A logical study on the formation of the work burden of township and town cadres

Abstract:The effect of the central government's multiple burden reduction measures on the empowerment of grassroots decentralization has gradually emerged, but there are still some problems. Based on the theory of social capital, from the perspective of the process of building red grape greenhouses for grassroots cadres in Y town in Northeast China, the formation of the work burden of township cadres stems from three problems: social trust, social norms, and relationship network, that is, the lack of social trust leads to the low work efficiency of township cadres, the lack of norms leads to the blurring of the work boundary of township cadres, and the complex relationship leads to excessive consumption of township cadres. Based on the current situation of rural social capital loss, it is necessary to solve the dilemma of "reducing the burden more and more" of township cadres from four aspects: endogenous burden reduction, mechanism burden reduction, cooperative burden reduction, and initiative burden reduction.

Author: Gu Aihua, Wang Zeng

1. Literature review and question raising

In the perspective of rural revitalization and common prosperity, how to promote the burden reduction at the grassroots level has attracted the attention of the academic community. However, returning to the reality of grassroots work, the phenomenon of heavy burdens and high pressure on township and town cadres still exists, and the process of reducing the burden itself has also caused new problems, which eventually leads to the increase in the overt and covert reduction of grassroots affairs, and the "more and more burdens" on grassroots personnel, the effectiveness of burden reduction needs to be improved. The work burden comes from the state of mismatch between work requirements and resource allocation[1], and the grassroots cadres in townships and towns have been under heavy pressure and high-intensity work for a long time, and their work enthusiasm and creativity have declined, which has affected the advancement of the process of agricultural and rural modernization. To explore the root causes of the burden on the grassroots, it can be summarized into three aspects: first, the burden on the grassroots is aggravated by the heavy workload at the grassroots level [2], second, the burden on the grassroots is aggravated by the stubborn disease of formalism [3], and third, the disadvantages of the bureaucratic system lead to the excessive burden on the grassroots [4]. In order to enhance the effect of burden reduction, the academic community put forward targeted suggestions on the main body of grassroots cadres, the assessment and evaluation system, and the innovation of institutional mechanisms. From the perspective of the main body of township cadres, it is necessary to strengthen the education and training of grassroots cadres and form a long-term mechanism[5] to guide township cadres to establish a correct view of political performance; From the perspective of the assessment and evaluation system, it is necessary to improve the assessment system of the township government, innovate the assessment methods and methods, and reduce the assessment and evaluation of the township government; From the perspective of institutional mechanisms, it is necessary to clarify rights and responsibilities [6] and reduce the burden on the grassroots through mechanism innovation.

To sum up, most of the academic research on the logic of the formation of the work burden of township and town cadres focuses on the analysis of the root factors of burden generation, presenting a research framework of "raising problems, analyzing the causes, and countermeasures and suggestions", trying to fundamentally resolve the practical dilemma of the lack of effectiveness in reducing the burden at the grassroots level. The root cause analysis focuses on the impact of social environment, institutional mechanism, and workload on the burden generation of township cadres, and rarely discusses the burden of grassroots civil servants from the perspective of social capital, which is detached from the reality of grassroots work, and the causal mechanism of social trust, interpersonal relationship and other rational factors that cause the burden of grassroots cadres is insufficiently explained. In fact, township and town cadres are located at the junction of the bureaucratic system and the network of local social relations, and are in a marginal position between the two, and when dealing with land requisition and demolition, civil mediation, etc., they are prone to enter the conflict zone between the formal system and the acquaintance society, and their work efficiency will inevitably be constrained by the rural social capital. It can be seen that in addition to the "rational" factors such as the pressure-based system, the handling of the "emotional" factors such as the inherent human relationship, social trust, and village rules and conventions in the rural society has brought greater work burden and pressure to the township cadres, making it difficult for them to cope. However, the influencing factors such as norms and relationships are intrinsically consistent with the constituent elements of social capital theory. In view of this, this paper introduces the theory of social capital, systematically expounds the formation logic of the work burden of township cadres, and conducts research and investigation in Y town in Northeast China, and explores a reasonable and feasible logical framework and governance path to reduce the work burden of township cadres.

