Jin Guangyao/Speaker Qi Hongru/Finishing
Gu Weijun delivered an important speech on behalf of China at the Paris Peace Conference, helped China become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and drafted the Charter of the United Nations with major powers. Professor Jin Guangyao of the Department of History of Fudan University has been immersed in the study of Gu Weijun for many years, and has introduced the important moments in Gu Weijun's life with detailed materials, restoring the style of a generation of diplomats who "strive for power with axioms".
This article is compiled from Professor Jin Guangyao's online lecture "Gu Weijun: Diplomats Fighting for Power with Axioms". The lecture department is one of the series of lectures on "New York Liaozhai Cloud Salon" and "Celebrities of the Republic of China", which was presided over by Professor Hong Chaohui of Fortenmo University in the United States and attended by Professor Tang Qihua of the Department of History of Fudan University. Professor Jin Guangyao mainly studies the history of China's modern foreign relations and contemporary Chinese history, and is the author of "The Biography of Gu Weijun" and "A Generation of Diplomats Gu Weijun". Professor Tang Qihua focused on the history of diplomacy in the Beiyang period, and wrote "The History of the Beiyang Amendment Obscured by the "Abolition of Unequal Treaties" (1912-1928)," "The Paris Peace Conference and China's Diplomacy", "Hongxian Imperial Diplomacy" and so on.
Professor Kim Kwang Yew
Before the lecture began, the host, Professor Hong Chaohui, introduced the background of the lecture series: The "Celebrities of the Republic of China" lecture series has been held six times, and will successively introduce the life deeds of famous people in the Republic of China period. The reason why "Celebrities of the Republic of China" was chosen as the theme is because the various fields of the Republic of China period were full of diversified transformations, and In just 38 years, China has experienced ups and downs, which has left valuable historical experience for today's people. In addition, the history of the Republic of China provides colorful research topics for all walks of life at home and abroad, and scholars can take what they need to conduct all-round research. Using celebrities as a window to reflect important historical periods can increase interest while spreading knowledge.
Jin Guangyao, "A Generation of Diplomats Gu Weijun", Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, published in August 2006, republished in 2019.
Professor Jin Guangyao first outlined Gu Weijun's life deeds. Gu Weijun was a famous diplomat during the Republic of China period, served as a minister and ambassador to the United States, France and Britain, attended the Paris Peace Conference and the San Francisco Conference after the two world wars, and made important contributions. Gu Weijun also served as foreign minister of the Beiyang government and foreign minister of the National Government in Nanjing. In addition, after his retirement, Gu Weijun also served as a judge of the International Court of Justice for 12 years. In his 1999 biography, Professor Jin Guangyao referred to Gu Weijun as "the first diplomat of the Republic of China", a title that was later widely circulated. Regarding Gu Weijun's position in China's modern diplomacy, Tang Degang, a well-known historian and co-author of "Memoirs of Gu Weijun," once pointed out that in the past hundred years, China has only produced "two and a half diplomats," Zhou Enlai, Li Hongzhang, and Gu Weijun. The reason why Tang Degang called Gu Weijun a "half" diplomat was because he believed that Gu Weijun did not have diplomatic decision-making power. Zi Zhongjun, a well-known scholar who has also studied the diplomacy of the Republic of China, judged from the perspective of diplomacy and believed that Gu Weijun's diplomatic performance was worthy of a diplomat no matter what, and he was an outstanding diplomat. During the Beiyang period, Gu Weijun served as foreign minister and prime minister, had greater discretion, and personally made important diplomatic decisions, such as the abolition of the Sino-Belgian Treaty of Commerce in 1926 and the removal of Francis Arthur Aglen from the General Taxation Department in 1927.
Early life
Gu Weijun was born into a family of officials and businessmen. His father, Gu Rong, was promoted by Zhu Baosan, a Ningbo merchant, and established contacts with Sheng Xuanhuai, an important bureaucrat in the late Qing Dynasty, and Yuan Shuxun, a Daoist in Shanghai. On the recommendation of Sheng Xuanhuai, Gu Rong served as the general office of the Shanghai Branch of the Bank of Communications. Therefore, Gu Rong provided Gu Weijun with very favorable living conditions, and his rich experience in the political and business circles also had a subtle impact on the young Gu Weijun. Professor Jin Guangyao showed three photos of Gu Weijun who were still young:
Gu Weijun's family portrait in his childhood
The first is a family portrait of Gu Weijun when he was a child, taken before 1892, when his grandmother was still alive. In the back row of the photo, from left to right, Gu Weijun's sister, mother, grandmother, father, and eldest brother are gu Weijun's sister, Gu Weijun himself, and Gu Weijun's second brother from left to right.
Teenager Gu Weijun
The second juvenile Gu Weijun wore a long coat and long pigtails of the Qing dynasty, but held a bicycle in his hand, which was not common in China at that time. Professor Jin Guangyao believes that this reflects Gu Weijun's yearning for new things in traditional society.
