This article was originally published in the February 2023 issue of "Weapons" magazine, and was reprinted with a second refinement of the content, editing, and supplementing some illustrations to share with colleagues. Personally, I think that "Weapons" is a professional and objective military magazine, and it is recommended to subscribe continuously to enrich one's military and political knowledge. Although most of the articles that are digitally saved and reprinted at home magazines are older, they are enough to provide ordinary netizens with professional military knowledge, and second, they want readers to examine things and opinions from a more unique perspective.
Engage the "Ghost Target".
On that dark, moonless, damp night of August 4th, something extraordinary seemed to ensue. "Maddox" received the latest information from naval intelligence that "an attack by gunboats / torpedo boats is imminent." At 20:40, the "Maddox" reported to the command of the 7th Fleet that she was tracking "unidentified targets."
The two United States destroyers were in waters more than 80 nautical miles from the coastline of North Vietnam, and the approaching ships appeared to be approaching the U.S. ship from multiple directions, some from the northeast and some from the southwest, while there seemed to be targets in the east. The suspicious target disappeared for a time, and then reappeared, and it was said that the silhouette of the torpedo boat could be analyzed from the radar screen.
The North Vietnamese torpedo boats waited for an opportunity in the coastal waters, which made the US ships quite fearful.
When the 7th Fleet command asked the Maddox to report exactly what it had seen, the latter said the targets were two "skunks" and three "yokai" — in the United States Navy's terminology system, "skunks" means surface contact, while "yokai" refers to air contact.
By this time, Colonel Herrick on the "Maddox" was convinced that the North Vietnamese torpedo boats were attacking again, and he demanded that the two destroyers enter a state of engagement, and at the same time called on the aircraft carrier "Ticonderoga" to send carrier-based aircraft to the aid as he had done last time. In the period that followed, the "Maddox" and "Turner·Joy" began high-speed maneuvers intended to evade enemy attacks. However, the target signals that appear during this period are rather bizarre: the "Youkai" disappears for a while, and the "Skunk" can still be tracked; Then, the surface contact also disappeared.
The United States destroyer changed its course to south-southeast, and the "monster" never appeared again, and the "skunk" seemed to appear from time to time. At 9:08 p.m., the radar crew of the "Maddox" reported that it had locked on to a target 13 nautical miles away from the southwest and was approaching at a high speed of more than 30 knots. At 21:31, this seemingly definite point of contact disappeared from the radar screen of the "Maddox". However, just three minutes later, sonar crews claimed to have found targets in another direction, and the search radar of the Turner · Joy made similar findings.
Tensions intensified, and when the sonar crew of the "Maddox" reported that the newly discovered target was less than 3 nautical miles from the ship, Herrick and Ogier agreed that it was a North Vietnamese torpedo boat about to launch a torpedo, so the "Maddox" took the lead in firing at the target.
Schematic diagram of the battle between the US ships and the "North Vietnamese torpedo boats" on the night of August 4
The Turner · Joy followed suit and began firing guns. However, the targets "locked" by the two destroyers were in different directions, so the two ships fought separately. The target of the "Maddox" bombardment then disappeared at a distance of about 5 nautical miles, while the target of the "Turner · Joey" suddenly disappeared as it approached 2 nautical miles.
It's not over. Soon, the sonar soldier of the "Maddox", who was unusually busy this night, made a new discovery at 22:01, it should be a rushing torpedo! So the United States destroyer entered a state of evasion while resuming firepower.
For a time, the Beibu Gulf was bustling. The United States destroyer recorded engagements including: main gun fire, automatic weapons fire, multiple torpedo attacks, observation of torpedo trails, enemy ship cockpit lights and searchlight illumination, and extensive surface contact with radar. By the time the United States destroyers' "counterattack" operations stopped, the two warships had fired 249 rounds of 127-mm shells and 123 rounds of 76.2-mm shells, as well as dropped between four and five depth charges.
Carrier-based planes from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga had already arrived, and several A-4 Skyhawk attack planes had arrived in formation, and the pilots dropped flares on the water, but could not find any trace of the attackers on the surface. And on the "Maddox", the last radar contact with the "Skunk" disappeared at 23:35.
