During the reign of Zhao Guangyi, Taizong of the Northern Song Dynasty, he personally recruited the party three times, and each time it seemed that victory was in sight, but in the end it was a failure. This historical mystery has always aroused the thinking and discussion of future generations. As a generation of Ming monarchs, Taizong has made great achievements in military affairs, why has he been repeatedly frustrated when dealing with the party? Is it a mistake in strategic decision-making, or is there a shortcoming in military strength? Or are external factors influencing the course of the war? What is the connection between the rise of the party in the northwest and the long-standing confrontation between Song and Liao? In the process of Taizong's three conquests of the party, in addition to military factors, are there other constraints?
The historical background of Song Taizong's three expeditions can be traced back to the late Tang Dynasty and the Five Dynasties. At that time, Tuoba Sigong, the leader of the Tuoba clan of the party, took advantage of the chaotic situation of the Huangchao Uprising to successfully control Xia, Sui and other prefectures, and was awarded the title of "Dingyan Military Festival Envoy", becoming one of the feudal towns in the late Tang Dynasty. During this period, although the various party departments had not yet been unified, several large separatist regimes had been formed centered on the "strong people with big surnames". Among them, the most important are the three party groups: the Dangxiang Tuoba clan entrenched in the four prefectures of Xia, Sui, Yin, and You, the Dangxiang Zhishi that emerged in Fu and Lin Prefectures, and the Xilu Dangxiang clan living between Qing and Ling.
At the beginning of the establishment of the Song Dynasty, the relationship between the party members and the Song court was still friendly. In the first year of Jianlong (960), after Zhao Kuangyin ascended the throne, the military regime of Dingyan was called a minister, but it still maintained relative independence. At that time, Li Yixing took the initiative to pay tribute to Song Taizu to pay tribute to horses, as a sign of attachment. Song Taizu Zhao Kuangyin was very happy about this, and even personally made a royal belt for Li Yixing. This harmonious relationship lasted until the seventh year of the Taiping Rejuvenation (982).
However, with the successive pacification of the Northern Han Dynasty and the Southern Tang Dynasty, Song Taizong began to set his sights on the northwest, intending to bring the four states of Xia and Sui into the territory of the Song Dynasty. This move sparked strong dissatisfaction among party members and led to a sharp deterioration in relations between the two sides. In the seventh year of the Taiping Rejuvenation of the Kingdom, Li Ji entered the court, saying that his accession to the throne caused his uncle's dissatisfaction, and he was willing to ask to stay in Beijing and offer the four states and eight counties under his control. This move became the fuse for Li Jiqian to raise the anti-flag, seize the military power of Dingyan, and publicly break with the Song court.
In order to weaken the party's power in the northwest and avoid the recurrence of the chaotic situation of the division of feudal towns in the late Tang Dynasty, Song Taizong adopted a series of measures. He ordered Li Jisheng's uncles Li Kexian and Li Kewen to go to Que, and knew Xiazhou with Li Kewen's power. At the same time, Song Taizong appointed Cao Guangshi as the inspection envoy of Yin, Xia, Sui, Lin, Fu, Feng, and Youzhou, in an attempt to curb the power of the Li clan in Xiazhou. However, these measures seriously underestimated the party's roots in the northwest and the 100-year operation of the Li family in Xiazhou.
In the first year of Yongxi (984), Emperor Taizong of the Song Dynasty issued an edict to Li Jizhu's relatives to go to Que. However, Li Jiqian's younger brother, Li Jiqian, refused to submit to the rule of the Song court and skillfully escaped the control of the Song court. He pretended that his nursing mother had died, hid his weapons and armor in a coffin, and fled into Dijinze with dozens of men and horses. Subsequently, Li Jiqian took out the portrait and banner of the ancestor Li Yixing, inciting the rebellion of the party and the tribe, and declared that he would "restore the legacy of his ancestors".