Young Gu Weijun
In the third photo, Gu Weijun wears a suit, a bow tie, and leather shoes, with the style of a teenager in the foreign field. These photographs were taken at the Shanghai "Baoji" photo studio, which was a fashion in the late Qing Dynasty and early Ming Dynasty, from which the influence from the culture of the concession can be seen. Another influence of living in the concession was that Gu Weijun felt the privileges enjoyed by the great powers in China. In his later years, Gu Weijun recalled that when he was studying at Zhongxi Academy, he took a rickshaw home from Hongkou every Saturday. Once, when passing the Waibaidu Bridge, an Englishman behind him rushed to see the horse racer, and whipped the rickshaw driver with a whip, thinking that he was slow. Gu Weijun was very angry at the time and asked the British, "Are you gentleman?" Gu Weijun, who grew up in the concession, not only has a yearning for Western culture, but also gradually awakens his sense of nationalism. This yearning for Western culture and nationalist consciousness entered Gu Weijun's heart at the same time, blending and merging, forming what Professor Jin Guangyao called "nationalist consciousness that embraces the outside world". This left a deep mark on Gu Weijun's young soul and became a background color that would not fade.
Gu Weijun went to the United States to study preparatory department at the age of 16, and was admitted to Columbia University in the United States in 1905. He was highly capable of learning, and although his first semester at Columbia University was not good, he made significant progress. The study time at Columbia University had a profound impact on Gu Weijun's later diplomatic activities: the first-class faculty not only cultivated Gu Weijun's basic knowledge of international law, but also brought him a very broad network. Mr. Gu's mentor, John Bassett Moore, is not only a well-known international law expert, but also served as assistant secretary of state and handled U.S. affairs with China. In addition, Gu Weijun chose several courses by Charles Austin Beard, who was a fledgling and later president of the American Historical Society, his constitutional law teacher was Frank Johnson Goodnow, who later served as the legal adviser to Yuan Shikai's government, and the teacher of European history was James Thomson Shotwell, who later accompanied the delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in the United States.
Gu Weijun and mentor John Moore
Gu Weijun also actively participates in various extracurricular activities, such as conducting speech competitions and organizing the Chinese Students' Union for Studying in the United States. These activities have cultivated Gu Weijun's ability to deal with various problems. As a Chinese student, Gu Weijun stood out from students from all over the world at Columbia University and formed a strong sense of self-confidence. Affected by this, after Gu Weijun entered the diplomatic circles, although he was very young, he dared to express his opinions. When Re-reading the materials, Professor Jin Guangyao found that Gu Weijun had published an article entitled "Private Discussion on China's Diplomacy" in the "Annual Report of Students Studying in the United States", which had not attracted the attention of researchers in the past. When Gu Weijun mentioned the diplomacy of the late Qing Dynasty in the article, he pointed out that China lacked bold diplomats. Gu Weijun believes that diplomats not only need to have legal knowledge, but also be resourceful and decisive. He pointed out that although there are powers and no justices in the world today, when making international negotiations, axioms can be used to fight for power, and the powerful cannot single-handedly cover the sky and obliterate the axioms. This reflects the important impact of studying international law on Gu Weijun's diplomacy. Gu Weijun spent only 7 years at Columbia University to complete his master's and doctoral studies and obtain a degree. In 1912, the Beiyang government summoned Gu Weijun to return to China, which was an important period of diplomatic transformation from "traditional" to "modern", and Lu Zhengxiang, the chief foreign minister, proposed that "foreign affairs should not be used as laymen". Therefore, Gu Weijun became the president's English secretary at the age of 24 and entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He then served as China's minister to the United States at the age of 27, represented China at the Paris Peace Conference at the age of 31, and served as foreign minister at the age of 34. This is a rare opportunity for young people, but whether they can seize the opportunity depends on their individual ability and endowment.
Budding
At the Paris Peace Conference, There were five Chinese delegates, of which Gu Weijun had the least seniority. If this is the case, it will not be Gu Weijun's turn to speak. However, when the incident occurred suddenly, on January 28, 1919, China and Japan debated the Shandong issue, and the other four people were either unprepared or retreated. Gu Weijun, who has studied the Sino-Japanese issue, has stepped forward without hesitation, fighting for justice for the country and winning a reputation for himself. This speech can be described as Gu Weijun's debut on the international diplomatic stage.
The Chinese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference published in the Oriental Magazine
According to Jin Wensi, an assistant at the time, Gu Weijun was very nervous when he first spoke, but then he put everything aside and talked about it. The speech lasted only half an hour, Gu Weijun used plain words, but the logic was very strict, reasonable and unassailable, and the speech was included in the "Collection of Gu Weijun Diplomatic Speeches". The speech won praise from the Western giants present: Then-US President Thomas Woodrow Wilson came to shake hands with Gu Weijun; French Prime Minister Georges Benjamin Clemenceau likened the debate between Gu Weijun and Japanese representatives to "cat and mouse", saying that the process was completely under Gu's control. The Paris Peace Conference speech had an extremely important impact on Gu Weijun's subsequent diplomatic career, and Professor Jin Guangyao believed that "heaven and time", "geographical advantages" and "people" together created this speech that has entered the annals of history.
