The game between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea has forced us to face a cruel reality: the United States is taking advantage of the Sino-Philippine dispute to launch a fierce public opinion war against China in multilateral international organizations. This shows that China hopes that the South China Sea dispute can be resolved between the countries concerned, but the issue is becoming more internationalized. The United States has been trying to expand the influence of the South China Sea dispute at the G7, NATO summits and various international security meetings.
From the perspective of Sino-US competition, it is obviously a favorable strategy for the United States to use the Philippines as a pawn to contain China's diplomatic resources and attention. For China, the key to resolving this situation now lies with the Philippines. The Marcos Jr. administration is the only ASEAN country that is confronting China by forging a defense alliance with the U.S. military. The Philippines has even tried to rally more countries into the South China Sea dispute, including Japan, Australia, India and the European Union.
In the recent close-quarters game between China and the Philippines at Ren'ai Jiao, the Chinese coast guard used an axe to stick to the bottom line, while the Philippines suffered injuries. China is almost telling the Philippines that no matter how many allies it has, no matter how many outside forces it can pull in, it is impossible to send building materials to the broken ship at Second Thomas Shoal without China's consent. However, many have also noted that China has not completely closed the possibility of establishing a new supply mechanism with the Philippines. Recently, China and the Philippines held a bilateral meeting in Manila, during which the two sides agreed to work to de-escalate and manage tensions without prejudice to their respective positions, and to continue discussions to find a solution. The Philippine Foreign Ministry said that China and the Philippines have made substantial progress in formulating measures to manage the maritime situation, but there are still major differences. Immediately afterwards, the Philippines issued a claim to China, and the chief of staff of the Philippine army even asked the army to use reciprocal means to confront the Chinese coast guard, that is, to use axe to axe and broadsword to broadsword in the future, and return to the era of cold weapons like the Sino-Indian border confrontation.
If we view China's counterattack on the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal as a crisis management event, then whether China and the Philippines can contain a further deterioration of the situation becomes critical. In the current situation, the Philippines is still babbling, but the basis for the two sides to reach a consensus still exists.
First, neither China nor the Philippines wants to see casualties, conflict, or war. Although China far outranks the Philippines in terms of strength, a war in the South China Sea is extremely unfavorable to the external environment necessary for China's peaceful rise. The Philippine mentality is very ambivalent, on the one hand it needs to provoke China to maintain its status as an ally in the eyes of the United States, but also understands that the United States or the United States military is unlikely to give real support in the event of a conflict.
Second, China also needs to extend the timeline of the dispute to reveal the unreliability of the U.S. security commitment and the true face of provoking the South China Sea dispute. In China's view, even if China and the Philippines have to end the South China Sea dispute through a skirmish, the sooner the better. This will depend on changes in U.S.-China military power in the South China Sea, changes in U.S. domestic politics, and the Philippines' projections of the prospect of conflict. It can be said unequivocally that if the Philippines finds that the war of public opinion cannot change China's behavior, then it has few better options, which is the fundamental reason why China has been able to remain calm in the struggle between the two sides.
Third, the changes in the domestic political situation in the Philippines and the contradictions between Marcos Jr. and the Duterte family have also brought hope to China to promote the political autonomy of the Philippines. In China's view, the situation in the South China Sea can only be truly improved if the Philippines chooses not to become a "vassal state" of the United States. For the Marcos Jr. administration, if the South China Sea strategy is not successful, the so-called "international support" will remain only in words, and the contradictions in domestic social governance will intensify. Maintaining a stable relationship with China, then, is exactly what China needs.
Some military enthusiasts should note that China's recent entry into the South China Sea with a number of Type 055 destroyers, the Shandong's first voyage in 2024 also approaching the Philippine coast, coupled with the activities of Type 075 amphibious assault ships and multiple landing combat forces in the disputed waters between China and the Philippines, are seen by some as a signal that China is ready to take tough measures against the Philippines.
However, this understanding, while seemingly plausible on the surface, ignores that China is essentially a peace-loving country. On the other hand, China's display of such military power to deter the Philippines is actually hoping that the Marcos Jr. administration will learn from its mistakes and change its behavior in the South China Sea.
In general, China will still try its best to maintain the image of a peacefully rising power, but this does not in any way mean that the Philippines has any opportunities in places such as Ren'ai Jiao and Xianbin Jiao. Next, it is worth paying close attention to how China can manage the escalation of the crisis with the Philippines while sticking to its bottom line.