Li Jiqian's rebellion quickly won the support of the party ministries. He expanded his power by marrying into the feudal chieftains, and constantly united and incited other clans. In the second year of Yongxi (985), Li Jiqian successfully surrendered, killed Cao Guangshi, the inspector of the Song Dynasty, and occupied Yinzhou, claiming to be "the queen of the difficult army". This incident marked the complete rupture of the relationship between the party and the Song Dynasty, and also laid the groundwork for the later triangular relationship between the Song, Liao, and Western Xia.
In this context, Song Taizong began many expeditions against the party. However, the underestimation of the strength of the party, coupled with the long-term confrontation between the Song and Liao, made it difficult for the Song dynasty to go all out to advance the northwest. At the same time, in order to contain the Song Dynasty, the Khitan adopted the strategy of "using the party item to control the Song" and continuously provided economic and military support to the party item. This complex geopolitical pattern made Song Taizong's three attacks on the party face many obstacles, and finally failed.
Song Taizong's first conquest of the party began in the third year of Yongxi (986). The immediate trigger for this expedition was Li Jiqian's rebellious behavior. After the successful surrender, Li Jiqian not only occupied Yinzhou, but also rapidly expanded his sphere of influence in a short period of time, posing a serious threat to the Song Dynasty's rule in the northwest.
Song Taizong knew that if Li Jiqian's rebellion was not quickly quelled, the party's power would further grow and threaten the northwestern frontier of the Song Dynasty. Therefore, he decided to personally lead his army to the west and suppress the rebellion with thunder. Emperor Taizong convened his courtiers to discuss military strategy, and finally decided on an offensive plan with Yinzhou as the main target.
In order to ensure the success of this expedition, Song Taizong made careful preparations. He mobilized a large number of elite troops, including the Forbidden Army and the Border Guards, with a total strength of 100,000 troops. At the same time, Taizong also paid special attention to logistical support, and ordered all prefectures and counties along the way to prepare sufficient grain, grass and baggage to ensure that there would be no problems with the supply of the army.
In July of the third year of Yongxi, Song Taizong personally led a large army from Kaifeng and marched to the northwest. During the march, Taizong sent scouts to reconnoiter the enemy's situation, and constantly adjusted the route and speed of the march. In order to improve the morale of the army, Taizong also held several military meetings on the way and personally deployed the battle plan.
After a long journey of more than a month, the Song army finally arrived at the city of Yinzhou. After Li Jiqian learned the news of Song Taizong's personal conquest, he immediately adopted the strategy of fortifying the walls and clearing the wilderness, and transferred all the surrounding grain, grass and population to Yinzhou City, preparing for a protracted war.
Seeing this, Song Taizong decided to adopt the tactics of besieging the city and sending reinforcements. He ordered part of the army to encircle Yinzhou City, and at the same time sent elite troops to sweep the surrounding area and cut off Li Jiqian's possible reinforcements and supply lines. This strategy paid off, and the Song army soon took control of several towns and fortresses around Yinzhou.
However, Li Jiqian did not sit still. He sent emissaries to ask the Khitan for help, and at the same time secretly contacted other party clans, preparing to launch a counterattack at a critical moment. After Song Taizong learned of this information, he accelerated the pace of his attack on Yinzhou. He ordered the engineering units to build siege equipment around the clock, and organized fierce siege operations on several occasions.
In a large-scale siege battle, the Song army managed to break through the outer defenses of Yinzhou City and capture several gate towers. Seeing that victory was in sight, Song Taizong personally climbed a high tower to command the battle. At this moment, an elite cavalry sent by Li Jiqian suddenly came out from the flank and launched a fierce surprise attack on the Song army.
Although this raid was repelled by the Song army in time, it disrupted the rhythm of the Song army's attack. To make matters worse, Song Taizong accidentally fell from a tower while directing a battle, and although it was not life-threatening, it seriously affected his command ability.
