Ge Zhaoguang: Let's talk about "looking at China from the periphery"

Mr. Ge Zhaoguang's first contact with the Yanxing literature of the Li Dynasty was in the autumn of 2000. At first, he found it easy and interesting to read these Yanxing documents, because he could see "interesting anecdotes and lost histories" in them. But after ten years of reading, the East Asian world presented in Yanxing's literature made him begin to rethink the issues of Asia and China, nationality and identity, ethnicity and territory, and at the same time, it was accompanied by the proposition of "looking at China from the periphery".

In an interview with the Shanghai Review of Books, Mr. Ge said that China is a "moving China", and sometimes, the old land is originally the "periphery"; Sometimes, the "periphery" can become the old frontier again. In the era of traditional empires, the "inside" and "outside" were often changing, which brought many territorial, ethnic, and religious problems to the modern nation-state, and the spatial movement in history brought a lot of trouble to the current historical research, and also provided a huge and challenging topic for the study of literature and history.

In the past two years, the Institute of Literature and History of Fudan University, where you work, has also published several sets of Chinese literature from its neighboring countries in East Asia.

Ge Zhaoguang: Let's start with an incident last year. Last March, a group of scholars and I participated in a discussion organized by the Harvard China Foundation on topics that should be supported in China studies. Everyone was mentioning it, and Professor Ou Lide wrote it on the blackboard, and the discussion seemed to have become "what are the key words in the study of China". Professor Ou Lide wrote a blackboard, and at the end of the screening, there were more than 20 left, which concentrated on some of the issues discussed in the academic community, including some topics that we are all concerned about. For example, borders or borders, ethnicity or race, nations or empires, identity and religion, and so on. What does this mean? It shows that whether it is international or domestic, there are gradually some major issues of common concern, which need to be studied together.

"Looking at China from the periphery" is related to these big issues, and it is something that should be done by Chinese scholars. Don't you borrow other people's eyes and look at yourself and see clearly? What's more, these issues related to territory, ethnicity, identity, and religion are full of feelings and even pathos, and you may not be able to see them clearly and objectively without borrowing the "eyes of a foreign land". At present, there are two tendencies in Chinese academic circles. One tendency is to specialize and divide fields, and the study of literature and history has become a technical work. Anyway, new historical materials are constantly coming out, so you don't need to know anything else at all, you can just use the old paradigm and old problems to make things. There is also a tendency to care about the Manchu issue just by looking at the research of outsiders, and when the new Qing history comes; When the theory of modernity came, it was concerned with the problem of Chinese modernity; When area studies flourished, they swarmed to make "places". These two extreme tendencies are not good, and we need to understand the research of the international academic community, what problems they can activate, and at the same time, we must also consider what problems can be continued in the most basic historical materials and topics.

So, why do you focus on the "periphery" of the modern era and East Asia?

Ge Zhaoguang: Modern China, after the Song Dynasty, is considered "modern China", and it needs special attention because it is related to modern China. The research topic of "China from the Periphery" that we are promoting is roughly equivalent to the Ming and Qing dynasties, in East Asia, the Lee dynasty of Korea, Japan after Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, and Annam after the Li dynasty. As I have said in the past, the focus of attention in modern Asia can gradually shift from west to east, that is, from the Western Regions to the East China Sea. Why? Because the history of cultural exchanges between China and the Middle Ages is still centered on the Western Regions, but in this era, there are more exchanges in the East, not only Japan, Korea, Annam, but even Westerners from the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The study of literature and history should pay more attention to the east, and re-examine China and its surrounding environment from this side. Regarding this area of the East China Sea, our plan is, first, to make a document, sort out some literature, this is the foundation, as the old saying goes, "it is difficult for a good woman to cook without rice". Second, we try to raise some issues that are of concern to Chinese scholars as well as foreign scholars. Third, we also need to understand the concerns of other scholars, including Japan, Korea, Viet Nam, Europe and the United States, and what is the background of these issues? However, there are still many problems in this field, and we Chinese scholars have not been deeply involved in them until now. I don't think we should always be entangled in what "history is led by theory" or "history is brought by history". Problems and historical materials are mutually reinforcing, and after entering the historical materials, it is found that there are many problems, which have not been clarified until now, and some questions can also take you to find new historical materials.

