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On October 30, 1952, the 15th Army of the Volunteer Army began to carry out a decisive counterattack on the surface positions of the 597.9 heights.
1. The response of the 44th Division
The day before the counterattack was launched, the 15th Army telegraphed the 45th and 29th Divisions tasked with the counterattack:
The counterattack force should not be too large, and more attention should be paid to small group movements and tactical formations. At the same time, it was emphasized that accompanying artillery fire "is the most effective, timely and accurate artillery fire to ensure the advance of infantry and the enemy's counterattack, and cannot rely on long-range artillery."
Four hours before the counterattack was launched, the 15th Army issued combat orders to all divisions, and at the same time reported to the Corps and the Zhiji.
It reads as follows:
(1) The U.S. 7th Division and the Puppet 2nd Division suffered heavy casualties. The 44th Division took the initiative to attack the northeast mountain of 381, killing more than 400 enemies in two days, and the enemy mobilized five artillery battalions to deal with 381, which was extremely beneficial to us.
(2) It was determined to use the two battalions of the 87th Regiment and the 132nd Regiment to jointly annihilate the enemy who had attacked 537.7 until the position was restored. The 12th Army lent 300 soldiers, and the 133rd Regiment was replenished first to keep the fighting going. If necessary, the 133rd Regiment will be supplemented with new recruits from the company with more casualties and then take over the defense of Zhongxian Mountain, so that the 87th Regiment can draw two battalions to fight.
(3) With the existing strength of the 135th Regiment and the 1 to 2nd battalions of the 86th Regiment, the enemy attacked and attacked 597.9 in succession. If the battle cannot be resolved, the 91st Regiment is used. In this way, it is estimated that the US Seventh Division and the Puppet Second Division will not be able to fight again.
It is hoped that we will carry forward a high degree of tenacity, overcome difficulties, strengthen combat unity, and not stop fighting until all positions are restored.
This telegram first affirmed the role of the 44th Division in taking the initiative to attack the 381st Heights in response to the counterattack on Shangganling.
About this action, it is indeed worth mentioning. After the Shangganling operation began, the enemy in front of the 44th Division did not launch the large-scale attack that the 15th Army feared most in the direction of the Western Mountains, but the 44th Division did not stand still because of this.
Instead, they took positive action and chose targets to take the initiative to attack, which put a lot of pressure on the main force of the US 7th Division in front of them, so that it was worried that the volunteers might launch a major offensive west of the Hantan River and south of Xishan and Douliufeng.
It was precisely because of this concern that the 7th Division of the US Army handed over the defense of the 597.9 Heights and the east of the Hantan River to the ROK Army on October 25 and 28, and the whole division was transferred to the west and separated from the Shangganling battlefield. This is undoubtedly good news for the 15th Army's preparations for a counterattack in the Shangganling area.
In order to fully cooperate with the 45th Division's Shangganling operation, the 44th Division also proposed to launch a counterattack on the 381st Heights south of Xishan Mountain on the first anniversary of the Volunteers' overseas combat (October 25). The army approved and instructed to postpone the counterattack until the evening of the 27th to make its coordination more direct. The 44th Division counterattacked for two days, annihilated more than 400 enemies, and attracted four artillery battalions of the US army from the front of Shangganling, which was a strong support for the subsequent counterattack on the 597.9 heights.
2. 597.9 Highland "Decisive Counterattack"
The October 30 counterattack was characterized as a "decisive counterattack", meaning that this counterattack was very different from previous counterattacks. Most of the previous counterattacks were of a war of attrition nature, a form of combat in which the enemy repeatedly fought over surface positions, with the aim of constantly killing and depleting the enemy and supporting the troops in the tunnel. Due to the small number of troops engaged in the counterattack and the insufficient combat intensity, the troops could not stand up for the counterattack, and soon retreated, and after a while they had to do it again.
And this counterattack is to completely restore the 597.9 high ground position through a decisive action and completely consolidate it.