The first is "people and people". Although the actual preparation time for the speech was less than 24 hours, Gu Weijun's preparation for this moment began as early as when he entered Columbia University. In his speech, Gu Weijun did not use sharp words to angrily rebuke the other side, and even gracefully "thanked" Japan for clearing Germany out of Shandong, but he immediately made it clear that he must not "thank" Japan at the expense of China's interests. In addition, Gu Weijun's mentor John Moore also played a great role, which is often overlooked. After Gu Weijun became a minister in the United States, he hired Moore as an adviser to the Chinese embassy. Despite some obstruction, Moore still advises Gu Weijun behind the scenes. Before the Paris Peace Conference began, Muir wrote a memorandum to Gu Weijun on the Chinese lease of land, which mentioned the Shandong issue, pointed out that because the war situation had changed, Japan's demands had no legal basis, and so on. Some of the words in Gu Weijun's speech came from Moore's memorandum, so Professor Jin Guangyao believes that Gu Weijun's preparation at Columbia University and Moore's promotion behind it can be called "people". In the twentieth century, nationalism gradually became a trend in China, and the call for changing unequal Sino-foreign relations became increasingly loud. Gu Weijun conformed to the trend and took the lead in making China's voice heard on the international stage. As for the "geographical advantage", Professor Jin Guangyao believes that the occasion of Gu Weijun's speech takes full advantage of geography. The "Meeting of Ten" takes place in the French Foreign Office building on the banks of the Seine, which is the center of European diplomacy. At that time, the heads of several "giants" such as the United States, Britain, France, and Italy were at the venue, and the international media paid attention to the speeches at the conference. Therefore, Gu Weijun took advantage of the favorable time and place and left this landmark speech.
"Gu Weijun Diplomatic Speeches", by Gu Weijun, selected by Jin Guangyao and Ma Jianbiao, Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, August 2006
However, the Shandong issue at the Paris Peace Conference was not resolved, and the problem was not resolved until three years later at the Washington Conference. Gu Weijun played a very important role in this matter, which made Gu Weijun not only emerge on the international diplomatic stage, but also received very wide recognition from all walks of life in China. For example, when Gu Weijun returned to China in 1922, Cai Yuanpei invited him to give a speech at Peking University and "advertised" him in the school journal, calling Gu Weijun "a young diplomat" and a model figure for Chinese university students.
Diplomatic thought
At that time, there was a lot of attention to diplomatic figures in China, and the other two plenipotentiaries of the Washington Conference, Shi Zhaoji and Wang Zhonghui, as well as Yan Huiqing and Wang Zhengting of the same era, all received public attention. These people were called the "Department of Diplomacy" by the people of the time, of which Gu Weijun was the youngest, but he was most confident in his diplomatic ability, especially with a sense of superiority over his academic background. Gu Weijun pointed out that Chinese believes that as long as they have studied in a foreign country and studied foreign languages, they can do diplomacy, which is incorrect, because diplomats must have basic knowledge of international law and diplomatic history. Gu Weijun's professional ability is also reflected in his sober understanding of China's national strength. In engaging in diplomatic activities, Gu Weijun often used "weak countries" to position China's diplomacy at that time and adopted corresponding strategies. The "Declaration" records Gu Weijun's views on China's diplomacy when he returned to China in 1934 to give a speech:
"The Chinese people have two views on diplomacy, one is that weak countries have no diplomacy, and the other is that only weak countries need diplomacy. Both of these statements can be said to be true, and both can be said to be incomplete. There is no strength or weakness of a country, it all depends on diplomacy, but its methods are different. The diplomacy of weak countries is particularly important. Because the diplomacy of powerful countries can be more careless, there are other ways to remedy it. Weak countries, on the other hand, cannot relax in the slightest, and it is not easy to obtain results, and when they obtain results, they often fail to make full use of them. ”
Therefore, every time there was a major negotiation, Gu Weijun was walking on thin ice. Gu Weijun believes that the idiom "it is better to be jade broken than for the whole" is okay for individuals, but it is not acceptable diplomatically, because the country cannot "crush jade". So you can't expect 100 percent success diplomatically, because if one side wants to be 100 percent successful and the other side wants to do so, no agreement can be reached. So usually sixty to seventy percent success is a big win. When fifty percent is reached, and it is approaching fifty-one or fifty-two percent, care should be taken not to lose any of the words and actions that could cause the negotiations to break down. This view was not widely shared by its contemporaries. Gu Weijun pointed out that there was a big problem in China's diplomacy at that time: Asking for prices everywhere, unwilling to suffer obvious losses, and as a result, suffering dark losses; unwilling to eat small losses, the result was a big loss. In diplomacy, Gu Weijun is very tough when he should be tough, and when he is soft, he will also seek compromise and deal with problems very flexibly.
Gu Weijun knows that as a diplomat of a weak country, it is very difficult to handle foreign affairs, but the diplomacy of a weak country may not have no room for development. Gu admires the French diplomat Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Talleyrand was called "the first diplomat of the 19th century" by Goethe, and his greatest exploit was at the Vienna Conference of 1814-1815. Although France was defeated at that time, Talleyrand negotiated with other countries in many ways during the meeting, and finally preserved France's national interests. As Gu Weijun wrote in 1911 in "Private Discussion on Chinese Diplomacy": "In the later years of Jiaqing, when France was a great innovation, its envoy, Darryland (Talelang), was able to manipulate the British-Russian-Austrian four heroes at the Vienna Conference. Therefore, Professor Jin Guangyao believes that as a diplomat of a weak country, Gu Weijun has a "Talleyran complex" in his heart. But the outcome of the two diplomatic conferences, a hundred years apart, was completely different: Talleyrand was a success, while Gu Weijun hated the banks of the Seine. It can be seen that the talent of diplomats cannot surpass the national fortunes. Gu Weijun had very close contacts with Hu Shi and other liberals, and he also invited them to participate in a symposium hosted by Gu Zhai in Tieshi Hutong. But in the 1920s, after Gu Weijun threw himself into domestic politics, they gradually split. The liberal "Effort Weekly" once published an article satirizing Gu Weijun as China's "Tayloran (Talelang)", believing that he was a "talent for human use", that is, no matter who Tang Shaoyi, Yuan Shikai, Xu Shichang or whatever, they could use him.
