The border general has a heavy army, why are few people rebelling? Those conditions must be met for a rebellion
In ancient China, the position of border generals played a pivotal role. They guard the frontier, defend against foreign enemies, have heavy troops, and have a lot of power. However, throughout history, there have been very few border generals who have really succeeded in rebellion. An Lushan in the Anshi Rebellion, Zhao Kuangyin in the yellow robe, and Wu Sangui in the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, although these names are loud, they are only a few waves in the long river of history. Why do few border generals with such great strength choose to betray the imperial court? Is loyalty at work, or is something else at play? If the border generals want to rebel, what conditions do they need to have? Let's peel back the veil on history and find out.
1. The special status of the border generals
In the ancient Chinese military system, the border generals occupied a pivotal position. They are not only military generals, but also the supreme commanders of a region, shouldering the heavy responsibility of defending the country against foreign enemies. This special status stems from the importance of the border pass in the ancient national defense system, and is also reflected in the power and responsibility of the border general.
First of all, from the point of view of military importance, the border pass is the forward line of defense of the country. In the Han Dynasty, for example, the famous four counties of Hexi were established to defend against the Xiongnu. The general of the border pass commanded the troops stationed in these areas and became the first line of defense against foreign enemies. They need to be ready to respond to a possible war, so they are given considerable military decision-making power. For example, Huo Quzhi, a famous general of the Han Dynasty, led his army to attack the Xiongnu many times and achieved outstanding results.
Second, from the point of view of political sensitivity, the status of the border general is directly related to the security and stability of the country. Not only do they have to deal with the threat of external enemies, but they also have to deal with relations with surrounding ethnic minorities. This requires that the border generals must not only have outstanding military talents, but also possess superb diplomatic wisdom. Yang Ye, a famous general of the Northern Song Dynasty, successfully resisted the Khitan invasion with his military skills and diplomatic skills, and made a significant contribution to the security of the Northern Song Dynasty.
In addition, the border generals also need to find a balance between power and responsibility. On the one hand, they have a lot of military resources at their disposal and have the power to mobilize troops; On the other hand, they are also responsible for the security of the frontier. This special status of combining power and responsibility makes Border Pass University the focus of the imperial court. Take Qi Jiguang of the Ming Dynasty as an example, he made great achievements in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, but at the same time, he was also suspicious of the imperial court because of his heavy army.
The special status of border generals is also reflected in the fact that they often need to have all-round talents. In addition to military talent, they also need to have managerial skills and political wisdom. For example, the famous Tang Dynasty general Zhang Rengan not only made achievements in military affairs, but also was quite effective in governing the frontier. During his tenure in the Anxi Protectorate, he not only resisted the attacks of the Tibetans, but also maintained the Tang Dynasty's rule in the Western Regions by properly handling relations with the surrounding ethnic groups.
However, the special status of the border generals is also often accompanied by great risks. If they make a mistake or are suspected of infidelity, they can face severe punishment. The famous Tang Dynasty general Li Guangbi is a typical example. He performed outstanding feats in the Anshi Rebellion, but was eventually demoted because he was suspected of having dissenting intentions. Such examples are not uncommon in history and reflect the complexity of the status of border generals.
In general, the special status of the border generals is a double-edged sword. They wield enormous power and influence, but at the same time faced intense surveillance and high vigilance from the imperial court. This special status is not only a stage for them to make contributions, but also a battlefield for them to walk in difficulty. It is this complex status that has made the border generals play an extremely important and controversial role in history.
2. The imperial court's means of controlling the border generals
Aware of the potential threat posed by the heavy armies of the border generals, successive imperial courts developed a series of elaborate means of control to ensure the loyalty of these generals. These means reflect both the wisdom of the rulers and the complexity of the ancient centralized system.
