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One day in July 1949, the hot sun shone down the streets of Manila, Philippines.
In this time of uncertainty, Chiang Kai-shek flew here from Taipei and was greeted not only with warm diplomatic etiquette, but also with discussions of possible future refuges.
The meeting took place at the Philippine Presidential Palace, an elegant and quiet room, where Chiang Kai-shek and Philippine President Girino had a three-hour close exchange.
The two leaders discussed not only how to strengthen the anti-communist alliance, but also touched on a sensitive and urgent issue - if the defense line on the island of Taiwan is lost, what will Chiang Kai-shek and his government do?
Chiang Kai-shek's strategic choice
In November 1948, the weather was getting colder, and the cold winds in Beijing seemed to foreshadow the future of the Kuomintang.
At such an important historical juncture, Chiang Kai-shek summoned the top leaders of the Kuomintang in a secret place, and the conference room was carefully arranged to ensure that there was no possibility of leakage.
The participants were all core members of the Kuomintang, their expressions were serious, their eyes were anxious, and everyone knew that this meeting was about the future of the Kuomintang.
Chiang Kai-shek was the first to break the silence and cut straight to the point to discuss the strategic options facing the Kuomintang.
He first mentioned the possibility of holding the southwest, which meant continuing resistance deep inland, but given the lack of troops and supplies, this option was full of variables.
He then proposed a strategy to retreat to Hainan Island, a relatively independent island that could form a natural defensive line, but also faced great challenges in terms of supply and transportation.
Finally, Chiang Kai-shek spoke about the island of Taiwan.
He elaborated on Taiwan's geographical location and historical background, mentioning Zheng Chenggong's historical military operations and how he tried to use Taiwan as a base to counterattack the mainland, but ultimately failed.
He stressed that although Taiwan is far away from the mainland, this has its natural defensive advantage strategically, but it may also mean that once Taiwan is chosen, the Kuomintang may be confined to this smaller land forever.
Zhang Qiyun's comprehensive analysis
At that critical moment, Zhang Qiyun stood up, faced all the senior leaders present, and began his report and analysis.
His tone was firm, his rhetoric was full of accurate grasp of the facts, and he systematically analyzed the possible advantages of retreating to Taiwan from the four perspectives of geography, economy, politics, and international relations.
Zhang Qiyun first pointed out: From a geographical point of view, the Taiwan Strait provides a natural line of defense for the Kuomintang.
He described in detail the vastness of the Taiwan Strait, emphasizing the difference between this geographical feature and the Yangtze River.
The Taiwan Strait is more than 100 nautical miles wide, and its vast waters not only provide an impenetrable natural barrier for the Kuomintang, but also greatly increase the difficulty for enemy troops to forcibly cross the sea.
At that time, the PLA had not yet formed a strong naval force, which made the Taiwan Strait an extremely important strategic defensive advantage.
Then, Zhang Qiyun turned to economic analysis.
He pointed out that under 50 years of Japanese rule, Taiwan has established a relatively complete industrial base. This included multiple bases of heavy and light industry, which could be quickly converted into dual uses of military and civilian production after the war, providing material support for the Kuomintang's protracted war.
In addition, Taiwan's climatic conditions are also extremely favorable for agriculture, especially in the western plains, which are suitable for large-scale cultivation of rice and other crops, and can basically achieve food self-sufficiency, which is especially important in wartime.
At the political level, Zhang Qiyun emphasized the historical background of Taiwan's long history under Japanese rule.
Due to this historical factor, the Communist Party in Taiwan is relatively weak, and the long-term isolation from the mainland has given the Taiwanese people a greater sense of identification with the Kuomintang government.
This political environment provided favorable conditions for the Kuomintang to establish a stable political base in Taiwan.
Finally, Zhang Qiyun discussed the importance of international strategy.
He pointed out that against the backdrop of the Cold War, Taiwan's geographical location is of great international strategic significance. Taiwan, located in the western Pacific Ocean, is not only an outpost of Asia, but also an important node connecting the Pacific Ocean. In the confrontation between the two camps of the United States and the Soviet Union, Taiwan's status made it a key area that could be supported by the United States and other Western countries.
For the Kuomintang, this international support was an important foreign aid to sustain resistance in the face of insufficient troops and materials.
As Zhang Qiyun's report gradually deepened, the atmosphere in the conference room became more solemn.
The leaders began to consider more carefully the feasibility of retreating to Taiwan, exchanging views, sometimes nodding and sometimes frowning, as if weighing the pros and cons of this major decision.
Decision to relocate to Taiwan
After intense and strategic discussions, Chiang Kai-shek was persuaded by Chang's detailed analysis to carry out this bold strategy of moving the Kuomintang government to Taiwan.
This decision marked Chiang Kai-shek's strategic thinking for the Kuomintang to seek to preserve its strength in the difficult situation, and also left "hope" for a possible future counteroffensive on the mainland, but this was clearly wishful thinking, and the defeat of the Chiang Kai-shek clique was due to their excessive corruption, oppression, and outcasts by the people.