A portrait of Talleyrand by Pierre-Paul Prud'hon now in the Metropolitan Museum of Art
Although he is in a weak country, Gu Weijun has a strong desire in his heart to make China one of the great powers. But it was only a brief period before the end of World War II that he had the opportunity to turn the idea into reality. Before the 1944 Dunbatten Oaks Conference in which China, the United States, britain, and the Soviet Union participated, Chiang Kai-shek consulted Gu Weijun for advice. The policy proposed by Gu Weijun to participate in the meeting is to ensure that China becomes one of the "four powers" and obtains the status of a big country on an equal footing with the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. Although Gu Weijun was aware of the power gap between China and the other three countries at that time, he adopted a proactive response strategy. Chiang Kai-shek affirmed Gu Weijun's proposal and appointed Gu Weijun as the chief representative to attend the Dumbarton Oaks Meeting. The outcome of this meeting is inseparable from Gu Weijun's efforts. After the United Nations Constituent Assembly in San Francisco from April to June 1945, Gu Weijun played an important role in the formation of the Chinese delegation. At the Time of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, China's status as a great power had not yet been determined; by the time of the San Francisco Conference, China's status as a great power had been determined, because China, the United States, britain, and the Soviet Union were jointly the initiators of the conference. Gu Weijun's speech at the San Francisco conference fully demonstrated China's ideas about the world order and its status as a great power. For example, in the distribution of non-permanent members, Britain proposed to be determined by its contribution to the war, and if so, the Commonwealth countries would have the lead and Britain would dominate the Council. Gu Weijun proposed that the principle of regional distribution should be taken into account by countries on all continents, and this principle should eventually be written into the UN Charter. This principle was put forward by China on behalf of the weak countries, and as Chiang Kai-shek said, if China did not participate in the conference as a representative of the East, the conference would have no meaning for half the world. In the United Nations discussions on the trust territory, Britain and the United States wanted to preserve their self-interest and maintain their colonial and strategic position. However, from the position of "striving for power with justice", Gu Weijun clashed head-on with Britain and the United States, debated many times, and showed a little bit of great power spirit, contributing to the formulation of relevant provisions of the UN Charter. Gu Weijun once said that he has always had a wish, that is, he hopes that China can have a proper position in the world family. At the San Francisco conference, Gu Weijun, as a representative of China, adhered to the position of "fighting for power with justice." Unfortunately, such a moment was very short in Gu Weijun's diplomatic career. Most of the time, Gu Weijun appeared on the diplomatic stage as a diplomat of a weak country.
Group photo of the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco conference
Another important influence of Gu Weijun on the diplomacy of the Republic of China is in diplomatic strategy. Since the "Twenty-One Articles" negotiations between China and Japan in 1915, Gu Weijun has advocated the strategy of "uniting the United States to control Japan", which is based on the judgment of Japan's ambitions to invade China and the geopolitical pattern in the Far East. In his 1917 report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gu Weijun believed that at that time, Britain, Russia, Japan, Portugal and other countries and China all had "unsolved problems", and "the United States has no conspiracy against me, and if I am sincere, I can rely on the United States for help", "The distant friendship with the United States is still enough to control Japan that is close to the press.". In 1918, Gu Weijun also mentioned: "The outbreak of the European War, the destruction of the balance of power, the party has spare strength and the main door is open, etc., enough for our helpers, but the United States." It can be seen that the purpose of uniting with the United States is to restrain Japan, which poses the greatest threat to China. In the 1930s, when Japan repeatedly invaded China, Gu Weijun repeatedly proposed to the government to establish a diplomatic strategy centered on the United States. China's traditional diplomacy advocates "using yi to control yi", but there is no fixed object of alliance, which can be united with the United States or Russia; and Gu Weijun regards the United States as a long-term joint object. In China's modern diplomatic transformation, Gu Weijun elevated the "United States" to the strategic level. This proposition is not only based on the judgment of the international situation at that time, but also a reflection of Gu Weijun's implicit sense of identity with the United States during his stay in the United States in foreign affairs. From the perspective of the Republic of China government, more and more students studying in the United States, including Hu Shi, Song Ziwen and other graduates of Columbia University, have entered the diplomatic circles and occupied important positions, forming what is known as the "pro-American faction." At the same time, as the contradictions between China and Japan intensified, "Uniting the United States to Make a Day" gradually became the basic diplomatic policy of the Republic of China government.