The first means of control is the appointment of cronies. The imperial court usually chose a close or blood relative of the emperor to serve as a border general to ensure his loyalty. This strategy has been seen throughout history. For example, Li Shimin, Taizong of the Tang Dynasty, appointed his cousin Li Daozong as the governor of Liangzhou to lead the northwest frontier. Li Daozong lived up to his trust, repelled the invasions of Tuyuhun many times, and made a significant contribution to the security of the northwest of the Tang Dynasty. This practice not only ensured the loyalty of the border generals, but also strengthened the royal family's control over the army.
However, relying on cronies alone is not enough to fully control the border generals. Therefore, the imperial court will also set up a supervising army as another guarantee. The military supervisor is usually a civilian officer, who is responsible for supervising the military operations and administrative affairs of the border generals. This system was widely used during the Tang Dynasty. A well-known example is that during the reign of Emperor Xuanzong of the Tang Dynasty, Yang Guozhong was sent to Fan Yang Jiedu in An Lushan to serve as a supervisor. Although Yang Guozhong's prison army did not stop An Lushan's rebellion, the existence of this system did limit the power of the border generals to a certain extent.
Controlling the supply of grain and grass was another important means for the imperial court to control the border generals. Border areas are often remote and have limited self-sufficiency, and most of them rely on the central government for food and grass supplies. By controlling the supply of grain and grass, the imperial court could effectively control the lifeblood of the border army. The Great Wall defense line of the Ming Dynasty is a typical example. Through the "nine-border" system, the imperial court transported grain and grass to various border fortresses, which not only ensured the supply of border troops, but also made it impossible for these troops to escape the control of the central government.
In addition, the family hostage system was also an effective means for the imperial court to control the border generals. The imperial court would require the families of border generals to remain in the capital as a guarantee of their loyalty. This system was already in place in the Han Dynasty, and it was even more mature in the Tang Dynasty. For example, despite his meritorious service to the famous Tang Dynasty general Guo Ziyi, his family was always left in Chang'an, which limited his freedom of movement to a certain extent.
The imperial court also used regular rotation to prevent the border generals from accumulating too much power. This practice was particularly common in the Ming and Qing dynasties. For example, the "nine-sided" system of the Ming Dynasty stipulated that the term of office of a border general generally did not exceed three years. This not only prevented the generals from forming alliances with the local forces, but also prevented them from disagreeing with each other for a long time.
In addition, the imperial court will also adopt a strategy of division and disintegration, and set up multiple military units in the border areas to contain each other. For example, in the early days of the Tang Dynasty's festival envoy system, multiple festival envoys were set up in the same area to prevent a single festival envoy from sitting large. Although this practice weakened the overall strength of the border defense to a certain extent, it effectively reduced the risk of rebellion by the border generals.
The imperial court will also use the honor system to win the hearts of border generals. Meritorious generals and high-ranking officials are given generous gifts, and even special titles are given, such as "Great General", "Protector of the Country", etc. This practice not only satisfied the vanity of the generals, but also strengthened their sense of belonging to the imperial court. For example, the famous Tang general Li Jing was made "Duke of United Kingdom" for pacifying the Eastern Turks, which was not only an affirmation of his military talent, but also a means for the imperial court to win over the hearts of the people.
In general, the imperial court's control over the border generals was a multi-level and all-round systematic project. From personnel appointments to material supply, from system design to honor incentives, the imperial court has carefully planned and strived to firmly control the border generals in their own hands. The use of these means of control largely explains why there have been so few successful border generals in history.
3. The difficulties of the rebellion of the border generals
Despite the fact that the border generals had heavy troops, in practice it was not easy to rebel. They faced many difficulties and challenges, and together these factors formed an invisible barrier, making it difficult for most border generals to take action, even if they had the intention of rebellion.
First of all, the disadvantage of geographical location is the most direct obstacle to the rebellion of the border generals. Border areas are often located on the periphery of the country, far from the political center and economic hinterland. This geographical disadvantage means not only a lag in the transfer of information, but also a difficulty in obtaining resources. In the Tang Dynasty, for example, although he had accumulated a large number of troops during his tenure as envoy to Fanyang Jiedu, when he decided to rebel, he still had to face a long march route. From Fanyang (present-day Beijing) to Luoyang, An Lushan's army had to travel nearly a thousand miles, which gave the Tang court enough time to organize its defenses.