The first one we did was the Chinese Yan Xing Literature in Viet Nam. Now some people have begun to use the materials we have done to study, but I would like to say that if he still uses these materials to talk about Sino-Vietnamese relations and the tributary system, it will not be stimulated to create new topics, but still the traditional topics of tribute, canonization, and the world that were discussed before, and the new materials will only add content to the old topics. But are there any new topics? There is an article in my book "Imagining Strange Lands" about Qianlong's celebration of his 80th birthday, and he once convened a large gathering of foreign delegations in Chengde, and Viet Nam has preserved a lot of relevant historical materials. Among them, there are some issues that we did not care about in the past, but that researchers of the new Qing history may be concerned about. First, in the eighteenth century, where was the arena where all the surrounding countries could communicate together? In addition to Beijing, it is Chengde. In the Forbidden City of Beijing, although there are also many national missions to pay tribute and congratulate, such as the winter solstice and the first lunar month, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama are generally only in Chengde, especially, in that year, Rehe was Chengde to congratulate and the then King of Annam, who was the highest-ranking guest, including the Kazakh prince, who were all there. This is a stage for exchanges between countries, which has a special significance. Second, when we talk about the tributary system in the past, we always focus on Sino-foreign relations, but what about the relationship between foreign countries and foreign countries in China? Since the Ming Dynasty, the envoys of Ryukyu, Korea, Annam, and Siam have met in Beijing and looked at each other. So, from these historical materials, you can do something different from the past. Again, when these missions come to Chengde, is he here to celebrate his birthday, is he here to pay tribute? If you look closely, Qianlong rewarded Annan with far more things than tribute. Is it the "tributary trade circle" that Mr. Takeshi Hamashita said? I always feel that this is a very interesting game between the Celestial Empire, which thinks it is the suzerain, and the tributary state, which calculates accurately, between face and benefit. However, it is surprising that there are still many new sources that have not been used, and this is certainly not only a question of attitude to expanding the scope of historical materials, but also a question of the ability to raise new topics.

Recently, we have been working on the "Selected Chinese Literature of the DPRK Correspondence Envoys". The so-called "Korean communications envoy" was an envoy sent by Lee Chao Korea to Japan. Most of the records of their visits to Japan are in Chinese. There has been very little attention paid to this field in Chinese academia, and I have searched the Internet carefully, and there are only a few articles, and most of these articles are introductory and general. However, there are at least 40 kinds of documents related to these correspondences, and Japan has published eight volumes of the "Great Series of Correspondence Envoys," and Korea has also published the main and sequel of the "General Records of the Sea Travel." We can't sort them all out now, so we can only select about a million words and select some of the more important ones for the reference of the Chinese academic community. Perhaps, when we Chinese scholars study China, we are still satisfied with the "abundance" of Chinese historical materials, and feel that Chinese literature is very important for understanding China, and we do not put "China" in the "periphery" to study at all, and we are not good at looking at ourselves from the perspective of "others" or "foreign lands". However, Japan has done a good job in the study of these documents. This may have something to do with the fact that they have always taken "East Asia" or "Oriental" as their field of study. However, you must know that most of these documents are in Chinese, and whether it is Japan or Korea scholars, it is not as convenient to read as us, not to mention that these materials always involve China, which is too important for re-understanding Ming and Qing China. Recently, I have been writing a long "introduction" to this series, and I will highlight a few points. First, Chinese must not think that the relationship between Li Chao, Korea, and Japan has nothing to do with China. Although there seems to be no China here, there is always an "absent present" in all kinds of exchanges between North Korea and Japan, political, ceremonial, and cultural exchanges, and that is China. Because all standards, including elegance, etiquette, reputation, and customs, as the standard of value of right and wrong, all come from traditional China, so this is a cultural circle that has shared traditions in history. Second, I would like to propose a concept called "intercultural competition". In the past, when Yang Lianchen said "inter-dynasty competition", he was talking about various dynasties at different times, and they often talked about each other's long and short points, but in fact, "intercultural competition" meant that different countries at the same time also had to compete with each other culturally. Especially in recent times, whether it is Japan, Korea, Viet Nam or China, at that time, when the national self-consciousness was gradually becoming more prominent, they all tried to boast to each other culturally for the sake of national self-esteem and national face. Therefore, there are often such matches between North Korea and Japan. A Japan scholar once said that the Koreans could not defeat us in terms of martial arts, so they always used culture to despise us. The cultural competition is also a "cultural war", but there must be a referee in the game, and this cultural referee has been traditional Chinese culture for a long time. Use traditional Chinese habits to compete who is better in poetry, calligraphy and painting, who is more in line with the rules, and who has more ancient origins in clothing? Third, the "intercultural competition" also raises a new problem, as far as culture is concerned, it may be that the traditional Han Chinese culture of the Han, Tang and Song dynasties was shrouded, and for a long time, East Asian countries used Chinese culture as a model and model. However, you should note that in realpolitik, after the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, from Korea to Japan, it gradually separated from China. Taking Japan as an example, in addition to Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, Takeshi Kojima of the University of Tokyo once wrote a pamphlet about this "vanished king of Japan". Ashikaga Yoshimitsu once tried to enter the tribute system of the Ming Dynasty, but Japan and real China after that had a sense of equality or antagonism. This began with the Sui Dynasty Japan's national letter signed by the "Son of Heaven in the Japanese Dynasty", but after the failure of the Mongol Yuan invasion of Japan, this sense of pursuing reciprocity became stronger and stronger. In the pursuit of self-esteem in their own countries, there are many countries in East Asia, and there are many famous names, but in the pursuit of self-esteem, it is interesting to use concepts and systems from traditional China. One of the most debated topics I see in the correspondence literature is "fame". For example, when Japan and Korea interact, is it the king of Japan or the monarch of Japan who signs the national credentials, or does they not use any name? When indicating the year, what is the year name? In the Ming and Qing dynasties, Joseon used the Chinese era name to sign himself as the king of Joseon. However, Japan felt that it could not be a subject country of the Ming Dynasty, so it was very entangled in the signature of the national letter, and there were endless arguments from Mt. Lin Luo to Arai Shiraishi.