That is to say, the troops must not only be able to counter, but also stand and can no longer be countered by the enemy. This is more resolute in purpose and action.
Qin Jiwei said confidently:
"I believe that if we decide to retake our positions, we can fully restore them within five hours. The crux of the matter lies in the massive consumption of the enemy's vital forces, as long as the enemy's vital forces are defeated, the position will still be ours in the end. ”
It was with such self-confidence and such a clear purpose that the 15th Army made its determination to carry out this decisive counterattack.
On the day of the launch of the 597.9 Highland Counterattack, there were 2 companies of the 86th Regiment, 2 companies of the 134th Regiment, and 3 companies of the 135th Regiment, a total of 7 infantry companies; In addition, one company of the 86th Regiment and one company of the 134th Regiment covertly entered the trench under the enemy's surface position the night before the counterattack was launched, and combined with the troops in the trench as the first echelon of the counterattack.
In this way, the first two echelons consisted of units of the 15th Army.
Military Instructions:
When counterattacking, it is not advisable to invest too many troops at one time, and two companies should be used as a stand-up, because the artillery fire of both sides is very strong, and if the troops are too large, there will inevitably be large casualties, and the "wheel warfare method" is used to divide the counterattack troops into three groups and take turns to fight, which can not only reduce casualties, but also continue to maintain the sharp momentum of the attack.
On 28 and 29 October, preparations for artillery fire were carried out two days in advance, using field howitzers to destroy the enemy's surface positions and fortifications, and then using mortars to carry out surveillance fire to prevent the enemy from resuming the fortifications. At 21 o'clock on the evening of the 30th, direct fire preparations began. After 5 minutes of rapid attack, the artillery fire was falsely extended, and the attacking troops feinted with 1 squad to lure the defending enemy out of the fortifications; At this time, the artillery fire suddenly turned around, and 24 rocket artillery guns fired a salvo and 80 field howitzers fired two rapid attacks, destroying all enemy fire points outside the anti-slope, destroying all trenches, and killing and wounding most of the personnel.
After that, 30 mortars fired about 5,000 shells, escorting the infantry charge and blocking the enemy's countercharge. The enemy's artillery in depth was suppressed by the artillery fire of the volunteers, and no response was made for two hours. The operation progressed smoothly that day, and by 23:23, the main positions on the 597.9 heights, including the main peak, had been regained, and one battalion and one company of the 31st Regiment of the South Korean Army defending the enemy had all been annihilated.
3. The big contest of reserve forces
Before the launch of the 597.9 Heights counterattack, the 45th Division raised five key issues that must be resolved:
"(1) Concentrate artillery fire to destroy the nest of enemy machine-gun fire. (2) Suppress the enemy's light artillery to block the mouth of our tunnel, so that we can smoothly approach the enemy. (3) Small groups continued to blast and seize the enemy's defensive artillery holes, so that I could stand firm on the main peak. (4) Killing and injuring a large number of the enemy's living forces. (9) Import assault teams into the tunnel to avoid casualties during the movement and at the mouth of the tunnel, and maintain the continuation of the battle. ”
Due to the appropriate measures, these five problems have been well solved in the actual felling.
On October 31, the remnants of the 31st Regiment and the 32nd Regiment of the ROK Army launched a continuous counterattack, fighting from 4 a.m. to 17 p.m., all of which were repulsed. That night, two positions on the northeastern leg of the highlands were also recaptured. So far, except for 1 outpost position, the 597.9 heights have all returned to the hands of the volunteers.
For six days, from October 31 to November 5, the 597.9 Heights operation revolved around repelling the enemy's counterattack and consolidating the recovered positions. The US and ROK forces successively invested 17 battalions of troops, and with the support of artillery and aviation fire, they continued to launch attacks, but they were all repulsed.