At the same time, the news of Khitan reinforcements came, which made the Song army panic. Considering the double pressure of his own injuries and the possible arrival of Khitan reinforcements, Song Taizong reluctantly made the decision to withdraw his troops. Although the expedition achieved some success and controlled several towns around Yinzhou, it was ultimately a failure.
During the withdrawal process, Song Taizong still did not forget to arrange fortifications and garrison troops in the fortress to consolidate the existing achievements. He also ordered the construction of beacon towers and post stations along the way, strengthening the Song Dynasty's ability to control the northwest region.
Although this expedition did not completely quell Li Jiqian's rebellion, it shocked the party departments and temporarily curbed their expansion momentum. At the same time, this personal expedition also made Song Taizong deeply aware of the strength of the party and the complexity of the northwest battlefield, and accumulated valuable experience for future military operations.
However, this expedition also exposed some problems of the Song army in the northwest operation. The first is the logistical difficulties, as the long journey consumes a large amount of grain and grass, and the strategy of clearing the field makes it difficult to replenish supplies on the spot. Second, the Song army lacked effective countermeasures to the mobility and guerrilla tactics of the Dangxiang cavalry. Finally, tensions between Song and Liao also limited the flexibility of the Song dynasty to use troops in the northwest.
Despite this, this expedition still won Song Taizong the evaluation of "emerging edge". It not only shows the military strength of the Song Dynasty, but also shows the military talent and determination of Taizong himself. The experience and lessons of this expedition laid the foundation for the two subsequent expeditions, and also became an important turning point in the evolution of the Song Dynasty's northwest policy.
Song Taizong's second conquest of the party took place in the fourth year of Yongxi (987), only one year after the first conquest. The background of this expedition was that Li Jiqian continued to expand his power after the first expedition, frequently harassing the Song Dynasty border, and even capturing several Song Dynasty border fortresses. Song Taizong realized that if Li Jiqian's threat was not completely resolved, it would be difficult for the northwest region to be peaceful.
In order to avoid repeating the mistakes of the first expedition, Song Taizong made more careful preparations in this expedition. First of all, he stepped up intelligence gathering in the northwest region and sent a large number of scouts deep into the party-controlled areas to find out the enemy's situation. Secondly, Taizong improved the organizational structure of the army, increasing the proportion of cavalry and lightly armed troops to increase mobility and flexibility. Finally, he also specially formed a guide team composed of people from the northwest frontier to deal with the complex terrain and climatic conditions.
In June of the fourth year of Yongxi, Song Taizong once again personally led a large army to the west. The main goal of this expedition was to recapture the fortress occupied by Li Jiqian and completely disintegrate the military power of the party. After the army set out, Song Taizong adopted the strategy of attacking the east and the west. He first sent a detachment of partial divisions to feint to attack Yinzhou to attract Li Jiqian's attention, while the main force secretly marched north, aiming directly at Li Jiqian's base camp.
This strategy is paying off. Li Jiqian misjudged the intentions of the Song army and concentrated the main forces in the Yinzhou area. By the time he realized the true intentions of the main forces of the Song army, it was already too late. The main force of the Song army quickly broke through the party's defense line and conquered several important cities in succession.
In the face of the fierce offensive of the Song army, Li Jiqian adopted guerrilla tactics and constantly harassed the rear supply lines of the Song army. He also used his familiarity with the terrain to set up ambushes in dangerous places, causing considerable losses to the Song army. However, Song Taizong had already prepared. He ordered part of the army to be dedicatedly to protecting the supply lines, and at the same time sent light cavalry to attack Li Jiqian's guerrilla forces.
At a critical moment in the battle, a sudden sandstorm hit the battlefield. Li Jiqian tried to use this opportunity to launch a counterattack, but Song Taizong successfully led the army to avoid the edge of the sandstorm with the help of the guide team prepared in advance, and instead used this opportunity to launch a surprise attack on Li Jiqian's camp. The raid was a great success, as the Song army broke through Li Jiqian's camp in one fell swoop and captured a large amount of supplies and horses.