2. Theoretical explanation: the logic of the formation of the work burden of township and town cadres

In 1916, Hanifan first used the theory of social capital to study rural communities, creating a precedent for using the theory of social capital to study social problems. With the increasing enrichment of the connotation of social capital, there are also two obvious trends in the field of social capital, namely, individual-centered and collective-centered. Individual-centered research on social capital emphasizes that individuals obtain scarce resources in the structure of social networks by virtue of their identity qualifications [7], and argues that this ability to obtain resources is dynamic [8], an embedded resource, and an investment in social relationships that individuals expect to be rewarded in the market, and that individuals can obtain opportunities for upward development through friends, colleagues, and closer acquaintances [9], that is, using social circles to obtain useful information that cannot be obtained in personal circles. The study of social capital centered on the collective pays more attention to social networks, social trust, and social norms. Fukuyama introduced social norms, pointing out that social capital is an informal norm that can promote group cooperation, and expanding the understanding of social capital to the value norms that drive economic and social development forward, that is, the universal social trust. [10] Putnam incorporates citizen engagement as a dynamic factor, defining social capital as the characteristics of social organization, including networks, trust, and norms, that act in concert to improve social efficiency. [11]

Drawing on the existing research results, this paper defines the work burden of township cadres as the additional workload brought about by the loss of rural social capital in the process of providing public goods and services to rural members in accordance with the rules and order of grassroots governments. The work burden of township and town cadres is different from that of the government, and matters that exceed the scope of the responsibilities and capabilities of township and town cadres will form a burden. The social trust, social norms, relationship networks and other constituent elements contained in the social capital theory are logically highly consistent and intrinsically deeply related to the formation process of the work burden of township and town cadres, which is an important focus for solving the dilemma of excessive burden at the grassroots level. Therefore, this paper discusses the individual social capital of township cadres and the collective social capital of township and township cadres, constructs a logical framework for the formation of the work burden of township cadres from the perspective of social capital, clarifies the formation mechanism of the work burden of township cadres, clarifies the hierarchical structure of the formation of the work burden of township cadres, and clarifies the formation mechanism of social capital affecting the work burden of township cadres.

(1) The construction of the logical framework of social capital at the individual level

Individual social capital refers to the social resources obtained by individuals in social networks by virtue of their membership, which reflects the ability of individuals to survive in society. The more social resources they have, the richer their social capital and the more developed their interpersonal networks. The less social resources there are, the less social capital an individual has, and the less developed the interpersonal network. Individual social capital can be divided into two types: pre-endowed social capital and accumulated social capital. Pre-endowment social capital is usually linked by blood and kinship, and is born without the efforts of individuals, and physical condition, family resources, and personality all belong to pre-endowment social capital. The pre-endowment type of social capital will affect the accumulation of acquired social capital, and the capital in the nature of family resources is inheritable, and the social resources and personal relationships of parents will take over and survive within the family. For township and town cadres, individuals with abundant social capital will be more likely to be promoted and promoted by leaders. [12] Accumulation social capital is the social resources acquired by individuals through continuous efforts such as learning and practice, and the academic qualifications, power, ability, status, and prestige belong to the accumulation social capital, and the establishment status of township and town cadres belongs to the accumulation social capital obtained through acquired efforts.

Generally speaking, the stock of social capital of township and town cadres is inversely proportional to their work burden, and the richer the social capital, the less difficult the work is, and the smaller the work burden. However, in the real environment, township and town cadres with rich social capital enjoy the convenience of "acquaintances are easy to do" brought by a well-developed interpersonal network, but also bear the pressure of being firmly bound by the big network of human feelings, and every node on the network represents a kind of interpersonal relationship, and the bonds of human affection make it difficult for them to escape. For township and town cadres who lack social capital, the underdeveloped interpersonal network leads to the estrangement of cadres and the masses, the decline of work enthusiasm, and the burden due to insufficient social support. As representatives of lack of capital, cadres in other places are facing more obvious problems. Non-local cadres often have the characteristics of being highly educated, young, and want to do things, and their methods of handling things and ways of thinking are more advanced, which are very different from closed and backward rural areas, and the language barrier, poor grassroots environment, and lack of emotional support will also increase the psychological burden of cadres in other places, and the blood relationship network will contribute to the isolation and exclusion of cadres in other places, making it difficult for them to obtain social support and face great difficulties in carrying out their work. [13]

(2) The construction of the logical framework of social capital at the collective level