After the 597.9 heights were fully recovered, Qin Jiwei estimated that the enemy's possible counterattack could not be in the following three situations:
First, the casualties were too large, and there was no second echelon, and there were no large numbers of troops to attack, so they had to withdraw their troops; Second, the ROK 9th Division, which is the reserve of the US 9th Army, will be transferred to attack the ROK 2nd Division in turn, which will prolong the duration of the operation and will make the battle more arduous, but these two ROK divisions alone will not be able to take away the 597.9 heights; the third is to put the US 7th Division into the attack on the 597.9 heights, in this case, it will inevitably move the 187th Airborne Regiment, thus emptying the US army's second-line troops, which will be more beneficial to the volunteers.
Later, as Qin Jiwei expected, the 9th Division of the ROK Army, the 7th Division of the US Army, and the 187th Airborne Regiment all joined the counterattack on the 597.9 heights, and the only Ethiopian battalion in the "United Nations Army" was also sent to the battlefield. However, compared with the volunteers with strong reserves and tenacious fighting spirit, the reserves of the US and South Korean troops are obviously insufficient, and they cannot fight the volunteers to the end on the high ground.
4. Command problems
November 1 was the most intense day of the blocking battle since the start of the Shangganling War, and it was also the day that Qin Jiwei felt the most painful.
He wrote in his diary that day:
Under the cover of 70 tanks, more than 100 aircraft, and hundreds of artillery pieces, the enemy's two formed regiments with a total of five battalions carried out 23 consecutive fronts from dawn to dusk, without occupying an inch of land.
Qin Jiwei wrote:
The enemy made a mistake in command, "With such a large number of troops and such a dense charge, how many people will not die?" "As long as the enemy dares to fight back, we should express a special welcome. US imperialism is joking about the lives of countless United States soldiers and the Lee puppet army of South Korea to save face, and this is exactly the good fighter plane we cannot ask for. ”
On the same day, the 15th Army telegraphed to all divisions and regiments, pointing out:
The current operation is of great significance both politically and strategically and tactically, and its victory or defeat can directly affect United States' fundamental decision on "peace and war" in the Korean War. If we annihilate most of the three battalions of the US army (1,500 people) and most of the three to five battalions of the puppet army (2,500~3,000 people), we can decide our victory, not only can we restore our positions, but also achieve complete consolidation. Our difficulties are the difficult living conditions of the tunnel troops, the difficulty of transportation on foot on the first line, but our reserves are sufficient, and the ammunition of long-range artillery is not difficult (it will be better in the future). The regiments that fought hard (each regiment of the 4th and 5th Divisions) suffered heavy casualties, and it was of course difficult to continue fighting. Now we are enduring difficulties with the enemy, and we must be tenacious to overcome the difficulties in the battle and survive the enemy.
Due to the large number of units participating in the battle, the time they have been engaged in combat has been early and late, and they have a familiar grasp of the battlefield situation, and some problems have arisen in command, communications, and logistical supply. In order to strengthen combat unity and jointly complete combat missions, the 15th Army requires all subordinate units to:
"It is necessary to unite with a high degree of fighting, help each other, and do everything for the sake of victory in the battle. Whenever there is a problem of non-principle, we must first examine ourselves and correct it," and stressed that "unity is more important in the unity of operational thinking, the resolute implementation of orders, and the close coordination of infantry and artillery among troops."
The directive, in particular, demanded that the units of the 15th Army should learn from the 31st Division of the 12th Army and actively help them solve some of the difficulties that would inevitably arise.
The electricity decides:
The 134th and 135th regiments of the 45th Division, which had been fighting hard for nearly 20 days and had suffered heavy casualties, were withdrawn from their positions for reorganization, and the 91st Regiment of the 31st Division of the 12th Army was put into battle, and together with the two companies of the 86th Regiment of the 29th Division, they held the positions on the 597.9 heights, and the command and logistics organization of the 135th Regiment remained behind to assist the 91st Regiment and the 87th Regiment in the battle.