Second, the challenge of military loyalty is a key issue that must be faced in the event of a rebellion by the border generals. Although the border generals led the army, it did not mean that all soldiers would unconditionally follow them in rebellion. Many soldiers may have hesitated out of loyalty to the imperial court, longing for their homeland, or simply the uncertainty of the future. History is full of examples of armies defecting at critical moments. For example, during the Huangchao Uprising at the end of the Tang Dynasty, Zhu Wen was originally a subordinate of Huangchao, but later led the army to surrender to the Tang Dynasty and became the main force to suppress the Huangchao Uprising. This example speaks volumes about the uncertainty of military loyalty.
The logistical dilemma is another problem that cannot be ignored. Once the decision was made to rebel, the general lost supplies from the imperial court and had to rely on his own reserves and plundering along the way to keep the army running. However, long-term military operations require continuous and stable logistical support, which is a huge challenge for rebels who have broken away from the imperial system. Li Zicheng's rebel army in the late Ming Dynasty quickly ran into a supply dilemma after capturing Beijing, and was eventually defeated by the Qing army, which is a typical example.
The lack of political legitimacy was also an important obstacle for the border generals to rebel. In traditional Chinese political culture, the concept of divine authority of the monarch is deeply rooted. If he is to gain broad support, he will need to find a convincing reason to justify his actions. However, compared to the peasant uprising leaders, who could use the banner of "doing the right thing for heaven", the border generals often lacked such political legitimacy. Even Zhao Kuangyin, who successfully usurped the throne, had to make up the story of "yellow robe" to put a layer of legitimacy on his actions.
In addition, the rebellion of the border generals also had to face strong pressure from the forbidden army. Successive dynasties would deploy elite forbidden armies around Gyeonggi as the last barrier to defend imperial power. These forbidden troops were not only well-equipped and well-trained, but also extremely loyal. The Sixteen Guards of the Tang Dynasty and the Governor's Mansion of the Five Armies of the Ming Dynasty are all such elite divisions. If the border generals want to succeed in rebellion, they must have the ability to defeat these forbidden troops, which undoubtedly greatly increases the difficulty of rebellion.
The rebellion of the border generals also faced a lack of potential allies. Due to their long presence on the frontiers, they often lacked strong supporters within the imperial court. In contrast, civil officials who came from large families or entered the imperial examination often had an extensive network of contacts in the court. This isolated situation made it difficult for the border generals to find a reliable internal response when planning a rebellion, and increased the risk of action.
Finally, the border generals will also have to face competition and threats from other military forces. In the event of a rebellion, they will not only have to confront the imperial forces, but may also face other ambitious warlords. This situation of multi-party game has greatly increased the uncertainty and risk of rebellion. Taking the period of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms as an example, the frequent battles between the envoys of various regions fully illustrate this point.
To sum up, although the rebellion of the border generals seems to have the advantage of troops, they are actually facing multiple difficulties and challenges. Together, these factors constitute a formidable resistance, making it difficult for most border generals to carry out their actions, even if they have the intention of rebellion. It is precisely these objective difficulties that, to a large extent, explain why it is so rare in history to successfully rebel border generals.
Fourth, the famous case of the rebellion of the border generals in history
Despite the many difficulties faced by the rebellion of the border generals, there are still some successful or influential cases of rebellion in history. These cases not only changed the course of Chinese history, but also provided us with a window into the complex relationship between the border generals and the central government.