1. Social trust: the intrinsic incentive of the work burden of township cadres.

Social trust stems from the belief that members benefit from each other, and is the most basic dimension of social capital. As a contract criterion, social trust is different from rigid institutional norms and cannot bring obvious efficiency improvement, but as a flexible social public value, it can invisibly integrate relationship networks and behavioral norms, thereby enhancing the cohesion of social capital. If there is no mutual trust between the members of the group, social capital will lack the core to maintain its stability and will not be able to play its due role. In recent years, the development of grassroots society has shown a trend of pluralism, complexity, inclusiveness and openness, and the urgency and harmfulness of public health events require the rapid and coordinated response of grassroots governance. The prerequisite for rapid collective action in a short period of time to respond to public crises is that society has universal social trust from both the top down and the bottom up. The lack of mutual trust among members in rural areas has led to the collapse of the trust network of rural society, the lack of public value and poor cohesion, which leads to the decrease of rural members' trust in township cadres and the government, and increases the cost of grassroots governance of township cadres.

2. Social norms: the external promotion of the work burden of township cadres.

Social norms are social public norms and legal systems that educate, guide, restrict, and coerce members of society. Putnam believes that only when social trust is guaranteed can it become a precious social asset, otherwise moral principles such as the supremacy of integrity will be reduced to vulgar slogans. [14] As a binding and mandatory institutional regulation, social norms are based on social public values and provide a rigid guarantee for the collective and individual actions of group members, thus becoming an indispensable and important factor of social capital. Although social trust can strengthen public ethics and moral awareness, the strength of the value level is not enough to support the operation of the entire social resource network, so the social system norms based on reciprocity are indispensable. Without a system to monitor and correct from the outside, there will be no relationship of trust and social networks will increasingly disintegrate. In rural areas, members of society always make choices in collective action out of the characteristics of human self-interest, and are eager to obtain additional benefits from the group through "free-riding" behavior, which in turn leads to the "prisoner's dilemma", resulting in the failure of the grassroots political system and the passive position of township and town cadres.

3. Relationship network: the carrier of the formation of the work burden of township and town cadres.

As the core component of social capital, the social relationship network is an important carrier that connects the elements of civic spirit, social trust, and reciprocal norms. Putnam puts relational networks at the forefront, naming them citizen engagement networks, and larger social networks mean richer social resources, which can promote mutual trust among members of society and curb behaviors that do not conform to the social contract. In rural areas dominated by in-laws, clans, blood relatives, and interpersonal relationships, a special network of social relations has naturally formed a closed geographical location, strong blood relations, traditional ideological concepts, and continuous traditional culture. However, at present, the trend of "hollowing out" and aging in China's rural areas is obvious, and the outflow of young labor is serious, which leads to the lack of endogenous power for rural social development, and produces the contradiction between the complex social relationship network and the weak human feelings in rural areas in the transition period. On the one hand, people are accustomed to using "elder rule" to measure the grassroots society, "elders" do not refer to age and experience, but more to ability, intelligence, status, expertise, rural elites, authoritative figures leave the countryside, big things and difficult things can not rely on them, it is necessary for township cadres to break the traditional inertia to come forward to resolve disputes; On the other hand, the relationship between households is relatively close, and information circulates rapidly, and to a certain extent, villagers are prone to cling to each other, confronting each other, and not abiding by policies or systems, and township and town cadres encounter difficulties in policy implementation.

3. Practical analysis: the burden of township cadres caused by the social capital behind the red grape greenhouse

(1) Case introduction

Y town is located in the market town area of the central township of Kuandong area, retains the strong Manchu customs and post station culture, under the jurisdiction of 11 administrative villages and 103 villager groups, the total number of households in the town is 5,780 households, the population is 16,602 people, the villagers' education is mainly primary school and junior high school, and the education level is low. Y town has 24 administrative establishments and 23 actual people; There are 27 business establishments and 23 actual employees. In the spring of 2019, under the leadership of the then secretary of the town party committee and the first secretary of the village, Y town decided to introduce the red grape industry as a collective economic industry project. In 2022, Y Town will take advantage of the red grape effect, give full play to its regional advantages, and sign a contract to attract investment - a boutique grape industrial park with an investment of 3 million yuan. After several years of development, red grapes have become a business card of Y Town, and the development of red grapes has achieved good economic and social benefits, adding new momentum to the development of the local agricultural industry, and empowering comprehensive rural revitalization and common prosperity.