The 15th Army made the following clarifications on the command relationship of the participating units:
"All the 91st and 93rd Regiments of the 45th Division, the 29th Division, and the 31st Division, as well as the artillery units attached to them, shall be under the unified command of Cui, Zhang, and Wang; Nie and Tang Ying commanded the reorganization of the 4th and 5th Divisions and prepared to fight again. ”
The "Cui, Zhang, and Wang" mentioned here refers to Cui Jiangong, commander of the 45th Division, Zhang Xianyang, commander of the 29th Division, and Wang Xin, political commissar; "Nie, Tang" refers to Nie Jifeng, political commissar of the 45th Division, and Tang Wancheng, deputy division commander.
However, the command responsibility of the commander of the 12th division of the 31st Army is not involved here.
At 17:15 on the same day, the 91st Regiment of the 31st Division had been ordered by the Corps to enter the battle, and the 93rd Regiment was also assigned to the 12th Army as a reserve of the 91st Regiment to prepare for battle.
The 31st Division concluded after the battle that the main problem of this battle was the imperfection of the command structure at the same level. Since the troops were moving to Gushan for rest and recuperation as planned before the war, the organs were moved to Gushan first, and when the combat order was received for the 15th Army, the division left only a light command post (15 men and 1 radio turned to the 15th Army.
At first, the instructions were given that the 91st Regiment should be attached to the 45th Division, and the 93rd Regiment should be the second echelon of the 44th Division.
It was not until the three regiments of the division were put into combat one after another and it was gradually made clear that the division was under direct command that they felt that the command organization lacked personnel and equipment and was incompetent. During this period, although it was assisted by friendly forces, the code signal regulations were different, and there were many inconveniences. When the personnel and equipment were transferred from Gushan to rest and recuperate, and the command structure was generally sound, the campaign was over.
It can be seen that when the 15th Army clarified the command relationship of the various units participating in the battle on November 1, it still regarded the 91st Regiment as a subordinate unit, and therefore designated the regiment to be under the command of the commanders of the 45th and 29th Divisions.
On the 3rd, the 15th Army again adjusted its deployment and determined that the 31st Division would be responsible for the counterattack and repeated contention of the 597.9 Heights and the 537.7 Heights Beishan, with the 91st Regiment responsible for holding the 597.9 Heights, the 93rd Regiment as its second echelon, and the 92nd Regiment as the counterattack on the 537.7 Heights Beishan.
5. The plan of the 12th Army to defend the 597.9 heights
The troops of the 12th Army were put into operation, indicating that the reserve forces of the Volunteer Army had begun to exert their strength, and also reflected the current situation that the front-line troops of the 15th Army had suffered serious battle losses and could no longer fight.
As stated in the battle report of the 45th Division:
"Four days to hold the position, two more to three companies per day. Generally speaking, a regiment will only hold on for four or five days without losing its position, and if it loses its position, the consumption of counterattack troops will be great."
The 45th and 29th Divisions used a total of 9 companies to counterattack the 597.9 heights, and based on the above consumption, the limit was exceeded in 4 days.
The 91st Regiment took over the main positions on the 597.9 heights from the 15th Army on the night of November 1.
This regiment had the experience of fighting defensive warfare in combination with tunnels and field fortifications, and also created the tactic of "small troop groups," that is, "combat groups at and below the squad level fought independently."
Regiment commander Li Changsheng decided to use "small soldiers" to deal with the enemy's "flock" tactics in the 597.9 highland operation, and in view of the defect that the highland tunnels were far away from the top of the mountain and inconvenient for the troops to move up and down, 10 strong and strong soldiers were dispatched in advance to dig a small tunnel that could accommodate two squads of troops at a distance of 10 meters from the top of the hill on the anticline of the highland, and each of them was given a great merit after completing the task. These three seemingly inconspicuous small tunnels have played a great role in alleviating the contradiction between hiding and fighting.
In terms of operational deployment, the regiment formulated two plans:
In the event of a counterattack, attack with 2 companies first; If the position is held, one company will be invested each time, and one company will be changed every day, and the nine companies of the whole regiment will be divided into nine echelons and take turns to fight. The territory of the highland operation is small, and when both sides use a large amount of artillery fire, whichever side has more troops will suffer more casualties. The 91st Regiment had a clear understanding of this before it entered the battle, and formulated a highly targeted plan.