So, why is the so-called "periphery", that is, East Asia, a problem?

Ge Zhaoguang: Actually, the problem of "periphery" began very early, even as far back as the 13th and 14th centuries during the Yuan and Ming dynasties. I have always said that there are two lines of internal and external problems in China in modern times, one of which is the "from the world to all nations" mentioned by the United States scholar Levinson in "Confucian China and Its Modern Destiny", from the concept of the world and the tributary system that enveloped the four seas in the center of the Celestial Empire, and was forced to turn to a new international order in which all nations confronted each other. However, I would like to make it clear that this change did not begin with the arrival of Westerners in East Asia, nor did it all begin with the "Western impact" that Fairbank talked about. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the failure of the Mongol Yuan invasion of Japan aroused Japan's egocentrism and cultural self-esteem. This is what Naito Hunan pointed out, namely the rise of Japan's cultural subjectivity after the Onaga Rebellion; The Li Dynasty replaced the Goryeo Dynasty, and although it entered the tributary circle of the Ming Dynasty, it gradually began to stand on its own cultural backing, tracing the legend of Danjun, rewriting the history of Joseon, and respecting the doctrine of Zhuzi, and gradually having a sense of its own culture. During the Mongol and Yuan dynasties, Annam, which had its own title of emperor and independent era, was always separated from the Celestial Empire, especially after the Li Dynasty replaced the Chen Dynasty and defeated the invading Ming Dynasty, and gradually developed a sense of cultural independence in its own country. Although Zhu Yuanzhang and Zhu Di always emphasized that "there are no two days in the sky, and there are no two monarchs in the country" and wanted to rebuild a large tributary system, in fact, some countries were forced to recognize it as a "country without levy", and although some still maintained tribute and canonization, some turned a blind eye to it, and what could really be controlled was the "eighteen provinces". So, if you look at the relationship between the "neighboring" countries and China, in fact, there have been problems for a long time, and they are by no means just starting now. However, as far as the understanding of China's history is concerned, these cultures have drifted apart, and the observation of China's "own interpretation" and "own position" is important for reflecting on China.