A-144 attack aircraft of the VA-4 squadron belonging to the aircraft carrier "Ticonderoga" patrol the area of the Gulf of Tonkin area
In addition to the Sky Eagle pilots, Lieutenant Colonel Stockdale, the leader of the VF-51 squadron, was also on the plane again, and due to a malfunction of his wingman, he rushed to the scene of the incident alone before 22 o'clock. For more than 90 minutes, Stockdale flew at a low altitude of about 600 meters to search for North Vietnamese torpedo boats on a course roughly equal to that of the destroyers, but found nothing. The squadron leader later reported: "I was in the best position to watch this incident, and our destroyer was just firing at a 'ghost target.'" There are no speedboats there...... Nothing but the pitch-black waters and the fire of United States warships. ”
Stockdale, the leader of the VF-51 carrier-based aircraft squadron, felt that he had seen nothing on the night of August 4.
"Confusing picture"
Admiral Herrick sent his first operational report to his superiors "in the course of the battle", clearly claiming that he had been attacked, and that he had taken the trouble of saying that two North Vietnamese torpedo boats had been sunk by artillery fire.
However, before the "engagement" was completely over, Herrick himself began to suspect the attack, realizing that the "attack of enemy boats" could be a reflection of "overzealous sonar operators" and poor performance of the equipment. The "Maddox" reported a number of torpedo attacks, but Herrick believed that the anomalous signal picked up by the sonar crew may have been the sound of the destroyer's propeller wake reflecting off the rudder surface during a sharp turn.
In addition, although the Maddox kept firing guns, the destroyer's gun commander never locked on to any targets, which led Herrick to speculate that the target detected by the radar may have been the waves of the storm.
"Maddox" is armed with three Mk38 twin 127-mm high-level dual-purpose naval guns
At 1:27 a.m. on Aug. 5, hours after the attack, Herrick sent a highest-priority telegram to Pacific Command in Hawaii. The commander of the 192nd destroyer detachment claimed that he could not determine the accuracy of the operational reports he had previously sent.
"A comprehensive review of multiple target contact reports and suspected torpedo launches has resulted in questionable results," Herrick reported. Unusual weather has affected radar and sonar operators, which may have contributed to the exposure report. The Maddox has no actual visual contact with the target. It is recommended that a full assessment be carried out before any further action is taken. ”
However, at 2:48 p.m., Admiral Sharp, who was in Hawaii, received another report from Herrick. This time, Herrick changed his statement, which was said to be his "correction" after consulting with the two captains and a number of officers.
The new report said, "It can be established that the initial attack was real." The details of the operation presented a confusing picture, listening to eyewitnesses who saw the lights of the speedboat's cockpit or similar signs near the 'Maddox'. It has been observed that several torpedoes, and possibly the torpedo boat itself, approached the 'Maddox' on several occasions. It is currently impossible to estimate the number of enemy vessels involved, and there are reports of contacts that may have come from a miscalculation of the noise of the propellers of their own warships. The Turner · Joy reported two torpedoes slashing near her. ”
Schematic map of the location of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents on August 2 and August 4, 1964.
Before dawn, the two United States destroyers left the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin and went to join the other ships of the 7th Fleet. At the same time, field officers' reports are sent up the chain of command.
Viet Nam time was 12 hours ahead of United States Eastern Time, so the "attack" that occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin on the night of August 4 was later in the morning in Washington. Washington received a report from the Pacific Command at 13:27 pm on the 4th. The content of the report has created confusion among the United States leadership. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Military Command Center, the Pacific Command, and the Secretary of Defense began a frequent exchange of views around this "ghost war."
After lunch at the White House, President Johnson agreed with the consensus of his military and civilian advisers: successive "shameless attacks" in the Gulf of Tonkin prompted the U.S. military to take immediate retaliatory action. Johnson ordered a retaliatory air strike. However, when the ship's mother battle group began to prepare for this air raid, codenamed "Bayer", Zimiya became suspicious of the actual situation in the Beibu Gulf. So McNamara called Admiral Sharp at 16:08 Washington time on the 4th and asked the latter, "Is there a possibility that there was no attack"?
Sharp, who struggled to respond definitively, said there was a "slim possibility" that there was no attack, based on unusual radar echoes, inexperienced sonar crews, and no visual observation of torpedo wakes. But the admiral added that he was working to get more information and advised the White House to hold off on any orders for a retaliatory strike against North Vietnam until "we have a clear idea of what happened."
Shortly after the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Sharp, commander of the US Pacific Command, appeared on the cover of Time magazine.
Then, an important piece of "evidence" emerged. The intelligence station in Da Nang claimed to have intercepted a telegram from a North Vietnamese torpedo boat that read: "We have taken action in the war zone. We lost two of our comrades, but everyone else was fine. The enemy ship may have been damaged. It was a so-called intercept of unknown origin and unclear pointing, but it immediately became "a convincing piece of evidence."