As the situation in the civil war deteriorated in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek realized that decision-making alone was not enough, and that he needed to act quickly to ensure the success of this diversion.
Chiang Kai-shek began to organize special teams to plan and execute the details of the relocation.
In order to make this transition as smooth as possible, Chiang Kai-shek also strengthened contacts and coordination with international friends.
He ensured that Taiwan could gain sufficient international support and recognition through multiple channels, including direct diplomatic contacts and seeking help through friendly third countries.
Chiang Kai-shek attached particular importance to relations with the United States, because in the Cold War context, American support was crucial to maintaining an anti-communist position in Taiwan.
In this series of preparations, Chiang Kai-shek also assigned a team responsible for communication and coordination with Taiwan's local government, ensuring that Taiwan's administrative, military, and social resources could be quickly integrated under the control of the Kuomintang.
This involves not only the rebuilding of the administrative apparatus, but also the reorganization of Taiwan's police force, as well as the monitoring and suppression of possible Communist Party activities.
At the same time, in order to ensure safety and order during the relocation, Chiang Kai-shek ordered to intensify patrols and protection at sea. Considering a possible communist pursuit, he ordered the navy to be heavily guarded in the Taiwan Strait, ensuring the safety of the main sea lanes and preventing any unauthorized ships from entering or leaving the island.
As preparations for the relocation to Taiwan progressed, in the spring of 1949, many ships began to depart from major ports with men and supplies on their way to Taiwan.
International diplomacy and alliance building
On a hot and humid morning in July 1949, Chiang Kai-shek flew a non-stop flight from Taipei to Manila, Philippines, on a crucial international visit, not only to seek support, but also to prepare for possible future difficulties.
When the plane landed at Manila Airport, the Philippine government was ready to greet it, and Philippine military honor guards lined up along the runway to salute the leader of the Asian neighbor.
Chiang Kai-shek, accompanied by numerous officials, went directly to the Philippine presidential palace to meet with Philippine President Elpideo Girino.
This was the first official meeting between the two leaders, and President Girino showed great enthusiasm and importance to Chiang Kai-shek's visit.
The meeting between the two men was held in a private meeting room at the Presidential Palace, in a solemn and quiet environment, ensuring privacy and focus.
As soon as the talks began, Chiang Kai-shek went straight to the point and put forward the idea of establishing an "anti-communist alliance" between China, the Philippines, and South Korea.
He elaborated on the communist threat to Asia and the importance of the alliance to the security of the three countries.
After hearing this, Girino showed great interest and put forward his own opinions and suggestions on how to implement this plan.
During the three-hour discussion, the two leaders also touched on a number of sensitive and pressing issues.
Chiang Kai-shek specifically referred to the security situation in Taiwan, suggesting that it might be necessary to find refuge abroad if Taiwan could not continue to be a base for the Nationalist government. He indicated to Girino that if that did happen, the Philippines could be an option.
In this regard, President Girino said that the Philippines, as a responsible country and friend, will give necessary support and assistance when necessary.
In addition, the two leaders discussed the possibility of military and economic assistance, including how to support each other in emergencies and how to strengthen cooperation among the three countries in military training, arms supply and intelligence sharing.
President Girino was open to all the proposals made by Chiang Kai-shek and expressed his willingness to further explore specific cooperation plans.
Media repercussions and aftermath
After the talks with Chiang Kai-shek, President Girino frankly expressed his position when asked by reporters.
He made it clear that the Philippines, as a responsible country, would open its doors if it faced a situation where Chiang Kai-shek and his government sought asylum.
Girino's words were quickly captured by the reporters present and quickly spread throughout the international community.
On July 18, Ta Kung Pao published an exhaustive report under the bold headline "Girino Allows Chiang Kai-shek and His Cronies to Go into Exile in the Philippines."
The report not only quoted Girino's words, but also described in detail the background of Chiang Kai-shek's visit to the Philippines, the content of the talks between the two sides, and the possible international implications, which aroused widespread attention and discussion.
After the publication of the report, the international community reacted to this position of the Philippines with mixed reactions.
On the one hand, some commentators have praised the Philippines for its international responsibility and support for its Asian neighbors.
On the other hand, there are concerns that this could embroil the Philippines in broader international political controversies.
At the same time, the conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and Girino did not stop at a discussion of theories and possibilities.
During the talks, the two leaders also reached a concrete agreement that if Chiang Kai-shek decided to go to the Philippines to establish a government-in-exile, he would need to inform the Philippine side in advance of the specific number of people coming to the Philippines and the specific assistance needed.
This agreement provided Chiang Kai-shek with a practical backup option and a window of time for the Philippine government to prepare for reception and placement.
Resources:
Theory and Contemporary,2015,0(2):57-57