Why? As for the situation in East Asia in the modern era, I have always felt that there is still a cultural identity, but there is a political separation. Until now, Japan, Korea, and Viet Nam have recognized historical China on the one hand, and contempt for real China on the other, and culturally they will say that your traditions are good, but politically they will not agree with your system and your territorial boundaries, which has probably taken root since that time. We can't say that these materials are "excavated" now, because they are placed there, and they can only be said to be "organized". Among scholars in the past, Wu Han and Jin Yuhuang paid more attention. Wu Han pays attention because he does Ming history; Jin Yuhuang's attention has something to do with his history of Northeast China. Since Meiji and Taisho, Japan has had other intentions against Manchuria, and occupied Korea after the First Sino-Japanese War. Jin Yuhuang made a history of the Northeast, probably adhering to Fu Sinian's idea. On the one hand, he had to respond to Japan's Manchurian and Mongolian studies, and on the other hand, he had to deal with the relationship between Korea and Northeast China. Therefore, he compiled a series of materials about the Northeast and collected a lot of things, including a part of the Korean Yanxinglu literature. But others rarely use it. In the past, China used very limited historical materials from Japan and Korea, and in addition to Sino-Japanese and Sino-Korean relations, the materials used were also concentrated in the "Pilgrimage to the Tang Dynasty and Seeking Law", "Rehe Diary", "Drifting Sea Record" and so on. Of course, the past twenty years have been much better, and I talked about the changes in the past twenty years at a conference at the Department of Foreign Affairs of Seoul National University in Korea, which is also included in the upcoming publication of "Imagining Exotic Lands", so I won't say much here. In general, new overseas historical materials can stimulate new problems, and new problems will force you to discover new historical materials, and when these problems and historical materials are available, and then you will have a better understanding of academic trends by reading some overseas research papers.

In his early years, Mr. Wu Han compiled "Chinese Historical Materials in the Records of the Li Dynasty of Korea".

Ge Zhaoguang: Wu Han used to be very influenced by Hu Shi, I don't know if he made this thing and had anything to do with Hu Shi. However, Hu Shi has long realized that in 1938, Hu Shi went to Zurich, Switzerland, on behalf of China to hold the first World History Conference, and talked about the study of Chinese history, in addition to the so-called four new materials, that is, oracle bone words, Dunhuang documents, Han and Jin Jianmu and Ouchi archives, there should also be a fifth major material, that is, Chinese historical materials circulating in Japan and Korea. Of course, at that time, the focus was to be able to supplement the lack of Chinese historical materials. But now, with new issues and new focuses, which are the key words I mentioned at the beginning, these historical materials are related to new issues, and are no longer just of the significance of picking up the missing points in Chinese history. Of course, the significance of supplementing the historical materials is still there. For example, during the Kangxi period, Wu Sangui raised troops, and there was an "Anti-Qing Text", which was not found in Chinese literature, but was preserved in the Korean "Li Dynasty Record" and Japan's "Huayi Metamorphosis", and Korean anthologies, official records and other historical materials also recorded that the "Chuan Wen" was transmitted to Japan and North Korea through merchants, and that officials on both sides of Japan's Tsushima Island and North Korea's Pusan had different views on this document.

In this way, it can be used with some Ming and Qing archives. However, I always feel that it is not enough to supplement the study of Chinese history as a historical material, but also as an "eye in a foreign land", in addition to my own eyes, I should also borrow a pair of eyes to know myself, which has a new meaning.

What do you mean by "new"?

Ge Zhaoguang: You know, academia is constantly changing, and the issues, focuses, angles, and positions are all changing, of course. In the past, Wang Guowei said, "Daoxian's learning is new", where is the new? Taking the history of the Mengyuan Dynasty as an example, the history of the Mengyuan Dynasty in China is the study of the history and geography of the northwest between the late Qing Dynasty and the Xianxian. The study of the history and geography of the Northwest in the Daoxian era ostensibly followed Gu Yanwu, but in fact, its orientation was different from Gu Yanwu, and the times were different. Therefore, Wang Guowei said this, because the academic focus, problem concern, and tool methods have changed. The most important changes brought about by Daoxian's study are, first, that it enlarged the historical time and space that was originally limited to Han China to the great multi-ethnic empire of the time and beyond. Second, you have to engage in this period of history, the original historical context and historical concepts of the Three Emperors and Five Emperors to the present day do not work, you must excavate historical materials and reshuffle the cards. There are usually two sources of new historical sources. One is an underground excavation, or the other is a historical material from a foreign country, that is, recorded in another language. For example, in addition to Mongolia, you also have to look at Persian, Russian, and so on. Third, this brings about a change in tools and methods, you have to learn a foreign language, in the past, Chinese did not need to learn a foreign language to study history. So you see, there may not be too many new changes in Qian Daxin's era, but when the history of the Yuan Dynasty is rebuilt to Ke Shaoxian, Hong Jun, and Tuji, there will be changes, and future generations can use foreign materials. In this way, the study of history is not the traditional way of China, or even the study of traditional China. Japan did not start very early, and when Nake passed the world, he still had to ask Shen Zengzhi and Chen Yi for information and learn things, but after Nake passed the world, Chinese studies developed more and more towards "Oriental studies", and the history of Manxian, Mongolia, and even the "study of the South China Sea in the Western Regions" like Westerners also became more and more advanced. However, what about the study of the history of Mongolia and Yuan in China? The study of history and geography in the northwest did not integrate with major issues such as nationality and territory, and later became a "unique study". After the twenties of the twentieth century, the history of the Mengyuan Dynasty was first in Wang Guowei and Zhongshi through Chen Yinke, and later from Yao Congwu, Han Rulin, and so on. Now, scholars from Japan, Europe and the United States have proposed that the history of the Mongol and Yuan periods should not be the history of China, so it cannot be called Yuan history, such as Masaaki Sugiyama of Kyoto University, who recently published the influential "Kublai Khan's Challenge" in China, and he inherited the idea of Professor Minoru Honda of the University of Tokyo, believing that the history of that era should be world history, so it should not be called Yuan history, but should be called the history of the Mongolia era. They replaced the connected, magnified, and trans-Eurasian history of the Mongolia Empire with the original China-based history of the Yuan Dynasty. Whether you agree or not, this is a new problem, a big shock. In this case, the question of historical materials, tools, and language arises again.

