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Lead:
June 20, 2024,美国兰德公司(RAND Corporation)发布报告,题为《中等强国在台海危机中的利益考量》(Middle-Power Equities in a Cross-Strait Conflict).
In this report, the RAND Corporation pointed out that the Taiwan Strait crisis is the "fuse" of the great power game, not only the United States will be involved, but also the middle power will not be spared. While a middle power does not have the ability to change the international order like a superpower, it can exert influence on the international situation by mediating conflicts between major powers.
This report selects Australia, Canada, Japan, and United Kingdom as the research objects, and explores the position of the middle power in the Taiwan Strait, China's assessment of the strength of the middle power, and the possibility of China provoking a conflict in the Taiwan Strait through case analysis.
图源:RAND Corporation*Text author:
Rafiq Dossani is a senior economist ·and professor at United States RAND Corporation.
Cortez A. Cooper III · Cortez A. Cooper III, Senior Fellow at United States RAND Corporation.
Joan Chang is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation of United States. *Due to the length of the full text, this article is a summary of the report:
Key findings
First, the support of the middle powers for the Taiwan region is very limited
Once a military conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, it is more likely that the middle powers will support the Taiwan region. But support for Taiwan by middle-power powers may be limited to diplomacy (e.g., cooperating with United States economic sanctions against China). Because of the large disparity between the military strength of the middle powers and China, the uncertainty of their support for the Taiwan region, and the influence of other policy objectives, the military involvement of the middle power in the Taiwan Strait conflict is less likely, but it may provide support for the military involvement of the United States. Second, a middle power cannot pose a military threat to China
In China's view, middle powers, such as Australia, Canada, Japan, and United Kingdom, are militarily weak and are no match for China, even if combined.
The middle power in Southeast Asia is not worth mentioning, only India has strong military strength, but it is currently engaged in a military confrontation with China in the direction of the Sino-Indian border. Based on this alone, military pressure from the direction of Southeast Asia is almost negligible. What China is really concerned about is Japan's military movements, because Japan is the only middle power that can pose a military threat to China. Even so, Japan's chances of a military victory over China are slim.
In 2021, Japan's Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Taro Aso said in a speech in Tokyo that "once there is a problem in Taiwan", it is a crisis situation for Japan and may exercise its limited right of collective self-defense. Source: Xinhua Third, it is unlikely that China will provoke a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, building its image as a major power and promoting sustained and healthy economic development are China's top priorities at present. Provoking a conflict in the Taiwan Strait will not only hinder the realization of the above-mentioned goals, but also shake the political foundation.
On the other hand, China is an important supporter of multilateralism, pursues a policy of non-alignment, opposes unilateralism, abides by the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, calls for the settlement of territorial disputes through multilateral mechanisms, and advocates international cooperation in the field of human rights. As a result, many middle-power countries regard China as a "friendly country," a "trustworthy partner," and a "benevolent regional power."
However, many United States officials said that it is only a matter of time before China provokes a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and its ultimate goal is not to unify China, but to challenge and replace United States' hegemonic status.
At the Shangri-La Dialogue in June, Samuel ·Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told the Washington Post that United States has the ability to turn Taiwan into a "hellish landscape." Fourth, the influence of middle powers is constrained by multiple factors
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the influence of the middle powers has been declining for three reasons: First, the middle powers (such as Japan and the United Kingdom) have lost their strategic autonomy in diplomacy with the lead of the United States. Second, the influence of middle powers (such as Australia) is limited to their own regions and has limited strategic attention to other regions; Finally, there is a clear lack of military investment in middle-sized powers, such as Canada. These factors make it difficult for the middle powers to play a mediating role in the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. But what is certain is that most middle powers will side with Taiwan when a conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait.
Policy recommendations
First, the middle power should play the role of "mediator" in the Taiwan Strait crisis
Avoiding a conflict in the Taiwan Strait is not only in the interests of China and United States, but also in the interests of a middle power. In this regard, the middle powers should play an active role in mediating the crisis in the Taiwan Strait.
However, no middle power currently has the capacity to influence decision-making in China or United States. If a middle power is to play the role of "mediator" in a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, it must enhance its diplomatic and military capabilities.
Second, the middle powers should use economic sanctions to force China to abandon its attack on Taiwan
The middle powers should unite and develop economic sanctions that may be imposed in response to China's attack on Taiwan. If the plan is coordinated by United States and its allies, it could put enough pressure on China. When the risk is beyond the tolerable range, it will make China have the mentality of being a rat trap, thus forcing it to give up attacking Taiwan. Third, the middle powers should strengthen their dialogue with United States
Strengthening dialogue is conducive to enhancing the understanding of the middle powers and United States on China's position on the Taiwan Strait and eliminating differences between the two sides on China's perception of the threat. Fourth, the middle powers should eliminate their differences with United States on the Taiwan Strait crisis
The middle powers generally believe that China has to suspend or abandon its attack on Taiwan because it is "building its image as a great power" and "promoting sustained and healthy economic development". United States, on the other hand, generally believe that military reunification Taiwan an important part of China's global strategy, and its purpose is to challenge and replace United States.
If the middle power cannot reach a consensus with the United States on China's threat perception, it will affect its performance in the Taiwan Strait crisis.
Fifth, the United States should heed the concerns of the middle powers
The latest research shows that the influence of middle powers is gradually declining, which means that it is difficult for middle powers to have a significant impact on the competition between China and the United States. So far, this trend has not received high-level attention from both China and the United States.
On the other hand, there are many uncertainties within the middle powers, such as the disapproval of some political blocs for intervening in the Taiwan Strait conflict, fearing that China will retaliate for intervening in the Taiwan Strait conflict.
Fully understanding and dispelling the concerns of the middle powers will help United States form cooperative relations with the middle powers on the Taiwan Strait issue.
Sixth, middle powers should enhance their strategic autonomy
If a middle power wants to play the role of "mediator" in the Taiwan Strait crisis, it must enhance its strategic autonomy. The prerequisite for this is to increase diplomatic and military power. Only by relying on solid military and diplomatic strength can a middle power become an intermediary between China and the United States. Once realized, the strategic autonomy of the middle powers will be enhanced. This will not only help check and balance China's activities in the Taiwan Strait, but also help safeguard its own national security.
★ This article compiles:
Zeng Hui, Institute of Public Policy, South China University of Technology
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