Involved in internal affairs
Chinese diplomats in the first half of the 20th century faced not only international problems, but also domestic political problems. China's domestic political situation is turbulent, and government changes are frequent. Gu Weijun experienced various periods from Yuan Shikai to Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to Taiwan, which was unique among diplomats of his generation. In the later period of the Beiyang government, Gu Weijun was deeply involved in the domestic political situation. From 1922 to 1927, Gu Weijun served six terms as Foreign Minister and One Term Of Finance, and served as Prime Minister twice, one of which was also Regent acting as President. Gu Weijun told the public after the Washington meeting that China's demands for restoring tariff autonomy and abolishing consular jurisdiction at the meeting were all expressed verbal sympathy, but "it is all known that at present, China's civil strife is frequent, the north and south have not yet been unified, and it is not the right time to withdraw consular adjudication and other matters..." Therefore, Gu Weijun hopes that a "strong government will be established at an early date" in China. This is the reason why Gu Weijun is involved in domestic politics and accepts government positions. From the perspective of domestic politics, after the Washington Conference, the domestic people spoke highly of the performance of China's diplomatic representatives in fighting for power for the country on the international stage, hoping that they could also use their energy and talents for domestic politics.
As a person with a background in the United States and an understanding of Western politics, Gu Weijun has the desire to promote domestic politics according to the Western model. However, in the factional struggle controlled by warlords, Gu Weijun and other diplomats of his contemporaries could only play a passive role, and their wishes in domestic affairs could not be realized. In his later memoirs, Gu Weijun mentioned in his memoirs that he was not interested in domestic politics and had no intention of getting involved in domestic disputes, and also mentioned that they were called "diplomatic departments" by the people of the time, because they did not participate in factional disputes and were above the various factions, so they were considered independent. Yan Huiqing has a similar expression in his autobiography. But in fact, Gu Weijun's recollection is not his own thoughts at that time, but the disgust he felt after experiencing factional struggles, reflecting the experience of being involved in internal affairs and not succeeding. After the fall of the Beiyang government in 1928, the Kuomintang wanted the so-called "Anfu remnants", Gu Weijun "made a name on the list", and the residences in Tieshi Hutong were confiscated as "reverse production". This experience made Gu Weijun understand the dangers of politics. Therefore, although Gu Weijun later served as the foreign minister and ambassador to the National Government, he tried his best to keep a distance from domestic politics. However, in the first half of the 20th century, domestic political strife made it difficult to maintain complete independence. In the competition between the two major forces of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the late 1940s, Gu Weijun could not completely stay out of the matter. Chiang Kai-shek sent him as ambassador to the United States in order to use his diplomatic skills to spare no effort to win US aid. As a result, Gu Weijun was deeply involved in the two-party politics of the United States. Gu Weijun also knows american civil society well, and has also done propaganda for the Kuomintang on the American TV show "Meet the Press". In 1949, Gu Weijun became involved in the internal politics of the Kuomintang, and together with Hu Shi and Jiang Tingdian, promoted a new cabinet dominated by "liberals". All three graduated from Columbia University and embraced liberalism, but their attitudes toward the new cabinet and realpolitik were different. Hu Shi had the intention of promoting politics, but he was always unwilling to give up the independence of intellectuals and directly intervene in politics. Jiang Tingdian threw himself into politics halfway and was determined to advance liberalism through his own actions. After the "new cabinet" plan was shelved, the two remained active in pursuing political reforms. Influenced by years of diplomatic experience, Gu Weijun is more realistic in his approach to the world, more aware of improvisation, and less persistent in his concepts than Hu and Jiang. When the plan of the new cabinet could not be carried out and a choice had to be made for drastic changes in the situation, he did not have much difficulty in returning to his previous position, believing that Chiang Kai-shek had an irreplaceable position and continued to run for the Kuomintang represented by Chiang Kai-shek in the United States.
Gu Weijun once said that diplomacy should consider national interests, not partisan interests, and should not consider personal political gains and losses. Diplomacy with the United States in the final stages of his diplomatic career was precisely what he himself criticized for having partisan and political interests in mind.
Despite his involvement in internal affairs, Gu Weijun is essentially a diplomat. Gu Weijun regarded diplomacy as the professional work of diplomats, so he opposed the "national diplomacy" that emerged after the rise of nationalism. Gu Weijun mentioned in his memoirs that in China, since the May Fourth Movement, "national diplomacy" has become a fashionable slogan, and mass demonstrations have put pressure on Chinese representatives, often with disastrous consequences. Because "national diplomacy" is based on the slogan of 100% success, but this cannot be done. Some of Gu Weijun's flexible practices at the Washington conference were indeed criticized by the newspapers of the time as "too weak."
