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Regional country dynamics 15 | "United States fights but does not win in the Middle East, China wins but does not fight in the Middle East"

Regional country dynamics 15 | "United States fights but does not win in the Middle East, China wins but does not fight in the Middle East"

Editor's note: At the invitation of the Chinese side, high-level representatives of the 14 Palestinian factions held a reconciliation dialogue in Beijing from July 21 to 23. On the morning of 23 July, the Palestinian factions signed the "Beijing Declaration on Ending Divisions and Strengthening Palestinian National Unity." This is not the first time in recent years that China has hosted Middle East reconciliation talks as a mediator. On March 10, 2023, under the auspices and promotion of China, Saudi Arabia and Iran reached an agreement to restore diplomatic relations. At the same time, U.S. troops are withdrawing from the Middle East. On April 19, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a well-known think tank in United States United States, released a long essay by United States scholar Jon B. Alterman, which comprehensively analyzes the current development of China's relations with the Middle East and the current situation of United States in the Middle East from the perspective of United States scholars. The 15th issue of the "Regional and Country Dynamics" column of the Chongyang National People's Congress is now compiled and published as follows:

01

China and the Middle East

Published: April 19, 2024

Issued by:Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of United States

作者:Jon B. Alterman

Original link:

https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-middle-east

China's regional view

In 1993, China became a net importer of oil; Since then, about half of China's oil has come from the Middle East. As a result, China has found itself dependent on a region that United States continues to dominate, and Chinese investment in the Middle East has remained steady for decades. Over the past 25 years, China's position in the Middle East has been changing, and this is not unrelated to the changing position of United States in the region. China has built strong relationships with both allies and adversaries of the United States, and has forged solid commercial ties in the process. A few years ago, India's Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar said: "For the past 20 years, United States has been fighting in the Middle East without winning, and China has been winning in the Middle East without fighting." In my opinion, this statement is quite accurate. To a large extent, there is a great deal of enthusiasm in the Middle East to strengthen relations with China. This is partly due to the widespread perception that China is a rising power in the world and that it would be wise to strengthen relations with China. But the most important driver of this enthusiasm is a shared belief that energy binds the two regions together. Since the end of the 20th century, China has become the largest driver of the growth of world energy demand. China's rapidly expanding industrial base is hungry for oil, and the Middle East is the only exporter that can meet this growing demand. When demand in the United States leveled off and demand in Europe began to decline, China's growth maintained global demand growth. Therefore, energy producers will not fail to seek to develop relations with China. They also expressed deep admiration for China's economic growth and appreciated the fact that China's strong growth did not make concessions to political, economic, and social liberalism, which Western countries often insist are necessary for prosperity and stability. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been a brilliant brand-building initiative that has convinced Middle Eastern countries that they can play a central role in the geostrategic calculations of the world's largest rising power, each imagining that it will grow in power as a result. Of course, the Belt and Road Initiative has not brought many dividends in the Middle East, but the desire to work more closely with China remains. Discontent with United States is also growing in the Middle East. People have been frustrated with United States' policy in handling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for decades, and this frustration and anger have become more acute in the last six months. It is also frustrating that the United States-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have little justification in international law that the United States claims to uphold, and that the United States waged wars while being indifferent to the civilian casualties caused by them. United States support for the "Arab Spring" color revolutions has unnerved governments, who complain that United States abandoned them when the Obama administration announced a rebalance to Asia, and Arab governments complain that United States policy toward Iran is recklessly empowering the Islamic Republic. Some countries and people believe that closer ties with China will enable them to resist United States hegemony and resist United States' demands that they adjust their domestic and foreign policies according to United States' wishes. Even United States' partners and allies believe that competition will truly benefit Middle Eastern countries because United States has a long-term monopoly in the Middle East. In this regard, China has a lot to offer. China not only has the aura of geostrategic influence, but also