1. "Party building + cooperatives" to raise funds before construction.

After determining the direction of development, in order to smoothly promote the construction of red grape greenhouses, the first secretary of the village persuaded his relatives to teach the red grape planting technology that had not been passed down for many years to the villagers free of charge, and provided later support, which solved the problem of lack of management experience and planting technology. However, due to the fact that there is no precedent for successful cultivation of red grapes in the area where Y Town is located, the higher-level leaders generally have reservations about the red grape project in Y Town. Therefore, before the launch of the red grape planting project, Y town did not win the project support funds from the superiors, and Y town had to solve the financing problem by itself if it wanted to develop the red grape industry. After several months of discussions, visits, and field investigations, the cadres of Y Town learned from the development experience of advanced areas and proposed the form of "party building + cooperatives", that is, to give full play to the organizational advantages of the grassroots party branch, and on the basis of villager cooperation, party members took the lead in mobilizing the enthusiasm of villagers to actively participate in strengthening the village collective economy. Villagers join the cooperative as shareholders in the form of cash, technology and land discount, and dividends are distributed according to the proportion at the end of the year, which not only mobilizes the enthusiasm of villagers to participate in industrial development, but also solves the financial problems faced by the development of red grape industry.

2. Flexible land compensation during construction.

After investigation and expert research, combined with soil conditions and comprehensive conditions, the red grape greenhouse was located at the junction of group 3, group 5 and group 7 of village B in Y town. This land is open and flat, with abundant water, deep and fertile soil, and convenient transportation. In recent years, some villagers have reclaimed the land and planted fruits, vegetables and other cash crops to obtain economic income, but the government has not stopped it, and has acquiesced to the villagers' free use. Y town attracts investment, rents the land of the villagers to build greenhouses, and pays rent to the villagers according to the land confirmation certificate according to the regulations, and the compensation standard is 700 yuan per mu. Villagers reclaim land on their own does not belong to the scope of compensation, but it is true that the construction of greenhouses affects the economic income of villagers, in line with the principle of people-oriented and considerate of the people, township cadres shall compensate for such land as appropriate, ranging from 200 yuan to 500 yuan per mu of land, and the specific amount shall be handed over to the discretion of front-line public officials at the grassroots level. Discretion is the practical behavior of grassroots cadres to use the wisdom of governance to make rational choices between universal standards and special problems and take reasonable actions, and the discretion of township cadres can resolve the dilemma of not adapting to the grassroots ecology caused by the impersonal policy to the greatest extent. Government functionaries should not only implement vague and general policies, that is, make appropriate compensation in line with the general rules of land occupation compensation, and be fair, open and just, but also analyze specific problems in detail, ensure the interests of villagers, and reflect discretionary humanization.

3. Participate in the management of greenhouses fairly after construction.

In order to achieve nearby employment and increase the income of villagers, the follow-up management and maintenance of the greenhouse are "packaged" to local villagers in the form of employment. The management of red grape greenhouses includes pruning, garden cleaning and disinfection, lime nitrogen treatment, fertilizer and water management, temperature and humidity control, etc., which are large, technical and require high care and patience of management personnel. Managers need to have relevant work experience and participate in intensive professional and technical training in order to complete the specific work in a specific time and ensure that the red grapes are grown in the best conditions. This requires the township government to be cautious in the process of selecting and employing people in the management of greenhouses.

(2) Case analysis

In the process of building red grape greenhouses and subsequent management, there are many interests between township cadres and villagers, village cadres and cadres stationed in the village, and the main factors that lead to the work burden of township cadres can be divided into three categories, namely, the lack of social trust reflected in the difficulty of raising funds, the imperfect social norm system reflected in the land occupation compensation dispute, and the complex relationship network reflected in the management of greenhouse employment and interpersonal relationship processing.