The An Lushan Rebellion is undoubtedly the most famous case of rebellion by border generals. An Lushan was originally a border general relied on by Tang Xuanzong, controlling the three towns of Fanyang, Pinglu and Hedong, with more than 150,000 troops. An Lushan took advantage of Tang Xuanzong's trust in him to gradually expand his military strength and accumulate rebel strength. In the fourteenth year of Tianbao (755), An Lushan rebelled in the name of "Qingjun side". He led his army south, and soon occupied Luoyang and established the Dayan regime. Although the rebellion was eventually put down, it greatly weakened the Tang Dynasty and accelerated its decline. The outbreak of the An Lushan Rebellion exposed the failure of the Tang Dynasty's central control over the military forces on the frontier, and also revealed the potential danger of the expansion of the ambitions of the border generals.
Another noteworthy case is the rise of Shi Jingjiao, the founding emperor of the Jin Dynasty five generations later. Shi Jingjiao was originally the envoy of the Hedong Festival in the Later Tang Dynasty, and controlled important border defense points. After the death of Mingzong in the Later Tang Dynasty, the contradiction between Shi Jingjiao and the central government intensified. In order to fight against Zhuangzong of the Later Tang Dynasty, Shi Jingjiao did not hesitate to cede the sixteen states of Yanyun to the Khitan in exchange for military support. With the help of the Khitan, Shi Jingjiao successfully overthrew the Later Tang Dynasty and established the Later Jin Dynasty. This case illustrates how the border generals used external forces to achieve their own political ambitions, and also reflected the complex political game between the frontier and the Central Plains.
The case of Wu Sangui at the end of the Ming Dynasty illustrates the key role played by the Border Pass General in the change of dynasty. Wu Sangui, as a border general of the Ming Dynasty, was originally stationed at Shanhaiguan and was an important force to resist the southward movement of the Qing army. However, after Li Zicheng captured Beijing, Wu Sangui chose to take refuge in the Qing army, opened the Shanhai Pass, and assisted the Qing army in entering the customs. This decision led directly to the fall of the Ming Dynasty and the establishment of the Qing Dynasty. Although Wu Sangui's actions cannot simply be classified as a rebellion, he used his military strength to influence the fate of the entire dynasty, fully demonstrating the enormous power held by the border generals.
The rise of Zhu Wen (Later Liang Taizu) at the end of the Tang Dynasty is also a typical case of rebellion by border generals. Zhu Wen was initially only a minor general in the Huangchao rebel army, but later surrendered to the Tang Dynasty and was entrusted with important tasks. He gradually amassed power, eventually taking control of a vast area north of the Yellow River. At the time of the decline of the Tang Dynasty, Zhu Wen took the opportunity to depose Tang Zhaozong, established himself as emperor, and founded the Later Liang Dynasty. Zhu Wen's example shows how a border general went from a rebel general to the throne, reflecting the complex path of a border general to power in turbulent times.
Although Yang Ye of the Song Dynasty did not rebel, his experience reflected the central government's suspicion of the border generals. Yang Ye was a famous general in the early years of the Northern Song Dynasty and made many achievements in the war with the Liao State. However, it was precisely because of his talent and prestige that Song Taizong had doubts. In the end, Yang Ye was sent to a dangerous place during the Yongxi Northern Expedition, which led to the defeat and capture of the army, and the guest died in a foreign land. Although Yang Ye's tragedy is not a case of rebellion, it reflects the vigilance and control of the central government over the border generals.
In addition, the secession of feudal towns in the late Tang Dynasty can also be regarded as a form of collective rebellion by border generals. For example, Wu Yuanji, the envoy of the Huaixi Jiedu, and Wang Chengzong, the envoy of the Chengde Jiedu, although they were still nominally under the jurisdiction of the Tang Dynasty, had in fact become the princes of the separatist side, openly disobeying the central government's decrees. This phenomenon reflected the overall relaxation of the central government's control over the frontiers, and also laid the groundwork for the warlord melee of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms.
Although these cases occurred in different historical periods, they all reflect the tension between the border generals and the central power. Their successful or failed rebellion not only affected the course of Chinese history, but also provided valuable historical material for us to understand the political and military structure of ancient China.
5. The control strategy of the dynasties over the border generals
In the face of the potential threat of border generals, successive dynasties developed a series of control strategies to maintain the authority of the central government and prevent border rebellions. These strategies reflect both the wisdom of the central government and the complex political ecology of ancient China.