At 5:23 p.m., Admiral Sharp called Washington, who was Air Force Lt. Gen. David · Butchner, the chief of the Joint Staff, who was at the National Military Command Center, and the two discussed the important "evidence" mentioned above, and Butchner said that the new intelligence "speaks more clearly than any report to date." Upon learning of the situation, Secretary of Defense McNamara immediately recognized the information and claimed that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had attacked United States warships again in the Gulf of Tonkin .
False pretexts
At 23:36 ET on August 4, United States, President Johnson made a televised address to the national public, announcing his intention to retaliate against North Vietnam: "The repeated acts of violence against the United States armed forces must be responded not only with vigilant defense, but with a positive response." As I address you tonight, such a response is ongoing. ”
Operation "Bayonet" was launched on the 5th. Squadron Leader Stockdale departed from the aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga and led 18 carrier-based aircraft to carry out an air strike on a fuel storage facility in Vinh. The air strike completely destroyed the oil depot, but two United States planes were shot down, one pilot was killed and the other became a prisoner. After his return, Stocktor bluntly said, "We will start a war under false pretenses." ”
An F-8 carrier-based plane flew over the aircraft carrier "Ticonderoga," and a large number of carrier-based planes were waiting to be released.
Stockdale is not alone in recognizing "falsehood". At a special meeting of the National Security Council on the afternoon of August 4, President Johnson asked CIA Director John · McCohen, "Are they trying to start a war by attacking our ships in the Gulf of Tonkin?" McCohen replied, based on the facts available at the time: "No, the North Vietnamese were responding defensively to our attacks on their offshore islands...... This attack sends us a signal that Hanoi has the will and determination to continue the military confrontation. ”
In fact, "our attack on its offshore islands" is very critical. For North Vietnam, it is impossible to view Operation 34A and the De Soto patrol as two separate operations. And McNamara, a key figure in the whole incident, knew very well that Operation 34A was likely the direct trigger for the attack on the Maddox on August 2 – an audio tape that was declassified in December 2005 showed that McNamara had admitted to President Johnson on August 3 that the two events were certainly linked.
At the time, the defense minister said: "Mr. President, I think I should, or rather we should, explain Operation 34A, these covert operations." There is no doubt that this has something to do with it. On Friday night, as you may know, we had 4 speedboats from South Vietnam, piloted by South Vietnamese soldiers or other nationals, attacking two islands, firing 1,000 rounds of various ammunition. We may have blown up a radar station and several other buildings. Twenty-four hours later, the destroyer ('Maddox') appeared in the same area, undoubtedly making them (North Vietnamese) link the two events. ”
The contents of Johnson's secret conversation with McNamara were declassified many years later.
However, what is extremely bad is that the defense secretary has since deliberately misled Congress and the public, creating an atmosphere of "innocent attack" on United States warships. When asked to testify on August 6 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Forces, McNamara did not answer truthfully and directly when asked to testify about whether Operation 34A might have triggered a military response from North Vietnam, but instead falsely claimed, "Our Navy was absolutely not involved, assisted, and unaware of any South Vietnamese operations." ”
Senator Wayne · Morse, who was present, apparently did not believe McNamara's statement, and he bluntly rebuked the latter: "If you try to give the impression that when South Vietnamese warships shelled two islands not far from the coastline of North Vietnam, we were not involved in the slightest, I think you are playing an international joke."
McNamara has since stuck to his "international joke." In his 2003 video memoir, The Fog of War, the former defense minister refused to apologize and even tried to whitewash his deception: "I learned early on that you should never answer the questions that others want you to answer, only the questions you want others to ask you." Frankly, I follow this rule. This is a very good rule. ”
Morse at the hearing questioned but his voice was weak, and the United States Congress was already filled with anger at the attack on the United States warship and calls for strong retaliation. On 7 August, the Senate voted 88 to 2 to pass the so-called Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Morse was one of only two opponents. The House of Representatives voted unanimously. The "resolution" was officially signed into law by President Johnson three days later.
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution came into force on August 10, 1964, when it was signed by United States President Johnson
Under the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the White House was granted broad freedom to use military force in Southeast Asia without a formal declaration of war. President Johnson is said to have rejoiced when he heard that the "resolution" had been passed in both houses, "The 'resolution' is like a grandmother's pajamas, it covers everything." ”
"I won't lose Viet Nam"
The incident in the Gulf of Tonkin and the subsequent response of the United States government were the dramatic beginning of a long and disastrous Viet Nam war for United States: the retaliatory air strikes of August 5 marked the first public military action by United States against North Vietnam, and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution opened the floodgates for the direct involvement of United States forces in Viet Nam fighting.