Although Li Jiqian escaped by luck, his vitality was greatly damaged. He was forced to retreat to more remote mountainous areas, temporarily losing the ability to contend with the Song army. Emperor Taizong of the Song Dynasty took advantage of the victory and pursued a number of cities and fortresses controlled by the party in succession, greatly expanding the Song Dynasty's control in the northwest.
However, just when the Song army was about to completely annihilate the remnants of Li Jiqian, the threat of the Liao State resurfaced. The Liao sent emissaries to warn the Song dynasty not to suppress the party too much, otherwise the Liao would have to take action. Faced with this situation, Song Taizong had to consider the overall situation of Song-Liao relations and decided to temporarily withdraw his troops.
Nevertheless, the expedition yielded significant results. The Song army not only recaptured the fortress it had lost before, but also penetrated deep into the hinterland of the party, greatly weakening Li Jiqian's strength. More importantly, this victory greatly boosted the morale of the Song army and the prestige of the Song dynasty in the northwest.
Before withdrawing his troops, Song Taizong took a series of measures to consolidate the gains of the war. He set up military and political institutions in the newly occupied areas and strengthened local administration. At the same time, Taizong also implemented the Huairou policy, giving preferential treatment to the Shun Dangxiang tribes, in an attempt to break Li Jiqian's support base.
The success of this expedition gave Song Taizong the hope of completely solving the party problem. He began to think about establishing a long-term stable ruling order in the Northwest Territories. To this end, Taizong ordered the construction of cities and garrisons in the newly occupied areas, and encouraged Han Chinese to migrate to the northwest in order to change the local demographic structure.
However, the expedition also exposed some problems. First of all, the supply of the Song army in the northwest region was still a huge challenge, and the long journey and harsh natural environment severely depleted the army's combat effectiveness. Second, Liao's intervention showed the diplomatic pressure that the Song dynasty faced in dealing with the northwest issue, which also limited the Song dynasty's freedom to use troops in the northwest. In the end, although Li Jiqian's strength was greatly weakened, he was still not completely eliminated, which left a hidden danger for the revival of the party's power in the future.
In general, Song Taizong's second expedition can be said to be a narrow victory. It shows the improvement of the military strength of the Song Dynasty and the military talent of Taizong himself, but it also exposes the many difficulties and constraints faced by the Song Dynasty when passing through the northwest. The experience and lessons of this expedition provided an important reference for the third expedition of Song Taizong and the subsequent northwest policy of the Song Dynasty.
Song Taizong's third expedition to the party took place in the fifth year of Yongxi (988), which was the largest and most well-prepared of the three expeditions. The goal of this expedition was not only to completely quell Li Jiqian's rebellion, but also to settle the party issue once and for all, and lay the foundation for the Song Dynasty to establish a long-term and stable rule in the northwest region.
On the basis of the previous two expeditions, Song Taizong made more careful planning for this operation. First of all, he massively expanded the Northwest Frontier Army, and at the same time mobilized a large number of elite troops from the Central Plains. Secondly, Taizong paid special attention to logistics support, set up a number of military reserve points in the northwest region, and formed a special transportation team. In addition, he sent emissaries to establish contact with the countries of the Western Regions in an attempt to isolate the party diplomatically.
In April of the fifth year of Yongxi, Song Taizong once again personally led the army to the expedition. This expedition was characterized by a multi-pronged march. The main force was led by Taizong himself, pointing directly at Li Jiqian's lair; At the same time, the other two detachments marched from the Longxi and Hetao areas respectively, forming an encirclement of the party.
In order to deal with the guerrilla tactics of the party cavalry, Song Taizong specially formed a "flying cavalry" unit this time. This force consisted of a select group of cavalry, lightly armed and extremely mobile, and specialized in pursuing and cutting off the enemy's retreat. At the same time, Taizong also used a large number of new weapons in the army, such as improved bed crossbows and firearms, which greatly improved the combat effectiveness of the Song army.