I think that the current study of literature and history is indispensable in three aspects: new historical materials, new problems, and new visions. Now we don't dare to say what we can do, we just do something to drive change. There are many languages that can be used as tools that I don't understand, so we chose "East Asia" to do it first, because in East Asia, the popular "international language" at that time was our Chinese Chinese, and we had advantages and convenience in this regard.

So, "China from the periphery" chose to do the East China Sea instead of the Western Regions?

Ge Zhaoguang: It's not that we don't want to be in the west, we choose to do the east first, there are some reasons. In addition to the objective constraints of personnel, knowledge, and materials, there are also some reasons. First, as I said before, in the Middle Ages, perhaps the Western Regions, like Braudel's Eastern Mediterranean in the fifteenth century, was indeed the center of Asian cultural contact and cultural conflict, but in the Ming and Qing dynasties, East Asia, that is, China, and its neighbors and even the West had greater relations, or Korea, Japan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Therefore, I would like to say that the focus of research should be "from the Western Regions to the East China Sea". Second, this part of the historical material is the easiest for us to obtain and the easiest to deal with. It is as convenient for us to make documents for correspondence in North Korea as it is for us to make documents for China. I think that if you want to do this, Chinese scholars must be the best, and there is hope that they will quickly lead the overseas academic community in this area. Perhaps, in our domestic historical research, no one dares to openly say that they are stronger than the West and the East, except for the ancient silk and archaeology, others have nothing to say, the history of the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, we are not necessarily the strongest, but in the collation of ancient books, Chinese literature, I think China, especially the mainland, is easy to be in an advantage. Third, not to mention that it has something to do with the real China issue that we are concerned about now. How so? According to the modern concept, "periphery" is "outside", "diplomacy", "foreign affairs". However, it is important to know that in the era of traditional empires, there was often no demarcation between "inside" and "outside". In ancient China, the problem of "inside" could become "outside", such as Nanzhao Dali, which was still "inside" in the Tang Dynasty, became "outside" in the Song Dynasty, and became "inside" in the Yuan Dynasty. We have an overall consideration of these issues, because the "key words" I just mentioned, namely, nation, territory, country, foreign country, periphery, and identity, are connected. "China as an empire", Professor Ou Lide, a representative of the new Qing history, is right, mainly referring to the Qing Empire. He wrote about the history of the new Qing Dynasty, and as recently in Singapore he said that the Qianlong Emperor was the founder of modern China. Such a large multi-ethnic state was laid in the Qianlong era. The country laid down in the Qianlong era has not changed much until now, except for the independence of Outer Mongolia, there are still small changes in some places, but in general, the territory is not a particularly big change, but because of the formation and integration of this large empire, there are both "inside" and "outside" of the so-called "periphery", how many problems have been left?

The issue of "periphery" is very complex and sensitive, and people have been reluctant to talk about it directly. I always emphasize that this is a "moving China", and sometimes, the old soil is originally the "periphery"; Sometimes, the "periphery" can become the old frontier again. In the era of traditional empires, the "inside" and "outside" were constantly changing, bringing many territorial, ethnic, and religious problems to the modern (multi)ethnic state, and the spatial movement of history brought a lot of trouble to the current historical research. Of course, it also provides a great and challenging topic for the study of literature and history. Why? This is because the study of issues such as neighborhood, ethnicity, territory, and religion will inevitably involve "identity", and when it comes to "identity", it will also involve a sensitive topic, that is, what about the countries outside China and the multi-ethnic groups inside? In this way, historical issues are related to current realities, and historical issues are linked to practical issues.