Although United States later had to swallow the bitter pill of defeat that frustrated them, in August 1964, policymakers in both the White House and the Pentagon were complacent about their strategic vision. In the view of Johnson and McNamara, a modest military commitment would be enough to force Hanoi into submission, and the Gulf of Tonkin incident provided a godsend for military force.
In order to promote the "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution" with strong offensive implications, the United States military spared no effort to provide a large amount of "first-hand evidence". In the aftermath of the Aug. 4 incident, civilian officials sent by McNamara to Subic Bay in the Philippines to investigate brought back "testimonies" from multiple eyewitnesses to the Seventh Fleet.
Former gun commander John · Barry, who was on duty on the deck of the "Turner · Joey" that night, and at least three other people all found "a torpedo trail"; After the ship launched a shelling, Captain Robert Jr. Lieutenant Commander Barnhardt observed "a thick puff of black smoke" rising not far away; Deputy Boatswain Donald. Shaki and four others witnessed "the silhouette of an attacking speedboat"; Lieutenant Commander Edmondson, a veteran pilot from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga, and his wingman, Admiral Burton, flew to the scene when they saw "a 'serpentine' high-speed wake." They claim that this is exactly what the torpedo boat is characteristic of its travel......
The USS Turner · Joy was donated as a museum ship in 1991 and opened to the public in United States Port of Bremerton, Washington.
And when the Chief of Staff of the 7th Fleet, Lloyd · Rear Admiral Vasay, questioned an experienced non-commissioned officer aboard the "Turner · Joy" if it was possible to mistake the dolphin trail for a torpedo's wake. The non-commissioned officer replied excitedly: "Sir, I have been on a destroyer for 15 years, and I know the difference between a dolphin and a torpedo wake. That's a torpedo! ”
The military's statements are naturally consistent with its eagerness to resort to force in Viet Nam. And United States military and government leaders have long shared the belief that North Vietnam has neither the will nor the ability to engage in an open showdown with the U.S. military, and that United States' military adventures in Southeast Asia will be twice as effective.
In the first half of 1964, United States Secretary of the Navy Paul Murphy . Nietzsche has publicly stated that "in the event that North Vietnam faces a joint attack by the United States Air Force and Navy, she will not have any illusions about the outcome of a military conflict." In other words, no matter what resistance the North Vietnamese put on, we will win in a relatively short time. Admiral Moore's opinion was: "We can drop bombs anywhere without punishment and without losing one or two aircraft." Another officer remembers hearing McNamara exclaim: "This is a completely different occasion, and we can win this little war with our hands tied behind our back!" ”
The "Beibu Gulf Resolution" opened the floodgates for United States to send troops to Viet Nam, and also plunged United States into the quagmire of war.
Historians have long suspected that the second attack on the Gulf of Tonkin never actually took place, but there is no evidence. More than 40 years later, in 2005 and 2006, the United States National Security Agency declassified nearly 200 documents, telephone and field tapes, oral history interviews, signals intelligence files, and a chronology of events compiled by the Department of Defense. A fact that researchers could not prove before has finally been revealed: the United States Navy ship did not suffer the so-called second attack on the Gulf of Tonkin attack!
According to the Ministry of National Defense files, on the night of August 2, the first attack, the NSA listening post had previously monitored a large number of North Vietnamese telecommunications, including VHF communications between ships, high-frequency communications between Hanoi and ships, and communication relays between regional naval bases. On the night of 4 August, however, no similar telecommunications were found, which would have been inconceivable for another attack. As for the telegram from the North Vietnamese torpedo boat, which was considered "a convincing piece of evidence," it was not fabricated, but the content of the telegram actually referred to the clash between the torpedo boat and the "Maddox" on 2 August, but the US side diverted it to the "second attack."
In the words of Robert · Hanyok, a historian at the United States National Security Agency, in his widely recognized research article, "Without reliable signals intelligence, the government's decision-making is based on the confusing and contradictory testimony and evidence of some of the people and equipment involved in the incident." ”
President Johnson himself is certainly aware of all this. A few days after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was passed, he said at the White House, "Hell, those damn stupid sailors are just shooting at Exocet." But he wanted to seize this "opportunity," an opportunity that would help him succeed in re-election, as he said to United States Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry · Cabot · Lodge shortly after he was sworn in: "I will not lose Viet Nam." ”
Thus, after a series of distortions, inducements and deceptions, the White House plunged United States into one of the longest and most costly large-scale conflicts in the country's history, with more than 58,000 United States soldiers losing their lives in Viet Nam.
In March 1965, United States Naval Task Force 77 turned around in formation in the South China Sea to launch an air offensive against North Vietnam.