brings economic resources. Over the past two decades, China's trade with the Middle East has grown exponentially through massive energy exports, imports of Chinese manufactured goods, and extensive use of Chinese companies to build infrastructure, housing, factories, and more. While Western companies have been slow to reach deals, seeking external financing and enacting a wide range of rules and regulations, from environmental protections to anti-corruption regulations, Chinese companies are government-aligned one-stop-shop agencies that are happy to build fast and open to the costs of doing business in an environment with an extensive network of sponsors. China does not want to replace United States in the Middle East, but to occupy another ecological niche in the Middle East and play a complementary role. Chinese investments in the Middle East are well thought out. It is known that China has established a hierarchy of relations, the highest of which is the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership". In the Middle East, China has established such partnerships with Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Iran, Egypt and Algeria. In my opinion, the partnership between China and Algeria is primarily emotional, closely linked to the ties established by these two revolutionary countries in the 50s of the 20th century and maintained in the decades since. As China has become more market-oriented, it has set its business sights on regional countries, making smart efforts to build relationships where it has the most potential.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is one of the Middle Eastern countries most interested in China. Part of the interest is energy-related: China is driving global economic growth, while Saudi Arabia has the world's largest proven oil reserves. Since Saudi Arabia sees its role as the "world's central oil bank," it is ridiculous for Saudi Arabia not to have a close relationship with the world's largest oil import customer. Strategically, Saudi Arabia also seeks to replace Iran as China's largest foreign energy supplier. From Saudi Arabia's perspective, a closer trade relationship with China could limit the development of Sino-Iranian relations and reassure Saudi Arabia that China will not advance Iran's interests in international forums. In the 90s of the 20th century, Saudi Arabia sought low-cost construction solutions in the face of economic recession, so it began to cooperate more deeply with Chinese companies. Oil prices rose in the first decade of this century, Saudi Arabia had abundant funds, and China-Saudi Arabia trade grew strongly. In 2012, China and Saudi Aramco, the Saudi Arabia state oil company, agreed to jointly build a large refinery in Yanbu, on the Red Sea coast. Within four years, the refinery was operational, processing about 400,000 barrels of crude oil per day. Over the past two decades, China has built some of the country's most important projects, including light rail, desalination plants, and industrial zones. China is closely involved in the construction of Saudi Arabia's IT backbone, and Chinese companies are also important partners in the construction of NEOM, the future city of the Red Sea. China has made it clear that it is an indispensable strategic partner of Saudi Arabia. China did this in part because Saudi Arabia feared that United States would abandon the Middle East as it pivoted to Asia, and partly because China's experience in economic growth could serve as a reference for Saudi Arabia's ambitious economic diversification efforts. China has described itself as a key partner in Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, which is the focus of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman· · economic plan. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has been fascinated by the miracle of China's reform and opening up. Saudi Arabia today is also in a moment of "crossing the river by feeling the stones" – full of optimism, willing to ask questions, and open to a new future. China's relationship with Saudi Arabia is more than just an energy relationship. Military relations also run through bilateral relations. Beginning in the 80s of the 20th century, Saudi Arabia occasionally looked to China as a source of weapons that United States would not provide, such as CSS-2 missiles. This trend continues. However, when it comes to human capital, China's participation is not high. The Saudi experience is almost exclusively Western (primarily United States). Given the rapid pace of business development in the Kingdom, there is a huge demand for management expertise, and the important role of Western institutions in providing it, which seems to put a ceiling on the closeness of the relationship between China and Saudi Arabia. Even so, it is clear that China-Saudi Arabia relations are still developing. Saudi Arabia's ambitions to draw closer to China grew after United States outrage over the murder of Jamal · Khashoggi and incumbent President Joe Biden pledged during the 2020 presidential campaign to treat Saudi Arabia "like a pariah." That ambition has waned in recent years, in part because the Biden administration has assured Saudi Arabia that it is not hostile, and China's regional diplomacy has shown it cannot replace United States. The Saudis are well aware that Saudi Arabia needs to build a solid relationship with China. Even if China cannot replace United States, Saudi Arabia sees China as an important counterweight to United States and an important supplement to its willingness to provide supplies.