During the march, the Song army encountered a rare torrential rain. Heavy rains caused the river to swell and many roads were washed away, making it extremely difficult for the army to march. However, Song Taizong had already prepared. He ordered the engineering units to quickly build pontoon bridges and roads, ensuring the smooth advance of the army. This experience also allowed the Song army to accumulate valuable field combat experience.
When the main force of the Song army arrived at Li Jiqian's base camp, to their surprise, they found that the city had been abandoned. It turned out that after Li Jiqian learned the news of the Song army's attack, he decided to avoid its edge and lead the main force to retreat to the more precipitous mountainous area. Song Taizong immediately made a decision and ordered the "flying cavalry" troops to pursue immediately, and at the same time sent scouts to search for traces of the enemy.
After several days of arduous pursuit, the "flying cavalry" troops finally found Li Jiqian's traces in a canyon. Song Taizong immediately mobilized the main force to encircle the canyon. Li Jiqian realized that the situation was critical and tried to break through, but was repelled by the Song army, which had been prepared. At this moment, the partial division that was marching from Longxi also arrived at the battlefield, completely cutting off Li Jiqian's retreat.
Faced with the embattled situation, Li Jiqian's subordinates began to waver. Some tribal leaders secretly sent people to surrender to the Song army, expressing their willingness to submit to the Song dynasty. Song Taizong seized this opportunity and sent an envoy to read out the edict of surrender, promising not to blame those who surrendered in the past, and promising high-ranking officials to be generous. This measure achieved remarkable results, and a large number of party generals led their troops to surrender.
Seeing that the general trend had gone, Li Jiqian finally decided to surrender. Emperor Taizong of the Song Dynasty personally received Li Jiqian, gave him favorable treatment, and appointed him as the frontier general of the Song Dynasty, responsible for managing some of the subjugated party tribes. This move not only appeased the party nobility, but also created conditions for the Song dynasty to use the power of the party to defend against other nomads.
After quelling Li Jiqian's rebellion, Song Taizong was in no hurry to withdraw his troops, but set about establishing a foundation for long-term rule in the northwest region. He ordered the construction of cities and military strongholds at strategic points, and encouraged Han Chinese to migrate to the northwest. At the same time, Taizong also implemented a series of policies, such as setting up schools to teach Han culture and rewarding party members to learn Chinese, in an attempt to consolidate his rule through cultural integration.
In order to prevent the party's power from growing again, Song Taizong adopted a divide-and-rule strategy. He dispersed the party and installed Song officials in it to supervise it. At the same time, Taizong also established a complex balancing mechanism to prevent the rise of any tribe by containing each other.
The success of this expedition not only put down Li Jiqian's rebellion once and for all, but also marked the establishment of a solid Song rule in the northwest region. However, this does not mean a complete solution to the Northwest problem. How to maintain long-term control over the region, how to balance the relationship between the party and other ethnic minorities, and how to deal with potential threats from the nomads from the Western Regions and the north were all new challenges for the Song dynasty.
The victory of the third expedition won the reputation of "once and for all" for Song Taizong. It not only demonstrated the military strength of the Song Dynasty, but also reflected Taizong's superb strategic vision and political wisdom. The experience and lessons of this expedition had a profound impact on the frontier policy of the Song Dynasty and even later generations.
The victories of Song Taizong's three conquests laid the foundation for the Song dynasty to establish solid rule in the northwest region. However, how to consolidate the gains of this victory and how to achieve long-term peace and stability in this complex frontier region became a major challenge for Song Taizong and his successors. To this end, the Song Dynasty formulated and implemented a series of unique and comprehensive policies in the northwest.