Gu weijun believes that diplomats must have four professional qualities – appropriate basic knowledge, proficiency in one or more foreign languages, practical negotiation experience and experience in international conferences. In addition to professional ability, Gu Weijun also attaches importance to the "temperament of diplomats", which can also be seen as Gu Weijun's master self-discipline. Professor Jin Guangyao believes that Gu Weijun is handsome in appearance and is known as one of the "beautiful men" in the Republic of China period, and his speech style is soft and rigid, and he uses the power of logic and justice without harsh rebuke, which are all characteristics suitable for engaging in diplomatic work. In 1933, Gu Weijun debated with Japanese representative Yoshinori Matsuoka on the contents of the "Report of the Lytton Investigation Mission" in the League of Nations, and Matsuoka sophistry called the boycott of Japanese goods by the Chinese people "war against Japan in disguise." Gu Weijun replied that the boycott of Japanese goods was a self-defense measure for the Chinese people to resist aggression, and if this was called a "disguised war," China would also welcome Japan to "expel China" in the same way, rather than invading and occupying the three eastern provinces. At this point, there was a lot of laughter in the venue, and Matsuoka was very embarrassed. Gu Weijun's years of diplomatic experience have also left a deep trace in dealing with people, and he is polite at any time as he is in diplomatic occasions, even in small talk at home. In everyone's impression, Gu Weijun seems to be forever "dressed in a suit and leather shoes", speaking English and writing a diary in English. However, Professor Jin Guangyao pointed out that at home, Gu Weijun likes to wear Chinese clothes, and in his spare time, he does not read British and American novels, but often reads the Four Books and Five Classics he brought from China. In the United States for many years, Gu Weijun also did not like to watch Hollywood movies, and in his later years, he especially loved to watch the TV series "Xiangfei". In addition, Gu Weijun can also casually recite dozens of Tang poems, write brush characters, and even study Chinese painting with a special teacher, which can see a strong Chinese feeling.
Gu Weijun's handwriting
Professor Jin Guangyao believes that Gu Weijun has had a highlight moment of fighting for power with justice for the country, and he also has a bitter memory of seeking perfection, and his personal experience in his life is the epitome of the diplomacy of the entire Republic of China. The difficulties Faced by Gu Weijun and the failures he experienced were inevitable in his time. Looking back on his entire diplomatic career, the speeches and refusal to sign the peace treaty at the Paris Peace Conference, as well as the first signing of the UN Charter on behalf of China at the San Francisco Conference, have become the permanent mark left by Gu Weijun in the history of China's diplomacy.
Gu Weijun
Dialogue: Is Gu Weijun a good diplomat?
Professor Tang Qihua, a fellow discussant, pointed out that Professor Jin Guangyao has studied Gu Weijun for a long time, and in recent years, he has collected many rare new materials and solved many important problems. After listening to the above report, I would like to raise four questions for discussion with Professor Jin Guangyao.
First, what are the criteria for a good diplomat?
Professor Tang Qihua believes that Gu Weijun is excellent, outstanding, and has high international reputation, but he also has his shortcomings, such as arrogance and arrogance, and emphasis on "face". For example, after the Paris Peace Conference, Gu Weijun won a non-permanent seat for China on the Council of the League of Nations from 1920 to 1922, but also promised that China would be willing to bear the membership fee of "first-class countries". However, at that time, China's financial difficulties and inability to pay high membership fees led to long-term arrears. When Gu Weijun left the League of Nations in 1922 and returned to Beijing as foreign minister, Chinese diplomats in Europe at that time did not dare to attend the League of Nations conference, did not dare to face being recovered for arrears, and did not want to be "compared" by Gu Weijun. Professor Tang Qihua believed that Gu Weijun was too outstanding personally, far beyond China's national conditions and national quality at that time, and foreign diplomats at that time often commented that Gu Weijun was the "exception" to China. Is such a particularly good diplomat good or bad for China's diplomacy? What are the criteria for being an excellent diplomat, should it be in line with China's national strength and national conditions at that time, and should we endure humiliation and burdens to seek perfection, or should we be like Gu Weijun with excellent performance that far exceeds national strength, and it is better to "sharply" compete for international reputation?
Second, was the peak of Gu Weijun's diplomatic career the Paris Peace Conference?
"Memoirs of Gu Weijun" consists of thirteen volumes, with detailed content, and is known as the most credible person in the memoirs of modern characters. However, the first fascicle (before 1931) is relatively simple, because Gu Weijun's personal files in his early years were almost all lost, and the first volume was written from memory. The content of "Memoirs" is basically credible, but the part of the Paris Peace Conference will inevitably highlight its own merits and importance, and it is quite critical of the performance of others. The Memoirs avoid the fact that he helped Yuan Shikai and emphasize his opposition to the imperial system. In addition to his personal research experience over the years, Gu Weijun also referred to the views of many Professor Moores, and was probably also influenced by the views of the US delegation, when China wanted to "unite the United States to make Japan", and the United States also hoped to use China to suppress Japan. In addition, the head of the Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference was Lu Zhengxiang, who was the decision maker of major policies such as "United States System Day" and "Refusal to Sign peace treaties", and Gu Weijun played more of a suggestive role and very good implementation. Tang Degang proposed that Gu Weijun was "half" of the two and a half excellent diplomats in modern China, because he was not really the decision-maker. Moreover, the failure of China's diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference is likely to be related to Gu Weijun's high expectations of the United States.
Third, what stage is Gu Weijun's greatest influence on China's diplomacy?