1. Lack of trust leads to low work efficiency of township cadres.

The continuous enrichment of rural material life and the increasing convenience of obtaining information have changed the way of thinking and ideological concepts of villagers, and people pay more attention to the consideration of "private", the boundary between public and private is clearly divided, the supremacy of money replaces the warm human touch, the psychology of comparison is enhanced, and the psychological imbalance caused by jealousy eventually leads to weak human affection among villagers, and then competition and mutual suspicion, distrust of each other, and collective action loses endogenous power. In the process of raising funds for the construction of red grape greenhouses, the lack of trust among the villagers led to an increase in the villagers' distrust of the township cadres, which in turn led to the villagers' skepticism about the government's policy decisions. Regarding the emergence of the new term "party building + cooperatives" in grassroots governance, grassroots cadres have repeatedly explained the policy, and cited the successful experience of similar practices in J province, H province and B city, but the villagers still have a resistance mentality. Township and town cadres had no choice but to visit door to door, organize party members of various branches to carry out policy propaganda, village secretaries and party members and cadres took the lead in taking shares, and spent nearly four months answering the villagers' policy doubts. The reason is that, on the one hand, the villagers have a natural sense of distrust of the township cadres, believing that the township cadres "cannot afford to be early", and the construction of red grape greenhouses must have ulterior motives and profits, and they are afraid that the savings they have saved will be "wasted", and they are always unwilling to come up with funds to develop village collective industrial projects; On the other hand, many villagers only care about their personal interests and do not consider collective interests, and are eager to "free ride" to take advantage, resulting in the dilemma of collective action. As a result, township and town cadres are faced with many restrictive factors at the perceptual level in carrying out their work.

2. The lack of norms has led to the blurring of the boundaries of the work of township cadres.

As a means to promote villagers' autonomy and an authoritative governance method, village rules and conventions are between formal and informal systems, and have become indispensable internally driven norms, which are of great significance for restraining villagers' behaviors, improving the rural legal system, and promoting the modernization of grassroots governance system and governance capacity. In rural areas, information is blocked, the young population is greatly lost, the problems of "hollowing" and "empty-nesting" are serious, the villagers' education level is generally low, the knowledge level is limited, and it is impossible to form effective governance guidelines and determine them in written form, and there are very few social rules that really play a role. Although in recent years, with the help of cadres stationed in the village and the selection and transfer of students, Y Town has formulated regulations on the self-management of villagers, which stipulate the maintenance of infrastructure, agricultural production, and changing customs, most of these regulations exist in the countryside for a short time, and when the term of office of the village-based cadres expires, the regulations are difficult to continue. The construction of red grape greenhouses requires renting farmers' land, but the grassroots affairs are complicated, the people's cultural level is limited, and the way of thinking is limited, which is difficult to explain clearly in policy language, which exacerbates the cost of communication between cadres and masses in rural society. The villagers are jealous, ignoring the objective facts of the existence of the land, and only want to use the policy gap to fight for their own interests. Many villagers seized the opportunity to visit the township and town cadres many times to ask for explanations, demanding that the government must pay rent for the occupation of the land, and refuse to allow the land to be occupied without compensation, resulting in the inability of the township and town cadres to organize and carry out follow-up work. Due to the uneven quality of the land, the variety of crops planted, and the large gap in land harvests, the lack of social norms that can be followed in the compensation of township and town cadres as appropriate, whether it is according to the land area or according to economic income, will be opposed by non-beneficiaries, and the remarks such as "why is the same land area as mine, his rent is more than mine" and so on are endless, and the lack of social norms has made the work of township and town cadres more difficult.

3. The complex relationship leads to excessive consumption of the work of township cadres.

The relationship network is supported by a kinship similar to the nature of "concentric circle ripples", and each person is the core of the circle of social influence, and the relationship will be generated when the circle is affected by the ripples of the circle. Township cadres, village "two committees", cadres stationed in the village, and villagers respectively take themselves as the center of the circle to push outward to form waves, forming small interest groups, trying to seek more benefits for their groups in the construction of red grape greenhouses. For example, as far as the question of who the township cadres choose to participate in the management of the greenhouse, the villagers all take advantage of their kinship to establish relationships with the township leaders and village leaders who are responsible for related matters, and even give them gifts, so as to get the opportunity to be selected to participate in the construction and management of the greenhouse. Township and town cadres not only need to weigh the relationship between all parties, reduce conflicts of interest, and avoid intensifying contradictions between cadres and the masses and affecting the follow-up work, but also select suitable candidates according to the nature of the work and the actual situation, so as to ensure that the work is carried out normally, and the work burden is self-evident.