After attacking the high ground, the biggest problem was that the surface position was unfortified and difficult to hold. As a result of the continuous and heavy bombardment by artillery fire from both sides, the fortifications on the surface positions, whether they were originally built by the volunteers or rebuilt by the US and South Korean troops after occupying the surface positions, were completely destroyed.
The rocks were also shattered and even blown into powder. The ground was piled up with a thick layer of floating soil, and when you stepped into a deep pit, the grenades thrown out fell into it, and even shrapnel could not burst out, and only air bombing could cause damage. Faced with this situation, the 91st Regiment packed sacks of earth and built light fortifications; There were not enough sacks, so they simply dragged the corpses of the enemy to form a chest wall and set up machine guns on them.
According to the tactic of "small soldiers", the 91st Regiment has always adopted the method of fighting small against large in offensive and defensive confrontations. One platoon of the enemy attacked, and 2~4 troops holding the high ground could repel it.
For example, on 5 November, the enemy held a group charge with one battalion in a "flock formation" to the No. 3, No. 9, and No. 10 positions garrisoned by the fifth company of the 91st Regiment.
Despite this, in the face of the continuous counterattack of the attacking enemy, the 91st Regiment suffered a large number of casualties to the enemy while also increasing its own casualties.
According to the diary of the 12th Army, it is recorded day by day:
On 2 November, the regiment went up to 2 companies, with 141 casualties; On the 3rd, another company was added, with 204 casualties; On the 4th, 1 company's position was attacked, with 50 casualties; On the 5th, two more companies went up, with 214 casualties.
Before the war, the strength of each company of the 91st Regiment averaged about 180 people, and in four days, the five companies engaged in combat had a total of 67.6% combat attrition. The fact that the casualties are so large shows how bloody and tragic the battle was.
6. The U.S. military gave up the attack on the 597.9 heights
On 5 November, a battalion of the 93rd Regiment entered the battle to take over the 86th Regiment's position on Heights 597.9.
At this point, the entire heights were held by the troops of the 31st Division.
From this day on, the US and South Korean forces, which had suffered so much, were forced to stop their attacks on the 597.9 heights.
United States war history says that stopping the attack on the 597.9 heights was the decision of Jenkins, commander of the 9th Army.
The history of the war reads:
During the five-day battle at Triangle Mountain, "the United Nations forces grew from two battalions to more than two divisions, and the number of casualties increased from 200 to 9,000." Although the Chinese probably spent 19,000 soldiers in this battle, they did not feel a lack of troops in the slightest. … With their indomitable struggle, the Chinese army reversed the defeat at the Battle of White Horse Mountain, saved face, and forced the UN forces to stop the offensive."
The White Horse Mountain mentioned in the history of the United States War refers to the 384.8 highland (the U.S. military map is 385 highland).
The 38th Army's attack on the high ground in the autumn counterattack was frustrated, and Shiji criticized it for "fighting very badly" and spending a lot of money, but failing to destroy the enemy. However, the Battle of White Horse Mountain, neither in scale nor impact, can be compared to the Battle of the 597.9 Highlands.
The history of the United States war specifically mentions the Battle of White Horse Mountain here, but it is only a self-relief for its defeat in the 597.9 heights.
On November 5, the head of the Sino-DPRK Joint Division sent a joint letter to the commander of the 15th Army and all the commanders and fighters of the participating units, congratulating the victory in the 597.9 highland battle and praising the following:
The participating troops "highly displayed a tenacious and tenacious fighting style, becoming stronger and stronger, more flexible tactics, closer coordination between infantry and artillery, and gradually reducing the casualties of our army"; He pointed out that "if we continue to fight like this, just as the Central Military Commission pointed out, 'we will be able to control the enemy's fate,'" and "I hope to inspire the whole army to make persistent efforts and resolutely fight until the enemy's partial offensive is completely and completely smashed."
(End of text)
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