United Arab Emirates

U.A.E.'s relationship with China is more complicated than Saudi Arabia's, in part because the U.A.E. has a different mix of interests within a country. Dubai has been a trading entrepot for centuries, and China's global trade has grown in tandem with Dubai's role as an important global transshipment terminal. Today, 60% of China's trade with Europe and Africa passes through the U.A.E. (mainly Dubai), and a large part of China's trade with the Middle East also passes through Dubai. About 250,000 Chinese live in the U.A.E., most of them in Dubai, while the U.A.E. has only 1 million citizens. Chinese companies have driven much of Dubai's construction, and China's mercantilist ethos is a perfect fit for Dubai's business community. Abu Dhabi, the capital of the U.A.E., has less interest in transshipment and trade, and is more focused on the U.A.E.'s role as a major oil exporter. Therefore, the Abu Dhabi leadership is focused on security and geopolitics. Like Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. government has extensive cooperation with China on domestic security issues, but the U.A.E. has also worked extensively with other security providers, including Israel. In the early months of the pandemic, the U.A.E. and China had a close working relationship on both testing and vaccines. About a year ago, there were reports that China was working closely with the U.A.E. on artificial intelligence, but that cooperation seems to have cooled somewhat. The U.A.E. government is increasingly seeking to adopt an "active neutral" posture in the world, maintaining close relations with the United States and growing with Russia and China. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, United States led sanctions against Russia, billions of dollars and thousands of Russia people found safe haven in U.A.E.. The problem is not that there are obvious tensions between the United States and the U.A.E., but that the U.A.E. is increasingly aware that it is large and powerful enough to advance its own interests and not just follow United States' dictates. The Saudis feel they are starting to transform, while the U.A.E. is more confident that it has been doing so for decades. The U.A.E. sees itself as a regional thought leader, demonstrating a model of careful balancing regional and global concerns, Western and Arab customs, and the development of private and public capital. The U.A.E.'s balance manifests itself in complex ways in domestic affairs. But when it comes to foreign policy, the U.A.E.'s balance is much simpler. Perhaps surprisingly, the U.A.E. appears to have pursued a foreign policy consistent with that advocated by India, a growing global heavyweight. The relationship between these two countries dates back centuries and is very interesting. India are closer to U.A.E. than Kuwait, and the citizens of India in U.A.E. are more than two and a half times the U.A.E. people in U.A.E.. Despite the huge disparity in size between the two countries — the India population is almost 15 times larger than U.A.E. when expatriates are included, and the India population is 150 times larger than U.A.E. when expats are not included — the leaders of both countries have strong domestic backing, and they share a common vision that there is no need to align with a world that is divided into blocs.

Iran

Iran does not seek to strike a balance in the global system, as the U.A.E. does, but seeks to undermine the structure of the system, which Iran's leaders consider hostile to Iran. China is an enthusiastic partner in this effort. Both countries are uneasy about what the United States claims is a "rules-based order," while both China and Iran see it as an order designed to limit them. To some extent, the ongoing tensions between the United States and Iran are a manifestation of United States' attempts to impose its will on a small country, many of which have both solidarity and sympathy for Iran. As long as Iran does not cost China too much, China is eager to stand with Iran. In 2021, China and Iran made headlines when they signed a 25-year cooperation agreement pledging to invest $400 billion in Iran's economy. Despite common goals, there is still a huge gap between China and Iran. The most obvious is the economic aspect. China accounts for about one-third of Iran's trade, but Iran accounts for less than one percent of China's trade. I was somewhat surprised that China did not "call a spade" a spade a spade against the Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping. Since the beginning of the year, Houthi attacks have halved revenues from the Suez Canal and deprived Egypt, which has a comprehensive strategic partnership with China, of billions of dollars in hard currency, in which China has invested billions in recent years. In my opinion, this may reflect two things. First, China doesn't think it can have much influence on this issue. But the second, and more important, point it reveals that almost everything China does in the Middle East is motivated by the most serious considerations: strategic competition with United States. China combines the two perfectly. By buying Iran crude to circumvent United States sanctions, China has also weakened United States' ability to use the international financial system to sanction its opponents and gained discounted oil. For China, this is a win-win solution, but its strategic goals (limiting United States' hegemony, weakening the centrality of the global dollar economy, proving United States' inability to stifle rivals' economies) are more important than near-term economic interests. China is guarding against a world in which United States may seek to isolate China, and weakening United States' ability to isolate China is a central concern.