Gu Weijun's diplomatic career was long, and Professor Tang Qihua believes that the most important stage was the Beiyang government period (1912-1928), which was also the golden age of Professional Chinese diplomats. Gu Weijun served as secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1912, participated in the "Twenty-One Articles" negotiations in 1915, served as a minister in the United States, and helped Yuan Shikai, who was only 27 years old at the time; in 1917, Gu Weijun advocated participating in the war, in 1918 advocated the "United States System Day", in 1919 he served as the plenipotentiary representative of the Paris Peace Conference, he became a blockbuster, in 1921 he served as a minister to Britain and a representative of the League of Nations, in 1921-22 as a representative of the Chinese Association, and several times after 1922 as foreign minister. From October 1926 to June 1927, Gu Weijun served as Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of the Regency Cabinet, equivalent to the head of state of the Beijing government, and held decision-making power. During this period, he promoted the revision of diplomacy, and in November 1926, he abrogated the Sino-Belgian Treaty, the first unequal treaty abolished by China. At the beginning of 1927, China negotiated with Belgium, Britain, France, Japan and other countries, and affected the policy of "revising the New Treaty" during the Period of the Nationalist Government in Nanjing. Although Gu Weijun was reinstated as a diplomat after the September 18 Incident, he mainly served as a confrontation with Japan and did international propaganda, and he was no longer able to enter the core of diplomatic decision-making. Therefore, the period of Gu Weijun's greatest diplomatic influence on China should be the Beiyang period, especially between 1926 and 1927, when he was in power.
Fourth, can diplomacy be made public?
Gu Weijun does not support "national diplomacy", believing that national diplomacy is irrational and nationalism is too strong, emphasizing that "it is better to be crushed than to be completed". The prosperity of national diplomacy during the Paris Peace Conference put a lot of pressure on the Chinese delegation in Paris. "National diplomacy" engages and influences the populace by wanting diplomacy to be open, but even in the most democratic countries in the modern world, foreign affairs cannot be made public. The prevalence of national diplomacy during the Beiyang period may be affected by the following factors: First, the "Provisional Treaty Law of the Republic of China" in the Beiyang period was the fundamental law of the country, and because the Kuomintang did not trust Yuan Shikai, the executive power in the "Provisional Treaty Law" was greatly limited, and the legislative power was expanded, which led to a large diplomatic power in the Provisional Senate and the National Assembly. At that time, the appointment of state ministers, ambassadors, and ministers must be approved by Congress. The Pro tempore President, with the consent of the Senate, may declare war, make peace and conclude treaties, i.e., all treaties must be ratified by Congress. At that time, the National Assembly was basically controlled by the Kuomintang, and the conflict between executive and legislative powers was serious. The small administrative power and the excessive legislative power do not match the national conditions of China, which has just ended the absolute monarchy, making it impossible to carry out many foreign affairs. Second, the struggle between the beiyang political factions is serious, and between the direct and Anhui families, between Xu Shichang and Duan Qirui, one side advocates the United States, the other side advocates the United States, and the other side advocates the United Japan, and also has different political views on the Shandong issue, and each other uses their own newspapers for propaganda. For example, the "Research Department" used the "Morning Post" to incite "patriotism" and attacked political enemies as traitors. Third, diplomatic secrets cannot be leaked, and newspapers often catch the wind and distort the truth, while the people do not know the truth and are easily instigated. So whether diplomacy can be made public, and whether "national diplomacy" is really helpful to diplomacy, or can it only "drag its feet"?
Professor Hong Chaohui also shared his experience. Professor Hong Chaohui believes that in diplomatic incidents, diplomats who are "humble and light" are often more able to lay down their burdens and forge ahead in a pioneering spirit. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, although Gu Weijun was the youngest and had very little seniority, this just gave Gu Weijun the opportunity to "fight for power with axioms." At the same time, diplomats have a very positive and optimistic mentality, and the incompetence of weak countries objectively exists, but diplomats' superb diplomatic methods and cultivation can make up for the lack of national strength. Moreover, diplomats must avoid the courage of the puppeteer, and must be good at and dare to compromise. Professor Hong Chaohui believes that the six words of "striving for power with axioms" are of extremely high value. Gu Weijun's original sentence was: "... Although there is power and no justice, when international negotiations are made, if we can strive for power with axioms, then the power cannot cover the eyes of the world with one hand and obliterate the axioms. This "golden sentence" makes people think: First, when the weak country and the strong country game, we need to know ourselves and know each other, when China was poor and weak, while the West was both a strong power and a "xiom". "Justice" here should refer to fairness, justice and justice, while "reason" refers to ideas, theories and ideals. At that time, it was difficult for Westerners to openly oppose the "axioms" they flaunted, and it was difficult to fully achieve "axioms" in reality, which was a long-term weakness of Western society, so Gu Weijun, who understood this, advocated "using the spear of the son and the shield of the son" in international diplomatic negotiations, which was also a Kind of Chinese practice of "soft power" and "clever strength". Second, the concept of resisting power is also reflected in Gu Weijun's strategy of "uniting the United States to control Japan" or "long-distance friendship and close attack.". Because to preach justice to the Japanese who are openly unjust is tantamount to asking for fish, and to the Western powers such as the United States, which are full of "axioms", can be effective. Third, Professor Hong Chaohui believes that the word "contention" in "striving for power with axioms" may have a pun. First of all, there is undoubtedly "resistance" to power, in addition, there may be the meaning of "fighting" and replacing power, and the "two-step" strategy of realizing the rise of the country: first use axioms as a weapon to fight against power; then use justice as a banner to overthrow the old power and help themselves become a new power, of course, the "power" here is not equal to "hegemony".
Subsequently, Professor Jin Guangyao responded to the questions raised by the interlocutors.