Individual social capital fuels the relationship network, which exacerbates the complexity of network relationships. For example, in the process of operation of the Y Town Industrial Park, the complex interpersonal network made Xiao Xing, a cadre in other places, miserable. Xiao Xing is the township cadre in charge of the daily operation of the industrial park, Huang, the deputy mayor of Y Town, is Xiao Xing's direct leader, and the "hero" who directly contributed to the implementation of the industrial park project is Bao Mou, the first secretary of the village. On the one hand, Xiao Xing has the typical characteristics of young township cadres, high education, shallow qualifications, and unfamiliar with the environment. On the other hand, he had to deal with the delicate interpersonal relationships that arose from the local people. The picking of grapes in the 17 greenhouses in the industrial park was completed by two teams, the team leaders were villagers Lin (a distant cousin of Bao Mou, the first secretary of the village) and Wang (the uncle of Huang Mou, the deputy mayor of Y Town). One night, the door of the greenhouse was not closed, resulting in the freezing of red grapes and serious losses, Lin and Wang said that it was the work mistakes of the employees managed by the other party, resulting in the loss of assets, and finally quarreled, and even fists and feet. This matter had an extremely bad impact in the process of attracting investment, and the superior leaders asked Xiao Xing, the cadre in charge, to deal with the matter, and Xiao Xing let the two parties communicate face-to-face in line with the principle of fairness, but Lin and Wang did not take him into account because Xiao Xing was young and inexperienced, and refused to cooperate with the mediation, which made Xiao Xing at a loss for a while. After that, Mayor Huang and Secretary Bao called Xiao Xing separately, hoping that he would take care of his relatives when dealing with it. Xiao Xing, a cadre in a different place, faced the double pressure of interpersonal relationships and disagreements from superiors at work.

Fourth, the path of governance: countermeasures and suggestions to solve the dilemma of the work burden of township cadres

(1) Endogenous burden reduction: build social trust and cultivate public value

The establishment of rural social capital calls for cooperation, and a stable and continuous trust relationship is the basis for the cooperation of various stakeholders, and it is also the basic condition for the orderly operation of capital. From the perspective of the work content of township cadres and the development direction of rural revitalization, the construction of social trust includes multiple levels. First, it is necessary to build the political trust of members of society in the township government. The government should establish a good image, strive to build a service-oriented government in the new era, and make government affairs, village affairs open, and financial matters open and transparent. It is necessary to be good at making use of the advantages of the township sages, and give full play to the organizational ability and emotional appeal ability of the township talents. In the face of neighborhood disputes, major and minor affairs, let the village sages assist the grassroots cadres to mediate together, shorten the distance between the cadres and the masses, and let the village sages become a good intermediary. It is necessary to innovate work methods and methods, use rural methods to solve rural problems, strengthen the liaison between cadres and the masses, implement a system of condolences for important New Year's holidays, frequently visit and comfort poor veteran party members, communicate more with retired grassroots cadres, and accumulate social support. Second, build internal trust among members of rural society. The qualities of unity, goodness, mutual assistance and cooperation are the spiritual veins of the survival of the Chinese nation, but with the penetration of material capital and the asymmetry of access to information, the villagers are jealous and emotionally indifferent. In order to alleviate the dilemma of the work burden of township and town cadres, it is necessary to promote the construction of political trust on the basis of mutual trust among members. Third, it is necessary to build interpersonal trust between township and town cadres and villagers. Trust is the operating logic of two-way interaction, which not only needs bottom-up trust, but also needs top-down trust, and it is necessary to establish a community of trust between cadres and villagers, and eliminate the estrangement between cadres and the masses, so as to improve the villagers' recognition of the policy and support the work of township cadres to the greatest extent.