In the past, I lived in the Miao area for 17 years, and sometimes I thought that in a sense, a foreign land seemed to be a foreign country. If you don't open the boundaries of "culture", don't tolerate the interpretation of "history", and don't provide "system" guarantees, how much do they identify with the so-called "China", "Chinese history" and "Chinese culture" dominated by the Han nationality? It's also a potential nuisance. Over the years, I have read some books on the history of nations, and I think there are big problems in this. What particularly impressed me was that the seemingly historical and academic issues we study are actually related to reality and politics. For example, in 1939, there was a fierce controversy in the Yishi Bao in Kunming, Yunnan Province, when most of the Chinese academic circles "retreated" to Yunnan and Sichuan. At that time, Wu Wenzao, Fei Xiaotong, Gu Jiegang, Ma Yi and others argued that the Chinese nation is one, whether there is a multi-ethnic problem, and whether there are many different ethnic groups in China. It is not a question of who is right and who is wrong, of course, ethnologists should engage in "ethnic identification". However, historians believe that as soon as you engage in ethnic identification, you imply the factor of China's division. Have you solved the identification of various alien races in the border areas with China? There is one more thing worth recalling. At that time, at the instigation of the Japanese, Siam established Greater Thailand, which caused tension among Chinese scholars. Why? Because the Tai people in the broad sense also have a large group in China. If "nation" is the foundation of the "state", and each "nation" has the right to "self-determination", and "self-determination" can establish an independent state, then if the "Tai people" really build an ethnocentric state, then what will happen to China's Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guizhou? Not only the "Tai", but also the distribution of Mongolia, Korean, Kazakh, Miao, etc., also transcends China's borders, not to mention the issue of different religious beliefs, which also transcend China's borders. Some time ago, I saw that Professor Ma Rong of Peking University had written a very famous article on the future of China's ethnic issues, and the topic was very terrifying. In fact, some of his apprehensions were justified. However, if we think back to China's academic circles from the 1920s to the 1940s, we know that this thinking is really old and deep-rooted. Therefore, I have always said that the understanding of the modern "nation-state" is very different from that of Europe, and the central region of China is very clear, that is, the "China" that integrates all kinds of Hu and Han blood, but modern China has integrated many "periphery" ethnic groups and regions at the time of Qianlong. This makes the theory of the "nation-state" from the experience of modern Europe to be revised, or to be opened, otherwise it will be difficult for China to manage.

It's just not easy to do. When you look back at that time, Chinese scholars used to debate whether to use the term "headquarters of the eighteen provinces", and historians Fu Sinian and Gu Jiegang were very opposed to this term, pointing out that it was a conspiracy of Japan. At that time, the Japanese often used this term, apparently behind which Japan's territorial claims to China from the Meiji, Taisho, and Showa periods were represented by the so-called "China without borders" and "Manchu, Mongolia, and non-China theory" by Japanese scholar Yano Renichi. However, most Chinese historians are resolutely opposed, and they want to defend that China is the whole and the Chinese nation is one, and the arguments of Chinese scholars are of course unquestionably justified. However, as a historian, how do you explain the process by which these "nations" (or "ethnic groups") and these spaces (or "territories") gradually entered "China" and became part of "China" in history? In the same way, how should we historically explain that although some of those "peripherals" have gradually entered China's territory and become "inside" in history, some have become foreign countries and "outside"? Don't simply say things like "China has been China since ancient times". These issues are sensitive issues in China, and it is difficult to discuss territory, ethnicity, religion, etc. Therefore, we use the word "periphery" because, first, it has both the meaning of the periphery of the territory of the traditional era, and it is also compatible with the meaning of the frontier of the modern country, and it is not too taboo; Second, it has a lot of historical materials that can be used to discuss the topics of "inside" and "outside", and can make new meanings. Third, there are some thorny issues that can be discussed rationally and calmly with such vague concepts.

You just mentioned the reaction of Chinese historians during the Anti-Japanese War, and it seems that Japan historians also made a lot of political moves before and after. Is this considered "academic anti-Japanese" and "academic invasion of China"?

