Army can attack in three steps" is the framework of the layout, the first step out of Shangluo (Shangzhou and Luonan), the second step out of western Henan, the third step out of Jinghan Road, this is the best policy.
The cable said that only by following this three-step attack could the entire situation be changed, Nanjing divided, and Chiang Kai-shek was forced to obey. At the same time, it was emphasized that the Second Front's response to friendly forces (the Northeast Army and the Seventeenth Route Army) in Weibei, and then the internal Red Army and friendly forces and the main forces of the Outer Red Army should be strategically coordinated.
On January 11, another telegram confirmed the above strategy, saying in "It is advisable for the main force of the Red Army to go out to Shangluo", saying that after thinking, the Red Army should take shangluo as appropriate, and the road can be broken and turned into western Henan, and the enemy's central and right roads are incompetent, and if the main force is located in Weibei, it will be in a passive position strategically, and there will be many tactical difficulties.
At the same time as military preparations, the work on the negotiation line was also proceeding intensely, and the January 9 telegram "Advocating Peace to Avoid Civil War and Maintaining the Current Situation in the Northwest" demanded that it vigorously advocate peace, win over Jiang song, instigate public opinion from all factions and circles in the country, instigate Britain and the United States, and maintain the current situation in the northwest.
On January 21, a telegram entitled "Principles of Negotiation and Military Deployment" was sent to inform the negotiators and the commander-in-chief of the former enemy of the Red Army to negotiate principles and military arrangements and fight a prepared battle.
Later, it included "Negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek on matters concerning the red army's garrisons," "The Red Army and Zhang Yangjun should advance and retreat together," "The main contents of negotiations with Nanjing," and "Demand for more defensive lands to nanjing," all of which were carried out on the basis of negotiations.
The telegram to "The Situation and Tasks After the Realization of Internal Peace" clearly defined the contents of the work of consolidating peace, preparing for the War of Resistance, and promoting the national united front, and the telegram also stressed that the Red Army should take advantage of this opportunity to strengthen internal political and military training, strengthen the party's role as a fortress in the Red Army, re-educate cadres, enable them to shoulder new tasks in the new situation, strictly rectify military discipline, study mass work, and strive to become an imitation of the anti-Japanese army. (Read the Military Anthology 44)
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="71" >6</h1>
The realization of the strategic layout is based on it.
The contents of the third volume were read in its entirety, and it was not until the end of February 1947 that it could be seen that a national layout was being made, but judging from the guidance given by the telegram, it was basically required to "seek opportunities to annihilate the enemy and create a favorable situation", or "concentrate superior forces and fight a war of annihilation", or "in both battles and tactics, we must concentrate our forces in order to win", or "we must prepare to fight several major battles in a row", or "if we annihilate the Fifth Army and other enemies advancing north within one or two months, the overall situation will improve", or "fight several annihilation wars in a certain area", or "Fight several annihilation battles in a certain area", or " Smash the opinions of so-and-so's offensive plan", or "fight more small battles with the goal of annihilating the enemy's living forces", or "strive to annihilate three or four enemy brigades per battle".
It can be seen that if a battle is lost somewhere, it is necessary to use more victories to digest this defeat.
Therefore, winning the battle must be the pursuit of the soldiers, and it must also become the faith of the soldiers.
Some people like to use Sun Tzu's art of war to say that "a hundred battles are won, and the good who is not good is also; the soldier who yields without a fight, and the good one who is good is also" to say that Sun Tzu does not approve of a hundred battles and a hundred victories, which is really a misunderstanding.
Needless to say that the first high-frequency word in "Sun Tzu's Art of War" is "victory", which has appeared 85 times, and it is already a hundred battles and a hundred victories, and its overall method of operation is also to pursue victory in battle, the material level breaks through the enemy's organization with a dangerous and short momentum, and the spiritual level uses square circles to improve the morale of the other side and hit the morale of the other side.
Therefore, what Sun Tzu taught us is the systematic method of winning battles. (Read military anthology 79)