(2) Institutional burden reduction: Integrate social norms and provide institutional safeguards

As a form of contract for neighbors and villagers to achieve the purpose of common cooperation, mutual relief and mutual benefit through mutual exhortation, the construction of social norms such as village rules and conventions effectively connects the state power and the grassroots society, and can effectively make up for the shortcomings of the lack of rationality and technical governance sensibility of flexible governance. Improving the system of social norms is not to completely eliminate the original social rules that exist in the countryside, but to take the essence and remove the dross, on the basis of taking its essence and removing its dross, with the help of the authority and legitimacy of state power to carry out rational innovation and transformation, increase the elements required for the operation of the organizational structure at the section level, and infiltrate the will of the state into the grassroots society in a standardized form. First of all, it is necessary to promote the coordinated development of social norms with laws and regulations, civilized customs, and cultural models. Policies such as the Regulations of the Communist Party of China on the Work of Rural Grassroots Organizations and the Work Plan for the Special Governance of Outstanding Problems in Key Areas of Rural Changing Customs such as High-priced Bride Prices and Large-scale Operations have been promulgated one after another, providing externally-driven norms for the development of township work. In view of the improvement of the living environment, safety management, the cultivation of family style, land disputes, and other stubborn diseases inherent in rural areas, it is also necessary to formulate corresponding restraint mechanisms in accordance with local conditions, so that township and town cadres can have laws and regulations to follow when handling corresponding affairs. Second, it is necessary to intensify the popularization of the law in rural areas and cultivate villagers' thinking on the rule of law. At present, in order to fulfill the political task of popularizing the law, many localities have put up on the walls the rural laws and regulations and the regulations on villagers' self-government organizations, but most of the villagers have turned a blind eye to them and ignored them, and eventually they will inevitably be reduced to a formality. It is necessary to earnestly enhance the villagers' awareness of the rules, internalize the rules in their hearts, reduce the cost of communication between township and town cadres and villagers, narrow the gap between education and thinking, and then reduce the resistance of township and town cadres to carry out their work.

(3) Cooperative burden reduction: optimize the relationship network and build a solid social foundation

In the process of grassroots governance, township cadres are the bridge between the government and the public, and the "lubricant" for the orderly operation of society, which is of great significance for effectively expanding social networks and benignly enhancing social capital. The efficiency of township and town cadres in the process of policy implementation is constrained by the operation of the relationship network, so it is necessary to optimize the relationship network and improve the operation mechanism of the social network. On the one hand, it is necessary to strengthen the leading role of party building, enhance the internal cohesion of the team, and provide strong backing for the work of township and town cadres. Solidly carry out party building to lead rural revitalization, give full play to the role of party organizations as a fighting fortress and the vanguard and exemplary role of party members, build a network system with towns, villages, and groups as units, and form a work pattern of grasping level by level and implementation at all levels. Strictly control the selection and employment of personnel, realize the "one drop and one rise" in age and education, strengthen the management of selected cadres, and inject vitality into grassroots governance and rural revitalization. On the other hand, it is necessary to strengthen emotional maintenance, enhance the emotional identity of rural social members with emotional mobilization, and reduce the work resistance of township and town cadres.

(4) Initiative to reduce burden: improve their own ability and accumulate social capital

The vast number of township and town cadres should take multiple measures at the same time, improve their own capabilities, adopt reasonable methods to resolve their work burdens, and accumulate benign individual capital. First, it is necessary to maintain the original intention of serving the people, lay a good foundation for the masses, take the mass line, improve one's self-cultivation and correct ideological attitude through theoretical study, and then establish a correct outlook on political achievements, so as to avoid impetuousness in work and become a lying cadre. The second is to be diligent in practice and constantly improve work ability in practice. Experience is the prerequisite for township and town cadres to do a good job in grassroots work, and experience needs to be accumulated in practice; only by combining theory with practice and deepening their understanding of theoretical knowledge in practice can they improve their ability to do things and work efficiently. The third is to strengthen psychological construction and avoid professional burnout. The grassroots level is a platform for young cadres to grow into talents and to succeed in their work, and busy, tired, and stressful are the normal state of township and town work, and township and town cadres should appropriately lower their psychological expectations, actively respond to the challenges of the grassroots level, and do a good job in mass work in a down-to-earth manner.

Original title: A Logical Study on the Formation of the Work Burden of Township and Township Cadres: Based on the Explanation of the Attenuation of Rural Social Capital

Fund: National Social Science Foundation of China Youth Project, "Research on the Evaluation of the Operational Effect of the Dynamic Interface Mechanism between Normalized Management and Emergency Management in Urban Communities" (No.: 22CZZ018)

About author:GU Aihua (1958—), female, professor and doctoral supervisor of Liaoning University, research direction is national governance and administrative ethics; Wang Zeng (1997—), female, master's degree candidate of Liaoning University, research direction is grassroots governance and civil service system.

Source: Leadership Science

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