The first control strategy is the deployment of personnel. The central government usually regularly mobilizes border generals to prevent them from being stationed in one place for a long time and accumulating too much local power. Taking the Tang Dynasty as an example, during the Xuanzong period, the policy of "separating generals and soldiers" was implemented, stipulating that military generals should not serve for more than three years. This policy effectively limits the possibility of military generals sitting on the throne. However, with the outbreak of the Anshi Rebellion, this policy became unsustainable, and the frontier jiedu gradually became hereditary warlords, leading to the formation of a situation of feudal towns in the late Tang Dynasty.
Another commonly used strategy is divide and conquer. The central power usually has multiple military units in the border areas to contain each other. For example, the Ming Dynasty set up nine military towns in the nine-border region, each of which was led by a different general, which could not only jointly defend against foreign enemies, but also supervise each other to prevent a single general from having too much power. This strategy reduces the likelihood of a rebellion by the border generals to a certain extent, but it may also lead to a decrease in the efficiency of military command.
The supervision system is another important means for the central government to control the border generals. Successive dynasties would send supervisors or imperial historians to the frontier areas to supervise the actions of the border generals. For example, although the Jiedu envoys of the Tang Dynasty had great military power, the central government would still send observer envoys or military supervision envoys to supervise. These supervision officials were not only responsible for supervising the military operations of the border generals, but also regularly reported the situation in the border areas to the imperial court, and became an important channel for the central authorities to understand and control the border areas.
Imperial checks and balances are also a common control strategy. Emperors of previous dynasties usually deliberately cultivated multiple border generals of equal strength to check and balance each other. For example, in the last years of the Ming Dynasty, Emperor Chongzhen relied on many border generals such as Wu Sangui and Hong Chengchou at the same time, trying to maintain the authority of the central government through the balance between them. However, this strategy can also lead to disunity in military operations and even lead to contradictions between generals.
Economic control is another important means used by the central government to control the border generals. The central government controlled the salaries and supply of goods to limit the independence of the border generals. For example, the "system" system in the Song Dynasty limited the autonomy of border generals through the direct management of border materials by the central government. However, this strategy may also lead to the weakening of border defense forces, such as in the late Northern Song Dynasty, due to the excessive control of border defense resources by the central government, resulting in insufficient strength of border guards to effectively resist the invasion of Jin soldiers.
The strategy of "raising troops for a thousand days and using them for a while" was also adopted by some wise emperors. They will deliberately give important military tasks to the border generals, so that they can concentrate their energy on foreign operations and have no time to care about internal politics. For example, Zhu Di, the ancestor of the Ming Dynasty, through many northern expeditions, not only gave full play to the military talents of the border generals, but also consumed their strength, effectively preventing potential rebellions.
In addition, the entrapment strategy is also a common tactic used by the central government. By bestowing high officials with generous gifts, rewarding land, or other privileges, the loyalty of the border generals was encouraged. For example, Tang Xuanzong's trust and reuse of An Lushan was a kind of entrapment strategy, although it backfired in the end. While this strategy can gain the support of the wingmen in the short term, it can also fuel their ambitions and sow hidden dangers.
It is worth noting that some dynasties also adopted more aggressive control strategies. For example, after Qin Shi Huang unified the six countries, he adopted the policy of "collecting the world's troops and gathering them in Xianyang", concentrated on destroying weapons in various places, and effectively prevented local forces from gaining momentum. However, this extreme centralization can also lead to the weakening of border defenses and increase the risk of foreign invasion.
In general, the control strategies of successive dynasties over border generals reflect the complex game between the central and local governments, and between civil officials and military generals. The success and failure of these strategies not only affected the stability of the frontier, but also determined the rise and fall of the entire dynasty to a large extent. With the changes of the times, these control strategies are also constantly evolving and adjusting, reflecting the evolution of ancient Chinese political wisdom with the times.