Professor Jin Guangyao thanked Professor Tang Qihua for his comments and questions, and pointed out that these issues allow us to understand Gu Weijun and the diplomacy of the Republic of China from a broader perspective. Regarding the criterion for judging good diplomats, Jin Guangyao believes that it depends on whether he has safeguarded the rights of the state, or whether he can regain some of the rights and interests that have been lost in the context of the Republic of China. From this point of view, Gu Weijun has done a very good job. In the case of the Paris Peace Conference's refusal to sign a peace treaty, although Lu Zhengxiang was the head of the delegation, the key negotiations in the last few days of the peace conference were completed by Gu Weijun alone. Professor Jin Guangyao believed that Gu Weijun almost alone took on the responsibilities of the entire delegation, because At that time, Lu Zhengxiang was ill and hospitalized, Shi Zhaoji had returned to England, and Wei Chenzu was mainly responsible for internal affairs. Therefore, Gu Weijun can be called a very good diplomat.
Second, the study of Gu Weijun certainly cannot rely entirely on Gu Weijun's own memoirs. Because memoirs are somewhat subjective, there are cases of elevating oneself and belittling others in some places. For example, regarding the dispute between Gu Weijun and Wang Zhengting, Yan Huiqing's diary should be used more as a reference. Regarding the campaign for Yuan Shikai's imperial system, in the 1999 "Biography of Gu Weijun", gu Weijun's memoirs were adopted, arguing that he did not intervene. In the recent research, this statement was revised, mainly referring to the relevant research results of scholars such as Associate Professor Cheng Honglei of the School of History and Culture of Central China Normal University, which used the records of American newspapers at that time. When Studying in the United States, Gu Weijun wrote an article arguing that there was nothing wrong with China's direct transition from the imperial system to the Republic of China. However, in 1915, Gu Weijun's thinking changed, which was related to the belief in "centralized nationalism" that was popular among international students at that time. After contacting Yuan Shikai, Gu Weijun admired his personal talents and believed that China needed such "strongmen". These are the reasons why Gu Weijun ran for the imperial system. On whether "UNITA Day" is more in line with the interests of the United States, Professor Jin Guangyao believes that diplomatic decisions should not consider whether it is in the interests of the United States, but should focus on whether it is in the interests of China at that time, because each country will give priority to its own interests in diplomacy. In the first half of the 20th century, Japan has always been the main threat to China, and China is difficult to compete with Japan on its own, and the most easily relied on external forces at that time was the United States. Judging from the results of the war of resistance against Japan later, although the independence and autonomy of the alliance with the United States were not enough, it was practical and feasible at that time.
Professor Jin Guangyao agreed with Professor Tang Qihua that the period of Gu Weijun's life that had the greatest influence on Chinese diplomacy was the Beiyang government, because Gu Weijun had decision-making power during that period. In addition, there are several points in Gu Weijun's diplomatic career, although there is no decision-making power, but it plays a key role in the final result. For example, in 1943, when the Sino-British New Treaty was concluded and gu Weijun participated in the establishment of the United Nations, Gu Weijun influenced the final decision through suggestions.
Professor Jin Guangyao believes that diplomatic openness and "national diplomacy" are not equivalent. Because diplomacy can never be fully open. For example, Kissinger's visit to China was also carried out in secret, and it was only after leaving China that it was made public. National diplomacy means giving people the right to know and the ability to influence diplomatic decisions. National diplomacy has a certain rationality, but for diplomats on the front line, national diplomacy has brought many shackles. Sometimes diplomats can take advantage of the momentum of national diplomacy, but more often than not, it is a burden. For example, at the Washington conference, many people criticized Gu Weijun for being weak, but if he was not "weak," the Shandong problem might be difficult to solve. In his memoirs, Gu Weijun has a negative attitude toward national diplomacy based on his own experience. For example, after the September 18 Incident, during Gu Weijun's brief tenure as foreign minister, students from all over the world surrounded the Nanjing Foreign Ministry to protest, believing that Gu Weijun's foreign policy was wrong, which also led to Gu Weijun's resignation after only two months in office. But in some specific diplomatic occasions, Gu Weijun also consciously used popular sentiment to advance negotiations. For example, during the Sino-British New Treaty negotiations at the end of 1942, in order to force the British side to make concessions, Gu Weijun also stressed that the Chinese government was facing "pressure from the people". Therefore, Professor Jin Guangyao believes that national diplomacy is a "double-edged sword".
Professor Jin Guangyao also responded to the issue of "fighting" for power mentioned by Professor Hong Chaohui. Axiom was a relatively common concept in the late Qing Dynasty and early Ming Dynasty, and Gu Weijun did not clearly indicate what its connotation was in the article. But after Wilson proposed the "Fourteen-Point Plan", Gu Weijun believed that he had explained the main problem of world peace, from which we could see the axioms that Gu Weijun agreed with. Because China is in a weak state, the "struggle" in "striving for power with justice" is mainly resistance. As for "fighting," judging from the performance at the future San Francisco meeting, Gu Weijun hopes that after China becomes a permanent member of the Security Council, it can speak out for the interests of weak and small nations. Today, the principles of regional distribution and national self-determination in the UN Charter are the result of Gu Weijun's adherence on behalf of China.
Editor-in-Charge: Shanshan Peng
Proofreader: Ding Xiao