Ge Zhaoguang: I have always said that in addition to the influence of Western modern academic orientation, one of the stimulating factors of modern Chinese historiography was the study of Oriental studies in Japan, and the other factor was China's own political situation at that time. At that time, many academic questions were stimulated by the Japanese academic community or were raised against Japanese scholars. For example, the first to do Miao research, Taiwan survey, and Manchu and Mongolian archaeology was Torii Ryuzo, and his "Miao Survey Report" was translated before the Anti-Japanese War. Later, a lot of research by Chinese archaeologists and anthropologists responded to him, and if you look at the Chinese newspapers and magazines at that time, you would often mention his name and track his movements. Another example is Fu Sinian's "Outline of the History of Northeast China", if you look at his preface, you can understand that it is aimed at Yano Renichi's "Manchurian and Mongolian Non-China Theory". Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan has studied Manchu, Mongolia, and Tibet, of course, some of them purely academic, but also with political, economic, and military backgrounds. This is, of course, the so-called "learning war". Japan's Oriental Studies, represented by Shiratori Kukichi since the Meiji era, competed with Westerners for the study of Asian history, geography and language on the one hand, and on the other hand, it had the color of Greater Japan under the surface of Greater East Asianism. In the mid-to-late Meiji era, Japan scholars studied Manchuria, Mongolia, and Korea, as well as Tibet and Xinjiang. There are both modern academic overtones and imperial political intentions. First of all, their "Manchurian research" was very prosperous, and later their "Manchurian and Mongolian studies" also flourished. Speaking of which, Japan's territorial desires (including for Taiwan) in that era have always been entangled with academic research. As mentioned earlier, before and after World War II, Yano's "Manchurian and Mongolian Non-China Theory" and "China Without Borders" once made Chinese feel very excited, and after the Chinese academic circles were stimulated, they began to do some topics. I remember that in 1910 there was an article in the "Declaration" saying that Japan had established the China Studies Association, saying that China was originally Chinese, and now the Japanese actually want to study it, and the main members are soldiers, businessmen, and diplomats in addition to scholars such as Hattori Uyukichi. He asked, "Why is that?" If you look at Jin Yuhuang's diary, you will know how shocked and anxious he was when he read the works on the history of the Northeast and the Qing Dynasty written by Japan people. This is the history of modern scholarship, and it is also the history of modern politics. We need to see this clearly.

In fact, the same is true for North Korea or Korea, where academics and politics will be entangled. During the colonial period of Japan, there was a lot of historical research full of nationalist feelings, and the purpose was, of course, to preserve the roots of national historical memory. However, after World War II, this sentiment was still strong, and North and Korea rewrote history strongly. They have a strong sense of establishing Korea (North Korea) subjectivity. For example, the legend of Tanjun, they wrote it in the textbook as a letter history, and Mizi has fallen behind, because Mizi is Chinese after all. In order to emphasize the dignity of the Korean nation and the subjectivity of Korean history, this practice of constantly writing history on its own and tracing its origins sometimes crosses the line, even to the point of ignoring 3721. We also saw some kind of historical map in Korea's history textbooks, which was simply scribbled, and sometimes most of China was it, which was called "a big country of ten thousand miles" at that time. Of course, we also understand that an important function of history textbooks is often to rebuild national self-esteem, and this is beyond reproach. However, history is a serious discipline after all, and serious scholarship still has to have boundaries, and I can't imagine history for the sake of my self-esteem. Korea has a very famous foundation, called the Northeast Asia History Foundation, which is dedicated to rewriting the history of Northeast Asia and establishing the historical status of the Korean nation in Northeast Asia. Half of my admiration is for its efforts, which are really to defend national dignity and national self-confidence, but half of it is also worried, because if this effort is gone, it will also become nationalist historiography.

Having said that, in history, the Li Dynasty had a strong national self-esteem and cultural self-confidence very early on, especially the cultural contempt for Qing Dynasty China, because it always believed that the Ming Dynasty was its cultural origin and the object of political identity. As for the Qing Dynasty, I think it is already a barbarian, so although I can't beat you, I have to submit to you Emperor Hu politically, but culturally I don't agree with it as a whole. China, Japan, and South Korea jointly wrote the history of East Asia, and because of these problems, many places basically had to be "one East Asia, each with its own interpretation". In November last year, I was called to the Korea Academy of Sciences for a series of lectures, and later the Chosun Ilbo came to interview me, and the interview was published on the half page, and I was very frank about my opinion. We cannot discuss the present territory in terms of the territory of history, but we also cannot discuss history in terms of the territory of the present. The problem of Koreans is that it is good to use historical territory to discuss whether a place was originally Korea, which is wrong; The Chinese are accustomed to looking back at history with the current territory, so some foreign regimes at that time on the current territory of China were said to be subject countries of a certain Chinese dynasty, and they have been Chinese territory since history. Therefore, the two sides have never been able to reach an agreement, and I have said it according to "now", and you have said it according to "history", so there have been deadlocks and contradictions in the Northeast Project, the application of Goguryeo ruins for World Heritage Sites, and so on.