First of all, the Song Dynasty adopted the strategy of "using razing to defeat raze". Emperor Taizong of the Song Dynasty knew that it would be difficult for Han Chinese officials alone to effectively manage this vast frontier area. Therefore, he boldly appointed subjugated party leaders, such as Li Jiqian and others, to hold local official positions and manage their own tribes. This policy not only relieved the pressure of the Song dynasty's rule, but also effectively used the familiarity of the party members with local conditions. At the same time, the Song dynasty also skillfully created contradictions between the tribes to prevent them from uniting against the central power.
Second, the Song Dynasty implemented a large-scale immigration policy. Song Taizong encouraged Han Chinese from the Central Plains to emigrate to the northwest region, especially the families of soldiers and poor farmers. These immigrants not only increased the population of the Northwest and changed the local demographic structure, but also brought advanced agricultural technology and production tools to promote the development of the local economy. In order to attract immigrants, the Song Dynasty also formulated a series of preferential policies, such as tax exemption and exemption, and the provision of cattle and farm tools.
In terms of military affairs, the Song Dynasty established a complete border defense system. A series of castles and military outposts were built at strategic points, forming a strong line of defense. At the same time, the Song Dynasty also stationed a large number of elite troops in the northwest region, which were not only responsible for defending against foreign invasions, but also took on the task of maintaining local order. In addition, the Song Dynasty also established a special frontier patrol team to regularly patrol the border areas to detect and deal with potential threats in a timely manner.
On the economic front, the Song Dynasty adopted a series of measures to promote the development of the northwest region. The first is to vigorously develop agriculture, introduce new crops and farming techniques, and increase local food production. The second is to encourage commercial development and set up special mutual markets to promote trade between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. The Song Dynasty also opened numismatic mints in the northwest region to issue specialized frontier currencies to promote the monetization of the local economy.
Culture and education were also an important part of the Song Dynasty's policy in the northwest. Emperor Taizong of the Song Dynasty ordered the establishment of schools in the northwest region to teach not only Han culture, but also to respect and protect the traditional culture of ethnic minorities. At the same time, the Song Dynasty encouraged young people from ethnic minorities such as Dang Xiang to enroll in school to learn Chinese language and Central Plains culture, so as to prepare them to become a bridge between the Central Plains and the frontier in the future. In addition, the Song Dynasty also sent a large number of Confucian scholars to the northwest to spread Confucian culture through lectures and writings.
In terms of religious policy, the Song Dynasty adopted a relatively tolerant attitude. Although Confucianism was vigorously promoted, Buddhism and Taoism were also allowed to spread in the northwest region. The Song Dynasty also adopted an attitude of respect and protection for the local religions practiced by the party members. This religious policy effectively reduced cultural clashes and promoted ethnic integration.
In order to strengthen its control over the northwest region, the Song dynasty also implemented a series of administrative reforms. On the basis of the original prefectures, more prefectures and counties were established, and the northwest region was gradually brought into the centralized management system. At the same time, the Song Dynasty also sent a large number of central officials to the northwest to serve as local governors or supervisory envoys to strengthen local supervision and management.
However, the Song Dynasty's Northwest Policy also faced many challenges. The first was the constant threat from the northern nomads, especially the Liao state, which forced the Song dynasty to maintain a large military presence in the northwest. The second is the issue of the identity of ethnic minorities such as the party item, and although the Song Dynasty adopted many soft policies, ethnic contradictions still existed. In addition, the harsh natural environment in the northwest also posed great challenges to the rule of the Song Dynasty, and frequent natural disasters often led to social unrest.
Despite this, the Song Dynasty's Northwest Policy generally achieved remarkable results. In the following nearly 100 years, the northwest region basically maintained stability, and the party and other ethnic minorities gradually integrated into the Central Plains cultural circle. During this period, the economy and culture of the Northwest Region have made great progress, and it has become an important bridge connecting the Central Plains and the Western Regions. The Song Dynasty's northwest policy not only consolidated the achievements of Taizong's three expeditions, but also provided valuable experience for later generations to run the northwest.