Israel

Israel, a close ally of the United States, has been actively courting China since the beginning of the 21st century, and China has responded. In the years following 9·11, China not only sought Israel counterterrorism assistance, but also saw Israel as an important source of technical expertise. Chinese companies began investing in Israel, such as buying the country's largest dairy producer in 2014. But the biggest shift in China-Israel relations came after the outbreak of a new round of Palestinian-Israeli conflict. China firmly supports the strategy of solidarity with the countries of the Global South and stands by the Palestinians. We haven't seen divestment in Israel yet, but China's involvement is certainly decreasing, and the scars on this conflict could be deep. Even so, when the conflict begins to subside, China is likely to seek to reassert itself and seek to restore relations with Israel.

China and the Global South

China was quick to take a stand of solidarity with the Global South and the Palestinians in the Gaza conflict. China has had little positive assessment of Israel, and its message underscores the hypocrisy of United States' position of advocating international law while avoiding any responsibility to protect Palestinian civilians from Israel forces. China's relations in the Middle East differ from those in places like Latin America or Africa in that it sees the region as facing thorny security challenges. China is focused on two things in the region: ensuring that competition with United States does not escalate into a direct conflict, and not replacing United States. China sees the Middle East as a more mercantilist world, and the more international relations revolve around bilateral relations between countries, the better it will be for China.

Recommendations to the United States

  • The United States government must understand that China's strategic focus in the Middle East is China's global competition with United States. This is critical for United States to develop appropriate policies regarding China's role in the region.
  • It is important to continue to articulate the United States administration's view that while it is appropriate for countries to develop close economic ties with China, it is also appropriate to be wary of China's actions. China's interest lies in claiming that United States is forcing countries to make choices, and that countries should resist them out of their own economic interests. But United States' trade with China is evidence that the United States is not opposed to economic ties.
  • The central role of United States in the Middle East should be brought into play, so that the theory that "United States is leaving the Middle East and China is rising" is self-defeating.
  • There are many polls that reflect China's popularity in the Middle East and United States' unpopularity in the region, but this is not a reliable indicator of the behavior of Middle Eastern governments. Regional rulers believed that they had the privilege of making foreign policy as they wished. On the surface, regional leaders are fascinated by China, but they don't know much about China. What interests them most is that China seems to refute the West's insistence that liberal views must be pursued. United States should focus less on ideological issues and more on the fact that human capital development is the only way to achieve an energy transition in the Middle East. The unique value of Western education and training vis-à-vis the Chinese model is irrefutable, and it provides a powerful strategic advantage for the continued influence of United States and its allies.

❈Note: The above articles only represent the author's views and are for research reference.

Regional country dynamics 15 | "United States fights but does not win in the Middle East, China wins but does not fight in the Middle East"
Regional country dynamics 15 | "United States fights but does not win in the Middle East, China wins but does not fight in the Middle East"
Regional country dynamics 15 | "United States fights but does not win in the Middle East, China wins but does not fight in the Middle East"
Regional country dynamics 15 | "United States fights but does not win in the Middle East, China wins but does not fight in the Middle East"

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Established on January 19, 2013, Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies of Chinese University of China (Renmin University Chongyang) is the main funding project donated by Chongyang Investment to Chinese University and set up an education fund for operation.

As a new type of think tank with Chinese characteristics, Chongyang has hired dozens of former politicians, bankers, and well-known scholars from around the world as senior researchers, aiming to pay attention to reality, advise the country, and serve the people. At present, the Chongyang National People's Congress has 7 departments and 4 operation and management centers (the Center for Ecological Finance, the Center for Global Governance, the Center for China-US People-to-People Exchange, and the China-Russia Center for People-to-People Exchange). In recent years, the Chongyang National People's Congress has been highly recognized at home and abroad in the fields of financial development, global governance, major-country relations, and macroeconomic policy.

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