When we talk about China's territory in history, we should emphasize changes, and when we talk about China's territory now, we must recognize it as an actual and legitimate area of political control. On this issue, it is quite powerless to emphasize "whose territory has been there since ancient times", so should we take back those places that were set aside by the Treaty of Nebuchu? Obviously not. Therefore, many of the issues we are talking about now will show that this is history, and of course, although it is a historical issue, it is actually related to reality. Recently, I have also seen that the field of international relations studies in Chinese mainland has slowly paid attention to history. In the past, China's international relations were basically focused on countermeasures, but now some people are gradually concerned about these historical and cultural issues, which is both change and progress. Of course, I am also worried that some people will also fall into another trap, that is, our ancient Chinese concept of the world and the tributary system are so good that they are equivalent to "cosmopolitanism" and "pluralism", and they have begun to package these old goods with new ideas, so as to make the old concepts of the past imperial era, and use the so-called "one family under heaven" to secretly obscure the warehouse, which seems to be cosmopolitanism, but in fact the world in the center of China has made a comeback.

Your new book is "Looking at China from the Perspective of North Korea", do you see any new problems?

Ge Zhaoguang: My main problem was the recognition and disagreement of Li Chao and North Korea with Chinese culture at that time. I always wondered, from the perspective of Korean intellectuals, what was the situation of the Qing Empire at that time, was the culture very prosperous, and how much was the Manchu-Han conflict resolved? In the end, what changes did the Qing Empire have compared to the previous Song and Ming dynasties, and did it repeat the era of the Mongolia Empire? For example, on the issue of the Manchus and Hans, we used to take it for granted that after Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong, on the one hand, the suppression and persuasion of imperial power, on the other hand, economic development and life stability, there was no big problem between the Manchus and Hans within the empire. In Jiaqing, Daoguang, and Xianfeng, the rise of a group of Han officials, including Lin Zexu, Zeng Guofan, and others, showed that the local power was getting stronger and stronger, and the Han officials in the imperial court were getting stronger and stronger, and the literary prison did not appear very often, so the Manchu and Han problems basically no longer existed. However, this does not seem to be the case in the Korean records, which reminds us that either the Qing Empire has not been able to truly resolve the issue of ethnic conflicts, or that the prejudiced Korean intellectuals are full of ethnic differences and Manchu-Han contradictions. However, why did the late Qing Dynasty put forward such a slogan as "drive out the Tartars and restore China", and why did Sun Yat-sen, Zhang Taiyan, Chen Tianhua, Liu Shipei, and so on use "expelling the Tartars" as a revolutionary mobilization force? We have to consider, is it still a bit reasonable to talk about the differences between Manchu identity and Manchu and Han in the new Qing history, and there are still some problems between ethnic groups? Of course, there are many issues involved in Yan Xinglu's literature, and I am also concerned about the so-called "modernity" of the Mongolia era and the Qing Empire, the cultural identity of the three East Asian countries, and the different reactions of the three countries under the impact of the western tide in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Of course, I can't discuss it comprehensively, but I just look at these big issues from a small perspective on some interesting information in Yanxing's literature.

Speaking of the "Collection of Chinese Literature of the Ryukyu Kingdom", it is not the project of our Fudan Institute of Literature and History, but of Japan scholars. We focus on Chinese materials, but we want to explain that they are mainly Chinese materials about China written by Koreans, Japan, and Ryukyuans. Perhaps the "Collection of Chinese Literature of the Ryukyu Kingdom" is more from the perspective of philology and editions, while we pay attention to these materials from the perspective of intellectual history, cultural history, and political history, which is a little different from them. In this regard, I have drawn up a plan from the very beginning for three sets of books, one for Viet Nam's Hanwen Yanxing literature on China, one for Li Chao's Korean Han literature on China, and one for Li Chao's Korean mission to Japan. If all three sets are completed, my plan will come to an end.